Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party’s inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Putin stated that the United Russia Party has a duty to do “everything possible to achieve victory” in Ukraine.[1] Putin is continuing efforts to make United Russia the only party that matters and to charge it with executing his own ideological aims, moving it toward the position that the Communist Party occupied in the Soviet Union.[2] The elimination of the only nominally anti-war party, Yabloko, from the election was part of this effort.[3]
Charging United Russia to do everything possible to win the war in Ukraine also furthers Putin’s long-term efforts to cohere Russian society around a pro-war, hyper-nationalist state ideology, bypassing the constitutional constraints on the formal adoption of a Russian state ideology.[4] Making victory in the war against Ukraine the center of United Russia’s platform sets conditions for Putin to demand further significant sacrifices for the Russian war effort, claiming a “popular” electoral mandate to do so. Such sacrifices will likely include some form of involuntary reserve call ups and demands that Russians continue to accept the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes and massive casualties for minimal frontline gains. Putin’s insistence on making United Russia, the dominant party in Russia, a war party highlights the fact that he is not looking for an off-ramp in Ukraine and is extraordinarily unlikely to make compromises for peace unless compelled to do so. His efforts to cohere Russian politics and society around aggressive ultranationalism and revanchism will likely have effects even after Putin himself leaves the scene.
Putin framed Russia’s ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia’s lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions. Putin claimed in an August 22 interview that Russia’s intensified combined strike campaign against Ukraine disrupts Ukraine’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and supports Russia’s frontline forces.[5] Putin attempted to falsely portray Russia’s strike campaign as a direct response to Ukraine’s intensified long-range strikes since March 2026, despite Russia conducting a deliberate and consistent strike campaign against Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure since February 2022.[6] Putin highlighted the effects of Russia’s combined strike campaign against Ukraine, likely in an effort to offset Russia’s lack of any meaningful tactical successes and mounting socio-economic issues that even Putin himself cannot effectively conceal from the Russian public.
Putin continues preparing Russian society for a prolonged war in Ukraine despite incremental and gradual battlefield advances and mounting personnel losses. Putin falsely said in the interview that Russian forces continue advancing in all directions of the frontline at an increased pace.[7] Russian forces have, in fact, lost control of 27.09 square kilometers in August 2026 so far, not counting areas into which Russian troops may have infiltrated (but do not doctrinally control), according to the evidence that ISW has observed. Russian forces have seized or infiltrated 8.52 square kilometers in August 2026 so far at an average rate of 0.39 square kilometers per day. Russia’s rate of advance has been steadily declining since January 2026.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff’s reports of Russian casualties indicate that Russian forces suffered around 29,120 casualties from July 31 to August 22, 2022 – an average of 1,074 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized.[9] Putin’s lies about these fictional battlefield gains are likely meant to sustain Russian support for the war and willingness to make additional sacrifices for the supposed victory toward which Putin claims to be leading his people.
Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems. Putin said in his August 22 interview that Ukrainian long-range strikes inflict casualties and cause “economic damage.”[10] Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs President Alexander Shokhin stated on August 20 that Ukrainian drone strikes reduced Russia’s oil refining capacity by 25 to 30 percent and degraded mineral fertilizer and chemical production.[11] Shokhin noted that Ukrainian strikes against logistics infrastructure, such as Wildberries, affect both domestic and export-oriented Russian markets. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has significantly reduced Russian seaborne oil and grain exports and oil refining capacity, caused fuel shortages, and degraded Russian microelectronics production.[12] Putin acknowledged the need to improve Russia’s air defense system and expand its capabilities through coordination between state-owned enterprises and private businesses – admitting Russia’s failure to protect its vast territory against Ukrainian long-range strikes.[13] Putin is attempting to highlight his awareness of the current domestic problems while assuring the Russian public that Ukraine’s 40-day strike campaign to pressure Russia to negotiate has failed to achieve its desired outcome.[14] Putin is likely prepared to accept increasing economic hardship for Russian society, including for urban populations Putin previously sought to shield in Moscow and St. Petersburg, while pursuing his unchanged theory of victory, which rests on the premise that Russia can win a war of attrition and outlast both Ukraine’s ability to defend and Western support for Ukraine.[15]
Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin said that Ukraine’s and Europe’s peace proposals are “exotic” and “unacceptable” to Russia and noted that Russia will only participate in negotiations that reflect “ground realities.”[16] Putin appears to believe that Russia’s missile strike campaign will pressure Ukraine into surrendering to Russian maximalist demands amidst a global Patriot interceptor shortage. The Kremlin’s continued rejection of any meaningful peace proposals demonstrates Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate and aims to unite the Russian public around a pro-war platform ahead of the September State Duma elections.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises that actually are in line with battlefield realities, while Russian officials continue to reject proposals that fail to fulfill Russia’s maximalist demands for Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[18] Putin’s insistence on Russia’s ability to achieve all of his demands despite Russia’s battlefield failures and inability to defend its own domestic infrastructure renders his own negotiating position “exotic.”
