Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian forces’ battlefield performance to assert that Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable. These claims continue to be divorced from the battlefield reality on the ground, however. Putin stated during a press conference on September 1 that Russian forces are increasing the pace of their offensive in Ukraine and that the seizure of Donetsk Oblast is proceeding as planned.[1] Putin claimed that Russian forces seized 15 settlements equal to 270 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast in August 2026. Putin claimed that Russian forces are between one-and-a-half and four kilometers from the eastern outskirts of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and southern Druzhkivka. Available open-source evidence does not support Putin’s claims, however. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 73.14 square kilometers and advanced and infiltrated into 104.44 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast in August 2026. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized only 90.35 square kilometers across the entire theater in August 2026.[2] Putin has issued no fewer than 15 separate deadlines for Russian forces to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, none of which Russian forces have met.[3]
Putin claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), an extreme claim disconnected from all available evidence. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces at the maximum extent of recent advances in late Spring/early Summer 2026 were as far as 13 kilometers from Svyatohirsk, with the current Russian line likely further than 13 kilometers from Svyatohirsk given ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Lyman, the full extent of which remains unclear.
Putin claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces also seized Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[4] Ukrainian officials notably refuted this claim on September 2 and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain defensive positions in Kozacha Lopan.[5] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only advanced and infiltrated into 1.31 square kilometers of Kozacha Lopan and are present only in 13.39 percent of the settlement. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces noted on September 2 that Russian forces have been postponing the seizure of Kozacha Lopan since at least July 2026 and are falsely reporting to Russian leadership that Russian forces seized the settlement.[6]
Putin also baselessly claimed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces encircled 13 Ukrainian battalions with a total of around 5,000 servicemembers on the eastern shore of the Oskil Reservoir near Pisky-Radkivski (south of Borova and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline). ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have a presence in the claimed area, let alone encircled a large Ukrainian force. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov similarly baselessly claimed in October 2025 that Russian forces encircled 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk, a claim that was decisively proven to be false with Zelensky’s public visit to Kupyansk in November 2025.[7]
Putin insisted that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the frontline and that Russian forces are making rapid gains, contrary to all observable evidence from the battlefield. Putin claimed that he “has no doubt” that Ukrainian defensive lines will fall and that Russian forces are not just advancing across the theater in Ukraine but are actively “accelerating” their rate of advance.[8] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized about 90.35 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in August 2026 compared to 505.55 square kilometers in August 2025.[9] Russian advances in August 2026 remained incremental at an average pace of 2.91 square kilometers seized per day, and Russia’s gains in August 2026 were a fraction of Russia’s gains during the same period last year. Russian forces have also taken on greater casualties for fewer gains compared to the same period in 2025. Russian forces reportedly suffered over 40,000 casualties in July and August 2026, for example.[10] Ukrainian forces previously conducted notable counteroffensive operations, particularly in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions, liberating at least 129.81 square kilometers in August 2026 alone.[11] Putin’s heavily inflated claims of Russian advances are part of the Kremlin’s long-standing cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian defenses as imminently collapsing despite substantial evidence to the contrary.[12]
Putin is likely aware that he appears detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine and has attempted to present himself as an informed leader. Putin stated that he receives battlefield information from “a variety of sources,” including Russian Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov and almost all Russian intelligence agencies and departments involved in the war.[13] Putin emphasized that his perception of the battlefield situation, therefore, is “quite objective.” Putin’s statement comes amidst growing complaints among Russian milbloggers and servicemembers that the Russian military is plagued by inaccurate and exaggerated reports that are fed up the chain to superiors.[14] Putin’s statement is likely an attempt to address these concerns and present himself as an involved, conscious, and knowledgeable wartime leader to the Russian public. This acknowledgement suggests that Putin is aware that there is a larger perception that senior Russian officials’ assessments of the battlefield are inflated.
