Toplines
Russia’s second batch of Rassvet satellites appears to have failed to reach intended operational altitudes, marking another setback in Moscow’s efforts to rapidly develop a Russian analogue to Starlink. None of the 16 Rassvet satellites from the second batch launched on July 19 have reached their anticipated altitude of 550 kilometers as of August 31, according to data from live satellite tracker N2YO.[1] Many of these satellites ended up at altitudes between 300 and 400 kilometers, and some are experiencing orbital decay; and at least two satellites are reportedly heading for reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. These altitudes are well short of the intended 870-kilometer operational altitude for the Rassvet satellites.[2] Satellites orbiting at lower altitudes have shorter operational lifespans due to increased atmospheric drag from upper layers of Earth’s atmosphere and greater fuel expenditure than satellites operating at higher altitudes.[3] It is unclear how long the lower-altitude Rassvet satellites will remain in orbit, but they will likely not operate for as long as Russia projected. Only 12 of the original 16 Rassvet satellites launched on March 24 had entered their anticipated altitude, reportedly 550 kilometers, as of July 31 and remain at such altitudes as of August 31.[4] These 12 satellites reportedly provided Russian forces with two windows of connectivity with ground terminals for up to an hour and a half per day over Ukraine.[5]
Russia is likely rushing to launch Rassvet satellites to compensate for the loss of Starlink connectivity over Ukraine. The February 1 shutdown of Russia’s access to Starlink communications forced Russia to lean into the Rassvet system and likely accelerated Russia’s planned timeline to create a fully operational alternative to Starlink. The apparent failure of all 16 satellites from the second launch to reach their intended operational altitudes suggests Russia may have been unprepared to accelerate constellation deployment at this pace and will likely face additional delays. The existing Rassvet satellite constellation still presents a threat to Ukraine as it may allow Russian forces to conduct more precise strikes against Ukraine using remotely controlled unmanned systems and leverage Rassvet satellite communications even during limited windows of connectivity.[6] Even partially successful Rassvet launches could allow Russian forces to increasingly use satellite communications on the battlefield and in their strikes against Ukraine.
Russia will likely continue struggling to establish an analogous version of the Starlink constellation unless it dramatically increases the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches. Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440, which is developing the satellites, noted that Russia plans to conduct “dozens” more launches to deploy “hundreds” more satellites.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed on May 31 that Russia will need to successfully launch at least 200 to 300 satellites to achieve stable, 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine and plans to launch several hundred more satellites in coming years, but that Russia is likely not capable of achieving this goal in the near term.[8] Russia is unable to launch satellites at the required tempo and scale partly because it remains dependent on the Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle — a costly and scarce asset — to conduct these launches.[9] Russia has reportedly only conducted six to eight launches using its Soyuz-2.1b vehicle across all space and commercial space launches since 2022.[10] Russia would only be able to launch a maximum of 128 Rassvet satellites per four years at such launch frequency, and it is not guaranteed that all launched satellites would be operable. Only 37.5 percent of the launched Rassvet satellites reached sustainable operational altitudes as of August 2026. Russia may also not be able to devote all its Soyuz-2.1b launch capabilities to Rassvet satellites due to other space launches. Russia’s failure to launch its second batch of Rassvet satellites to the necessary altitude, as well as the frequency at which it can conduct such launches, will make Russia’s goal of launching ”hundreds” of new satellites into orbit in a short period of time exceedingly difficult in the near term.[11]
Ukrainian strikes against Rassvet satellite production and launch sites threaten to further degrade Russia’s ability to establish a successful constellation on a timeline Russia deems acceptable. Ukrainian forces struck the Progress Space Rocket Center overnight on August 14 to 15, a facility that produces Soyuz-type launch vehicles.[12] Ukraine also attempted a strike against the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on August 23, two days before Russian forces launched a Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle that may have been carrying a GLONASS-K1 satellite for Russia’s GPS alternative.[13] Russia reportedly launched both batches of Rassvet satellites from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, and Ukraine’s attempted strike on August 23 suggests that Ukrainian forces can threaten not only Russia’s limited supply and production of launch vehicles but also the scarce launch infrastructure to place satellites into orbit.[14] Ukrainian strikes against facilities and sites key to Russia‘s satellite and space industry may hinder Russia’s ability to launch satellites and further delay Russia‘s goal to establish its own analogue of Starlink in the near-term, including for use on the battlefield in Ukraine.[15]
