Toplines
The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi published a video on September 7 showing himself calmly speaking in Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), demonstrating unchallenged Ukrainian control over that settlement contrary to Putin’s September 1 claims that Russian forces had seized it.[1] Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces comfortably control Svyatohirsk and that Ukraine considers the settlement to be in its “rear area.” ISW has observed evidence to assess that the closest Russian forces were 13 kilometers away from Svyatohirsk in late Spring/early Summer 2026, and numerous reports indicate that the current Russian line is even further away amidst ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. A Russian source published archival and doctored footage on September 5 purporting to show Russian control over Svyatohirsk, presumably to support Putin’s false claims, but a Russian milblogger responded to this footage on the same day and denied that Russian forces maintain positions even close to Svyatohirsk.[2]
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on September 7 that Biletskyi’s video was a clear demonstration of Ukrainian control over Svyatohirsk and observed that the Russian military command and the agencies responsible for Russian cognitive warfare efforts should have realized how easy it would be for Ukrainian forces to dispel Putin’s grossly exaggerated claims in this area.[3] The milblogger noted that false reports of captured settlements such as Svyatohirsk create operational risks for Russian forces because they cannot call for strikes on locations they claim to control and because units in adjacent sectors may plan operations based on this inaccurate battlefield picture. The milblogger noted that Russia’s failure to impose accountability for such dishonesty will increase deceptive reporting and may produce even strategic consequences.
The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces’ ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia’s negotiation position. Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the consequences of Russia’s pervasive culture of lying, which Russian milbloggers speak of as generating “beautiful reports” that exaggerate the extent of Russian advances so much that they harm military operations.[4] The Kremlin continues to insist, however, on its delusional depiction of the current battlefield as the basis for negotiations, demanding Ukraine’s full capitulation and its withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including large and heavily populated areas that Russian forces have never occupied.[5] Putin has shown that he is sensitive to the accusation that he is detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine by claiming on September 1 that his understanding of the battlefield is ”quite objective,” yet he continues to make absurd claims of fictional Russian gains.[6] The Kremlin’s continued willingness to tolerate and seek to benefit from the pervasive lying of the Russian military continues to both damage its own ability to fight effectively and to fuel Putin’s insistence on his ability to achieve all his aims by military force. Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.
Key Takeaways
- The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast.
- The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces’ ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia’s negotiation position.
- Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russia launched 92 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of September 6 to 7.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of September 6 and 7. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck oil refineries in the Republic of Tatarstan and Perm Krai, a Russian storage and launch site for strike drones in Kursk Oblast, and an unspecified target in the Black Sea.[7] A Ukrainian source that frequently reports on Ukrainian strikes in Russia reported that Russian forces struck the Lukoil Permnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Perm Krai and published footage of a strike reportedly near the refinery.[8] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin confirmed Ukrainian strikes in Perm Krai.[9] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from September 7 shows heat anomalies at the Taganrog Airbase, Rostov Oblast (roughly 160 kilometers from the frontline) following reports of Ukrainian strikes in the area.[10]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) contrary to Russian claims, according to geolocated footage published on September 4.[11]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[12]
Russian forces are intensifying operations in the Vovchansk direction ahead of a seasonal shift. An officer of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Vovchansk direction stated on September 7 that Russian forces are intensifying attacks in the area ahead of a seasonal change, as they are aware that upcoming green cover loss in the fall will preclude Russian infiltrators from hiding from Ukrainian drones and hinder Russian advances.[13]
Russian milbloggers continue to baselessly claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, contrary to all available evidence. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on September 6 and 7 that Ukrainian forces are attempting to break through the encirclement that Russian forces have supposedly completed between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions.[14] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 7 that Russian forces did not even reach the southern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and advanced only between three and five kilometers from the international border in the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, indirectly but clearly refuting Russian claims.[15] Trehubov stated that Russian officials present ”absolutely strange information” about claims of seizing Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) that do not correspond to reality.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[16]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[17] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on September 7 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dvorichna and Zapadne (both north of Kupyansk).[18]
