Toplines
Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. ISW has observed an increase in Russian mechanized assaults in various sectors of the front since March 17. Russian forces conducted a roughly reduced company-sized mechanized and motorized assault toward Novopavlivka on March 17; reduced platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk direction and near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) on March 18; and a platoon-sized mechanized assault in Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and a reinforced company-sized assault near Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) on March 19.[1] Some of these mechanized assaults may have been Russian reconnaissance-in-force missions that aim to probe, identify, or test Ukrainian positions ahead of future ground assaults in the spring-summer campaign.
ISW has observed other indications of Russian preparation for the spring-summer offensive. Russian forces began shelling settlements immediately near Kramatorsk in late February 2026.[2] Russian forces have also been conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the southern tip of the Fortress Belt since at least late February 2026 to prepare for the upcoming campaign, striking main Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area.[3] Russian forces have repeatedly struck dams near Kostyantynivka and in the Pokrovsk direction since late February 2026, likely in an attempt to interrupt Ukrainian logistics and flood Ukrainian positions.[4] ISW has seen reports that Russia may launch its spring-summer offensive against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, and mechanized assaults and strikes in the Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk directions may be part of efforts to prepare for attacks on the Fortress Belt from the north and south in the future.[5] These various preparations suggest that the ground phase of the spring-summer offensive campaign is nearing, if it is not already underway. The anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive is unlikely to bring to bear substantial amounts of armor in multiple, simultaneous, mechanized attacks on Ukrainian positions; however, considering the drone-dense frontline and Russian armor shortages. Russian forces are more likely to commit more limited amounts of armor to localized, pulsing offensives at multiple parts of the frontline.
Ukraine remains committed to holding safe, free, and fair elections, but the Kremlin is refusing to commit to the ceasefire necessary to hold such elections.[6] The Times reported on March 20 that members of the official Ukrainian working group analyzing the possibility of holding future elections stated that they have not resolved key questions about how to ensure free and fair elections, given the possibility of Russian strikes or election interference.[7] Serhiy Dubovyk, the deputy head of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission (CEC), told The Times that “everyone,” including members of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (Parliament), agrees that active hostilities must end, there must be a “clear” line of demarcation on the frontline, and a six-month period must pass before Ukraine can hold elections. Dubovyk noted that Ukraine can hold elections without changing the constitution and amending martial law and election legislation, but that the working group has ruled out an election while fighting continues. Working group members reportedly expressed concern about the risk of Russian strikes against polling stations and the limits that martial law places on freedom of speech and movement that would hamper the pre-election campaign period. Dobuvyk reported that some opposition Ukrainian authorities are unwilling to agree to a digital vote that could be subject to manipulation and would not have international monitoring oversight. ISW continues to assess that a theater-wide, long-term ceasefire is necessary for Ukraine to prepare and hold legitimate elections after the lifting of martial law, but Russia has repeatedly rejected such a ceasefire.[8]
Russia has invented an unresolvable problem for Ukraine — both demanding that Ukraine hold elections as a precondition for a final peace agreement while refusing the ceasefire necessary for such elections.[9] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate since Ukraine did not hold elections in 2024, ignoring the fact that Ukraine’s constitution and law prohibit elections during martial law.[10] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, for example, claimed on March 19 that Russia will never see Zelensky as a legal party to negotiations or able to legally sign a future war termination agreement.[11] Russia’s circular rhetoric about legitimacy and elections aims to portray Ukraine — not Russia — as the obstacle to negotiations.[12] Medvedev’s claims that Zelensky is unable to sign a peace agreement are in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment that the Kremlin is setting conditions to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine at a time of its choosing.[13]
The Kremlin is trying to use its intelligence sharing with Iran as a bargaining chip to benefit its war against Ukraine. Politico, citing two sources familiar with the matter, stated on March 20 that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev proposed during his March 11 meeting in Miami with former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff that Russia would stop sharing intelligence with Iran if the United States also stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine.[14] The sources reported that the US delegation rejected Dmitriev’s proposal. Politico stated that another source reported that Russia has made various proposals about Iran to the United States, including a proposal that Iran move its enriched uranium to Russia, but that the United States has rejected all of the proposals. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on March 17, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Russia has been providing Iran with satellite imagery and drone technology and advice to support Iran’s strike campaign against Israeli and US forces in the Middle East.[15]
