Toplines
North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 21 that 8,500 new North Korean troops already operating mostly in Kursk Oblast include a 400-person drone unit whose operators could survey and strike targets in Ukraine.[1] Skibitskyi added that the deployed North Korean troops will not fight within Ukraine but will reinforce Russia’s rear areas and free up Russian manpower. Skibitsky reported that North Korea has deployed or rotated around 25,000 soldiers through the Russian military so far and that Russian President Vladimir Putin may ask North Korean dictator and Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un for up to 50,000 additional North Korean troops in September 2026. ISW previously observed evidence of North Korean forces operating first-person view (FPV) and reconnaissance drones alongside Russian troops in Kursk Oblast during their first Russian deployment in August and October 2025, which provided North Korean troops with valuable tactical and technical experiences.[2] Elements of the innovative Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies have been operating in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast international border area for a prolonged period and could pass down valuable lessons learned from prior Russian offensives (particularly in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions) to North Korean forces should they operate together.[3] Ukrainian intelligence suggests that North Korean troops are currently only operating within Russia, but any potential deployment of North Korean forces to Ukraine itself would be a dramatic escalation of North Korean involvement in the war in Ukraine that would require the international community, particularly South Korea, to reassess diplomatic positions.
Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages. Sources told The Financial Times (FT) on August 21 that Ukraine is seeking approval to use Starlink-equipped drones to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers up to 200 kilometers inside Russia.[4] Authorization to access Starlink over geographically defined segments of Russia would allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more accurate strikes against Russian mobile ground-based ballistic missile launchers, given Ukraine’s integration of Starlink-equipped drones during the intermediate-strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine.[5] Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have shifted in Summer 2026 to rely on ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot and ballistic missile interceptor shortage.[6] Ukraine’s request for restricted Starlink use demonstrates an alternative approach to countering Russian ground-based ballistic missiles that does not require the actual shipment of missile interceptors from the United States and other Ukrainian partners. Reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia could also allow Ukraine to effectively and accurately target mobile ground-based missile launchers in Russia and offset the wider surface-to-air missile (SAM) shortage.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 21 that Ukraine developed the Alexa Spatium jet-powered interceptor drone, which is capable of intercepting Russian jet-powered Geran-3, Geran-4, and Geran-5 strike drones, reconnaissance drones, helicopters, and other targets.[7] Russian forces have recently prioritized the production and use of faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones in combined drone strike packages.[8] The ability of Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones to reach and sustain higher flight speeds compared to piston engine-driven drones complicates Ukraine’s ability to catch up and intercept them.[9] An effective jet-powered drone interceptor can provide a cost-effective interception method and reduce the need for conventional SAM and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which will in turn reset the technological offense-defense race.[10]
A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on August 21 that Russia will only accept a peace proposal that aligns with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war aims and reflects the “ground realities.”[11] Putin’s maximalist and often-repeated war aims include Ukraine’s complete capitulation, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv, and severe limitations on the Ukrainian military and Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations.[12] Russian officials’ continued invocation of “battlefield realities” fails to address Russia’s declining rate of advance and incremental and gradual tactical successes and instead requires that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands.[13] Ryabkov’s statement confirms Putin’s commitment to continue the war in Ukraine despite the growing economic and military strain.[14] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[15]
Key Takeaways
- North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare.
- Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages.