Putin once again reiterated Russia’s continued unwillingness to freeze the current frontline or engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin stated that Russia does not want to “freeze” the war in Ukraine along the current frontline and will only accept negotiations filled with “concrete content,” likely referring to conditions that favor Russia and effectively reiterating Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any negotiations that fail to fulfill Russia’s demands.[15] Russian high-ranking officials have repeatedly signaled the Kremlin’s continued disinterest in peace negotiations and willingness to continue waging the war in Ukraine until Ukraine concedes to Russia’s unwavering demands.[16]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi released a statement of priorities for the Ukrainian military that outlines the focus on unifying operational planning to contest Russia’s initiative and bolster Ukraine’s long-term defensive capabilities.[17] The document outlines Drapatyi’s principles of leadership and emphasizes Drapatyi’s plans to achieve unity of effort by coordinating Ukrainian efforts in the land, air, sea, cyber, and cognitive domains under a single framework while reducing organizational and interservice competition within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Drapatyi identified his primary objective as stabilizing the frontline, which includes integrating new combat capabilities, seizing the initiative where possible, and preventing Russia from achieving its operational objectives. Drapatyi stated that Ukraine must develop the warfighting and defense-industrial capabilities necessary to wage a “protracted war.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces Major General Gennady Shapovalov and appointed Brigadier General Svyatoslav Zaitsya as his replacement on September 2.[18] Zaitsya previously served as Ukraine’s 8th Air Assault Corps Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander from April 2025 to 2026 and as Ukraine’s 20th Army Corps Commander from April to August 2026.[19]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Security Service (SBU) elements engaged in a small arms firefight in Kyiv City on September 2.[20] The incident’s details and circumstances remain unclear. President Zelensky stated on September 2 that Ukraine’s Prosecutor General and the State Bureau of Investigation will investigate the incident and that both services must conduct internal investigations.[21] Zelensky signed a decree on September 2 dismissing the head of SBU’s Department for the Protection of State Secrets and Licensing following the incident.[22]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian forces’ battlefield performance to assert that Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable. These claims continue to be divorced from the battlefield reality on the ground, however.
- Putin insisted that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the frontline and that Russian forces are making rapid gains, contrary to all observable evidence from the battlefield.
- Putin is likely aware that he appears detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine and has attempted to present himself as an informed leader.
- Putin once again reiterated Russia’s continued unwillingness to freeze the current frontline or engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi released a statement of priorities for the Ukrainian military that outlines the focus on unifying operational planning to contest Russia’s initiative and bolster Ukraine’s long-term defensive capabilities.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces Major General Gennady Shapovalov and appointed Brigadier General Svyatoslav Zaitsya as his replacement on September 2.
- Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Security Service (SBU) elements engaged in a small arms firefight in Kyiv City on September 2.
- Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and the Slovyansk direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, an unspecified number of S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 174 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia and provided battle damage assessments (BDAs) on recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian airbases. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 2 that Ukrainian Forces struck a Russian concentration of weapons and military equipment in Rechitsa, Bryansk Oblast (around 58 kilometers from the international border), on September 1 or overnight on September 2.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that an August 30 Ukrainian strike on the Yeysk airbase in Krasnodar Krai (around 181 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed a Ka-27 helicopter and that an August 27 Ukrainian strike near the Millerovo Airfield in Rostov Oblast (around 171 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed a MiG-29 fighter jet.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the NOVATEK Ust-Luga oil refinery in Slobidka, Leningrad Oblast (approximately 1,100 kilometers from the international border) on September 1.[25]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces raised a flag in Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City) according to geolocated footage published on September 1, indicating that Ukrainian forces control Mohrytsya contrary to Russian claims.[26]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position west of Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) according to geolocated footage published on September 2, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[27]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 1 and 2 but did not advance.[28]
See topline text for reports about Russian exaggerated claims in Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on September 2 but did not advance.[29] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 2 that Russian forces continue attempting to infiltrate Kupyansk, but that Ukrainian forces are disrupting logistics to the city and degrading Russian infiltrators’ ability to retrieve supplies from drone drops.[30]
Russian forces continue attempts to secure and expand the bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River to enable further infiltrations into Kupyansk. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 2 that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Kupyansk but have failed to consolidate positions along the right bank of the Oskil River in Holubivka and Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk).[31] Trehubov added that Ukrainian efforts to reduce the Russian bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) have complicated Russian infiltrations north of Kupyansk. Trehubov stated that Russian forces are focusing their operations on Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) from the direction of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) to narrow the Ukrainian bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskil River.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently defeated a Russian infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction. Ukrainian forces captured Russian servicemembers during clearing operations in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) according to geolocated footage published on September 1, indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated Mykolaivka on a prior date.[32]
Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka according to geolocated footage published on September 1.[33]
Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position east of Chernihivka (formerly Krasnoyarske, south of Dobropillya) according to geolocated footage published on September 2, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in this area contrary to Russian claims.[34]
Russian forces are reportedly allocating significant resources to their efforts in the Dobropillya direction by repeatedly conducting costly and largely unsuccessful mechanized assaults. A staff officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on September 2 that Russian forces periodically send columns of 10 to 15 armored vehicles toward Dobropillya, knowing that only one vehicle may survive the assault and reach the objective.[35] The staff officer noted that Russian forces are likely prioritizing the Dobropillya direction as it presents both symbolic and military value as Russian forces attempt to envelop the Fortress Belt from the southwest.