French and British authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea on March 20. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the French Navy intercepted and boarded the Deyna oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea on the morning of March 20.[16] Macron noted that the vessel was part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which evades international sanctions and violates the law of the sea. Local officials told Reuters that the French Navy boarded the Mozambique-flagged Deyna tanker, which authorities suspected of flying a false flag.[17] A Western military source reportedly stated that the vessel was carrying Russian crude oil, and the French Mediterranean prefecture stated that France conducted the operation with the UK.[18] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Denya sailed under a Tonga flag from Singapore to Murmansk, Russia, in December 2025; reappeared in late February 2026 under a Mozambique flag near Murmansk; and then set its destination as Port Said, Egypt, on March 1. The Deyna is under US sanctions for transporting Russian oil.[19]
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko highlighted Belarus’ cooperation with Russia and Iran while discussing possible economic deals with the United States. Lukashenko gave an interview on March 20 to the Belarusian state news agency Belta about his March 19 meeting with US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale.[20] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus and the United States are preparing a “big deal” including a number of US-proposed “major deals.”[21] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus may sell a mine to the United States for at least $3 billion.[22] Lukashenko claimed that the US delegation asked about Belarus’ relationships with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which Lukashenko described as not just Belarus’ allies but states close to Belarus.[23] Lukashenko applauded the United States for having never set a goal to separate Belarus and Russia. Lukashenko claimed that the United States asked about alleged Iranian requests for Belarusian missiles.[24] Lukashenko noted that Minsk has talked about “many things” with Iran related to the defense industrial base (DIB) but claimed they have never discussed missiles. Lukashenko noted that when one actor supplies weapons to another actor who is currently at war, the supplier becomes a supporter of or even an accomplice to that side in the war, but claimed that Belarus “does not need this” with Iran.
ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that any US support for the Belarusian economy will likely directly benefit the Russian economy and war effort.[25] The Russian and Belarusian DIBs are closely intertwined, and the Kremlin uses Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner to supply the Russian DIB with necessary components.[26] Belarus has also allowed Russia to deploy Russian Oreshnik ballistic missiles on Belarusian territory and is reportedly hosting repeaters to allow Russian forces to adjust their Shahed-type drone strikes.[27] Iran and Belarus have also increased their economic and military cooperation, with public high-level meetings surging in Spring 2024.[28] Iran, like Russia, is trying to use Belarus to circumvent international sanctions, and Iran has likely sought technical information exchanges related to air defenses and electronic warfare with Belarus.[29] Belarus appears to be attempting to forge inroads with the Trump Administration and portray itself as independent from the Kremlin, despite ample evidence to the contrary.
The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate from 15.5 percent to 15 percent on March 20 — the seventh time the Russian Central Bank has cut its rates since June 2025.[30] The Central Bank also claimed on March 20 that it estimates Russia’s inflation rate to be 5.9 percent as of March 16 — a number very likely misrepresentative of Russia’s actual inflation rate.[31] The bank claimed that it expects inflation to decline to 4.5 to 5.5 percent in 2026, given Russia’s current monetary policy. Russian inflation is likely much higher, with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent estimating actual Russian inflation to be over 20 percent in October 2025.[32] ISW also observed reports of rising prices of many essential goods and services in Russia throughout 2025 and in early 2026 that suggest the inflation rate is higher than the Kremlin has been claiming.[33] ISW continues to assess that the Central Bank is largely leveraging monetary policy to cope with the economic consequences of Russia’s wartime economy (by making capital more available for war industry despite inflationary pressure, for example) and exacerbated Russian inflation through expansionary fiscal policy through record military spending, military benefits payouts, social projects, and investment in the defense industrial base (DIB).[34] The Kremlin is continuing this expansionary fiscal policy by increasing its deficit spending.[35] ISW has not observed indications that the Kremlin is reducing its spending, and continued high spending will likely continue to drive up inflation.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
- Ukraine remains committed to holding safe, free, and fair elections, but the Kremlin is refusing to commit to the ceasefire necessary to hold such elections.
- The Kremlin is trying to use its intelligence sharing with Iran as a bargaining chip to benefit its war against Ukraine.
- French and British authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea on March 20.
- Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko highlighted Belarus’ cooperation with Russia and Iran while discussing possible economic deals with the United States.