- A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russian military airfields and oil infrastructure. Russian forces launched 135 long-range strike drones against Ukraine.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and oil infrastructure in Russia. Ukrainian officials reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast, damaging a Su-34 multi-role bomber aircraft, and a Russian drone storage and launch site in Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, on August 20.[16] The Russian 929th State Flight Test Center (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) is based at the Akhtubinsk Airfield, and Ukrainian sources reported that the strikes also caused a fuel spill at the airfield.[17] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Lukoil Permnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Perm, Perm Krai, and the Marinovka Airfield in Volgograd Oblast overnight on August 20 to 21.[18] Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows a fire at the Perm Oil Refinery, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project reported that Ukrainian forces likely hit a tank farm or the phenolic oil purification unit at the Perm Oil Refinery.[19] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged an industrial facility in Perm Krai.[20]
Ukrainian forces continue their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Russian air defense assets. Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike against a loaded Russian S-300 air defense missile launcher west of Kholdonoye, Belgorod Oblast (about 69 kilometers from the international border).[21]
Leaked communications from Moscow City officials indicate that Russian authorities recognize Russia’s inability to protect Moscow’s oil refineries from Ukrainian strikes. Independent Russian news outlet Agenstvo reported on August 21 that it obtained leaked communications from Moscow Deputy Mayor Alexander Gorbenko from June 2026 in which one of Gorbenko’s subordinates acknowledged that Russia cannot defend Moscow’s oil refineries and Ukrainian forces are only expanding their strike capabilities.[22] Gorbenko’s subordinate reportedly called for the decentralization of Moscow’s oil refining into a series of mini-refineries. The Russian information space is increasingly publicly acknowledging that Russia will not be able to fully intercept Ukrainian strike packages in the near future.[23] The leaked Moscow official communications suggest that officials in Moscow, an area the Kremlin has sought to shield from the impacts of the war in Ukraine, are also privately acknowledging this same reality.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 20 and 21 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[24]
Russian forces are reportedly transferring Spetsnaz units to northern Sumy Oblast to combat manpower shortages. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 20 that Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz elements will arrive near Turya (east of Sumy City) to reinforce elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) because of manpower shortages.[25] Elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between northern Sumy Oblast, the Velykyi Burluk direction, and the Oleksandrivka direction.[26]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian 2S5 Hyacinth-S self-propelled gun northeast of Borki, Kursk Oblast (roughly 7 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[27] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) news agency ArmyInform published footage on August 20 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian truck near Gruzskoye, Belgorod Oblast (roughly seven kilometers from the Ukrainian border) and a Grad Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in an unspecified location of the Belgorod Oblast border area.[28]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 20 and 21 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 21 that Russian forces launched five FAB-500 glide bombs against Ukrainian temporary deployment points near Blahodatne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[30]
A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 21 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 20 and 21 but did not make confirmed advances.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 21 that Russian forces advanced in central, southern, and eastern Kupyansk and on the city’s southern outskirts.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaign against Russian transportation equipment and military assets in the Kupyansk direction. A Ukrainian brigade reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian UAZ cars, an armored tractor, an electronic warfare (EW) antenna, and a Hyacinth-S self-propelled gun in the Kupyansk direction.[34]
A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 21 but did not advance.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces either recently advanced or maintained positions in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in southern Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Rai-Oleksandrivka contrary to Russian claims.[36]
Russian forces appear to be increasing efforts to infiltrate into Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) — a tactical objective that would allow them more favorable positions from which to launch assaults towards Slovyansk and the wider Fortress Belt. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 20 that Russian forces are intensifying efforts to infiltrate into and advance near Mykolaivka.[37] ISW additionally observed reports on August 20 that Russian forces infiltrated into Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk), but ISW is currently unable to independently verify these reports as of August 21.[38] Russian forces have been largely unsuccessful in their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive in this direction despite likely prioritizing offensive operations against Slovyansk from the northeast through Lyman at the beginning of Summer 2026.[39] Certain geographic limitations and water features make Russian advances towards Slovyansk from the northeast through Lyman and directly east through Mykolaivka particularly challenging, as the Siverskyi Donets River flows north to northeast of Slovyansk and there are several canals and reservoirs directly east of Slovyansk.[40] Russian forces likely view Mykolaivka as a primary tactical objective because its potential seizure would allow for assaults westward towards Slovyansk, having bypassed difficult canalizing terrain features. It remains exceedingly unlikely that Russian forces will achieve any significant tactical or operational gains in the Slovyansk direction through Lyman or westward from Mykolaivka, however, considering that Russian forces would need to do more than simply infiltrate into Mykolaivka in order to set conditions for future attacks on Slovyansk.[41] Slovyansk, and the northern portion of the Fortress Belt more broadly, have posed significant operational challenges to Russian forces since the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Russian forces previously failed to bypass and encircle Slovyansk from the northwest via Izyum and the northeast via Lyman in 2022, for example.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows a Ukrainian airstrike against a Russian-occupied building in western Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely consolidated positions in the building.[42] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control all or even most of Kostyantynivka, but that Russian infiltration missions throughout the city continue to degrade Ukrainian defenses. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 21 that Russian forces advanced west of Mykolaipillya and into central Novohryhorivka (both west of Kostyantynivka).[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 21 that Russian forces advanced south of Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya) and into eastern Rubizne (northeast of Dobropillya) and seized eastern and central Dobropillya (the smaller of two settlements named “Dobropillya” southwest of the larger settlement).[45]
Russian forces continued infiltration missions to identify and exploit weak spots in Ukrainian defenses in the Pokrovsk direction but did not advance on August 20 or 21.[46] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 21 that Russian forces decreased their usage of armored vehicles in this direction after Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault 10 to 20 kilometers behind the frontline a few weeks prior.[47]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations near and northeast of Novopavlivka on August 20 and 21 but did not advance.[48]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.[49] Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 21 that Russian forces seized Zelene, Zaporizhia Oblast (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[50] Zelene is roughly 17 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian-seized area.