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party’s inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia’s informal state ideology.
- Putin framed Russia’s ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia’s lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions.
- Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems.
- Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure.
- Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 271 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Oleksandrivka, and west of Orikhiv.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery in Samara City, Samara Oblast (roughly 900 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on August 21 to 22.[19] Geolocated footage published on August 22 shows smoke over the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery following Ukrainian strikes.[20] Ukrainian forces last struck the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery on April 18, 2026.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 22 shows damage to an Ozon (another Russian analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) logistics center in Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast (roughly 887 kilometers from the frontline) following Ukrainian strikes, and Ozon confirmed that a drone struck the warehouse.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified logistics facility in Samara Oblast.[23] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged on August 22 that Ukrainian forces had damaged both an unspecified industrial facility and an Ozon logistics center in Samara Oblast.[24] Several Russian sources claimed that this is the first Ukrainian strike against an Ozon facility; however, ISW observed evidence that Ukrainian forces struck an Ozon warehouse in Zelenodolsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 970 kilometers from the international border) on July 31, 2026.[25]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Yeysk oil-filling complex in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[26] Geolocated images published on August 22 show a large smoke plume at the Port of Yeysk.[27] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev acknowledged on August 22 that Ukrainian drones struck civilian and commercial infrastructure at Yeysk.[28]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Ukrainian strikes against a drone storage and launch site in Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, on August 20 to 21 damaged one Niobi radar station and 18 drone warehouses.[29]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on August 21 and 22 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked and reportedly advanced.[30] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 22 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and counterattacked near Yunakivka and Sadky (both northeast of Sumy City).[31]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 21 and 22 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[32] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 22 that Russian forces are attacking toward Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) from Veterynarne (northwest of Kozacha Lopan), likely to outflank the settlement from the west amid unsuccessful efforts to seize the settlement in attacks from the north and east of Kozacha Lopan since early June 2026.[33]
Some Russian forces in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts are reportedly disbanding tank units to prioritize drone and assault operations amid broader military reorganizations to optimize for positional warfare. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 22 that the Russian military command is disbanding the tank battalions of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), which is operating in northern Sumy Oblast, and of the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD), which is split between northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[34] The source claimed that the Russian military command is reallocating young servicemembers from these battalions to drone units and the remainder to assault units. The Russian military command has been reorganizing the military to optimize away from mechanized maneuver and toward positional warfare, and the reported disbanding of tank battalions in a positional sector of the frontline is an indicator that the Russian military command is doubling down on its current way of warfare in Ukraine.[35]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 22 but did not make confirmed advances.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 22 that Russian forces seized Kupyne and advanced east of Ustynivka and northeast of Khatnie (all northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 22 but did not make confirmed advances.[38] A source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced near Myrove (immediately west of Kupyansk), where Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.[39]
Russian and Ukrainian forces attacked southeast of Borova on August 21 and 22 but did not advance.[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 21 and 22 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Lyman direction.[41] Russian and Ukrainian forces continue interdicting each others’ logistics in the area.[42]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 22 that Russian forces advanced to central Fedorivka, in southeastern Virolyubivka, and west of Stinky (all north of Kostyantynivka).[44]
Russian sources continue to exaggerate claimed Russian advances in the Kostyantynivka direction by spreading disinformation about open-source material. Geolocated footage from a Russian milblogger published on August 21 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in central Kostyantynivka, but the milblogger claimed that the footage depicted Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[45] The Russian military command claimed to have seized Kostyantynivka as of July 3, 2026, and the milblogger is likely obfuscating the true location of the Ukrainian positions to avoid contradicting this claim and to falsely portray the frontline more favorably to Russian forces.[46] Russian newswire TASS recently falsely portrayed old footage of Russian strikes against Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka and Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka and behind the current frontline) as striking Ukrainian forces in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka.[47] Russian forces have been using a variety of informational tactics, including doctoring footage, lying about locations of combat and Russian advances, and using footage of infiltration missions to spread disinformation about a Russian presence in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and elsewhere in the theater, which ISW continues to assess is part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian gains.[48]