- The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate from 15.5 percent to 15 percent on March 20 – the seventh time the Russian Central Bank has cut its rates since June 2025.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russian forces launched 156 drones against Ukraine, including against Kharkiv City and Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Chernihiv oblasts.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure overnight on March 19 to 20. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters stated on March 20 that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the 500 kV Taman electrical substation near Starotitarovskaya, Krasnodar Krai.[36] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the substation beginning on the night of March 19 to 20.[37] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi noted that the substation is a key node in Russia’s energy supply to occupied Crimea.[38]
Ukrainian sources provided battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian military aviation. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 20 that the March 17 Ukrainian strike on the 123rd Aircraft Repair Plant in Staraya Russa, Novgorod Oblast, damaged an A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft under repair at the plant.[39] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source posted satellite imagery indicating that the Ukrainian strikes on the Khanskaya Airfield at Maykop Airbase, Republic of Adygea, on the night of March 13 to 14 damaged the airbase control tower.[40]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on March 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including northwest of Sumy City near Sopych and toward Ulanove; north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Novomykolaivka, and Oleksiivka, and toward Potapivka, Nova Sich, and Mala Korchakivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on March 19 and 20.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sopych.[42]
Order of Battle: T-80BVM tank crews of the Russian 49th Separate Tank Battalion (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[43]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Lyman, Starytsya, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, and Tykhe and toward Zybyne, Bochkove, Okhrimivka, and Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 19 and 20.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on March 19 and 20 but did not advance.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized eastern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka and toward Hlushkivka on March 19 and 20.[47]
Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have almost entirely cleared Russian forces from Kupyansk and blamed the Russian military command for undermining Russian forces by previously fabricating claims of success in Kupyansk. A Russian milblogger stated on March 20 that Ukrainian forces have almost completely seized Kupyansk and are clearing the northern part of the town after killing remaining Russian forces in the Central District Hospital.[48] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted on March 20 that Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov falsely claimed that Russian forces seized Kupyansk on November 20, 2025, exactly four months ago.[49] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command’s exaggerated claims that Russian forces are advancing in all directions prevent Russian forces from effectively maneuvering mobile reconnaissance and strike assets to provide fire support to specific sectors of the front and from switching to defensive operations when necessary. The milblogger stated that the Russian military command’s false claims that Russian forces had tied down Ukraine’s main efforts in the Pokrovsk direction and seized Kupyansk diverted attention from Kupyansk, leaving Russian forces vulnerable to the November 2025 Ukrainian counterattacks in that direction.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, Olhivka, and Serednie; and south of Borova toward Korovii Yar on March 19 and 20.[51]
Unconfirmed claims: Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed on March 20 that Russian forces advanced in Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[52]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on March 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 20 that Ukrainian forces struck the Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant in occupied Alchevsk (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline), which manufactures artillery shell casings and produces and repairs vehicle armor for Russian forces.[53] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on March 20, citing open-source intelligence (OSINT) channels, that at least four drones struck the plant and may have damaged the plant’s blast furnace and oxygen converter.[54] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on March 20 that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged two workshops and started a fire in a building at a metallurgical plant in occupied Alchevsk.[55]
Satellite imagery provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) from March 14 Ukrainian strikes on occupied Luhansk Oblast. A Ukrainian OSINT analyst published satellite imagery on March 19 that shows that the March 14 Ukrainian strikes on a Russian air defense missile depot near occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 142 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed at least one building.[56]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[57]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; east of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova; south of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan; northeast of Slovyansk near Platonivka; east of Slovyansk toward Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, and Zakitne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on March 19 and 20.[58]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are committing infantry to combat who have received “barely a week” of training, in contrast to a month of training in mid- to late-2025.[59]
Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on March 20 the mandatory evacuation of children from areas of Slovyansk most vulnerable to Russian shelling.[60]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Drobysheve and Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[61] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[62]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka and central Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[63]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[64]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Malynivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and toward Dovha Balka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on March 19 and 20.[65]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 20 that recent geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces may control Shevchenko Microraion in southwestern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and that continued Ukrainian presence in Chasiv Yar prevents any potential Russian envelopment of Kostyantynivka.[66]
