Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials are reiterating Russia’s commitment to its original war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation as Ukraine, the United States, and Europe appear ready to restart negotiations to end the war. Putin claimed on June 23 that Russia is ready for peace talks with Ukraine but noted that Russia will only negotiate on the basis of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the alleged August 2025 Anchorage understandings with the United States — all of which amount to demands for Ukrainian capitulation.[1] Russia’s demands, as articulated in the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed severe limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance, while failing to impose any restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[2] The parties notably negotiated the Istanbul Protocols in March and April 2022 under starkly different battlefield conditions compared to those in 2026, as Russia was advancing on Kyiv City and held significant portions of northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine, and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Putin’s June 2024 speech committed to similar maximalist goals: Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the abandonment of Ukraine’s NATO accession aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and start peace negotiations.[3] Russian officials have routinely invoked the alleged “Anchorage agreements” following the US-Russian meetings in Alaska in August 2025 in order to advance narratives about Russia’s willingness to negotiate, despite the lack of public statements following the summit.[4] Putin’s June 23 statements, therefore, represent his view of the maximalist position from which he will start any renewed peace talks.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly stated on June 23 that Russia will achieve all of its war objectives, including Ukraine’s neutrality and non-nuclear status, the elimination of alleged “discriminatory” laws against the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and Ukrainian respect for the illegal sham Russian referendums in occupied Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts.[5] Lavrov’s list of Russia’s war objectives mirrors Kremlin narratives about Russia’s commitment to eliminating the alleged “root causes” of the war.[6] Both Putin’s and Lavrov’s statements are reiterations of Russia’s original war aims from 2022 that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation, effectively signaling that any peace deal that does not address Russian demands of not only Ukraine but also of NATO and the West will not satisfy Russia.
Putin continues to rely on a negotiating tactic that aims to falsely portray the Russian military as on the verge of collapsing Ukrainian defenses. Putin claimed on June 23 that future peace negotiations must take into consideration the current “battlefield realities,” a long-used Kremlin expression to refer to Russian gains on the battlefield, which all available evidence suggests are largely incremental and gradual.[7] Kremlin officials use the phrase in an attempt to paint the Ukrainian front as collapsing, such that Ukraine and its partners should capitulate to Russia’s demands now out of fear of further Russian offensives.[8] Putin’s June 23 reference to the alleged “battlefield realities” ignores, however, the fact that Russia’s rate of advance has been steadily declining since November 2025 and that Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is increasingly inhibiting Russian logistics across occupied Ukraine in ways that are beginning to manifest on the frontline.[9]
The Kremlin is conducting a cognitive warfare campaign to frame potential Ukrainian strikes against legitimate Belarusian targets that support Russian military operations as a Ukrainian escalation against Belarus and the Union State. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used a roundtable with Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Yuri Seliverstov on June 23 to comment on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent requests that Belarus remove signal repeater stations from the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and warnings that Ukraine will target this equipment if Belarus fails to do so.[10] Lavrov claimed that Zelensky’s requests and European support for these requests are attempts to draw Belarus into Russia’s war in Ukraine.[11] Lavrov claimed that Russia is prepared to use the ”full range of measures” under the Russian-Belarusian Union State treaty on security guarantees, which enables Russia and Belarus to employ military force to ensure their security. Seliverstov notably did not repeat any of Lavrov’s talking points regarding Ukrainian requests of Belarus, and Seliverstov’s response is consistent with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s June 15 denial that Belarus would commit forces to the war in Ukraine.[12]
Signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border enable Russian forces to conduct precision drone strikes against the Ukrainian deep-rear and therefore would represent a legitimate military target for potential Ukrainian strikes. Zelensky noted on June 21 that four Russian-installed repeater stations in Gomel and Brest oblasts allow Russian forces to fly guided drones at extended ranges and to conduct drone strikes against energy, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts.[13] Zelensky previously reported in December 2025 that Russian forces used Belarusian territory to bypass Ukrainian drone interception systems and credited the increase in Russian Shahed drone strikes against western Ukraine to Russia’s exploitation of Belarusian territory and technical assets.[14] Zelensky subsequently reported that Russian forces carried out precision drone strikes against a locomotive in Volyn Oblast, and ISW reported that Russia had been increasingly targeting trains and railway infrastructure since Summer 2025 to undermine Ukraine’s logistics.[15] Russian forces are increasingly leveraging Belarusian territory, airspace, and repeaters to conduct precise strikes against Ukrainian moving targets, critical infrastructure, and logistics. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on June 23 that Russian forces are increasingly prioritizing strikes against Ukrainian rail logistics, particularly in western Ukraine and near Belarus.[16] The milblogger observed that Ukrainian authorities quickly restored damaged static facilities that Russian forces had been striking or found alternatives, so Russian forces are now increasingly striking rolling stock in order to take advantage of Ukraine’s shortages of locomotives and other types of trains that are expensive to restore. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces conducted 21 strikes against rolling stock between May 16 and June 20-21. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conduct most of the strikes in frontline regions and areas bordering Belarus, with Russian forces reportedly destroying more than 20 locomotives in Zhytomyr Oblast between May 31 and June 6.