Russian forces are reportedly postponing their objective of seizing Kupyansk until Spring 2027, according to a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF), likely due to recent successful Ukrainian counterattacks and advances near Kupyansk.[19]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[20]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command posts in occupied Nyzhnii Naholchyk (roughly 109 kilometers from the frontline) and Dovzhanske (roughly 142 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot near occupied Teple (roughly 95 or 118 kilometers from the frontline).[21] Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that the ammunition depot near occupied Teple supplied units of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]).[22]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[23] Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southeastern and southeast of Lyman in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[24]
Russian sources are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman. ISW is not prepared to assess the extent or results of these counterattacks at this time, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Stavky (north of Lyman) and toward Zarichne (southeast of Stavky); from Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and Novoselivka (northwest of Drobysheve) toward Myrne and Kolodyazi (both east of Novoselivka); and infiltrating toward Ivanivka, Yampolivka, and Terny (all north of Zarichne).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also pressing toward Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) from Novomykhailivka (northwest of Novolyubivka), Terny, and Olhivka (north of Novomykhailivka).[26] A Ukrainian military source noted, however, that while individual reports include some Ukrainian success around Lyman, it is premature to draw final conclusions regarding the situation.[27]
ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction, and additional collection will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction in Fall 2026. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Druzhkivka. Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Stepanivka (south of Druzhkivka) and maintain positions in Stepanivka, according to geolocated footage published on August 30.[28]
Russian sources continue to heavily exaggerate the extent of Russian advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, contrary to all available evidence. A Telegram channel associated with the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) published footage on September 5 claiming to show a strike against a Ukrainian position in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka), but the Ukrainian position was geolocated to northwestern Kostyantynivka.[29] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously claimed that Russian forces had seized Kostyantynivka as of July 3.[30] The Russian channel likely lied about the location of the Ukrainian position to avoid contradicting Putin’s claim that Russian forces had seized all of Kostyantynivka and to continue aggrandizing Russian advances in the area. Russian forces still have not seized all of Kostyantynivka as of September 7, over two months after Putin’s claim.
Russian forces are interdicting Ukrainian logistics in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on September 7 that Russian forces are constantly using first-person view (FPV) drones around Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, which prevents Ukrainian forces from using conventional transport in the area.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[32]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 7 that Russian forces are using Msta-S self-propelled howitzers to interdict Ukrainian logistics and disrupt personnel rotations in the Dobropillya direction.[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that Russian forces advanced northeast of and into central Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[35]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[36]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics infrastructure and military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian truck along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway, according to geolocated footage published on September 5.[37] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov posted footage on September 6 showing Ukrainian drones striking 15 pieces of Russian military equipment along the Donetsk Ring Road.[38] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile system near Vodyane (roughly 45 kilometers from the front line) likely in mid-August 2026, according to geolocated footage published on September 6.[39]
Ukrainian special services recently assassinated a Russian officer responsible for the assassination of Ukrainian intelligence officers in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian special services sources told a Ukrainian news agency on September 7 that Ukrainian forces planted an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed an employee of occupied Donetsk Oblast State Security Ministry Center for Special Operations, Oleg Shutov, on July 27, 2026, in occupied Donetsk City.[40] Shutov reportedly supported the assassinations of Ukrainian Major General Maksym Shapoval on June 27, 2017, and Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) counterintelligence officer Colonel Oleksandr Kharaberyush on March 31, 2017.[41]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[42]
Russian forces continue to actively operate in small infantry groups in the Hulyaipole direction while predominantly using radio-controlled drones. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion commander operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on September 7 that trees and other challenging terrain features prevent Russian forces from effectively using fiber-optic drones in the area, forcing them to rely on radio-controlled drones instead.[43]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 7, but ISW did not observe evidence of Russian advances.[44]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Azovske (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[45]
Ukrainian drones are reportedly freely flying over the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway), contrary to Russian occupation officials’ claims of securing the highway. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration council member Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 7 that Ukrainian drones are operating along the entire section of the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and criticized Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky for claiming that the highway is safe.[46] ISW has previously observed Russian milbloggers repeatedly rejecting Russian occupation officials’ claims that the M-14 highway is safe from Ukrainian drones.[47]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 7.