The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on March 20 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a humanitarian evacuation vehicle in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka) killed two civilians and wounded two others.[67]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 1008th and 1442nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[68] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka) and Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka) in coordination with reconnaissance elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA).[69]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Novyi Donbas, and Toretske on March 19 and 20.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 19 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[71]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka and toward Serhiivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Novopidhorodne on March 19 and 20.[72]
A Ukrainian fire support officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 19 that Ukrainian drone operators repelled a large-scale Russian motorized assault of an unspecified echelon along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway (west of Pokrovsk) involving infantry, light vehicles, and motorcycles.[73] The officer stated that effective Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and use of sleeper drone ambushes and remote mining repelled the assault, despite Russian forces attempting to exploit foggy conditions. A Ukrainian brigade reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian motorized assaults using light vehicles and quad bikes in the Pokrovsk direction during the previous two days (presumably March 18 and 19), destroying seven quad bikes, four motorcycles, and three cars and killing 120 Russian servicemembers and wounding six others.[74]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 19 and 20.[75]
Ukrainian forces used an FPV drone to down a Russian helicopter for the third time in the war. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 20 that Ukrainian drone operators used a fiber-optic FPV drone to down a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter near occupied Nadiivka (roughly six kilometers from the frontline northeast of Novopavlivka) and killed the surviving crew members in drone strikes.[76] Geolocated footage published on March 20 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking the helicopter northwest of Nadiivka.[77] Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and a milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), acknowledged the loss of the Ka-52.[78] A Ukrainian military observer noted that the milblogger, reportedly affiliated with the VKS, edited his posts about the incident to remove claims of the crew’s survival.[79] The downing of the Ka-52 is the third time in the war that Ukrainian forces used an FPV drone to down a helicopter in mid-air after the August 7, 2024, downing of a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast and the September 29, 2025, downing of an Mi-8 helicopter near Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[80] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi, citing an anonymous source, and a Russian milblogger both reported that the FPV drone struck the Ka-52’s S-8 unguided rocket pod.[81]
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command’s employment of attack helicopters for risky air support missions near the frontline, given current battlefield conditions and Ukraine’s pervasive use of FPV drones. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that the helicopter was carrying S-8 unguided rockets that are ineffective under current battlefield conditions and noted that the Russian military command’s use of valuable attack helicopters for missions within Ukrainian FPV drone range is a waste of valuable equipment and crews.[82] A Russian milblogger noted that S-8 unguided rockets are best suited for striking massed troops in open terrain rather than the small groups operating in ruined basements, which are characteristic of the current battlefield.[83] Russian milbloggers noted that there are few suitable targets for unguided rocket strikes under current battlefield conditions and that it is preferable for Russian forces to employ cheap FPV drones to strike Ukrainian positions in ruined basements rather than risking helicopters in inaccurate unguided rocket strikes.[84]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Kalynivske, Krasnohirske, Zlahoda, Sichneve, and Sosnivka on March 19 and 20.[85]
Order of Battle: Counter-drone elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones east of Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[86] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and equipment near Oleksandrivka and Dibrova (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[87]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 19 and 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Hirke, western Zaliznychne (both west of Hulyaipole), and eastern Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[88]
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating west and south of Hirke, contrary to previous Russian claims.[89]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka, and Rizdvyanka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske on March 19 and 20.[90]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction stated on March 19 that Russian forces are conducting massed infantry assaults roughly every three to five days and occasionally employ motorcycles and light vehicles.[91]
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[92] First-person view (FPV) drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Hirke and western Zaliznychne.[93] Drone operators of the BARS-8 Khabarovsk Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Myrne.[94] Bomber aircraft of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Liubytske and reportedly in Nizhynka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[95]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on March 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 20 that Ukrainian forces struck infrastructure at the Vostochnyi training ground near occupied Novopetrivka (roughly 99 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[96]