Russian forces are reportedly intensifying drone operations in the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya directions. A Ukrainian military source reported on August 21 that Russian forces are launching between 1,500 and 2,000 radio-controlled first-person view (FPV) drones against Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and two logistics routes to the city, and around 1,200 radio-controlled FPV drones in the Dobropillya direction (likely inclusive of the Pokrovsk direction) every 24 hours.[49] The source noted that it is impossible to count the number of Russian fiber-optic drones launched in these directions. Putiata added that Russian forces are constantly increasing the number of drones and drone operators in both directions.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 21 and 22 but did not advance.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 21 and 22 but did not make confirmed advances.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[52]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on August 22.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Oleksandrivka as Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 21 and 22.[53] Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhzhia (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[54]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest of Hulyaipole on August 21 and 22 but did not advance.[55]
A Ukrainian intermediate-range strike reportedly severely wounded a Russian brigade commander in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces regiment reported on August 22 that its drone operators recently struck a car carrying Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) Commander Colonel Dmitry Shabaev about 80 kilometers behind the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast.[56] The Ukrainian regiment reported that the strike severely wounded Shabaev and assessed that Shabaev will likely have to retire from military service if he survives his injuries. The Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade is operating in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[57]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Orikhiv. Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[58]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 22.
Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes are degrading energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea amidst Russia’s failure to protect the peninsula. Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo claimed on August 22 that it introduced energy restrictions across the entire occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian drone strikes on energy infrastructure.[59] Ukrainian forces have been intensely targeting energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea for weeks, and occupied Crimea has suffered extensive power outages in recent days.[60] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on August 22 that there were fires near the Perove Solar Park and a power substation near occupied Klyuchi (approximately 209 kilometers from the frontline).[61] The source also claimed that Ukrainian forces may have struck a tower atop Mount Pasha-Tepe near occupied Feodosia (approximately 243 kilometers from the frontline).[62] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 22 that the intensity of Ukrainian drone strikes on occupied Crimea increased fourfold since August 2025 and complained that authorities have failed to undertake adequate measures to counter the strikes.[63] The milblogger complained that “relevant agencies” – likely referring to the Russian Ministry of Defense – failed to improve coordination, weaponry, and competency of air defenses and are shifting this responsibility onto the heads of Russian federal subjects and occupied Ukrainian territories.
A Russian milblogger claimed on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the ferry Ural in the Black Sea.[64]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[65]
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 22 that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, including Iskander-M and S-400 missiles, and three Kh-31/Kh-59 cruise missiles from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Belgorod Oblast; and the Black Sea.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched an unspecified number of Banderol-type loitering munitions and 217 Shahed- (of which over 50 were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-31/Kh-59 cruise missiles, six Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 182 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones; that drones and missiles struck 41 locations; and that debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, postal, industrial, gasoline, energy, and port infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[67]
Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian railway infrastructure. Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) CEO Oleksandr Pertsovsk reported on August 22 that Russian forces struck a railway enterprise in Kyiv City and a train station hall in Odesa City on the night of August 21 to 22, killing one employee.[68] Geolocated footage published on August 22 shows Russian Geran (Shahed) drone strikes against two locomotives near Mykolaivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a third locomotive near Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast.[69]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 22 that the August 21 Russian double-tap strike against a shopping center in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, caused a 9,000 square-meter fire, killed 16 people, and injured 130, including 26 children.[70]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Several Russian Banderol loitering munitions reportedly exited Ukrainian airspace and entered Belarus during Russian strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 21 to 22. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on August 22 that several Russian Banderol loitering munitions left Ukrainian airspace and crossed the international border into Belarus and that the fate of the Banderols is unclear.[71] ISW is unable to confirm this report. Russian long-range drones have previously flown through Belarusian airspace before striking Ukraine and fallen in Belarusian territory.[72]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80570
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-19/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2026/;
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-3/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-2/
[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80572
[6] https://understandingwar.primer.ai/document/c9b0eaec-bd76-5a37-8a12-c896db91e762; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_2-29/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-11/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2026/;
[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80572
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/photos/%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D1%96-%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96-%D0%B2%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B7-240222-%D0%BF%D0%BE-310726-%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%96%D1%94%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8-the-estim/1398486955797712/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036akotwtYGenaD76rsXeStsr35wzF13MYaFJdYAyxpbD32FeCS4cyxt1SKr5YtuQGl?__cft__[0]=AZbJSumIyPAc2n9fU-twm-KZS3jARabtIHNbknmyg3Kpy1c7ytUXyfaJVNXFtsybTvsBCzPkfDhDePehtWt5ws87CFUQTMTkgknGaEmfQJFrHhi9sFah4TTpzncAZGWyQ1E3mHQ5utAFPnNUhpk3Vdtv2RveazGiqqR5SHLfUa0rKfEzNkCQyi9zCBxwfSgsmOc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily reports between July 31 and August 22, 2026.]