Belarus has materially supported Russia’s war in Ukraine since 2022 and is effectively a cobelligerent with Russia. Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and has used Belarus as a sanctuary from which to launch its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[17] Russia also used Belarusian military infrastructure and airspace to launch missile, air, and Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine since 2022.[18] Belarus is key for Russia’s sanctions evasion schemes, and Russia and Belarus are increasingly integrating their economies via the Union State framework.[19] Any legitimate Ukrainian strike against Belarusian infrastructure that supports Russia’s war effort in Ukraine is therefore not inherently escalatory.
The Kremlin may attempt to invoke the Union State collective security treaty in an attempt to draw Belarus into the war so that Russia can leverage Belarusian manpower and training resources. ISW previously forecast that the Kremlin could attempt to use Belarus’ population as a recruitment base to offset the systemic manpower shortages that the Russian military has been facing since May 2022.[20] ISW also forecasted that the Kremlin could seek to recruit Belarusian citizens into the Russian military, particularly as Belarusians and Russians have a single citizenship status under the Union State Treaty and, in theory, have equal rights under Union State law.[21] The Kremlin could assert that Belarusians, therefore, also have the same civic duties and responsibilities under Union State law. Russian officials may one day insist that Belarusian subjects of a de facto annexed Belarus serve within the Russian military or within Russian-controlled Union State military formations under a uniform Union State law.
Russian gains in Kostyantynivka remain limited to small group infiltrations that are not resulting in consolidated territorial control. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 23 that Russian forces are advancing on all areas of the frontline and that Russian forces are “practically reaching” Kostyantynivka.[22] Putin dismissed Ukrainian official statements that the city is a contested “gray zone” but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in buildings and are counterattacking. The Russian MoD continued on June 23 its recent pattern of publishing hyper-tactical details of alleged Russian gains in Kostyantynivka in order to aggrandize Russia’s progress.[23] Ukraine’s tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD and Putin are falsely framing the seizure of Kostyantynivka as imminent. Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Deputy Commander Yuriy Madyar reported on June 23 that Ukrainian forces cleared areas south of Kostyantynivka with a “minimum” number of Russian servicemembers left in the area.[24] Madyar stated that Ukrainian forces are starting operations to push Russian servicemembers from central and western Kostyantynivka. Madyar stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are experiencing roughly 53 losses per day compared to Ukraine’s roughly three daily losses, and that Russian forces must walk 20 to 30 kilometers to get closer to Kostyantynivka as Ukrainian forces are heavily striking the surrounding areas. Madyar denied Russian claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in the city, reporting that there are many more Ukrainian servicemembers in Kostyantynivka than there are Russians. A Russian milblogger also noted that Russian forces are struggling to resupply positions near northern Kostyantynivka and are relying on drone drops.[25] Russian forces are increasingly infiltrating within Kostyantynivka, but these infiltrations do not amount to control of terrain in the doctrinal sense and will not enable Russian forces to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large.[26] Reports that Ukrainian forces are clearing Russian positions on Kostyantynivka’s southern flank further suggest that Russian forces are unable to consolidate their positions after infiltrating and will require more manpower to actually convert infiltrations into usable frontline positions. Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare efforts surrounding the Kostyantynivka direction, including the promotion of AI-generated footage alleging successes on the ground, aim to saturate the information space with false claims about the Russian military’s successes and ability to collapse the Ukrainian lines in the near future.[27]