Russian forces recently infiltrated in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking Russian servicemembers northeast of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[97]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Luhivske; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Richne on March 19 and 20.[98]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[99]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults northeast of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi bridge on March 20. [100]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kherson direction reported on March 19 that Ukrainian drone interdiction efforts are preventing Russian forces from conducting logistics to positions in occupied Oleshky (east of Kherson City) and on the Dnipro River islands, in contrast to Russian forces’ ability to conduct unimpeded rotations to Oleshky in early 2025.[101]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in Sadove (northeast of Kherson City).[102]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 156 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[103] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 133 drones, that 19 drones struck 13 locations, and that fragments of downed drones fell in seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged energy, commercial, residential, and educational infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Chernihiv oblasts.[104] Ukrainian officials reported on March 20 that Russian strikes also damaged residential and port infrastructure and Palau- and Barbados-flagged grain vessels in Odesa Oblast.[105]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
See topline text.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2026/; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2034687532433060102; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2034672063382716922; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/2034658972729258154 https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2034697281832652828 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2034783850065236285 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2034739900977729831; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1268778-ponad-20-odinic-tehniki-sili-oboroni-vidbili-mehanizovanij-sturm-rf-bila-limana/; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/2034658972729258154
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/; https://united24media dot com/latest-news/russian-forces-destroy-dam-near-osykove-to-disrupt-kostiantynivka-logistics-16276; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/4098290-russians-attack-dams-and-build-up-reserves-in-pokrovsk-direction-military-sources-say.html; https://www.facebook.com/euromaidanpress.en/posts/russia-dropped-a-3-ton-guided-bomb-on-a-dam-west-of-kostiantynivka-flooding-the-/1392330316242988/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/
[7] https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/ukraine-presidential-elections-wartime-zelensky-cphnhq6ps?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqeZINlv4tknVAC431C2eMSSCXPkkQdxKz5574c-n4K-EGMvVIN4tFsb&gaa_ts=69bd748d&gaa_sig=gdV9RDxy1CVAFiGSTtss4XUWxWn1rVbuzVUqK-i1ObDJ5g7Qw9dmMC3AFt0SFh7ZaQCoQbhfnAsshSPVg9S9hg%3D%3D
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/
[11] https://aif dot ru/politics/medvedev-zelenskiy-nikogda-ne-stanet-legalnoy-storonoy-na-peregovorah
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/
[14] https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-offers-stop-intel-iran-condition-us-cuts-off-ukraine/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/
[16] https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/2034966586390368464
[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/french-navy-seizes-tanker-russia-suspected-flying-false-flag-mediterranean-2026-03-20/
[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/french-navy-seizes-tanker-russia-suspected-flying-false-flag-mediterranean-2026-03-20/
[19] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=51609; https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-QdpWeBgH9MFrTbNApEr4gK/
[20] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-kak-idet-podgotovka-bolshoj-sdelki-s-ssha-770811-2026/
[21] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-kak-idet-podgotovka-bolshoj-sdelki-s-ssha-770811-2026/
[22] https://belta dot by/president/view/tri-milliarda-eto-minimum-lukashenko-o-vozmozhnoj-prodazhe-rudnika-amerikantsam-770841-2026/
[23] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-ssha-ne-stavjat-tsel-otorvat-belarus-ot-rossii-770828-2026/
[24] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-predlozhil-ssha-variant-okonchanija-vojny-v-irane-770816-2026/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2026/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Russia27s20Quiet20Conquest20Belarus.pdf; https://militarnyidot com/en/articles/role-of-defense-industry-of-belarus-in-russian-aggression-against-ukraine/; https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2025/09/12/in-belarus-a-global-network-supplies-russias-war-machine/
[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18060; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The20Russia-Iran20Coalition20Deepens20013025.pdf;
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-5-2025/
[30] https://t.me/bbcrussian/92946; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/26831531
[31] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/26831623
[32] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-bessent-treasury-secretary-face-the-nation-transcript-10-26-2025/
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-budget-deficit-may-almost-triple-this-year-oil-revenues-decline-2026-02-04/
[36] https://t.me/opershtab23/15521
[37] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#t:tsd;d:2026-03-19;@37.208,45.189,14.333z
[38] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udar-ukrayinskyh-droniv-po-pidstantsiyi-taman-pryzviv-do-pozhezhi/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36301
[40] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7311
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/uvkkursk/279; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71279; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010; https://t.me/severnnyi/7216
[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71279
[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/203513; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1226
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20284; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40973; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010; https://t.me/severnnyi/7216; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20284
[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/89906; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20284; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906
[48] https://t.me/romanov_92/51672
[49] https://t.me/philologist_zov/3729
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20284;
[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/367103
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36301
[54] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-metalurgijnyj-kombinat-v-okupovanomu-alchevsku/
[55] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/4831
[56] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7309; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2026/
[57] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2034800717656203395; https://t.me/BV25org/2039
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20284; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/gvZapad/18089; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40990; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906