A Russian milblogger claimed on September 1 that Russian forces conducted ground operations in the Pokrovsk direction, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 1 and 2 but did not advance.[37]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 2.
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Volodymyrivka (either 56, 23, or five kilometers from the frontline) and a logistics warehouse in Ocheretyne (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline).[38]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 1 and 2 but did not advance.[39]
Russian milbloggers continue to make exaggerated claims of Russian advances in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces seized nine settlements in August 2026, including Liubytske, Zirnytsya, Nove Pole, Rybalske, Novosoloshyne, Zelene, Dolynka, Nizhenka, and Shevchenkivske (roughly between 5 and 18 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian advances).[40] ISW has not observed any evidence to support these claims at this time.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 1 and 2 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Orikhiv.[41]
A Russian drone strike damaged a civilian volunteer evacuation vehicle and injured two people near Novotroitske (roughly 48 or 70 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 1.[42]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 2.
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, targeting civilians in Kherson City. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian in civilian clothes using a first-person view (FPV) drone in Kherson City, according to geolocated footage published September 1.[43]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian naval assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 2 that Ukrainian forces struck an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) in the Black Sea near Zmiinyi (Snake) Island.[44]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[45]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces overnight launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, two Kh-59 or Kh-69 missiles from over the Black Sea, and 174 Shahed- (about half of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol City; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three S8000 Banderol loitering munitions and 138 Shahed- (including jet-powered) and Gerbera-type and other drones; that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 16 locations; and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, transport, food, energy, educational, administrative, logistical, and industrial infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts.[47] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on September 2 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv oblasts.[48]
Ukraine is introducing measures to mitigate the effects of new Russian strike tactics that seek to maximize population fatigue and the disruption of economic activity by striking Ukrainian cities continuously throughout the day. Zelensky announced on September 2 that Ukraine will revise its threat-response procedures for Russian strikes by introducing a two-level air alert system in which authorities will issue a “yellow alert” for drone threats and a more severe “red alert” for missile threats.[49] New guidelines will allow certain businesses, social services, and public transport to continue operating during yellow alerts. Russian forces have recently adopted new tactics by striking Ukrainian cities continuously throughout the day in addition to conducting overnight strike packages, very likely aiming to demoralize the civilian population by disrupting daily life and commercial activity.[50] Russia notably has not increased the overall volume of drones in its strike packages and is instead using a comparable total number of vehicles throughout the day, leveraging jet-powered drones and missiles to maintain strike effectiveness despite distributing strikes over time.[51]
Russia is expanding its key Geran-type strike drone production facility at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan. An open-source intelligence channel reported that satellite imagery collected on August 31 shows the construction of at least ten new workshops and a large undeveloped area at the Alabuga SEZ.[52] The observed expansion reportedly began in late April 2026 and covers an area of over 500 hectares (approximately 1.9 square miles). Russia reportedly completed a new road and dozens of warehouses since July 2026 and is constructing a new workshop in the central part of Alabuga SEZ. The Institute for Science and International Security reported that satellite imagery of Alabuga SEZ collected in July and August 2026 shows two perimeters of lattice towers surrounding Geran drone production facilities as part of a passive drone defensive structure.[53]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/66977; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665
[5] https://t.me/Corpsarmy/2268 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1393574-kozaca-lopan-castkovo-perebuvae-pid-kontrolem-rosijskih-vijskovih-zadorenko/
[6] https://t.me/severnnyi/9201
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/
[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-22/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/
[17] https://www dot zsu.gov.ua/api/file-proxy?target=https%3A%2F%2Fs3-bucket.mil.gov.ua%2Fzsu.gov.ua%2F1788342150998-fe459b4e-31eb-4e2e-a729-6da1962b33d2-%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BF%D0%B8+%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B0+%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0+%D0%97%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%85+%D0%A1%D0%B8%D0%BB+%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8+%D1%82%D0%B0+%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%BA%D1%83+%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0+%D0%B2+%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%85+%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B9%D0%BD%D0%B8.pdf ; https://www.zsu.gov dot ua/suchasni-zbroini-syly-ukrainy/pryntsypy-liderstva-holovnokomanduvacha-zbroinykh-syl-ukrainy-ta-rozvytku-viiska-v-umovakh-viiny
[18] https://president.gov dot ua/documents/8532026-61381; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/8522026-61377 ; https://suspilne dot media/1393658-zelenskij-priznaciv-svatoslava-zaica-komanduvacem-suhoputnih-vijsk-zsu/