Kremlin officials acknowledged Ukraine’s escalating long-range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure but downplayed their country-wide impact on fuel supplies. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 23 that Ukrainian forces are conducting large-scale drone strikes against claimed civilian infrastructure in Russia and that these drones have an unspecified “massive impact.”[28] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces conduct the drone strikes to destabilize the Russian society, deflect from alleged Russian battlefield advances, and cast doubt about the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, possibly referring to the Russian military’s increasing inability to protect critical infrastructure from strikes across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Putin also attempted to downplay Ukrainian strike capabilities by claiming that the “entire West is working” to facilitate these strikes. Ukrainian forces have recently intensified their long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, including striking the Moscow Oil Refinery on June 18, and Putin is likely trying to vaguely address the growing concerns in Russian society about Ukrainian strikes and growing criticism of the Kremlin’s failure to repel Ukrainian strikes.[29]
Kremlin officials similarly acknowledged that Russia is increasingly facing fuel shortages but likely deliberately avoided connecting these shortages to the intensifying Ukrainian strike campaign. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated during a meeting with Putin on June 23 that the current situation on the Russian fuel market is challenging but manageable and noted that the Russian government is taking the necessary measures to ensure stable fuel supplies.[30] Novak reported that Russian authorities instituted a complete ban on gasoline and jet fuel exports, are considering banning diesel exports, and are introducing changes to the tax legislation to help the domestic gasoline market handle increased fuel demand. Novak noted that Russian oil refineries are delaying maintenance work and increasing production rates, and that Russia is using previously untapped fuel reserves to meet the rising market demand. Novak added that Russian state-owned oil companies bear the main burden of supplying fuel for the domestic market and that the Russian government is monitoring gasoline prices. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 23 that all global economies, including Russia, are impacted by the current oil price volatility.[31] Peskov is using the global oil irregularities to explain away Russian domestic gasoline shortages while refusing to acknowledge the direct impact that Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure have had on domestic fuel shortages. Russian officials have implemented gasoline restrictions across many Russian regions stretching as far east as Kamchatka Krai since the beginning of June 2026.[32] The Kremlin will likely continue to struggle to uniformly mitigate domestic gasoline shortages in the short- to medium-term, given that intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely continue to exacerbate existing shortages.[33]
The Kremlin continues threatening retaliatory strikes against Ukraine, likely to project strength amid growing domestic gasoline supply shortages. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on June 23 that the previous Russian warning for all foreign embassies to evacuate from Kyiv City remains in effect, indirectly threatening that Russia would launch another devastating large strike package against Ukraine in the near future.[34]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials are reiterating Russia’s commitment to its original war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation as Ukraine, the United States, and Europe appear ready to restart negotiations to end the war.
- Putin continues to rely on a negotiating tactic that aims to falsely portray the Russian military as on the verge of collapsing Ukrainian defenses.
- The Kremlin is conducting a cognitive warfare campaign to frame potential Ukrainian strikes against legitimate Belarusian targets that support Russian military operations as a Ukrainian escalation against Belarus and the Union State.
- Signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border enable Russian forces to conduct precision drone strikes against the Ukrainian deep-rear and therefore would represent a legitimate military target for potential Ukrainian strikes.
- Belarus has materially supported Russia’s war in Ukraine since 2022 and is effectively a cobelligerent with Russia.
- The Kremlin may attempt to invoke the Union State collective security treaty in an attempt to draw Belarus into the war so that Russia can leverage Belarusian manpower and training resources.
- Russian gains in Kostyantynivka remain limited to small group infiltrations that are not resulting in consolidated territorial control.
- Kremlin officials acknowledged Ukraine’s escalating long-range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure but downplayed their country-wide impact on fuel supplies.
- The Kremlin continues threatening retaliatory strikes against Ukraine, likely to project strength amid growing domestic gasoline supply shortages.
- Ukrainian forces regained some positions in Kostyantynivka.
