Toplines
Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) is disrupting Russian logistics across the theater, from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Crimea. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on May 31 that Ukrainian forces have achieved drone-enabled fire control over Luhansk City, Starobilsk, Alchevsk, Bryanka, and Kadiivka (all roughly 50 to 90 kilometers from the frontline) as part of Ukraine’s broader operational strike campaign against Russian GLOCs in Luhansk Oblast aimed at preventing Russian forces from conducting logistics operations in rear areas.[1] The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces regularly strike Russian GLOCs, armor and ammunition depots in the area and recently reached the Izvaryne checkpoint on the international border, over 205 kilometers from Ukrainian drone operators’ positions. Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their mid-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs across the theater over the last several months, which has been generating cascading effects on the battlefield and inhibiting Russian advances.[2] These strikes have been creating logistics problems for Russian forces throughout southern Ukraine in recent weeks and are now also affecting Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[3] Geolocated footage published on May 30 and 31 shows Ukrainian forces conducting strikes against Russian military equipment along the Debaltseve-Luhansk City highway, the H-32 Alchevsk-Kadiivka highway, the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Donetsk City highway, and the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol-Henichesk highway in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[4]
Russian milbloggers confirmed on May 31 that Ukrainian strikes are creating logistical problems for Russian forces across the theater, with one milblogger claiming that Ukrainian drones are now penetrating Russian air defenses throughout occupied Luhansk Oblast and reaching the border with Rostov Oblast.[5] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian mid-range strikes are significantly disrupting Russian logistics not only along the land corridor connecting occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts with Crimea, but also throughout occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[6] The milblogger claimed that these strikes have caused significant fuel shortages and seriously hampered Russian personnel rotations and ammunition supplies throughout occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov previously stated on May 27 that Ukraine is launching a “logistics lockdown” of Russian forces, aiming to scale its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and supply lines.[7] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated the growing pervasiveness of their campaign in recent weeks, consistently striking along the M-03 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway, the M-14 highway, and the M-30 Luhansk City-Donetsk City highway.[8] Ukrainian strikes against major Russian GLOCs recently forced Russian occupation officials to place restrictions on the M-14 highway — the primary land route connecting occupied Crimea to Russia.[9] Ukrainian forces are effectively expanding a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, which is disrupting Russia’s ability to transport personnel to the frontlines, supply and sustain frontline positions, and conduct the infiltration tactics on which Russian forces have relied to advance over the past several months.
Ukraine may also be expanding its drone strike campaign against Russian training grounds in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 30 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tryokhizbenko Training Ground of the Russian 3rd Army – likely the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) but possibly the 3rd Army Corps (AC, under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) — near Kryakivka, Luhansk Oblast (about 70 kilometers from the frontline).[10] Magyar reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Primorsky Posad Training Ground of the Russian 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, where elements of the Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) were training. Brovdi stated that preliminary information shows that the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade suffered at least 31 casualties, including at least 9 killed in action (KIA), at the Primorsky Posad Training Ground but that losses are likely much higher. Russian forces were able to leverage improved drone reconnaissance capabilities in the near rear in late 2024 into 2025 to conduct several precision missile strikes against Ukrainian training grounds as part of Russia’s wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign.[11] Ukraine may be trying to replicate these strikes against training grounds with drones in order to endanger Russian troop concentrations in the operational rear.
Russian officials continue to accuse Ukraine of striking the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). ZNPP occupation officials claimed on May 30 and 31 that Ukraine conducted two strikes against ZNPP, hitting the Unit 6 turbine hall on May 30 and a transport shop on May 31.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces refuted both accusations and stated that these Russian accusations are an attempt to divert attention away from Russia’s illegal occupation of the plant.[13] The Ukrainian MFA noted that Russia launches a new wave of such accusations ahead of each International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting. The IAEA reported on May 31 that its representatives at the plant observed damage to the turbine hall consistent with a drone strike but did not attribute the damage to a Ukrainian or Russian drone.[14] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used the purported Ukrainian strike to threaten escalatory retaliatory strikes, claiming that Russia will conduct “symmetrical” strikes against Ukrainian or NATO nuclear power plants if strikes destroy the ZNPP.[15] Russia has systemically threatened and damaged Ukrainian NPPs throughout the course of the war.[16] Russia has also heavily militarized the ZNPP by storing military equipment next to the ZNPP’s nuclear reactors, stationing military personnel at and around the ZNPP, and launching drones from the ZNPP’s grounds.[17] Russian officials frequently make unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian strikes on ZNPP and civilian targets to justify escalatory behavior and intensified long-range strikes against Ukraine.[18] Russian officials may use purported strikes to justify a new massive long-range strike against Ukraine in the near future, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned of on May 29 and 30.[19]
Key Takeaways
- Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) is disrupting Russian logistics across the theater, from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Crimea.
- Ukraine may also be expanding its drone strike campaign against Russian training grounds in occupied Ukraine.
- Russian officials continue to accuse Ukraine of striking the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.
