Toplines
Russian forces launched their fourth large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine since June 1 on the night of July 5 to 6. This latest strike series again heavily targeted Kyiv City and caused dozens of civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a total of 419 missiles and drones overnight on July 5 to 6, including six Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast; 23 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk oblasts; 33 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast; and six Kalibr cruise missiles from Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 351 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City. Ukrainian forces downed 326 drones and 37 total missiles, including 31 Kh-101 missiles and all six Kalibr missiles. Twenty-nine ballistic missiles, including anti-ship missiles, and 18 strike drones hit 34 locations, and drone debris fell at 16 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously warned on July 5 that Russia was preparing another massive strike against Ukraine before the July 7 to 8 NATO summit in Turkey.[2]
Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged over 10 locations in Kyiv City, including residential buildings.[3] Ukraine’s State Emergency Services and Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the strike killed at least 16 people and injured 58 in Kyiv City.[4] Russian forces also struck residential infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a variety of Ukrainian defense industrial and energy infrastructure facilities, particularly in Kyiv City and Oblast.[6]
Russian forces are taking advantage of Ukraine’s depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors to maximize the destructive potential of their strike packages. Ukrainian forces successfully intercepted nearly all of the Russian cruise missiles but none of the ballistic missiles overnight. Zelensky acknowledged that Ukraine was unable to intercept Russia’s ballistic missiles due to Ukraine’s insufficient supply of interceptor missiles.[7] Zelensky called on Europe and the United States to use the upcoming NATO summit to support Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported that Ukraine has already contracted Patriot missile deliveries with its partners but that deliveries will not start until 2027.[8] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russia’s Iskander-M, S-400, Zirkon, and Onyx missiles are either ballistic missiles or follow ballistic trajectories and that only US-produced Patriot systems and their analogues can intercept these missiles.[9] Ihnat reported that ballistic missiles caused most of the large-scale destruction in Kyiv City during the July 5 to 6 strikes. Ihnat assessed that Russia is increasingly using ballistic missiles to take advantage of the Patriot interceptor missile shortages both in Ukraine and globally. Ihnat assessed that Russia may increase its production of ballistic missiles over cruise missiles to take advantage of interceptor shortages in the long-term but noted that the production process is slow and costly. Ihnat stated that Russia could stockpile missiles by adjusting the frequency of its massive strike packages.
Russian forces have been decreasing the number of ballistic missiles in each strike package in recent weeks as Ukraine’s interception rate has declined. Russian forces launched 29 total ballistic missiles/missiles with ballistic trajectories on the night of July 5 to 6 and have been decreasing the number of ballistic missiles launched in their large-scale strike packages throughout June and the start of July. Russian forces launched 41 ballistic missiles on the night of June 1-2, 40 on the night of June 14-15, and 28 on the night of July 1-2.[10] Russian forces have likely been decreasing their use of ballistic missiles in recent weeks, suggesting that the military command has calculated that previous strikes already heavily depleted Ukraine’s interceptor stocks, such that Ukraine would be unable to repel most if not all of the ballistic missiles in later packages. The Russian military command may be confident that they no longer must launch strike packages with a large number of ballistic missiles to ensure at least some missiles result in hits even in the event of interceptions.