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Ukrainian Kherson City officials reported on September 7 that Russian forces struck a public transportation stop in Kherson City, injuring one person.[48] Russian forces dropped grenades using rotary drones on two civilians in Kherson City and one in Antonivka (just east of Kherson City), according to geolocated footage published on September 7.[49]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge across the North Crimean Canal near occupied Vladyslavivka (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline), which Russian forces used for logistics.[50] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Department of Active Operations reported on September 7 that GUR drone operators struck and damaged a Russian aircraft, reportedly a Su-24 tactical bomber, in occupied Crimea overnight on September 6 to 7.[51]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[52]
Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 7 that Russian forces launched 92 Shahed-type strike drones (including jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[53] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 71 drones, that aerial vehicles hit 12 locations, and that debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and logistics infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[54] Russian forces struck a helicopter in Zhulyany, the Vasylkiv Airbase, and the Alutech logistics center in Kyiv Oblast, according to geolocated footage published on September 7.[55]
Russian forces are reportedly increasingly using glide bombs to strike southern Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that Russian forces are increasingly using glide bombs alongside Geran-type strike drones to support their long-range strike packages against Ukrainian shipping and logistics infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[56] The milblogger claimed that Ukraine’s degraded air defenses in the region and modernizations to Russian glide bombs are allowing Russian forces to use them in strikes against Odesa and Zaporizhia oblasts, presumably from airspace over the Black and Azov seas.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/ab3army/7443; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/;
[3] https://t.me/rybar/82961
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ;
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/
[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20741
[8] https://t.me/supernova_plus/59530 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/07/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-perm-odin-iz-dronov-popal-v-mnogoetazhnyy-zhiloy-dom
[9] https://t.me/mahonin59/13249 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/07/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-perm-odin-iz-dronov-popal-v-mnogoetazhnyy-zhiloy-dom
[10] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-aerodrom-v-taganrozi/; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@38.862,47.252,14.344z; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2096810481583583330
[11] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12903; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2554
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ;
[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/u-rosiyan-zalyshylysya-licheni-tyzhni-chomu-vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-bilya-vovchanska/ ; https://youtu.be/pqouOydYZ4w
[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/98615 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15964 ; https://t.me/sashakots/64291 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/28966
[15] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1397508-rosia-cetvertij-rik-namagaetsa-stvoriti-20-kilometrovu-zonu-kontrolu-vzdovz-kordonu-z-ukrainou-tregubov/
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19692
[18] https://t.me/grvZapad/19692
[19] https://t.me/grvZapad/19696 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[20] https://t.me/grvZapad/19692 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42154
[22] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2093798392012431 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1397322-sso-znisili-artilerijskij-sklad-armii-rf-na-teritorii-ptahofabriki-v-luganskij-oblasti/
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36747 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98615 ; https://t.me/KOT_DOBROHOD/56297
[24] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2096717115676110913?s=20; https://t.me/BV25org/3372-; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12899
[25] https://t.me/KOT_DOBROHOD/56297 ; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/20353 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2096862746889289925 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36747 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98615 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19692