- Russian forces launched 135 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian officials continue to pursue solutions to repel Ukrainian long-range drone strikes. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko announced on June 23 one-time payments of 250,000 rubles ($3,356) to new mobile fire group recruits and bonus payments of 100,000 rubles ($1,342) for each Ukrainian drone the soldiers intercept.[35]
Geolocated imagery published on June 23 shows the aftermath of a possible Ukrainian strike on the Alekseyevsky Building Materials Plant in Alekseyevka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 128 kilometers from the international border).[36] Russian opposition source Astra reported that there was a missile alert in Belgorod Oblast before the strike on the plant.[37]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember north of Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 22 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman, Starytsya, and Vovchansk (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[40]
Ukrainian authorities are working to protect Kharkiv Oblast from Russia’s expanding first-person view (FPV) drone strike campaign. Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on June 23 that Ukrainian authorities are installing anti-drone nets in and near Kharkiv City.[41] Synehubov stated that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones with a range of 30 kilometers and that the range will likely continue to grow. Synehubov noted that Russian forces conducted over 9,000 drone strikes against Kharkiv Oblast from May 1 to June 22 and that Russian forces used 130 drones that Ukrainian authorities have not yet identified.
Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked northeast and southeast of Velykyi Burluk. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted infiltration missions near and within Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on June 22 and 23 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in northeastern and eastern Kupyansk and north of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi after what ISW assesses was also a Russian infiltration mission.[44]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in western Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova), indicating Ukrainian presence in the area contrary to previous Russian claims.[45]
Ukrainian forces continue interdicting Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 23 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian transport logistics in an unspecified location in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces in the Lyman direction are reportedly beginning to suffer from fuel supply issues due to Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on June 23 that Russian forces intensified attacks in the Lyman direction in an effort to advance north of the town, but are starting to face fuel supply issues due to Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[47] Trehubov assessed that Russian forces are intensifying their attacks in the area at the peak of their summer campaign in order to advance before their issues with supplies, including fuel and lubricants, start to generate more detrimental effects.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command appointed Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Zolin, who previously served as commander of the Russian 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), as the new commander of the 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division).[48] ISW last observed reports of the 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Lyman direction in May and June 2026.[49]
Russian forces continue to infiltrate into Kostyantynivka as Ukrainian forces regained some positions in the city. Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in a cemetery on the outskirts of northwestern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[50] Geolocated footage published on June 22 and 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in western Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[51]
See topline for more information about the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya tactical area. Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Russian forces conducting a guided FAB-500 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions in northern Dobropillya.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 22 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a Ukrainian drone control point and a temporary deployment point near Hannivka (just east of Dobropillya) and Dobropillya.[53]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 22 to 23 but did not advance.[54] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[55]
Ukrainian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb strike against a Russian personnel concentration point just south of Udachne (southeast of Pokrovsk).[56]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on June 22 to 23 but did not advance.[57]
A Ukrainian deputy commander noted how artillery is not obsolete on the contemporary battlefield and will not become obsolete “for a very long time.”[58] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces continue to use artillery, especially during poor weather conditions or periods of active Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) that inhibit Ukrainian drone flights. The deputy commander stated that Ukrainian forces are also using mortars during difficult weather conditions when Russian forces struggle to detect them. The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are also intensely using artillery but almost never engage in counter-battery warfare except when using Giatsint-type self-propelled guns that have longer ranges and can operate further away.[59]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 23 that Ukrainian forces struck the “Dzerzhinsk” Training Ground for drone pilots of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near Debaltseve (roughly 49 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants tanker near Horlivka (roughly 29 kilometers from the frontline).[60] Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian military transport vehicles along the H-20 Donetsk City-Mariupol Highway east of Volnovakha (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[61] Additional geolocated footage published on June 22 shows a destroyed Russian vehicle along the E-50 Debaltseve-Donetsk City highway north of Korsun (roughly 40 from the frontline).[62]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukraine’s intermediate-range and frontline strike campaigns against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) are reportedly disrupting Russian supplies of ammunition and drones to the Hulyaipole direction. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on June 23 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs in southern Ukraine, including against the Chonhar Bridge connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea, have significantly reduced the amount of supplies Russian forces operating in Zaporizhia Oblast are receiving from Crimea.[63] The commander reported that Russian forces must travel 50 kilometers on foot to bring supplies to the front and noted that even motorcycles are not efficient as they often hit mines. The commander highlighted reduced Russian deliveries of ammunition and drones and assessed that Russian infantry transporting artillery by foot indicates that Russian forces cannot effectively deliver ammunition to the front. The commander added that the number of Russian reconnaissance drones operating in the Hulyaipole direction has decreased by two-thirds in an unspecified time frame.