Russian forces likely purposely timed this latest large-scale strike package to generate informational effects ahead of the July 7 to 8 NATO summit in Turkey. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated in a post about Ukraine’s overnight strikes targeting Russia that Russia will not ignore Western supplies of drones, missiles, and ammunition to Ukraine and will increase the number and intensity of Russia’s strikes against Ukraine in response.[11] Russia has frequently launched large strikes against Ukraine in the lead-up to major international events, such as the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska summit and multiple bilateral US-Ukrainian, US-Russian, and European-Ukrainian talks in 2025 and 2026.[12] The Kremlin likely aims to deter Ukraine’s Western partners from agreeing to continue or increase their support for Ukraine at the NATO summit out of fear of Russia escalating its strike campaign against Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest drone strike against Russia thus far in the war, striking the largest oil refinery in Russia over 2,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Omsk Oil Refinery in Omsk City overnight for the first time, causing a fire at the refinery.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Omsk Oil Refinery is over 2,500 kilometers from Ukraine and is Russia’s largest refinery, with a refining capacity of over 21 million tons per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that preliminary information indicates that Ukrainian drones struck the ELOU-AVT-11 primary oil refining unit. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows smoke rising from the refinery.[14] Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaliy Khotsenko acknowledged that several Ukrainian drones struck the Omsk Oil Refinery.[15]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City overnight, causing explosions and smoke.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery is one of Russia’s largest and has a refining capacity of 15 million tons of oil per year.[17] Footage published on July 6 shows smoke rising from the refinery.[18] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed that Russian air defense downed over 70 Ukrainian drones approaching Yaroslavl City and that drone debris injured two people in an unspecified area.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Novatek Ust-Luga Oil Refinery in Slobodka, Leningrad Oblast, and the base of the Russian 26th Missile Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Luga, Leningrad Oblast.[20] Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows a Ukrainian drone striking the 26th Missile Brigade’s base in Luga.[21] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged that Ukrainian drones damaged infrastructure at the Luga training ground and near the Ust-Luga and Vysotsk ports.[22] Three sources in pro-government media told Russian opposition source Verstka on July 6 that the Kremlin demanded that major government-controlled media outlets refrain from publishing information about the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on Russia and instead “strongly advised” these outlets to publish details of Russian strikes on Ukraine — indicating that the Kremlin is continuing an effort to manage and censor the information space discussion of Ukrainian long-range strikes.[23] Russia has been largely unable to defend against and adapt to Ukrainian long-range strikes in recent weeks and months, despite undertaking some limited mitigation efforts, including re-allocating air defenses and creating mobile fire groups.[24] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure deep in the Russian rear since March 2026, taking advantage of overstretched Russian air defenses, reducing Russia’s refining capacity, and causing gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[25]
Russian officials are trying to present Russia as a willing negotiator and Ukraine as the obstacle to peace ahead of US President Donald Trump’s meetings with Ukraine and Europe at the July 7 to 8 NATO summit. Trump stated on July 6 that he will meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the NATO summit.[26] A senior US official told Reuters that Trump will speak with Zelensky about how to end the war and will likely then follow up with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[27] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed that Russia will continue contacts with the United States about a peace settlement even if the United States were to change its position on the war.[28] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Ukraine must be willing to negotiate in order for talks to resume — falsely framing Ukraine as the reason talks have stalled.[29] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed that Putin’s July 4 phone conversation with Trump was a blow to European leaders who are trying to change Trump’s mind about the war, particularly after recent remarks from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the G7.[30] Rubio stated on June 25 that there was only a “proposal” at the Alaska summit in August 2025 but that parties did not come to an agreement, and the G7 issued a joint statement reaffirming its unified support for Ukraine on June 17.[31] The Trump administration is increasingly speaking publicly about Ukrainian successes on the battlefield, including about Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure and tactical Ukrainian advances in several frontline sectors in Winter and Spring 2026.[32] The Kremlin is likely trying to shape the Trump administration’s views of the state of the war ahead of possible renewed US and European interest in resuming negotiations and efforts to bring Putin to the negotiating table.
Russia is engaging in increasingly risky kinetic behaviors against NATO member states as part of its “Phase Zero” condition-setting campaign. Politico reported on July 6 that a Russian “Bear-F” patrol aircraft dropped over 10 sonobuoys – small submarine detection and tracking systems – near the British HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carrier in the Norwegian Sea on July 2 after repeatedly approaching the carrier in an “unsafe and unprofessional” manner.[33] Politico reported that British aircraft intercepted and escorted the Russian aircraft away from the carrier following the incident. The Russian military is increasingly approaching or operating near NATO assets at sea in a reckless manner in order to intimidate NATO and test its resolve.[34] A Russian frigate fired warning shots as a British civilian vessel in the English Channel in mid-June 2026.[35] ISW continues to assess that such Russian actions are part of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[36]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces launched their fourth large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine since June 1 on the night of July 5 to 6. This latest strike series again heavily targeted Kyiv City and caused dozens of civilian casualties.
- Russian forces are taking advantage of Ukraine’s depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors to maximize the destructive potential of their strike packages.
- Russian forces have been decreasing the number of ballistic missiles in each strike package in recent weeks as Ukraine’s interception rate has declined.
- Russian forces likely purposely timed this latest large-scale strike package to generate informational effects ahead of the July 7 to 8 NATO summit in Turkey.
- Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest drone strike against Russia thus far in the war, striking the largest oil refinery in Russia over 2,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
- Russian officials are trying to present Russia as a willing negotiator and Ukraine as the obstacle to peace ahead of US President Donald Trump’s meetings with Ukraine and Europe at the July 7 to 8 NATO summit.