Russian forces are increasing artillery use against Ukrainian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on August 21 that Russian forces increased their use of artillery and likely redeployed additional artillery reserves to the area.[51]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian strike drone infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a storage, preparation, and launch site for Russian strike drones near occupied Donetsk City, Donetsk Oblast (approximately 64 kilometers from the frontline) and a command post in occupied Zaporizke, Donetsk Oblast (approximately 96 kilometers from the frontline).[52]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces either recently advanced or maintained positions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position north of Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Verkhnya Tersa contrary to Russian claims.[53]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 21 that Russian forces recently infiltrated between Charivne and Luhivske, throughout Luhivske, into southeastern Bilohirya, south of Mala Tokmachka, and in northwestern Mala Tokmachka (all southeast of Orikhiv).[54] Mashovets also reported on August 21 that Russian forces recently infiltrated into eastern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and into southwestern Orikhiv itself.[55]
Russian forces are likely to intensify offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets reported that Russian forces, primarily the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and the 35th CAA (Eastern Grouping of Forces [GoF]), are likely to intensify offensive operations in the Orikhiv direction after several months of costly and slow advances, advancing only 2.5 to 5.5 kilometers (likely in depth) in some areas.[56] Mashovets reported that Russian forces previously attempted to break into Orikhiv by bypassing its flanks, including through Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv). Mashovets noted that these attempts were unsuccessful and that Russian command reportedly abandoned this effort.[57] Mashovets reported that Russian forces may now be prioritizing a frontal assault towards Orikhiv through Novodanylivka and northeast toward Mala Tokmachka after failing to advance around Orikhiv’s flanks. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces effectively cleared Mala Tokmachka of Russian infiltrators and that only a few isolated Russian personnel remain in the settlement. Mashovets noted that the situation has worsened for Ukrainian forces further west of Orikhiv as Russian forces have begun counterattacking southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.[58]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Kobylne, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline).[59]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 21.
Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics, hunting civilians in Kherson City. Kherson Oblast officials reported on August 20 that Russian drone operators struck and killed a cyclist in Daryivka (northeast of Kherson City), and struck and injured two civilians, including one elderly person, in the Tsentralnyi Microraion of Kherson City on August 21.[60]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on August 20 to 21 as power outages continue on the occupied peninsula. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian materiel and equipment warehouse in occupied Novosilske (roughly 116 kilometers from the frontline), two ground-based drone relay stations in occupied Sterehushche (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline), three relay stations near occupied Olenivka (one of multiple settlements between 120 and 248 kilometers from the frontline), and one relay station in occupied Chornomorske (either 109 or 294 kilometers from the frontline).[61] Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a Russian freight truck on the E-97 Oleshky-Armyansk-Simferopol highway west of occupied Pyatykhatka (about 90 kilometers from the frontline).[62] Russian occupation energy operators Krymenergo and Sevastopolenergo claimed that parts of occupied Crimea remain without power and initiated restricted power schedules due to a large Ukrainian drone strike.[63]
The sale and use of lower quality gasoline in occupied Crimea is causing mechanical difficulties in civilian cars. A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on August 21 that cars are breaking down due to the use of Euro-2 and Euro-3 standard gasoline, which is lower-quality than the Euro-5 standard Russia followed in recent years and which increases wear on vehicles.[64] The Russian government passed legislation allowing the production and sale of Euro-2 and Euro-3 standard gasoline to mitigate shortages because of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries.[65] Russia’s efforts to mitigate fuel shortages have also created tension in other areas, such as the supply of motor oil, of which vehicles require more when using lower-quality gasoline.[66]
Ukrainian forces likely struck vessels carrying Russian cargo off the Krasnodar Krai coast. Turkish shipping company Akkon Lines reported on August 21 that a naval drone struck the Barbados-flagged, likely Turkish-owned container ship RMS TEAM in the Black Sea, causing the crew to abandon ship.[67] The RMS TEAM was likely sailing for Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai at the time of the strike.[68] Footage published on August 21 shows the aftermath of a drone strike on the Turkish-owned, Comoros-flagged cargo ship VOLGO-BALT 226 in the Black Sea, damaging the vessel’s bridge and living quarters but causing no casualties.[69] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck unspecified targets in the Black Sea.[70]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[71]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 21 that Russian forces launched 135 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Crimea.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 107 drones, that 27 drones struck 16 locations, and that drone debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, residential, logistics, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[73] The Ukrainian State Border Service reported on August 21 that Russian forces struck the Tabaky international border crossing between Ukraine and Moldova in Odesa Oblast for the second night in a row.[74] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on August 21 that Russian shelling of energy facilities caused power outages in Donetsk, Sumy, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts.[75]
Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on August 21. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 21 that Russian forces struck a shopping center in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and conducted a second drone strike 30 minutes later against emergency personnel responding to the scene, killing five and injuring at least 52 people.[76] Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows Russian forces conducting this double-tap strike.[77]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/21/europe/russia-north-korea-ukraine-drones-intl
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/;
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/
[4] https://www.ft.com/content/ff536e6e-dc56-45e3-b5e0-2dfb28148cb6?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/
[7] https://mod dot gov.ua/en/news/defence-forces-arsenal-expands-with-the-addition-of-ukraines-first-jet-powered-drone-interceptor-alexa-spatium
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; https://t.me/HolodniyYar_93ombr/3359; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[11] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2134367/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/88910 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/391321
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-22/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/
[16] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20475; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2090715785857482842; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2090715781482836161; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EWMHMsn3w/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41975; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/21/su-34-yakyj-vykorystovuvaly-dlya-udariv-kabamy-poshkodzheno-na-aerodromi-ahtubinsk/
[17] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/16; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-urazyly-ahtubynsk-ta-su-34/; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29290
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41973; https://t.me/usf_army/2344; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20475; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2090715785857482842; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2090715781482836161
[19] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8063; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2090674127363305942; https://t.me/astrapress/122747
[20] https://t.me/mahonin59/13019
[21] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2090756686923337795; https://x.com/15obrar/status/2090719188188860835; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/21/feyerverk-na-miljony-dolariv-chornyj-lis-znyshhyv-transportno-zaryadzhalnu-mashynu-s-300-razom-iz-raketamy/
[22] https://www.agents dot media/v-merii-moskvy-priznali-chto-ne-mogut-zashhitit-npz-stolitsy-i-sprognozirovali-bolshoe-kolichestvo-bankrotstv-iz-za-udarov-po-wildberries/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41964; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966; https://t.me/dva_majors/97766; https://t.me/wargonzo/36345; https://t.me/severnnyi/9085
[25] https://t.me/severnnyi/9083