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 22 and 23 but did not advance.[64]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 23, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics transport vehicle in occupied Pryazovske (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline).[65]
Russian forces are reportedly targeting Ukrainian gas stations in unoccupied western Zaporizhia Oblast, likely in response to Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure that are causing massive gasoline shortages. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 23 that Russian forces struck a gas station in Zaporizhzhia City.[66]
Russian forces are reportedly recruiting personnel to protect against Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes in occupied areas. Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated on June 23 that the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment), which Rogozin oversees, is recruiting truck drivers, gunsmiths, drone interceptor operators, and infantrymen to shoot down Ukrainian drones that are disrupting Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine and Crimea.[67] Rogozhin stated that the BARS-Sarmat Center will provide an unspecified financial reward to recruits for all the drones they down.
Russian forces conducted a double tap strike against rescue workers in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (west of Orikhiv). The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on June 23 that Russian forces struck first responders who were responding to a Russian strike against Nikopol.[68]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 23.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 23 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian logistics transport in an unspecified area of occupied Kherson Oblast.[69] Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck along the M-18 Melitopol-Dzhankoi highway south of Novyi Myr (roughly 112 kilometers from the frontline).[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against logistics in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces conducted intermediate-range strikes against over 60 Russian targets in Crimea on the night of June 22 to 23.[71] Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian Orion reconnaissance drones and a Nebo-U radar station in Kerch (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline); fuel storage tanks at the Kerch Thermal Power Plant (TPP); a Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Baherove (just west of Kerch); an S-300 air defense launcher and a ZU-23 anti-aircraft autocannon near Kurortne (likely referring to the settlement just northwest of Kerch); an electrical substation near Karierne (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline); and the Simferopol gas distribution station near Trudove (either roughly 170 or 210 kilometers from the frontline). The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported a fire at the Kerch TPP on June 23, and geolocated footage published on June 23 confirms the strikes on the S-300 launcher near Kurortne and the Orion drones near Kerch.[72] Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reported that strikes on the Kerch TPP caused a fire at oil product tanks and power outages in several raions of Crimea.[73]
Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on June 23 that Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes and resistance groups destroyed the railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal near Rozdolne (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline) that Russian forces used to transport military cargo to support troops in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.[74] The SSO noted that Ukrainian forces struck the bridge on the night of June 21 to 22, that resistance groups reported the deployment of Russian rail repair equipment to the area, and that Ukrainian drones then struck the equipment and the bridge again on the night of June 22 to 23. Geolocated footage published on June 23 confirms the second strike against the bridge.[75]
Ukraine’s strike campaign continues to cause supply disruptions and other issues in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 22 that occupied Crimea is starting to have electricity and water issues, as there are power outages affecting critical equipment operations at the state water enterprise in Crimea.[76] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 23 that the families of Black Sea Fleet (BSF) servicemembers in occupied Crimea are trying to leave for Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and that there are traffic jams in both directions on the Kerch Bridge.[77] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu responded on June 23 to a question about Ukrainian strikes against Crimea, claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), regional governors, the defense industrial base (DIB), and other Russian ministries are working on countermeasures to the strikes.[78] Shoigu noted that Ukrainian forces will only improve their strike capabilities when Russian forces improve their air defenses, acknowledging the offense-defense war that has characterized Russia’s full-scale invasion thus far.
Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russian forces are withdrawing from their limited positions on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast due to supply issues. Ukraine’s Odesa Operational Tactical Group Commander Colonel Denys Nosikov reported on June 22 that the Russian military command is evacuating some Russian units from the Kinburn Spit after Ukrainian strikes had disrupted logistics in the area.[79] Nosikov noted that Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign has degraded Russia’s ability to sustain its presence on the spit and that supplies of ammunition, food, and fuel have effectively stopped. ISW observed unconfirmed reports on June 8 that elements of the Russian 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) were abandoning their positions on the northern and western parts of the Kinburn Spit due to “completely disrupted” supplies.[80] Russian forces have previously used their limited positions on the Kinburn Spit to conduct artillery strikes against Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast (four kilometers from the tip of the spit across the Dniprovska Gulf).[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 21 to 22 that particularly targeted energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 135 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 118 drones, that 13 drones hit 11 locations, and that drone debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and a gas station in Zaporizhia Oblast.[83] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian forces struck an energy facility in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight and caused power outages.[84] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported on June 23 that Russian shelling against energy infrastructure and hostilities also caused power outages in Zaporizhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[85]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also conducted an Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, during the day on June 23, damaging industrial, transport, educational, cultural, and residential infrastructure and killing at least three people and injuring 23.[86]
Russian forces are reportedly using Starlink-enabled naval drones to try to strike the Ukrainian Black Sea coast. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on June 23 that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to strike the Ukrainian coast with several unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the early morning.[87] Beskrestnov reported that Ukrainian forces detected and destroyed the USVs at sea and that Russian forces had installed Starlink systems on the destroyed USVs, as Russia does not have other long-range control systems.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
See topline text.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80090
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-of-april-15-2022/; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-… ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november… https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december… https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-… https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-… https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/
[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/27847203
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/;
[7] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80090
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19559; https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2121604/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121604/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121599/
[11] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2121604/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121604/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121599/
[12]https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2121604/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121604/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121599/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-22/
[13] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19565; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/
[16] https://t.me/rybar/81286
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_18-24/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf
[21] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf
[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80089
[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/64863 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/
[24] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1337770-v-kostantinivci-trivae-zacistka-okupantiv-aki-pronikli-v-misto-oficer-19-korpusu/
[25] https://t.me/DKulko/1697
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ;
[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80089
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/
[30] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80090
[31] https://tass dot com/politics/2150295 ;
[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/381924; https://t.me/idelrealii/45429; https://t.me/TravnikovAndrey/3113; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61198; https://t.me/idelrealii/45427; https://t.me/sotaproject/114895; https://t.me/astrapress/116504 ; https://t.me/omelnichenko/10251; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61215; https://t.me/idelrealii/45429; https://t.me/sotaproject/114903; https://t.me/astrapress/116516 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96378; https://t.me/kobzevii/16098; https://t.me/sibrealii/37607; https://t.me/idelrealii/45427; https://t.me/dva_majors/94992; https://t.me/tvknew/79108; https://t.me/sibrealii/37607; https://t.me/idelrealii/45427; https://t.me/astrapress/116483 ; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2026/06/23/76493815/; https://t.me/sotaproject/114915; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96348 ; https://t.me/AoMurmansk/36883; https://t.me/sotaproject/114921; https://t.me/astrapress/116541 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117706 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96395 ; https://t.me/HocenkoVP/8377; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117654; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/1701; https://ru dot themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/23/ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-benzina-vveli-v-glavnom-neftyanom-regione-rossii-a198929; https://suspilne dot media/1338104-deficit-palnogo-ohopiv-golovni-naftovi-regioni-rf/; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/65439; http://rbc dot ru/economics/23/06/2026/6a3a04ec9a7947915661d20b?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=rbc_news&utm_content=6a3a04ec9a7947915661d20b&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.me%2F; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8762515; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/55517
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/
[34] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2121604/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/
[35] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/10821
[36] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2069348835537678682; https://t.me/astrapress/116507; https://t.me/supernova_plus/54366; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/2069332389357105396; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2069327637432979561
[37] https://t.me/astrapress/116507
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12263; https://www.facebook.com/reel/869612735763056; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2069218623621677304
[39] https://t.me/mpe1488/123; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12266
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44505
[41] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1337652-dumaemo-pro-ce-u-harkovi-mozut-pocati-vstanovluvati-antidronovi-sitki-cerez-udari-fpv-droniv/; youtube.com/watch?v=V-Og-Dm6suM&source_ve_path=OTY3MTQ&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44553