- Russia is engaging in increasingly risky kinetic behaviors against NATO member states as part of its “Phase Zero” condition-setting campaign.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline for more information about Ukrainian operations in Russia.
Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian S-400 Triumph air defense system in Kosenki, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 96 kilometers from the international border).[37]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Ukrainian forces shelling a Russian position north of Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 6 that Russian forces advanced north and west of Kharkivka (northwest of Sumy City) and west of Komarivka.[39]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Reconnaissance and Strike Center (subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast, the first evidence ISW has observed of this unit’s existence.[40] Mobile fire groups of the BARS-Bryansk volunteer detachment are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Sumy direction – the first time ISW has observed this detachment operating on the frontline.[41]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Volokhivske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[43]
Russian forces are intensifying small infantry assaults and air strikes in Kharkiv Oblast. The inspector of a Ukrainian border commandant’s rapid response unit operating in Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 6 that Russian forces are intensifying small infantry group assaults and air strikes but that Russian forces remain unable to conduct large, mechanized assaults.[44]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 5 and 6 but did not advance.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 5 and 6 but did not advance.[47]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian railway overpass near occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline), which Russian forces use to transport personnel, weapons, and ammunition.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian drone depot near occupied Chervonopopivka (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline) and a military equipment concentration near occupied Pysarivka (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline).
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions southeast of Lyman. Geolocated footage published on July 5 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions west of Yampil (southeast of Lyman) in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated.[49]
Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes to set conditions for future offensives against Kramatorsk. The Kramatorsk City Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Kramatorsk on the morning of July 6, injuring three workers from Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK.[50] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces recently increased their use of guided glide bombs in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR).[51] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics from Chasiv Yar (southeast of Kramatorsk) but that Ukrainian forces kill or wound about 100 Russian soldiers every week.
Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 5 shows Ukrainian forces operating in central and northern Kostyantynivka in areas in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces advanced.[52]
Certain Russian milbloggers and prominent former pro-Russian Ukrainian separatists continue to deny the Kremlin’s claim that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin continued on July 6 to tout the alleged Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka.[53] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are now fighting in Osykove and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (both northwest of Kostyantynivka).[54] Another Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger supported the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces remain in Kostyantynivka and that Russian forces are struggling to clear the city, in part due to the prevalence of Ukrainian drones.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Kostyantynivka and that the situation resembles that with Pokrovsk, in which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized the town long before Russian forces had pushed Ukrainian forces out and before fighting in the town stopped.[56] Former pro-Russian separatist leader and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev claimed that none of his Russian military sources confirmed official reports that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka but noted that the situation is ambiguous as he cannot get in contact with any Russian assault troops in the city.[57] Gubarev claimed that Russian forces lost their potential to advance in the area a month ago due to heavy losses and Ukraine’s drone dominance, such that Russian forces have had to rely on small group infiltration tactics. Gubarev compared the situation with Kostyantynivka with that of Kupyansk, where Russian officials falsely claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement in late 2025 despite Ukrainian presence and tactical counterattacks. Russian authorities reportedly opened a case against Gubarev for “discrediting the Russian Armed Forces” in February 2026, likely for criticizing Russian officials, including Pushilin and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov.[58]
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in other parts of the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 5 shows a Russian servicemember operating on the western outskirts of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[59]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 5 and 6 but did not advance.[60] The Russian MoD claimed on July 6 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 guided glide bomb strike against Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[61]
Ukrainian forces continue drone strikes against Russian military assets within and around Pokrovsk. Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on July 6 that Ukrainian drone pilots struck Russian drone, fuel and lubricant, and ammunition warehouses in southern Pokrovsk and a Russian temporary deployment point and logistics depot in Novooleksandrivka (east of Pokrovsk about 25 kilometers from the front).[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 5 and 6 but did not advance.[63]