- Russian forces launched 229 drones toward Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of May 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants warehouse in Matveyev Kurgan, Rostov Oblast.[20] Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at a fuel storage facility in Matveyev Kurgan.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov City, causing a large fire at the facility.[22] Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows fires at the refinery and indicates that the Ukrainian strike damaged the ELOU-AVT-6 processing unit and struck two tanks.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Lazarevo oil pumping station in Kirov Oblast.[24] Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows fires and a large smoke plume at the oil pumping station.[25] Kirov Oblast Governor Aleksandr Sokolov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck Urzhurmsky Raion, causing a fire.[26]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in border regions on the night of May 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post in Begoshcha, Kursk Oblast, and a drone control point near Grafovka, Belgorod Oblast.[27]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 31 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) and that fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[29]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Kharkiv direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[30] Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in eastern Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pokalyane, between Zybyne and Karaichne, and south of Chaikivka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[32]
Russian forces are unsuccessfully trying to establish a pontoon crossing in the Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) direction. A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on May 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian truck with a cut off roof and attached trailer that Russian forces were trying to use as an improvised pontoon.[33]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 31.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces occupied Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[35] Mashovets reported that only isolated Russian groups remain in Kupyansk at the Lyceum No. 7 and the canning plant but that Russian forces do not have stable control over these areas.
Russian forces continue to struggle to advance and consolidate positions in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets reported on May 31 that Russian forces continue attacks on Kupyansk from the north and east to try to split Ukraine’s bridgehead in Kupyansk into two but are having limited tactical successes.[36] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have been unable to seize Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk), Kurylivka (east of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi), or Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi).
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Borova direction on May 31 but did not advance.[37] Mashovets stated on May 31 that Russian forces in the Borova direction are attempting to advance on a broad front toward the Oskil River but that the Russian military command will not be able to allocate sufficient operational reserves to this effort as it prioritizes the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[38] Mashovets stated that Russian advances to the P-79 Borova-Kupyansk highway between Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka (both northeast of Borova) have complicated Ukrainian logistics near Zahryzove (northeast of Borova), Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka (south of Zahryzove).[39]
Geolocated footage published on May 29 confirms previous Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) strikes against a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Rubizhne (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 31 but did not advance.[41]
Russian forces continue to target and destroy religious infrastructure in Ukraine. A Ukrainian brigade reported on May 31 that Russian forces destroyed the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Zaktine (east of Slovyansk) after a drone dropped an incendiary device onto the church and started a fire on May 30.[42] Geolocated footage published on May 31 confirmed the strike on the church.[43] Russian forces have long been engaged in a targeted campaign to deliberately destroy, desecrate, and loot religious infrastructure in occupied Ukraine, intending to eradicate religious organizations that the Kremlin deems “undesirable.”[44]
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 28 and 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northwestern, northern, central, western, and southern Kostyantynivka and in northern Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and further in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka.[46] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further in northern Dovha Balka.[47]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dobropillya direction on May 30 and 31 but did not advance.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 30 and 31 but did not make confirmed advances.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[50]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Novopavlivka direction on May 30 and 31 but did not advance.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Oleksandrivka on May 30 and 31 but did not make confirmed advances.[52] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces advanced in Lisne (east of Oleksandrivka) and seized the settlement despite recent geolocated evidence indicating that the Russian frontline is much farther southeast of Lisne.[53]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including near Donetsk City and along the M-14 Mariupol-Melitopol highway. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Kalynove (one of a number of settlements ranging from roughly 20 to 120 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone workshop and manpower concentration in Donetsk City on the night of May 30 to 31.[54] Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian fuel tanker along the M-14 highway northeast of Novoazovsk (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline).[55] Geolocated footage published on May 29 and 30 confirms previous Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) drone strikes against a Russian fuel truck along the H-20 Slovyansk-Kostyantynivka highway just south of Donetsk City; a gas storage facility in Yenakiyeve (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline); a railway fuel tank west of Makiivka (just east of Donetsk City and roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline); and a mobile fire group west of Mariupol.[56] Geolocated footage published on May 29 confirms the earlier Ukrainian USF drone strike against a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system as Russian forces transported it along the M-14 highway north of Berdyanske, Zaporizhia Oblast (about 135 kilometers from the frontline).[57]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) and east of the settlement after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[58] Additional geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions west of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast, southwest, and west of Orikhiv on May 30 and 31 but did not make confirmed advances.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Luhivske (southeast of Orikhiv).[62]
Russian forces continue to expand their “human safari” strike campaign to target police cars in various sectors of the front. The Kherson Oblast National Police reported on May 31 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike overnight against a patrol police car in Kherson City, damaging the vehicle and injuring three police officers.[63] Russian forces conducted drone strikes against police cars near Kharkiv City on May 21 and in Bilopillya, Sumy Oblast on May 3.[64]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that the Ukrainian strike against a marine oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea, on May 30 damaged three tanks with fuel and lubricants.[65] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind stated on May 31 that the oil depot in Feodosia continues to burn.[66] Geolocated footage published on May 29 also confirms the Ukrainian strike against a Russian radar system south of Feodosia and against a Pantsir air defense system south of Saky, Crimea.[67]
