Toplines
Ukrainian forces are intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian airfields and drone launch sites while conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) in Russia’s border regions to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system, an aviation ammunition depot, and a Sopka-2 radar system at the Yeysk Airfield in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 180 kilometers from the front line); a strike drone launch site, ammunition depots, a technical and operational unit, and RSP-27 (DRL-27) and Nebo-SV radar systems at the Millerovo Airfield in Millerovo, Rostov Oblast (roughly 170 kilometers from the front line); and a drone launch site in Oryol Oblast overnight on August 30.[1] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at the Yeysk Airfield following the Ukrainian strikes, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows multiple heat anomalies at the Yeysk and Millerovo airfields.[2] Ukrainian forces have recently intensified strikes against Russian strike and air defense assets in heavily defended military airfields in Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea, including the most recent strike against the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast on August 28.[3]
Ukrainian forces recently conducted a clearing mission with foot-mobile infantry in the Kupyansk direction, likely following a condition-setting effort aimed at suppressing Russian drone strike capabilities in the area. The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces have cleared two square kilometers of a forested area southwest of Zapadne and continue to advance west of Dvorichna (both north of Kupyansk).[4] The 2nd Khartiya Corps posted a geolocated video showing at least 15 to 20 Ukrainian servicemembers running into the forested area, and it is likely that Ukrainian forces conducted up to a platoon-sized infantry assault.[5] The footage shows that Ukrainian forces operated freely in the open field, which suggests that Ukrainian forces had likely successfully suppressed Russian drone capabilities in the area beforehand, such that Russian forces had not been able to repel the advance. Ukrainian forces previously seized seven and a half square kilometers of windbreaks southwest of Dvorichna and advanced into northern Zapadne.[6] Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian manpower concentrations, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, communication antennas, and Molniya-type strike drones in the Kupyansk direction.[7] ISW previously observed that both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been trying to restore tactical maneuver on the battlefield since 2025.[8] Ukraine’s recent counterattacks, including in the Kupyansk direction, and suppressions of Russian drone-based defenses are likely part of such efforts.[9]
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian marketplaces continues to impose high financial and operational costs on Russian logistics chains and the Russian economy writ large. Russian Sberbank CFO and Management Board Deputy Chair Taras Skvortsov stated on August 29 that consumer spending on Russian marketplaces has decreased by 15 percent in recent weeks and noted that marketplaces have taken up 15 percent of all Russian consumer spending.[10] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on August 30 that Russian marketplaces have sharply increased commissions and logistics commissions, with Ozon (Wildberries’ main competitor) charging commissions and logistics costs averaging 47.8 percent of product value between April and June 2026. SZRU reported that Ozon started charging up to 55 percent in commissions for sellers that use Ozon’s warehouses under the fulfillment-by-operator (FBO) warehousing model.[11] SZRU reported that Russia’s average marketplace retail profitability fell from approximately 15 to five percent between 2025 and 2026, rendering certain product categories unprofitable. SZRU noted that Russian marketplaces are preparing to further increase tariffs in the second half of 2026 to offset the costs associated with the restoration of damaged infrastructure and security concerns, likely referring to Ukrainian drone and missile strikes. Ukrainian forces have recently intensified strikes against Russian marketplaces to disrupt military-related supply chains and strain the Russian economy.[12]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces are intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian airfields and drone launch sites while conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) in Russia’s border regions to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.
- Ukrainian forces recently conducted a clearing mission with foot-mobile infantry in the Kupyansk direction, likely following a condition-setting effort aimed at suppressing Russian drone strike capabilities in the area.
- Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian marketplaces continues to impose high financial and operational costs on Russian logistics chains and the Russian economy writ large.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Slovyansk directions.
- Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 130 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on the night of August 29 to 30.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on the night of August 29 to 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast (roughly 790 kilometers from the international border), which has an annual processing capacity of approximately 20 million metric tons of oil.[13] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged on August 30 that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at an industrial zone in Kirishi.[14] Ukrainian forces have struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery five times since March 2025.[15] Ukrainian forces have recently been conducting repeat strikes against Russian oil refineries at a higher tempo to keep the refineries closed and compound repair and lost revenue costs for Russia.[16]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Ukrainian forces and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) refuted recent Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claims of settlement seizures in northern Sumy Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on August 30 that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 15th Separate Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) seized Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) and Velykyi Prykil (east of Sumy City).[17] The Ukrainian Kursk GoF refuted the Russian MoD claim, stating that Ukrainian forces control Velykyi Prykil and Sadky.[18] A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF added that Russian forces also do not control Khrapivshchyna (north of Sumy City), which the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized on August 29.[19]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 29 and 30 but did not advance.[20] A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF reported on August 30 that Russian forces are trying to consolidate positions in central Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) and are actively infiltrating toward Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City).[21]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 29 and 30 but did not advance.[22] Russian forces launched one FAB-3000 and two FAB-1500 glide bombs against Prykolotne (north of Velykyi Burluk) and four FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Pidesednye (northwest of Velykyi Burluk), according to geolocated footage published on August 30.[23] Russian forces also launched five FAB-250 glide bombs against Ivashkyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and three FAB-500 glide bombs against Vasylivka (north of Velykyi Burluk), according to additional footage published on August 28 and 29.[24]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
See topline text for additional reports about Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Borova direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember in northern Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova), according to geolocated footage published on August 30, which ISW assesses occurred after a Russian infiltration mission.[25] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF reported that Ukrainian forces are attacking in several areas simultaneously along the Ridkodub-Nove line (southeast of Borova) in an effort to expand the contested gray zone and identify weaknesses of Russian defenses.[26]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian control posts in occupied Sukhodilsk (roughly 145 kilometers from the front line) and an ammunition depot in occupied Kadiivka (roughly 60 kilometers from the front line).[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) according to geolocated footage published on August 29.[28] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that the Lyman direction has become more dynamic following a series of Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[29]
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southern and central Dovha Balka (south of Kostyantynivka), according to geolocated footage published on August 28, which ISW assesses occurred after Russian infiltration missions.[30] Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in northern Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), according to geolocated footage published on August 27, indicating that Russian forces have not consolidated positions in Stepanivka as ISW previously assessed.[31]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sirin Air Defense Battalion of the Unmanned Systems Forces are striking Ukrainian forces in Druzhkivka — the first time ISW has observed this unit operating on the battlefield.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Rubizhne (northeast of Dobropillya).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southwest of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, primarily attacking northeast of Novopavlivka, on August 29 and 30 but did not advance.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command post near occupied Chumatske (east of Novopavlivka and roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline).[37]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 29 and 30 but did not advance.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone depot of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems in occupied Khartsyzk (roughly 56 kilometers from the frontline) and material and technical warehouses in occupied Berdyanske and Hirnyk (roughly 106 and 32 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[39]
Ukrainian internet outlet Censor Net reported on August 29, citing sources in Ukrainian special services, that an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated under the car of the First Deputy Head of the Olenivka penal colony, Dmytro Neelov, on August 29 in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[40] Ukraine’s Prosecutor General identified Neelov as responsible for the mass killing of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Olenivka in July 2022 and involvement in the torture and beating of Ukrainian POWs at the penal colony.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 29 and 30 but did not advance.[41]
Russian forces are reportedly increasingly moving engineering and other equipment toward the Hulyaipole direction from occupied Mariupol. Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 30 that Russian forces are building concrete fortifications along the frontline using large numbers of engineering and other equipment in the Hulyaipole-Polohy direction, likely in preparation for offensive operations in the near future.[42]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29 and 30 but did not advance.[43]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 30.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian logistics infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a material and technical equipment warehouse in occupied Krasnosilske (either roughly 128 kilometers or 220 kilometers from the frontline).[44]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[45]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 130 Shahed- (including jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 125 drones, that an unspecified number of drones and missiles hit 14 locations, and that drone and missile debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and logistics infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[47]
Ukrainian officials provided updated casualty counts for Russia’s massive August 28 to 29 strike series against Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 30 that Russia’s strike against Myla, Kyiv Oblast, on August 29 killed 38 people and injured 20, including two children.[48] Zelensky reported that Russian forces launched almost 2,000 strike drones, over 1,600 aerial bombs, and 31 North Korean and Russian missiles against Ukraine between August 22 and 29.