A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are advancing east of Oleksandrivka. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 6 that Ukrainian forces seized Piddubne and advanced into central Voskresenka and into Myrne (all east of Oleksandrivka).[64] The presence of Ukrainian forces in Myrne indicates that Russian forces do not control any part of the settlement, as ISW has previously assessed. French open-source analyst Clement Molin reported on July 4 that analysis of airstrikes and recent satellite images show that Ukrainian forces entered Piddubne and may have entered Myrne.[65]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions west of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position southwest of Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole) in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 5 and 6 but did not advance.[67] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 6 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian fuel and lubricants warehouse near Zaporizhzhia City.[68]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukraine’s Berdyansk City Military Administration reported on July 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Azovkabel plant in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline), which Russian forces used to house military personnel.[69]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 6.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian fuel tankers along the M-17 Kalanchak-Armyansk highway east of Kalanchak (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline).[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea, causing continued power outages. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 6 that Ukrainian forces struck tanks with petroleum products at the TES-Terminal-1 oil depot in occupied Kerch (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline), which Russia uses to transship fuel oil, liquefied gas, and light petroleum products across the Kerch Strait, on the night of July 5 to 6.[71] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 6 that it struck and destroyed two rare Russian Orion strike and reconnaissance drones in occupied Kerch on July 2, which carry Kh-50, Kh-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Banderol loitering munitions and guided bombs.[72] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 6 that Ukrainian forces struck 47 targets in occupied Crimea on the night of July 5 to 6, including the 330 kV Simferopolska electrical substation in occupied Simferopol (roughly 205 kilometers from the frontline); two Russian shadow fleet tankers transporting 7,000 tons of fuel each from Taganrog Oblast to occupied Crimea through the Sea of Azov; two Russian S-400 air defense systems in occupied Kerch (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline); and a Nebo-U radar station in occupied Kerch.[73] Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo reported massive power outages throughout Crimea on July 6, likely due to Ukrainian strikes.[74] Crimean occupation authorities similarly reported temporary power outages in southern Crimea and Simferopol on July 6 likely due to Ukrainian strikes.[75]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text.
Russian forces are expanding their strike campaign against Ukrainian gas stations and gas production facilities. Ukrainian officials reported on July 5 and 6 that Russian forces struck gas stations in Zaporizhia and Mykolaiv oblasts.[76] Chernihiv Oblast governor Vyacheslav Chaus reported that Russian forces struck gas stations in Chernihiv Oblast at least 25 times in the last two months.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 6 that Russian drones struck gas production sites in Poltava, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts for the second day in a row. Russian forces appear to be systematically targeting the Sumy and Dnipro-Donetsk gas production sectors, which together account for the majority of Ukraine’s fuel production.[78] A Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance servicemember reported on July 6 that Russian forces are ramping up their strike campaign on gas stations in frontline oblasts.[79] Ukrainian West Oil Group (WOG) gas station chain CEO Andrei Pivovarsky stated on June 25 that Ukraine’s diversified fuel market has ensured a resilient fuel supply despite Russian forces expanding the geography of their strike campaign against Ukrainian fuel infrastructure.[80] Russian forces are increasingly striking gas stations in Ukraine as part of a concerted strike campaign aiming to replicate the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure.[81]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko blamed the European Union (EU) and Ukraine for prolonging the war in Ukraine, while reiterating Belarus’ alleged commitment to a peaceful resolution. Lukashenko claimed on July 6 that the EU has openly embarked on a course of militarization and is only nominally committed to peace.[82] Lukashenko claimed that the West is waging hybrid war against Belarus, using economic, political and information pressure, espionage and provocations on Belarus’ southern borders. Lukashenko claimed that Belarus in alliance with Russia is committed to a peaceful resolution of the war but reaffirmed that Belarus is not going to deploy Belarusian forces to the frontline.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
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[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19804
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[4] https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/2074141238828167275; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/2074199451464356273
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[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/65337; https://t.me/mod_russia/65342
[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19806
[8] https://t.me/zedigital/6863
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[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/65350
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/
[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40828:
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[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40827
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[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40827
[21] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24523 ; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2074075444693856712 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2074080410074489193 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinski-drony-atakuvaly-luzkyj-poligon-u-leningradskij-oblasti/
[22] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/10969
[23] https://verstka dot media/kreml-potreboval-ot-smi-ne-publikovat-posledstviya-atak-vsu?__cf_chl_f_tk=rstuGwVwxSdGtWBlWC_ThBUkFXtJ.oHs9yL1U8u7jDc-1783351805-1.0.1.1-pKYdMH5Ohe0jh0zWBJUkeIstb32kTX15hD4xTmuhTi4; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9212
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/;
[26] https://youtu.be/FgBPU_QWJmA ; https://suspilne dot media/1348664-tramp-zaaviv-so-putin-vidcuvae-tisk-i-hoce-zaversiti-vijnu-proti-ukraini/
[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-meet-leaders-ukraine-syria-alongside-nato-summit-2026-07-05/
[28] https://tass dot ru/politika/27891353