[43] https://t.me/kcaebirds/3102; https://t.me/Osintpen/3014; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12270
[44] https://t.me/nebesnamara/348; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2069151926428557756
[45] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2069293306996281407; https://t.me/endspiell/3725
[46] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515
[47] https://suspilne dot media/1337322-sili-oboroni-vdarili-po-zavodu-v-rf-v-krimu-pocali-vvoditi-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla-1581-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1782206718&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[48] https://t.me/grvZapad/18935
[49] https://t.me/gvZapad/18463 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18496 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/18892 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3438
[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12265; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/2954; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2069401800461922443
[51] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2069316417648820272; https://t.me/mod_russia/64856; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2069314395742916966 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117679
[52] https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2069362952843546853; https://x.com/lostarmour/status/2069086027373773130; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2069380754027450431; https://t.me/lost_armour/9988; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2069362061541543981; https://t.me/Sib_army/10851
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/64849
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40338; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40317; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40315; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117671; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52925; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44558; https://t.me/wargonzo/35008
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52925
[56] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36646; https://t.me/soniah_hub/16520
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40338; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40317; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40315; https://t.me/voin_dv/19918
[58] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/23/minomet-mozhna-i-ponesty-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-ukrayinski-artylerysty-ne-sydyat-bez-roboty/
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/23/minomet-mozhna-i-ponesty-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-ukrayinski-artylerysty-ne-sydyat-bez-roboty/
[60] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1336104-ukrainski-vijskovi-pokazali-ak-atakuvali-poligon-bpla-armii-rf-v-okupovanomu-debalcevomu/
[61] https://www.facebook.com/ngu3017?__cft__[0]=AZarvkLaMdV7wc8Gl_xhQ2oysG3UC2Z1f0b48AB183ML50-rq_a7Kxg4XgsGEKQzJn746onp45r8-OKhw1S3es3O3xMVHPLh4CDFgq0UKcYjRLz3iCiSFJWueupMqmJt4-2BDqkLLNGrmUBpmSBLMVfsN4HROQq-e_qxEdfa2Xw_aIaamTKPI-Umy6YaJfA56z9MfkheADkb1FvdxXSh1iId&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/22/trasa-doneczk-mariupol-pid-vognevym-kontrolem-brygady-spartan-drony-urazhayut-transport-okupantiv/; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2069064718388519394 ; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/3169; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36684;
[62] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2069136191941652948; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2069205585778929760
[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/23/hodyat-pishky-50-kilometriv-nosyat-na-sobi-snaryady-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-trishhyt-vorozha-logistyka/
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40317 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40315 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35008
[65] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2069376005458829770?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2069361989697032635?s=20; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515 ; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2069367467541959131
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44535
[67] https://t.me/rogozin_do/8665
[68] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/66713; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/23/u-nikopoli-rosiyany-vdruge-vdaryly-po-ryatuvalnykah-pid-chas-likvidacziyi-naslidkiv-obstrilu/
[69] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515
[70] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8741 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1337500-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-bijci-gur-znisili-rosijski-vijskovi-vantazivki-na-slahu-do-krimu/; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2069344401797583227?s=20; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2069322411233759345?s=20
[71] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515
[72] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102865; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2069424198875754540; https://x.com/usf_army/status/2069370564691558760; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2069370278832967939?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2069361989697032635?s=20; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2515; https://x.com/Noobieshunta_/status/2069372383144648958; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2069409337051578722 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2069409344433553722
[73] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1417279260446095&set=pb.100064921021431.-2207520000
[74] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2990
[75] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36678; https://x.com/SOF_UKR/status/2069392800236343664; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2069393094491898185?s=20; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2990 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7722
[76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3464
[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/23/rodyny-vijskovosluzhbovcziv-chornomorskogo-flotu-rf-tikayut-iz-krymu/
[78] https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/1097819
[79] https://united24media dot com/war-in-ukraine/russian-troops-forced-to-withdraw-from-strategic-black-sea-peninsula-20074
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/
[81] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-17/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-17/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-17/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-24/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_57/
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/66046
[83] https://t.me/odeskaODA/16989; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2551; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/59031; https://t.me/astrapress/116520; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid0kpTGe9vANQMkGYk5WjPy92zXhUYZE6LtAtDV9KbAE7ffg5sQHxF9Dxzg5fEAA967l?__cft__[0]=AZb2gOaP9nCHJ1sr24a7EhOgzcRjTp_q38Okuf6aDd56XJ_-_Xi0ADAWAypF95hxX1NM0aONOSkPK59szEWvUkM1HNiHQfa40Ghtf7wNfNk4–wpyG8ldVkEknAlZc_hwV_RslU0yZQDmnzQVnS79zHAVqzdcJMmE7U6RnMtiaJ7bQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1337594-na-odesini-cerez-obstril-zalisilasa-bez-svitla-51-tisaca-rodin/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/42498 ;
[84] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4374
[85] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7259
[86] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30356; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30358; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30359; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30360; https://t.me/vilkul/16815; https://t.me/vilkul/16816
[87] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7512