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain in favor of conducting covert mobilization following Russia’s September 18-20 State Duma elections and appears committed to sustaining his existing force generation mechanism. Russian sources told The Economist on August 30 that Putin is committed to deploying between an additional 300,000 and 400,000 troops to the frontline in Ukraine.[16] The Economist stated that Putin will not need to declare a new wave of mobilization and will likely use regional governments to recruit additional servicemen via coercive mechanisms, though it is unclear if this statement is from The Economist‘s sources or its own assessment. Russian officials are continuing to publicly posture that Russia does not need to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev on August 28 denied any plans for mobilization in Russia because the Russian military has enough contract servicemembers to fight in Ukraine.[17] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya similarly claimed on August 21 that Russia does not need and is not planning a large-scale mobilization at this moment.[18] Some regional authorities are also leaning into existing covert mobilization mechanisms which coerce Russians into signing service contracts. Russian military authorities have intensified an aggressive recruitment effort in Penza Oblast since at least June 2026 by detaining and coercing Russian men into signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Penza City, Kamenka, Kuznetsk, and other cities.[19]
The Kremlin is likely attempting to appease and reassure the Russian society amidst growing fears of involuntary mobilization, and ahead of the State Duma’s September 18-20 elections, as mobilization remains highly unpopular in Russia.[20] The Kremlin has been setting conditions for some form of mobilization and associated civil unrest, as ISW has previously assessed, but the presence of these measures does not mean that Putin has imminently made a decision about whether to conduct large-scale reserve call-ups.[21] These measures instead give Putin the option to conduct such call-ups at a time of his choosing in the future, should he choose to do so. ISW continues to assess that any compulsory mobilization is a personal decision for Putin and is contingent on his perception of the battlefield reality and regime stability.[22]
Russian President Vladimir Putin met separately with People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 31 ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.[23] Putin used these meetings to highlight Russia’s cooperation with the PRC and India on the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic Sea and discussed further avenues for economic cooperation with Xi and Modi. Putin has historically sought complete Russian control over the Northern Sea Route, but has seemingly relaxed this position in recent years to instead use the Arctic as an avenue for revenues and cooperation with allies and partners after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[24] Russia will also likely seek to use the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to shipping — and sanctions evasion schemes — through the Black and Caspian seas because of Ukraine’s escalating long-range drone strikes and European seizures of sanctioned vessels.
Russian officials continue to implicitly threaten NATO in the Arctic as part of their rhetorical efforts to deter NATO defensive and cohesion measures in the region. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov published an article on August 31 accusing NATO of militarizing the Far North in a “direct threat” to Russian security and an attempt to turn the Arctic region into a “new front” against Russia.[25] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov claimed on August 31 that Russia poses no threat to Norway or other NATO states but is responding to NATO military escalations along Russia’s northern flank.[26] The Kremlin has been employing similar rhetoric regarding the Arctic in an effort to deter NATO from conducting military exercises in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and other forms of aggression and threats against NATO since 2022.[27]
US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials appear to be resuming limited bilateral negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 31 that he spoke with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner to discuss setting a date for Witkoff’s and Kushner’s visit to Ukraine aimed at developing solutions to end the war.[28] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov attended the G20 Summit in Asheville, North Carolina, on August 31, at the invitation of the US Presidential Administration, for the first time since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.[29] Siluanov reportedly discussed with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent the US-proposed 28-point peace plan from November 2025, a plan that Russian officials repeatedly rejected.[30]
Key Takeaways
- Russia’s second batch of Rassvet satellites appears to have failed to reach intended operational altitudes, marking another setback in Moscow’s efforts to rapidly develop a Russian analogue to Starlink.
- Russia is likely rushing to launch Rassvet satellites to compensate for the loss of Starlink connectivity over Ukraine.