[29] https://t.me/alexchepa_duma/4788
[30] https://ldpr dot ru/event/slutskiy-nazval-telefonnyy-razgovor-putina-i-trampa-vazhneyshim-signalom-dlya-evropeyskikh-yastrebov/
[31] https://www.c-span.org/program/news-conference/secretary-of-state-rubio-speaks-with-reporters-in-bahrain/681714 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://www.elysee dot fr/en/G7evian/2026/06/17/g7-leaders-statement-on-geopolitical-issues ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[33] https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-intercepted-russian-aircraft-nato-arctic-mission/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/
[35] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/jun/16/russian-shadow-tanker-captain-ajay-pant-remanded-into-custody ; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/06/16/russian-warship-fired-warning-shot-at-yacht-in-channel/ ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20yzm84r7lo
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/
[37] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2074087639691468820 ; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2074086318015988158 ; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2074093485691449615
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12415; https://t.me/shadow_strike_27/1031
[39] https://t.me/divgen/82218
[40] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6712
[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/65344
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40829; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40796; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40794; https://t.me/wargonzo/35309; https://t.me/motopatriot78/53366; https://t.me/dva_majors/95693; https://t.me/severnnyi/8597; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73308;
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/53403
[44] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1348492-kharkivshchyna-front-rf-aviatsiya-taktika/
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40796; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40794;
[46] https://t.me/ombr41/2840; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12416
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40794 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35309 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19067
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40827
[49] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2073925583319544124; https://t.me/BV25org/2936
[50] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1348274-okupanti-atakuvali-brigadu-dtek-v-kramatorsku-e-poraneni-energetiki/; https://www.facebook.com/kramatorsk.rada/posts/pfbid02cy45GoeWufmWbww6aujSGi52taf1xkVi53WDhpGCZwcXj2acsurU8qPbGodM3tmTl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/06/unaslidok-aviaudaru-rf-po-kramatorsku-postrazhdaly-troye-praczivnykiv-dtek/ ; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/26971
[51] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1347846-bulo-neprosto-stalo-kriticno-skladno-okupanti-tisnut-na-kramatorskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL9aDK_7u4r7fdqmAI1MCnnaps2knOndKw
[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073784228869750872; https://t.me/armycorps19/302
[53] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/pushilin-vsu-sdelali-iz-konstantinovki-nastoyashchuyu-krepost
[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/35309
[55] https://t.me/rybar/81546
[56] https://t.me/milinfolive/175501; https://t.me/milinfolive/175506
[57] https://t.me/pgubarev/1642
[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/
[59] https://t.me/feniksdpsu/2115; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2074126865908834430
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40829 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40794
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/65349
[62] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1348462-desantniki-otrimali-na-ozbroenna-ukrainski-droni-fp-2-ta-urazili-nimi-sklad-armii-rf-v-pokrovsku/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1173886958264850?locale=uk_UA
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40829 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40794
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/53420
[65] https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2073450068829483286?s=20
[66] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2073937241672479087; https://t.me/voin_dv/20097
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40794 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35309
[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/65341
[69] https://t.me/bmvabrzo/11415 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1348078-sili-oboroni-atakuvali-zavod-azovkabel-u-timcasovo-okupovanomu-berdansku-na-zaporizzi/
[70] https://x.com/markito0171/status/2074075402167787942?s=20 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2074100606541717727?s=20 ; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10089
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40827 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104000; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/103990
[72] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8853
[73] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2562 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2166 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104009; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/103985
[74] https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/1101381
[75] https://t.me/rk_gov/45261 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/383913 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/22060
[76] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/67935; https://t.me/astrapress/117816 ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02BeBGYvTnLY2gG1C5Nphgerpox5sMSapsJrkrcFkAACbDCPfn2MucnMTYnYnr9R8Vl; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1347968-sestero-poranenih-poskodzeno-budinok-i-azs-armia-rf-atakuvala-mikolaivsinu-sahedami-i-fpv-dronami/; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1347902-poraneno-zinku-armia-rf-atakuvala-mikolaivskij-rajon-sahedami/; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/22277
[77] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30358
[78] https://t.me/sashakots/62933
[79] https://www.facebook.com/100001207563892/posts/27824912150465664/?mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=kN0h3ZbTBfGd32bQ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/31024
[80] https://www.facebook.com/andrei.pivovarsky/posts/pfbid0YMvNK1WXo21VmU93pGoypXBFejiWc5qi8UuYtGK9XmNvTWG3YTeXf9Zx1wh1VCrml
[81] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/
[82] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-k-zatjagivaniju-vooruzhennogo-protivostojanija-v-ukraine-vsemi-silami-stremitsja-partija-789842-2026/