[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197042; https://t.me/severnnyi/8777; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3490; https://t.me/severnnyi/9062; https://t.me/severnnyi/9057; https://t.me/severnnyi/8968; https://t.me/severnnyi/8968; https://t.me/dva_majors/96951; https://t.me/severnnyi/8837; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3523
[27] https://t.me/uvkkursk/626; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2090703239230488650
[28] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/20/kilzona-v-byelgorodskij-oblasti-minus-21-bezpilotnyk-za-dobu-zbyly-shahed-z-kulemeta-strim/
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41964; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966; https://t.me/dva_majors/97766; https://t.me/wargonzo/36345; https://t.me/severnnyi/9085;
[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/66666
[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/97766; https://t.me/severnnyi/9085
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41964; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966; https://t.me/wargonzo/36345; https://t.me/grvZapad/19516;
[33] https://t.me/divgen/83374
[34] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1571341884683831/?__cft__[0]=AZYESy9FuPw-tJwpFBmRZJWipDW4r1qMrjMc51B7c2z1q1ilzDfFi5isbWvuoNDvC-p3cuUby8YcP7bfMv3yOo4YzL7p-JQoqmV0f8gOa4T8NPnh8jeLGu0DqaZxL5HB0kVoEQkV2RekBC8hdzu0_AptlyCKTVmrseMc0dqMwLbnQPF73O12lrgzhZlmtCZKFm3grD75menm2xe0lJJHnArE&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1384184-bijci-volinskoi-brigadi-znisili-na-kupanskomu-napramku-avtotransport-i-garmatu-rosian/
[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/97766; https://t.me/grvZapad/19516
[36] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2090503632860983498; https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/566
[37] https://t.me/rybar/82582; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74315
[38] https://t.me/nikolaevka_online/33422; https://t.me/nikolaevka_online/33424; https://t.me/nikolaevka_online/33430; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2090521203651809349; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/2090423276610670894
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-geospatial-intelligence-terrain-analysis/
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/
[42] https://t.me/soniah_hub/17794; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37715
[43] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33711
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966; https://t.me/wargonzo/36345
[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33711; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33714
[46] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1384114-vorog-kidae-rezervi-na-pivnic-vid-pokrovska-ale-zaznae-znacnih-vtrat-major/
[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1384114-vorog-kidae-rezervi-na-pivnic-vid-pokrovska-ale-zaznae-znacnih-vtrat-major/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41964; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41964; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41966
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/66670
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/21/u-voroga-sposterigayetsya-pevna-panika-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-tryvaye-nastupalna-operacziya/
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41974
[53] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37790; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2090496178299244738
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3565
[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3565; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3566
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3564
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3565
[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3566
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41974
[60] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/65358; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14654; https://t.me/severrealii/34116; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/102824; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/65367; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/65375
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41974
[62] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2090497083442643361; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2090483632448176354
[63] https://t.me/sev_energo/4203; https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13471-218-45
[64] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107744
[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[66] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/
[67] https://www.lojiport dot com/d/file/urgent-notice-mv-rms-team-incident-in-the-black-sea.pdf
[68] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8905565
[69] https://x.com/MaritimeVoice/status/2090731521195786436; https://t.me/sotaproject/117687; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121693
[70] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20475
[71] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/73699
[73] https://t.me/chernihivrada/4234; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1383388-poskodzeni-12-obijst-povidomili-naslidki-raketno-dronovoi-ataki-na-cerkasinu-20-serpna/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31499; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31505; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17507; https://t.me/synegubov/24954; https://t.me/synegubov/24957; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7284; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7285; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7287; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7288; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7289; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7286; https://t.me/police_su_region/39781; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46506; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66264; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46538; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66285; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66286; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46537; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/37340
[74]https://t.me/DPSUkr/34648; https://www.facebook.com/SouthernBorderUkraine/posts/pfbid0bzWXzPcZfAEkEBa1PWurNPjTve13KJjYQWh2nNBFUVZzWjbynJ9LTj1V27xRM849l?__cft__[0]=AZa2uDN1A9NywUelfSsXQ5Qap35WNeq3WJugqiWgDFMSu5S8RC-MUV-BJ2cmrRfX6G136pXPdu4pZ5LLH3fm6GJQYXHHMXX0Y4AZW0vblzDAJsRSuzPZWtzaDCbL2Au04cp5a-K7l8_3aFG-bbXZIK14W8SmBi2BsLUjp13btPEjgQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;
[75] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7636
[76] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20476
[77] https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2090809543064256758; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2090802076666183716