- Russia will likely continue struggling to establish an analogous version of the Starlink constellation unless it dramatically increases the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches.
- Ukrainian strikes against Rassvet satellite production and launch sites threaten to further degrade Russia’s ability to establish a successful constellation on a timeline Russia deems acceptable.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain in favor of conducting covert mobilization following Russia’s September 18-20 State Duma elections and appears committed to sustaining his existing force generation mechanism.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met separately with People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 31 ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.
- Russian officials continue to implicitly threaten NATO in the Arctic as part of its rhetorical efforts to deter NATO defensive and cohesion measures in the region.
- US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials appear to be resuming limited bilateral negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Sumy, Borova, and Slovyansk directions and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Belgorod Oblast, including Ozon (Wildberries’ main competitor) marketplaces, on the night of August 30 to 31.
- Russia launched one Kh-59 cruise missile and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Belgorod and Sverdlovsk oblasts, notably targeting Wildberries and Ozon (Wildberries’ main competitor) marketplaces on the night of August 30 to 31. The Ozon Press Service reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces struck their sorting center and delivery hub in Belgorod City, causing a fire and forcing Ozon to halt operations in Belgorod Oblast for an unspecified period of time.[31] Belgorod Oblast-based outlet Pepel reported that a Ukrainian missile strike damaged two Estate Logistics warehouses which Ozon had leased.[32] Belgorod Oblast Governor Alexander Shuvaev confirmed on August 31 that Ukrainian forces struck seven warehouses in Belgorod Oblast overnight.[33] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at two Estate Logistics warehouses, smoke plumes rising from the Belgorod Thermal Power Plant (TPP), and explosions near a telecommunications tower.[34] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed that Ukrainian strikes against Belgorod Oblast damaged at least five facilities, including the Belgorod TPP, the Estate Logistics warehouse complex, the PEK transport company, an unspecified facility in the Belgorod City’s industrial zone, and a telecommunications tower.[35] Social media footage published on August 31 also shows Ukrainian drones likely targeting a Wildberries logistics center in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, but it is unclear if the strike was successful.[36] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck a nearby parking lot and an apartment building and that the Wildberries warehouse likely did not sustain significant damage.[37]
Ukrainian forces recently targeted a drone port in Oryol Oblast. Satellite imagery captured on August 31 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes against the Tsimbulov Drone Port in Tsimbulov, Oryol Oblast, that reportedly damaged one drone launcher and a drone storage facility.[38]
Russian sources and satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure in Leningrad and Yaroslavl oblasts. A source affiliated with the Kirishi Oil Refinery claimed on August 31 that Ukraine’s August 30 strike against the refinery forced the refinery to partially suspend operations.[39] Satellite imagery captured on August 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck at least twice near the pipe rack at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery.[40]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently consolidated some tactical positions in northern Sumy Oblast but remain unlikely to develop a major offensive in the Sumy City direction. Russian forces likely consolidated positions north of Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) in areas where Russian forces had previously infiltrated, according to geolocated footage published on August 30.[41] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unlikely to conduct a large offensive against Sumy City and are instead attempting to fix Ukrainian forces across a wide front.[42] The milblogger implied that Russian forces are trying to advance towards a large, forested area in northern Sumy Oblast, likely in an effort to hide from Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of frontline and intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar station in Desnyansky, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 57 kilometers from the international border); a command and staff vehicle from the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system near Ploskobukreyevka, Kursk Oblast (roughly 130 kilometers from the international border); and a material and technical warehouse in Popovo-Lezhachi, Kursk Oblast (roughly five kilometers from the international border).[43]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 31 but did not advance.[44] A source reporting on Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance near Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City) due to Ukrainian resistance.[45]
The Ukrainian Air Force, using MiG-29 fighter aircraft, struck a Russian manpower concentration point on the E-105 Kharkiv — Belgorod City highway east of Oktyabrskiy, Belgorod Oblast, according to geolocated footage published on August 29.[46]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on August 30 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked near Dovzhanka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in northern Kivsharivka (south of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on August 30, which occurred after a Russian infiltration mission according to ISW’s assessment.[48]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the area. Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Olhivka (southeast of Borova) according to geolocated footage published on August 29.[49] Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions east of Nova Kruhlyakivka (north of Borova), according to geolocated footage published on August 31, which ISW assesses occurred after a Russian infiltration mission.[50]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified Shahed strikes against Ukrainian logistics in the Borova direction throughout Summer 2026. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces began targeting Ukrainian logistics and rear positions west of Borova with Shahed (Geran) strike drones in early August 2026, after launching routine first-person view (FPV), aviation, and MLRS strikes against Ukrainian intermediate rear positions in July 2026.[51] The milblogger added that Russian forces also targeted Izyum (west of Borova) in mid-August.
