Toplines
The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater, including a part of the frontline that has been largely stagnant for nearly two years. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 29 that Russian forces seized Nova Sich (north of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast and then claimed on July 30 that Russian forces seized Mala Slobidka (northwest of Sumy City) and Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast and Virivka (northeast of Kharkiv City) in Kharkiv Oblast.[1] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces has claimed to have seized a new settlement in its area of responsibility — which encompasses the frontline in Sumy Oblast, the area northwest to northeast of Kharkiv City, and the Velykyi Burluk direction in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — nearly every day since at least July 22.[2] The increase in the Russian high command’s claims of advance in northern Ukraine is notable as ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces have conducted the necessary quantity of force redeployments, equipment concentration, or intensified offensive operations commensurate with the amount of territory they are claiming to have seized in recent days.
Russian commanders are utilizing a variety of informational tools to support their efforts to aggrandize the extent of Russian advances. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson, callsign “Hants,” stated that Russian forces have redeployed elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Sumy direction to the Velykyi Burluk direction following Ukrainian advances in the area.[3] Russian forces recently launched a rare mechanized assault near Artilne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and dismounted infantry, even though the battlefield situation has not changed to such an extent that Russian forces can reliably field mechanized vehicles in the kill zone (an area in the near rear of elevated drone strike risk) or on the frontline.[4] Russian dismounted infantry continue conducting infiltration missions across the Northern Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility, and servicemembers continue filming videos and using AI to alter or generate footage of Russian soldiers holding flags in settlements into which Russian forces may have only infiltrated to falsely claim them as seized.[5] Small Russian redeployments below the regimental echelon for defensive operations, small and rare mechanized assaults, infiltration missions, flag-raising videos, and AI-altered footage notably do not replace actual advances or constitute doctrinal control of terrain.
The Kremlin is using these exaggerated claims of advance as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the battlefield in order to convince Ukraine’s partners to abandon their support. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and Ministry of Defense (MoD) have heavily celebrated their claimed advances in recent days.[6] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov claimed on July 30 that the purported seizure of Mohrytsya, a settlement with a pre-war population reportedly of about 850 people, is a “strategic success.”[7] Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov previously briefed Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov in a highly-publicized meeting on the evening of July 3, a meeting the Kremlin likely hoped that Western news would report on ahead of Putin’s July 4 phone call with US President Donald Trump.[8] Nikiforov and Gerasimov heavily exaggerated Russian advances in northern Ukraine and elsewhere in the theater as of July 3, as Gerasimov and other military commanders have done at least once a month since January 2026.[9] The Kremlin likely uses these meetings as part of a targeted information campaign to convince the United States and other Western states that Russia’s war is going so well that the West should just abandon Ukraine, thereby enabling Russia to continue waging its war against a Ukraine with less material and technological support, which would potentially alleviate some of the burdens of its war effort. The Russian war effort is struggling writ large as Russia’s recruitment numbers have decreased. Russian officials are setting conditions for possible involuntary reserve call-ups, and as pervasive economic issues, fuel shortages, and censorship campaigns generate increasing discontent among Russian society.[10] The Kremlin has undertaken great effort to disguise these issues both from its populace and from the Western governments it seeks to influence, and aggrandized claims of advance – including those which Russian officials repeat directly to Western leaders – are part of this facade.
Available battlefield evidence does not corroborate Russian claims of advances in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Northern Grouping of Forces refuted on July 30 the Russian MoD’s claims that Russian forces seized Mala Slobidka and Mohrytsya, stating that these claims are part of a wider Russian informational effort.[11] The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces also refuted Russian MoD claims on July 30 that Russian forces seized Nova Sich, stating that Ukrainian forces maintain full control of the settlement.[12] The Ukrainian 16th AC reported on July 25 that Russian forces do not control Bily Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City) in Kharkiv Oblast, contrary to Russian claims of seizing it, but noted that Russian infantry have begun to infiltrate the settlement and its surrounding forests. This report also indicates that Russian forces likely do not control Yurchenkove (immediately southwest of Bily Kolodyaz). Local Kharkiv Oblast outlet Kharkiv Today added that Russian forces recently used AI-altered footage to falsely claim that they seized Bily Kolodyaz, likely referring to a video that Russian forces circulated on July 27 that purportedly showed a Russian servicemember holding a Russian flag in the eastern outskirts of Bily Kolodyaz, which was likely AI-generated or -altered.[13] Ukrainian 14th AC Spokesperson Colonel Vitaliy Sarantsev reported that Ukrainian forces still control Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) but that Russian forces are again infiltrating into the settlement. Ukrainian 16th AC spokesperson “Hants” reported on July 30 that Russian forces have not completely seized Artilne, suggesting that Russian forces have also likely not seized Ivashkyne (west of Artilne), despite the Russian MoD claims that Russian forces seized Artilne on July 22 and Ivashkyne on July 24.[14] The spokesperson’s statement suggests that the July 29 Russian mechanized assault near Artilne likely failed to consolidate Russian positions in Artilne or neighboring Ivashkyne.[15]
Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in some areas of northern Ukraine, contradicting the Russian narrative of theater-wide and unchallenged advances. “Hants” also stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk) on a prior date, consistent with ISW’s assessment indicating that Ukrainian forces liberated Odradne as of May 15.[16] Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized assault northeast of Khatne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[17] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on July 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks near Nova Sich, Mohrytsya, Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City), and Pysarivka (north of Sumy City), likely inhibiting the Russian rate of advance in these areas.[18]
Prominent Kremlin co-opted milbloggers are notably refuting the official Russian military narrative about the situation in northern Ukraine. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized Russian forces for using AI to create or alter footage fabricating Russian advances, particularly in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[19] The milblogger also reiterated long-held criticisms that Russian forces are sending small infantry groups to infiltrate into a settlement and then film videos of the soldiers holding flags to falsely imply that Russian forces have seized the settlement. The milblogger condemned these lies as a broader issue endemic to Russian military culture and called for reform at all echelons. Another prominent Russian milblogger responded to the first milblogger, claiming that the military commander responsible for the AI-altered footage in the Velykyi Burluk direction may have wanted to preserve manpower, to aggrandize a claim of seizing an unimportant position or that the commander was under-resourced and unable to complete an objective.[20] Both milbloggers criticized the altered footage as part of the “beautiful reports” phenomenon, in which reports of false advances inhibit Russian tactical and operational planning and require Russian units to expend more manpower and resources to advance in worse conditions.[21] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces directly accused the Northern Grouping of Forces command of aggrandizing claims and of claiming that any settlement into which Russian forces had infiltrated was actually seized even when Russian forces had not seized it and even withdrew.[22] The source directly challenged whether Russian forces had seized Mohrytsya, Mala Slobidka, Yurchenkove, and Virivka, all of which the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 30 or 31 and claimed that Russian forces have not even reached Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) despite claiming to have seized it in June 2026. It remains notable that the Russian military command’s claims of advances are so unrealistic that even pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-affiliated ultranationalist milbloggers are criticizing Russian commanders for them.
Ukrainian defense company F-Drones delivered the first 2,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the US military as part of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) Drone Dominance Program. Ukrainian defense company F-Drones told Ukrainian source Militarnyi on July 31 that the US military received the first 2,000 F10 FPV drones from F-Drones as part of the DoD’s first stage of Gauntlet I of the Drone Dominance Program, a program in which the DoD purchases small, lethal drones through 2028.[23] Militarnyi reported that F10 is the first Ukrainian drone that received official export approval to the United States. Ukraine continues to be an essential partner in experience, technology, and expertise exchange in the use of unmanned systems and adaptation to drone-dominated battlefields for the United States and NATO.[24]
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater, including a part of the frontline that has been largely stagnant for nearly two years.
- The Kremlin is using these exaggerated claims of advance as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the battlefield in order to convince Ukraine’s partners to abandon their support.
- Available battlefield evidence does not corroborate Russian claims of advances in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.
- Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in some areas of northern Ukraine, contradicting the Russian narrative of theater-wide and unchallenged advances.
- Prominent Kremlin co-opted milbloggers are notably refuting the official Russian military narrative about the situation in northern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian defense company F-Drones delivered the first 2,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the US military as part of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) Drone Dominance Program.
- Russia launched 255 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka oil refinery in Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 500 kilometers from the frontline), overnight on July 30 to 31, causing a fire and damaging the refinery’s oil facilities.[25] Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows several large smoke plumes coming from the refinery.[26] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov acknowledged on July 31 that Ukrainian drones damaged an industrial facility in Volgograd City oblast and caused a fire.[27] Ukrainian officials reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck port infrastructure at the Port of Taman in Taman, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 270 kilometers from the frontline), causing a large fire.[28] Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows smoke coming from an oil storage facility at the Port of Taman.[29]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, including strikes on Wildberries and Ozon warehouses (both major Russian retailers). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck logistics centers in Sarapul, Udmurt Republic (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the international border), in Kazan, Tatarstan (roughly 970 kilometers from the international border), and in Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 480 kilometers from the frontline).[30] Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows fires at Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) in Sarapul, Kazan, and Volgograd.[31] Additional geolocated imagery and footage published on July 31 show smoke from an Ozon warehouse (Wildberries’ main competitor) in Zelenodolsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 970 kilometers from the international border) and an explosion at a Wildberries storage center in Penza City, Penza Oblast (roughly 600 kilometers from the frontline) after reported Ukrainian drone strikes.[32] Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko claimed on July 31 that Russian emergency workers extinguished a fire at a logistics center in Penza Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike.[33]
Geolocated footage published on July 21, 22, and 23 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on gas stations in and near Belgorod City.[34]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
See topline text for aggrandized Russian claims of advance in the Sumy Oblast international border area.