[59] https://youtu.be/XiWc2loRzNw; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/20/tyzhden-tilky-mynuv-i-kydayut-pryamo-v-topku-u-bij-z-boku-rosiyi-jdut-lyshe-novachky/
[60] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/14321
[61] https://t.me/otukharkiv/7408
[62] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1227 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/203477
[63] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2034928969842122763; https://x.com/425Skala/status/2034889621738229786; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2034895227043885067; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2034895227043885067; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4388; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2021307030607134958; https://t.me/Gryphon501/83
[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71267
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40990; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906
[66] https://t.me/rybar/78735
[67] https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/5316
[68] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2034895227043885067; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4388; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2034789587860566462; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4385; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2034787361393906133; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4390; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2034782731616293102; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4376
[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15149
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71267; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010
[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71267
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71267; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010
[73] https://youtu.be/XiWc2loRzNw; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/20/protyvnyk-ishov-troma-napryamkamy-u-tumani-pid-pokrovskom-vidbyly-masovanyj-shturm-okupantiv/
[74] https://t.me/spartan_ngu/2979
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302
[76] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2106
[77] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2034958933089988697; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2034962242429755863; https://t.me/kyianyn204/4943; https://t.me/kvbarmy/738; https://t.me/supernova_plus/49701; https://t.me/mag_vodogray/14870; https://t.me/oko_gora/18509; https://t.me/TyskNIP/17870
[78] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/24629; https://t.me/rybar/78760; https://t.me/romanov_92/51673; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27394; https://t.me/voenacher/91418; https://t.me/milinfolive/168871
[79] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/27814
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-4/
[81] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/hyzhaky-vysot-zbyly-fpv-dronom-gelikpoter-ka-52/; https://t.me/milinfolive/168873
[82] https://t.me/rybar/78760
[83] https://t.me/voenacher/91418
[84] https://t.me/rybar/78762; https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/42523; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27394; https://t.me/voenacher/91418; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/22508; https://t.me/milinfolive/168876
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/19033; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034987373428121606
[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/19034; https://t.me/voin_dv/19035
[88] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034977810620486041; https://t.me/voin_dv/19032; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034974250235228663; https://t [dot] me/voin_dv/19032; https://t.me/mod_russia/62056; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2034760997588570489; https://t.me/zvo_pobeda_za_nami/522; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2034925205207097391
[89] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034977810620486041; https://t.me/voin_dv/19032
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906; https://t.me/voin_dv/19031
[91] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1268048-rosijski-vijskovi-prosunulisa-bila-selisa-zaliznicne-na-gulajpilskomu-napramku-deepstate/
[92] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5318; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/19/prosyvsya-na-amputacziyu-vidpravyly-na-shturm-rosijske-komanduvannya-zczilyaye-svoyih-bijcziv/
[93] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034977810620486041; https://t.me/voin_dv/19032; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034974250235228663; https://t.me/voin_dv/19032; https://t.me/mod_russia/62056
[94] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2034760997588570489; https://t.me/zvo_pobeda_za_nami/522
[95] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2034884394935070870; https://t.me/voin_dv/19030
[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36301
[97] https://t.me/intelligencecompany/237; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11513
[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36277; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36279; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302; https://t.me/dva_majors/89906; https://t.me/wargonzo/33010
[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/203491
[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36302
[101] https://youtu.be/XiWc2loRzNw; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/20/oleshky-vidrizani-dlya-rosijskyh-okupantiv-vid-logistyky-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku-voroga-pozbavyly-postachannya/
[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40993; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33405
[103] https://t.me/kpszsu/58388
[104] https://www.facebook.com/61579137283645/posts/122157258392971242/ ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1268468-rosiski-vijska-atakuvali-udarnimi-bpla-geran-novgorod-siverskij-na-prikordonni-cernigivsini/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3663; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/19347; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1267042-droni-rf-vdarili-po-mikolaivsini-poskodzeno-budinki-ta-bez-svitla-dva-naseleni-punkti/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/32758; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1268484-rosijski-droni-atakuvali-poltavsinu-aki-poskodzenna/
[105] https://t.me/odeskaODA/14814 ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/2798 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1268532-dvoe-travmovanih-poskodzena-infrastruktura-prokuratura-rozslidue-ataku-rf-na-odesini/ ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1268478-ataka-droniv-na-odesinu-poskodzeno-inozemni-sudna-ta-adminbudivli-e-postrazdali/ ; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8343 ;