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian logistics infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a material and technical warehouse in Verkhnyokamyanka (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline).[52]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces continued to infiltrate east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) according to a report from a Ukrainian servicemember and geolocated imagery published on August 29.[53] The Ukrainian servicemember noted that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from Novoselivka, Yarova, Pryshyb, Tetyanivka, Oleksandrivka, and Svyatohirsk (all northwest of Lyman) on a prior date. A Russian milblogger posted a map on August 31 acknowledging that Russian forces do not hold positions in Oleksandrivka (northwest of Novoselivka).[54] Assault elements of the Russian 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [2nd LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) launched an assault on a Ukrainian drone control point east of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) according to geolocated footage published on August 29, which ISW assesses was during a Russian infiltration mission.[55]
Russian sources are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from Ridkodub and around Stavky (both north of Lyman) and in forests south of Lyman.[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to cut off the Russian salient northwest of Lyman and have liberated several strongholds near Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[57]
Russian forces are seemingly struggling to conduct a wide envelopment of the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka area from its flanks but have made some tactically significant advances through frontal assaults. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 31 that Russian forces east of Kramatorsk consolidated positions from the Fedorivka area toward Zapovidne, from Pryvillya toward Malynivka, and from Malynivka toward Vasyutynske (all northeast of Kostyantynivka); entered Malynivka and Tykhonivka (both east of Kramatorsk); and reached the approaches the eastern outskirts of Vasyutynske.[58] Mashovets reported that Russian small infantry groups near Vasyutynske are about 6.8 to seven kilometers east of the Kramatorsk airfield. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Molocharka and Stinky (both north of Kostyantynivka) to encircle Ukrainian forces defending positions west of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka on the Russian right flank). Mashovets reported that Russian forces southeast of Druzhkivka advanced north and northeast of Sofiivka and conducted infiltration missions near Novomykolaivka and Novohryhorivka (both north of Sofiivka).[59] Mashovets noted that only a few Russian troops have managed to infiltrate through Ukrainian defenses in the area southwest of Druzhkivka along the Kazennyi Torets River, but have not been successful in developing their advances in the area. Mashovets’ reports of Russian advances southeast of Druzhkivka near the Kazennyi Torets River corroborate a report from another Ukrainian military source on August 20.[60]
Mashovets reported that Ukrainian defenses forced the Russian military command to divert the entirety of the 3rd Army Corps ([AC], under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) and a significant portion of the 8th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) to reinforce Russian offensive operations near Kostyantynivka rather than committing these forces to envelop Druzhkivka.[61] Mashovets noted that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) have an opportunity to advance more rapidly on Druzhkivka from the Chasiv Yar area, however, due to successful infiltration missions in the Novodmytrivka-Molocharka directions. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces still hold the Novomykolaivka-Krasnyi Kut line and Toretske-Torske-Pavlivka-Priyut area (all southwest of Druzhkivka along the banks of the Kazennyi Torets River), which will prevent Russian forces from achieving an easy victory in Druzhkivka. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces could reach the immediate approaches of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk as early as Fall 2026 and that Russian forces will likely prioritize conducting a frontal assault on the two cities from the east.[62] Russian forces are unlikely to seize either city by the end of 2026 even if they reach the approached of both cities from the east on Mashovets’ stated timeline, however. Mashovets added that Russian forces are notably struggling to complete a wide envelopment around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, and that it is unlikely that Russian forces will complete the envelopment by the end of 2026 even if they reach the eastern approaches of both cities.
Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces conducted infiltration missions into Krasnyi Kut and Torske, according to geolocated footage published on August 31.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novomykolaivka.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions on August 30 and 31 but did not advance.[65]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking the Russian-flagged Alfa-1 cargo vessel in occupied Mariupol (roughly 114 kilometers from the frontline).[66]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and southwest of Hulyaipole on August 30 and 31 but did not advance.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone ground station near Hulyaipole.[68]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30 and 31 but did not advance.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces identified and destroyed a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group on the outskirts of Orikhiv and that Russian forces continue attempts to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses in the area ahead of future offensive operations.[70] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are currently focusing efforts near Mala Tokmachka (just southeast of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv).
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on August 30 and 31 but did not advance.[71]
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in Kherson Oblast. The commander of a Ukrainian intelligence detachment reported on August 31 that Russian forces are trying to disguise themselves in civilian clothing and take cover in civilian homes on the Kinburn Spit — an act of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory.[72] The commander reported that there are still civilians living on the Kinburn Peninsula, which prevents Ukrainian forces from striking these targets even if Russian forces and legitimate military targets are likely present in the area.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse in occupied Kir-Bailar (roughly 173 kilometers from the frontline).[73]
Turkish Demiroren News Agency (DHA) reported on August 31 that a Russian-flagged cargo ship Omskiy-107 ran aground off the coast of Turkey near Istanbul after a Ukrainian drone struck the ship near the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[74] The DHA reported that the crew abandoned the carrier and that the vessel subsequently drifted across the Black Sea until it washed ashore.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[75]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59 cruise missile from airspace over the Black Sea and 121 Shahed-type (mostly jet-powered), Gerbera-type drones, and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 96 drones, that the Kh-59 missile did not hit its target, that an unspecified number of munitions struck 11 locations, and that debris hit eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial and mining infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; food industry warehouses and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv and Mykolaiv oblasts; and a Nova Poshta postal building in Odesa Oblast.[77]
Ukrainian officials are searching for ways to mitigate disruptions to railway operations after Russian forces adopted a new strike tactic of prompting prolonged air raids in Kyiv City and Oblast. Kyiv City officials reported that officials and Ukrainian train operator Ukrzaliznytsia are discussing procedures for operating transport and logistics and organizing road traffic on bridges during prolonged air alerts.[78] Russian forces have recently begun leaning into prolonging air raids in Kyiv City and Oblast in order to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses ahead of more dangerous strike packages, disrupt civilian and economic daily functions, and to demoralize the Ukrainian people.[79]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
The Belarusian military’s use of flatbed railway cars for transport is reportedly causing shortages of the railway cars across Belarus. Belarusian opposition source Community of Railway Workers claimed on August 30 that Belarusian Railways is facing a flatbed car shortage because Belarusian authorities have allocated the cars for military transport.[80] The Belarusian Community of Railway Workers noted that this shortage coincides with an upcoming joint Russian-Belarusian air defense exercise at the Ashuluk Training Ground in Astrakhan Oblast scheduled from August 25 to September 10. Sources indicated to the Community of Railway Workers that the exercise only requires a small portion of flatbed railway cars, and that authorities allocated the remainder for another unspecified military use. The Belarusian Community of Railway Workers noted that Belarus had similar flatbed railway car shortages while moving military equipment for the joint Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2021 military exercises in September 2021.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=CIS&t=country; https://www.numerama dot com/sciences/2319505-le-starlink-russe-en-difficulte-ses-satellites-tombent-dans-latmosphere.html; https://russianspaceweb dot com/buro1440-2026-0719.html#flight; https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russias-starlink-rival-rassvet-is-falling-one-satellite-gone-two-more-may-be-next-21967; https://defence-ua dot com/minds_and_ideas/z_analogom_starlink_poki_ne_zroslos_u_rashistiv_mozhut_zgoriti_sche_2_suputniki_rassvet_3_i_tse_daleko_ne_jedini_jih_problemi-24078.html
[2] https://tass dot com/science/1005554
[3] https://www.numerama dot com/sciences/2319505-le-starlink-russe-en-difficulte-ses-satellites-tombent-dans-latmosphere.html