Russian forces are struggling to advance in northern Sumy Oblast as Ukrainian forces are counterattacking. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pysarivka and Ivolzhanske (both north of Sumy City).[35] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance because the forested terrain north of Sumy City provides concealment for Ukrainian forces. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on July 31 that Russian forces are engaged in the heaviest fighting near Turya (east of Sumy City) but that the frontline in Sumy Oblast has not changed significantly.[36] The source added that Russian forces have found attacking near Turya particularly difficult and have been unable to advance past Pokrovka (south of Turya and east of Sumy City) despite taking the settlement several months ago.[37]
Ukrainian strikes are complicating Russian logistics in northern Sumy Oblast. A Ukrainian commander of a self-propelled artillery battalion operating in the north Slobozhansk direction reported on July 31 that Russian forces use infantry to carry ammunition and cargo to the frontline, even though Ukrainian forces frequently strike foot mobile infantry.[38] The commander reported that Russian forces rarely use artillery, and that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian 122-mm D-30 howitzer roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline. The Ukrainian battalion commander reported that Russian forces do not operate at night.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
See topline text for aggrandized Russian claims of advance in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City and toward Velykyi Burluk on July 30 and 31 but did not make confirmed advances.[39]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 30 and 31 but did not advance.[40]
Ukrainian forces are blocking Russian infiltration efforts in the Kupyansk direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk-Borova direction reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces have almost completely blocked Russian infiltration routes into the rear of the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR).[41] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces redesigned their approach to countering Russian infiltration missions and now prevent up to 95 percent of these missions.
Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 31 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub, Nove, Katerynivka, and Karpivka (all southeast of Borova) as Russian forces continued offensive operations.[42]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Pole-21 electronic warfare system near occupied Holubivka (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline).[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 30 and 31 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[44]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on July 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tigr armored vehicle near Terny (roughly 18 kilometers from the frontline) and that the vehicle was carrying the commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Moscow Military District) Dmitry Mikhailov and his deputy.[45]
The source reporting on the Russian Western GoF reported on July 31 that Russian forces are concentrating north and west of Lyman but are not engaged in combat in the city itself.[46]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northeastern Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces seized Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Tykhonivka and west of Novomarkove (both northeast of Kostyantynivka).[49]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Dobropillya tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 30 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in the fields west of Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 30 and 31 but did not advance.[51]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on July 30 and 31 but did not advance.[52]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near occupied Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[53]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 30 and 31 but did not advance.[54]
Russian drone operators are employing new tactics to complicate Ukrainian air defense in the Zaporizhzhia City direction. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on July 31 that Russian drone operators have begun flying to heights of up to three kilometers before diving to strike their targets, a new tactic which is complicating Ukrainian air defense.[55] The commander reported that Ukrainian air defense struggles to identify and intercept the small drones descending at high speeds. The commander noted that rapidly descending Russian drones are less accurate and prone to strike civilian targets.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel truck southeast of occupied Melitopol (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline).[56]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 31.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on July 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot near occupied Naumivka (roughly 160 kilometers from the frontline).[57] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 31 that Ukrainian forces struck two aviation hangars and a production workshop of the Yevpatoria aircraft factory near occupied Yevpatoria (roughly also 170 kilometers from the frontline).[58]
Food supplies in occupied Sevastopol appear to be at risk. Crimean occupation authority affiliated news agency Kryminform claimed on July 30, citing the occupied Sevastopol city press service, that Sevastopol retail chains have food to last from two weeks to a month and a half.[59] Kryminform claimed that stores in occupied Sevastopol are operating under rolling power outages and that stores have increased prices for some products while decreasing prices for others. Kryminform claimed that occupation authorities are restricting sales of certain goods.