[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80572
[11] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/21/08/2026/6a86f5079a79477801fd1657
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/
[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80572
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-16/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/putins-theory-of-victory-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/
[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80572
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/
[19] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41981; https://t.me/usf_army/2355
[20] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2090978264168698199; https://x.com/John_Gardi/status/2090995708111314946; https://t.me/supernova_plus/58508; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/2091039075755344243; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/32508
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/
[22] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8071; https://t.me/ozonru/8832
[23] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20492
[24] https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/1642
[25] https://t.me/arx_spn/30721; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46729; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74332; https://t.me/dva_majors/97804; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41983; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20492
[27] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091057111656440145; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2091040211216327059; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091062295719735458
[28] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/10913
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41982; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978; https://t.me/severnnyi/9095
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/9095
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978; https://t.me/dva_majors/97801; https://t.me/severnnyi/9103; https://t.me/wargonzo/36363
[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/9095; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/
[34] https://t.me/severnnyi/9097
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025/;
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/97801;
[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33725
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978; https://t.me/dva_majors/97801; https://t.me/grvZapad/19525
[39] https://t.me/grvZapad/19525
[40] https://t.me/grvZapad/19525; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19525 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36363
[42]
https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1385080-armia-rf-mae-problemi-iz-logistikou-na-limanskomu-fronti-cerez-ataki-sil-oboroni-vijskovij/
[43] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2090876096321302942 ; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37825
[44] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33720
[45] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37825
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/
[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/
[49] https://x.com/kriegsforscherD/status/2090868622612672670
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33720 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36363
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121725
[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33720
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978; https://t.me/rybar/82599; https://t.me/voin_dv/20790
[54] https://t.me/shturmovikche/1508; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12758; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2090853924622184809
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41976; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41978; https://t.me/wargonzo/36363; https://t.me/voin_dv/20790
[56] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1430127028987473; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1376682-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-ukrainski-bijci-vazko-poranili-rosijskogo-polkovnika/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udar-po-mashyni-polkovnyka-dmytra-shabayeva/
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/19369 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/62337 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19172; https://t.me/rybar/79116; https://t.me/voin_dv/19799; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3479; https://t.me/voin_dv/20520
[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12762; https://t.me/Otryad_Fobia/3457
[59] https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13476-22-08
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/
[61] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107839
[62] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107806
[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/97833
[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/97830
[65] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/73939
[67] https://t.me/chernihivrada/4239 ; https://www.facebook.com/policechernigivshchini/posts/pfbid025E8EK1jsSAYfKcDARBk38SSVq399qKaKtG9exVQvNVToPPhhTpfC5km77EB3C7Del?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31233 ; https://t.me/Zelenskiy_Sergiy/11850 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2711 ; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv_region/19048 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72305 ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34402 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18825 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18843 ; https://www.facebook.com/izmail.rda/posts/pfbid03RiqFikbBkdUuYQFtMS1LUP1ah1VUYUXA3fwaDxd7LWRGEhfvesN78ABTkMHhPeMl ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46578 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46626 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46629
[68] https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=10165173327835631&set=a.10151473379480631 ; https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid02wpP9WHxYsW932w1knBU4MQXFHnGtE7TQqB4ipUHeCUamR6GuFRM6ubjMBQQGaA5jl
[69] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30690 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3375 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66696 ; https://t.me/sashakots/63914
[70] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2091063376516366844 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2091063380371009678 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20487 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[71] https://x.com/war_monitor_ua/status/2090976377499459755
[72] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-3/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2024/