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rassvet-zmozhut-zabezpechyty-rosiyi-zvyazok/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rassvet-zmozhut-zabezpechyty-rosiyi-zvyazok/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/
[7] https://t.me/bureau_1440/145
[8] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7447
[9] https://defence-ua dot com/army_and_war/udarom_flamingo_po_progres_u_samari_zsu_pererizali_najvuzhche_girlo_rosijskim_suputnikam_rassvet_ta_vsim_kosmichnim_vijskovim_programam-23975.html
[10] https://defence-ua dot com/army_and_war/udarom_flamingo_po_progres_u_samari_zsu_pererizali_najvuzhche_girlo_rosijskim_suputnikam_rassvet_ta_vsim_kosmichnim_vijskovim_programam-23975.html
[11] https://t.me/bureau_1440/145
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41885; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/; https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=CIS&t=country; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinski-drony-doletily-do-arhangelskoyi-oblasti-zvidky-zapuskayut-suputnyky-rassvet-ta-mbr/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/123045 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/117780 ; https://t.me/severrealii/34130
[14] https://defence-ua dot com/news/rf_v_umovah_sekretnosti_prodovzhila_rozgortannja_analogu_starlink_skilki_chasu_pide_na_rozgortannja_ugrupuvannja_rassvet-23696.html
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[16] https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/08/30/cornered-vladimir-putin-plans-to-escalate-his-war
[17] https://tass dot ru/politika/28054781
[18] https://webtv dot un.org/ru/asset/k11/k11rpr0mmc ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/21/mobilizatsiya-v-rossii-ne-planiruetsya-i-ne-ozhidaetsya-zayavil-pospred-rf-pri-oon-vasiliy-nebenzya
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[26] https://t.me/MID_Russia/89435
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[31] https://t.me/ozonhq/1494
[32] https://t.me/belpepel/24601 ; https://t.me/belpepel/24596
[33] https://t.me/aleksandr_shuvaev/1357
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[37] https://t.me/milinfolive/178534
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[39] https://t.me/paperpaper_ru/71795 ; https://t.me/severrealii/34191 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/
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[42] https://t.me/rybar/82771
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42080
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42077 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36584 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9180 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19629
[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/9180
[46] https://t.me/soniah_hub/17955; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37979
[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/9180 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42075
[48] https://t.me/army_9th_sbus/1037 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2094089753230459219?s=20
[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12834 ; https://t.me/endspiell/4327
[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12830 ; https://t.me/oaembr77/1622
[51] https://t.me/red_war_machina/863
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42080
[53] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/2093955939552448966 ; https://t.me/ShalinW/19276 ; https://x.com/SitrepLinksENG/status/2093811588834746800 ; https://t.me/ukrliberatioo/24126
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[56] https://t.me/rybar/82775
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47085
[58]
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3577
[59] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3576
[60] https://t.me/silukr/1065
[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3577
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3578
[63] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2094339376524243062 ; https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2094386939688280326 ; https://t.me/nichnavarta/335; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2094375816457064841
[64] https://t.me/divgen/83570
[65]https://t.me/wargonzo/36584 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98262 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42075 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42077 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20913
[66] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2094111097401803096?s=20; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093995177316659285?s=20
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42075 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42077 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36584
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42080
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42075 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42077 ; https://t.me/rybar/82775 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36584
[70] https://armyinform dot om.ua/2026/08/31/v-orihovi-znyshhyly-rosijsku-dyversijnu-grupu/
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42075 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42077
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[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/75536
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[78] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7370; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/11127
[79] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/
[80] https://x.com/The_Lookout_N/status/2094072644601573594; https://x.com/belzhd_live/status/2094053425340096757; https://belzhd dot info/military-transportation/na-bzhd-ne-hvataet-vagonov-platform-prichina-%e2%80%94-voinskie-perevozki/