[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/02/volodymyr-zelenskyj-pryznachyv-brygadnogo-generala-svyatoslava-zayiczya-komanduvachem-suhoputnyh-vijsk/ ; https://ukranews dot com/ua/news/1172534-zelenskyj-pryznachyv-komanduvachem-suhoputnyh-vijsk-zayitsya-zamist-shapovalova
[20] https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-prevents-fsb-plot-against-russian-opposition-figure/; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2026/09/02/8051496/; https://en.interfax dot com.ua/news/general/1197831.html; https://ssu.gov dot ua/en/novyny/dodatkova-informatsiia-shchodo-spetsoperatsii-sbu-zavdiaky-yakii-vdalosia-zirvaty-terakt-fsb-rf-proty-odnoho-z-lideriv-rosiiskoho-opozytsiinoho-politychnoho-natsionalnoho-rukhu
[21] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/uryad-nashoyi-derzhavi-bude-pracyuvati-nad-neobhidnimi-zaraz-106225
[22] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/8682026-61441
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42096
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42096
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42095
[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12853 ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dcu3LgflU8e/?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet
[27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12857 ; https://t.me/tro119ua/98
[28]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42089 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42091 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9195 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98378 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36633
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42089; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42091; https://t.me/wargonzo/36633
[30] https://t.me/grvZapad/19650
[31] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1393972-infiltruvali-pevnu-castinu-svoih-bijciv-rosiani-namagautsa-potraplati-u-kupansk-cerez-golubivku/
[32] https://x.com/Playfra0/status/2094865486978625736; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/2094805700929081455; https://t.me/nikolaevka_online/33582
[33] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2094851666679906348 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2094835694313034103?s=20 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2094835694313034103
[34] https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1842; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095133614455582966;
[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1393532-armia-rf-kidae-v-bij-desatki-bronemasin-zaradi-prorivu-u-napramku-dobropilla-oficer-kara-dagu/
[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122433
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42089; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42091
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42096
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42089; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42091; https://t.me/wargonzo/36633
[40] https://t.me/voin_dv/20944
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42089 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42091 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36633 ; https://t.me/rybar/82833 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74556 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98378
[42]https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2094845350964011435 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1733477857764983 ; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed ; https://x.com/UAControlMap ; https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua
[43] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/37493 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2095042485068124631
[44] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1053136887634588
[45] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[46] https://t.me/kpszsu/75880
[47] https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28446; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31787; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1393262-poranena-ludina-poskodzeni-budinki-ditsadok-naslidki-udariv-armii-rf-po-dnipropetrovsini-v-nic-proti-2-veresna/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73472; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73467; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28451 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31790 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31792 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31793; https://t.me/synegubov/25395; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv_region/19281; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20276; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2782 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2783 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55738 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55780 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55782 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2784 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7392; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7383; https://t.me/press_kobl/4413; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73450; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1393284-u-poltavskomu-rajoni-vnoci-rosijska-armia-atakuvala-promislovij-obekt/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19476 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3154; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3153; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3154; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20664
[48] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5384; https://t.me/energyofukraine/7748
[49] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2095149362053579227?s=20
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/;
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[52] https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/39471
[53] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/new-passive-defensive-construction-identified-at-the-alabuga-sez