[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/98615 ; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/20353
[27] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14219
[28] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2096621571481780562; https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/240; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2096610274623070684; https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/241
[29] https://t.me/shock3OA/9059 ; https://x.com/Mocca1x/status/2096653561795064054
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[31] https://t.me/liut_npu/1886
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36747
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/67119
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122792
[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33831
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143
[37] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2096644771850895854 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2096295970938003459
[38] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/32952
[39] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2096871653032722936 ; https://t.me/SkifskiGrifony/756 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2096909607025119734 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2096898974980440346 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2096890631289176407
[40]https://lb dot ua/society/2026/09/07/764076_dzherela_ukrayinski_spetssluzhbi.html ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/ukrayinski-speczsluzhby-likviduvaly-v-doneczku-vbyvczyu-rozvidnyka-maksyma-shapovala/
[41] https://lb dot ua/news/2019/04/17/424780_sbu_ustanovila_imya_muzhchini.html
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42146; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42143 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36747 ;
[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/vorog-nablyzhayetsya-do-pozyczij-ale-ye-nyuans-shho-zadumaly-okupanty-pid-gulyajpolem/ ; https://youtu.be/pqouOydYZ4w
[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/36747 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98615 ; https://t.me/divgen/83728
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42154
[46] https://t.me/vrogov/25922
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80309 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/177025
[48] https://www.facebook.com/miskrada.ks/posts/972422409215430?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1397154-udar-rf-po-zupinci-v-centralnomu-rajoni-hersona-poranena-zinka/
[49] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2096893219657204131 ; https://t.me/zona_Red/1291 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2096903457231806515 ; https://t.me/zona_Red/1283
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42154
[51] https://t.me/risk_dept/704 ; https://militarnyi dot om/uk/news/dron-gur-urazyv-rosijskyj-su-24-u-krymu/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/07/svyatkovyj-podarunok-okupantam-dronari-gur-urazyly-rosijskyj-su-24-u-krymu/
[52] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[53] https://t.me/kpszsu/76967
[54] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1397070-rosijski-vijska-fpv-dronami-ta-z-minometiv-atakuvali-tri-prikordonni-gromadi-na-cernigivsini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/policechernigivshchini/posts/pfbid02TQxVUDrWtM8KDncPxCyjMJCfygan14DVeKWtJ5UHodgMUcwA4jX39NhrbQDgaxyGl?cft[0]=AZgawpgOurXBqHFq1-v-sYmGQFDirAecA9aRL8MhQyJn3k03J8lICU6dQHanUTcK9KldlarUqIpb298ZDLFtWHRJRoy9Kn8DYzqMSmZaedUKO2qmYGiBrRjiCfBv7fRcDW-o9_fIWMtfWafF0muDzt8C1Q&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31871 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31880 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1396992-rf-pocilila-dronom-po-civilnomu-avto-poblizu-svitlicnogo-na-harkivsini-v-akomu-stani-pasaziri/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1397352-za-ves-period-vijni-ce-vperse-rf-dva-dni-pospil-atakuvala-sahnovsinu-reaktivnimi-sahedami/ ; https://t.me/vkarabanov/2760 ; https://www.facebook.com/miskrada.ks/posts/971952445929093?ref=embed_post ; https://t.me/kyivoda/56331 ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/pfbid02HAJpfTga5DTNtMZ2LC61MraEkEBm6ytKn9W7v8WooQiaMUshZp7ewpFK5JKuYEwSl?cft[0]=AZiBvpqtPKIrWvrF14DUDf7rjR5NdKFtOgNV0YSuHrLY0hwmlin67AD4EaSD2bZ-7fSMXJLcPxROsGf2-At0Y3HahxcV3JVBpy5_BbywZ9DuGcnWTR97x1wfPPJZo1KY6PIovxxBngg3KKBhDPs7i2LZpmvZPXh_&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19723 ; https://t.me/police_zp_news/31294 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/47835
[55] https://t.me/Osintpen/3496; https://t.me/Osintpen/3497; https://t.me/Osintpen/3498; https://t.me/Osintpen/3499; https://t.me/Osintpen/3500; https://t.me/Osintpen/3501; https://t.me/Osintpen/3502; https://t.me/Osintpen/3503; https://t.me/Osintpen/3504
[56] https://t.me/arx_spn/30965