Russia continues to strike Ukrainian book facilities as part of an ongoing campaign aimed at erasing Ukrainian language and cultural identity. The Ukrainian Strategic Communications Center reported on August 30 that Russian forces struck six book warehouses, logistics centers, and offices in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts in July and August 2026, destroying roughly one third of Ukraine’s annual print output.[49]
Russian jet-powered Banderol loitering munitions are reportedly enabling repeated Russian strikes against Ukraine’s Black Sea port infrastructure, disrupting Ukrainian seaborne trade. The Telegraph reported on August 29 that Russian forces have been using the Banderol loitering munitions to conduct repeated strikes against Ukrainian Black Sea ports since the Banderol entered serial production in late July 2026, preventing cargo ships from shipping product.[50] Ukrainian Ports Association President Dmytro Barinov told The Telegraph that traffic through Odesa Oblast ports has fallen from an average of seven or eight vessels per day to one vessel per day since Russia intensified strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure. Russian forces can launch Banderols from Orion drones and Mi-28N attack helicopters, and The Telegraph noted that Russian forces launch Banderols from the Crimean airspace and store them in Dzhankoi Raion and the Kirovske and Simferopol airfields in occupied Crimea.[51] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 30 that Banderols and other similar munitions are cheaper and faster to manufacture than Kh-101 cruise missiles, enabling Russian forces to conduct precision strikes en masse against Ukrainian maritime exports and logistics.[52]
Russia is preparing to increase strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of and during the Winter 2026 to 2027 as part of its annual campaign intended to break Ukraine’s energy grid in the dead of winter and demoralize the Ukrainian populace. The Russian MoD stated on August 29 that Russia is preparing to launch “massive” strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities in response to Ukraine’s continued long-range strike campaign against Russian civilian, fuel, and energy infrastructure.[53] Russia has intensified strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure each fall and winter since 2022 to degrade Ukraine’s energy security.[54]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2777 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2393 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2394 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42072 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20641 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093995179942240723 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093995177316659285
[2] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2094039228783149284?s=20 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30106 https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2093921746797649933?s=20 ; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;l:fires_all,countries,earth;@40.306,48.956,14.432z
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/
[4] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1Da9sxXCJ1/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/30/vybyly-rosiyan-z-opornykiv-i-rushyly-dali-shturmovyky-hartiyi-pokazaly-zachystku-lisu-bilya-dvorichnoyi/
[5] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2094010458810290321?s=20; https://www.youtubordere.com/watch?v=yuOGuJ7znzo
[6] https://t.me/rug_international/507 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/25/shturmovyj-polk-r-u-g-zvilnyv-lisovyj-masyv-na-kup%ca%bcyanshhyni/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[7] https://t.me/oaembr77/1612 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/26/desantnyky-zavdaly-seriyi-udariv-po-okupantah-na-kup%e2%80%99yanskomu-napryamku-paralizuvavshy-jogo-logistyku/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/
[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/392665
[11] https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/rosiiski-marketpleisy-perekladayut-svoi-vytraty-na-prodavtsiv-ta-pokuptsiv
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/
[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42072 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20641 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093995179942240723 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093995177316659285
[14] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/11904
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28963
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/
[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/66880
[18] https://suspilne dot media/1390988-u-milij-na-kiivsini-37-zagiblih-cerez-detonaciu-boepripasiv-kiiv-cetvertu-dobu-pid-atakou-droniv-1649-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1788089858&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[19] https://t.me/severnnyi/9176 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36559
[21] https://t.me/severnnyi/9173
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9173
[23] https://t.me/Osintpen/3423 ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30843
[24] https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2093999043663810985; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30255 ; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2093990249751793956; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30239
[25] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2094033758689108240 ; https://t.me/oaembr77/1621
[26] https://t.me/grvZapad/19620
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42073
[28] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/2093955939552448966 ; https://t.me/ShalinW/19276 ; https://x.com/SitrepLinksENG/status/2093811588834746800 ; https://t.me/ukrliberatioo/24126
[29] https://t.me/grvZapad/19620
[30] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1286882086750383; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093771945594470712?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093771971653783809?s=20
[31] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093771850585170393?s=20; https://t.me/BOBR_SEVER/98
[32] https://t.me/vbs_sirin/57 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3422
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36559 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55652
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/66871
[35] https://t.me/divgen/83538
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42073
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42073
[40] https://censor dot net/ua/videonews/4020844/likvidatsiya-kata-olenivky-u-donetsku-vybuhnuv-avtomobil-neyelova ; https://t.me/sotaproject/118008 ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2026/08/29/8050974/
[41]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36559
[42] https://t.me/andriyshTime/66737
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42069 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42067 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36559
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42073
[45] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[46] https://t.me/kpszsu/75371
[47]https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1UiW6ic3ay/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2755 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55360 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55422 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55445 ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3136 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19345
[48] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20640
[49] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2093999843039453411
[50] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/08/29/russia-cheap-fast-missiles-cut-ukraine-sea/
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[52] https://t.me/rybar/82766
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/66878
[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024