Order of Battle: The Russian 12th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (31st Air Defense Division, Russian Aerospace Forces) reportedly occupies positions near the T-2716 Sevastopol – Cape Fiolent highway southwest of Sevastopol.[60]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 255 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 195 drones, that 22 drones struck 14 locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck agricultural, commercial, industrial, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[62] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on July 31 that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[63]
A Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian fuel facility in Samar, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[64]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20764; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20734; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20702; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20732
[2] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20477; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20517; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20518; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20549; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20702; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20728; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20732; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20734; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20744; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20759; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20764
[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/30/boyi-za-artilne-vorog-nakopychyv-syly-ale-zayavy-pro-jogo-uspihy-perebilsheni-16-j-korpus/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/;
[7] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/main/belousov-kontrol-nad-selom-mogrica-otkryvaet-novye-vozmozhnosti-dlya-razvitiya-nastupleniya-armii-rf
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/;
[11] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1368014-informacia-pro-zahoplenna-maloi-slobidki-mogrici-ta-novoi-sici-fejki/
[12] https://t.me/uvkkursk/574
[13] https://2day dot kh.ua/ua/kharkow/rosiyany-zaymayut-posadky-shcho-vidbuvayetsya-na-pivnochi-kharkivskoyi-oblasti ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/
[14] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/30/boyi-za-artilne-vorog-nakopychyv-syly-ale-zayavy-pro-jogo-uspihy-perebilsheni-16-j-korpus/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[16] https://armyinform [dot] com.ua/2026/07/30/boyi-za-artilne-vorog-nakopychyv-syly-ale-zayavy-pro-jogo-uspihy-perebilsheni-16-j-korpus/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/
[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120278 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2082943700334756268
[18] https://t.me/rybar/82094 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35892 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45964
[19] https://t.me/rybar/82103
[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/96819
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[22] https://t.me/severnnyi/8871
[23] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/f-drones-postavyla-ssha-pershi-2000-droniv/?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=f-drones-postavyla-ssha-pershi-2000-droniv
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2026/
[25] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9018 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41652; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20250;
[26] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083073086161555761; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083073088292303264
[27] https://iz dot ru/2141486/2026-07-31/piat-chelovek-postradali-v-rezultate-ataki-bpla-v-volgogradskoi-oblasti; https://t.me/rgn_34/11936
[28] https://t.me/SBUkr/18241; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20250;
[29] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2083067698523877831; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083054731983790127
[30] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20250
[31] https://x.com/Vlad_23456/status/2082909401577337011?s=20 ; https://x.com/Vlad_23456/status/2082909582586782187?s=20 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27478?single; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2083027176153108866; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27618; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083059344594149606
[32] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2083028577709375794; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2083113487052501218; https://x.com/ayzin_illya/status/2083076007687258128;
[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/388058
[34] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2082838501804978493?s=20; https://t.me/belpepel/22908; https://t.me/belpepel/22910; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2082843156303708191?s=20; https://t.me/belpepel/22955; https://t.me/belpepel/23035; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2082844723832599026?s=20; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2082850731430711456?s=20; https://t.me/belpepel/23025; https://t.me/belpepel/23026; https://t.me/belpepel/23029
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45964
[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/8870
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/8874
[38] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/31/na-pivnichno-slobozhanskomu-napryamku-zsu-znyshhyly-rosijsku-garmatu-d-30-ta-zirvaly-sproby-proryvu/; https://youtu.be/cFqXtVWGRK8?t=2576
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41647; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41662; https://t.me/severnnyi/8870; https://2day dot kh.ua/ua/kharkow/rosiyany-zaymayut-posadky-shcho-vidbuvayetsya-na-pivnochi-kharkivskoyi-oblasti; https://t.me/wargonzo/35892
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41647; https://t.me/wargonzo/35892; https://t.me/grvZapad/19299
[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/31/tretya-shturmova-na-95-perekryla-shlyahy-infiltracziyi-rosijskyh-vijsk-u-tyl/
[42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19299; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120278; https://t.me/dva_majors/96793
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41652
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41647; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41662; https://t.me/wargonzo/35892;
[45] https://t.me/grvZapad/19298
[46] `https://t.me/grvZapad/19299
[47] https://t.me/MSP1465/917 ; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2083102525054685325?s=20 ; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2083101154326835278?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2083113246815596833?s=20
[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/66140
[49] https://t.me/divgen/82793
[50] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2082840875919425670; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2245
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41647; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41662; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120309; https://t.me/rybar/82094
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41662; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41647
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41652
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41647; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41662; https://t.me/wargonzo/35892
[55] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1368524-rosijski-udarni-droni-atakuut-zaporizza-iz-visoti-ponad-3-km-ak-ih-perehopluut-ukrainski-operatori-bpla/
[56] https://www.instagram.com/deviro_ua/reel/Dbc3BHUuvuN/; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2083174232662389120
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41652
[58] https://t.me/SBUkr/18241
[59] https://t.me/crimeainform/46416
[60] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106160
[61] https://t.me/kpszsu/70844
[62] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30806; https://www.facebook.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid02cQXJZAqzxfyTK5rtoVR7nfvpzNp2qrdj7h82qcbLS99uoLmNZcDXb56niok6hZt8l; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31114; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27853; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27855; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31110; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31113; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31115; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70243; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31138; https://t.me/synegubov/24393; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/24448; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7173; https://t.me/kyivoda/53272; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18205; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/60955; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/60958; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2921; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2922; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18208; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70316; https://t.me/VinnytsiaODA/75661; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70274; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45179; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65284; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70173
[63] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5266
[64] https://t.me/epoddubny/28444