Russian authorities continue to ration gasoline in occupied Crimea as Ukraine’s strike campaign is leading to logistics issues and shortages. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on May 30 that there are “localized and temporary” logistics issues along the R-280 highway (the Russian occupation name for the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway) but that traffic and cargo transport continues.[68] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov announced that Russian authorities will prioritize the supply of AI-95 gasoline in occupied Crimea to municipal and social transport starting May 31.[69] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev stated on May 31 that fuel sales in Sevastopol began in the morning but that sellers had sold their allotted amount for the day within a few hours.[70] Razvozhaev acknowledged that Russian authorities are struggling with gasoline supplies as they work to strengthen security measures and optimize logistics routes that deliver gasoline to Sevastopol. Aksyonov and Razvozhaev stated that authorities will limit gasoline sales to those with coupons.[71] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that some gas stations in Crimea are empty and that long lines are forming overnight at those stations that can sell limited supplies.[72] The milblogger acknowledged that Russian authorities’ calls for restrictions on civilian movement along the highways show that the situation is worsening. The milblogger assessed that Ukraine’s strikes against supply lines in southern Ukraine are allowing Ukrainian forces to be more active along the frontline in the Zaporizhia, Hulyaipole, and Orikhiv directions.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 229 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 212 drones, that 14 drones struck 11 locations, and that debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Rivne oblasts.[74]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on May 30 his warning that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russia is preparing a new massive strike package against Ukraine.[75]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed on May 31 that no Belarusian servicemembers are currently present in Ukraine and that Belarus will not deploy any forces there in the future.[76] Lukashenko threatened that the war in Ukraine will take on a different dimension should Ukraine launch an attack on Belarus.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1674515583762385; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/31/luganshhyna-pid-kontrolem-bpla-tretij-korpus-ogolosyv-novu-operacziyu-proty-logistyky-okupantiv/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/;
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2026/
[4] https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2061037435773923408?s=20; https://t.me/ab3army/7154; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2061039956420710451?s=20; https://t.me/ab3army/7154; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060751108759334912; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2060712801421717596; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2061011216244334978 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2061003031525638399 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ULNak_p9HQ
[5] https://t.me/milinfolive/173343; https://t.me/dva_majors/93808; https://t.me/dva_majors/93790
[6] https://t.me/dva_majors/93808
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/
[8] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36044 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2060094802121609236 ; https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/21565; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2060099470847513065; https://t.me/DonbassYasinovatayanaliniiOgnia/66263 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2058882607991886224; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2058823598031159314; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2058668175986733561?s=20 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2051232037336437178?s=20; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2051288896051335179?s=20 ; https://t.co/Aeq4tAsOt6 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/
[10] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39309
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[12] https://t.me/znppofficial/1770
[13] https://suspilne dot media/1319541-mzs-vidkinulo-zaavu-rosii-pro-ukrainsku-ataku-po-zaes/; https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/komentar-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-chergovoyi-rosijskoyi-informacijnoyi-operaciyi-navkolo-zaes-naperedodni-zasidannya-radi-keruyuchih-magate; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14102 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14105
[14] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2061075747884658807?s=20
[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/378257 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/378260
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Russian20Operations20Assessments20December2013.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-12/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-assessment-july-8-2023/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-19/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351
[21] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/5941
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351
[23] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13094; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2060908151210193068; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21514 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2060897930945708308; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2060912975167541624; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2060949959760019761; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2060905150894772307; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2060893656379162727; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2060895485867827274; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52546; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52561
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351
[25] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13096 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2060975930064171096?s=20 ;https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2060965548016677060?s=20; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21539
[26] https://t.me/aleksandrsokolov43/7837 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/378286
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39327; https://t.me/wargonzo/34531 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8233 ;
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/34531
[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72601 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39327 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34531
[31] https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/12052; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1546510183858881
[32] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52353; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212635
[33] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1C2NGG2Ryf/
[34] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2060842853161439418; https://x.com/41mechbr/status/2060593643845509448
[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3434
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3434
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353
[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3435 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3436
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3436
[40] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36057; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2416
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330 ;https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39327
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/31/spalyly-vdruge-za-stolittya-rosiyany-znyshhyly-hram-u-zakitnomu-na-donechchyni/; https://t.me/sloaembr_81/420; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1319753-rosijski-vijska-zavdali-udaru-po-cerkvi-u-zakitnomu-na-doneccini-81-oaembr/
[43] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060996686667796612?s=20; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060996886446641640?s=20; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2061061670445723906; https://t.me/sloaembr_81/420
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-10-20/
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060745006151864734; https://www.instagram.com/bat_kruk.npu/reel/DY4GH88ovJr/ ; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/12050; https://www.instagram.com/bat_kruk.npu/reel/DY4GH88ovJr/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KSg9IBCNmJs ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060739908445016211.com ; AudaxonX/status/2060739904988946828; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KSg9IBCNmJs; https://www.instagram.com/bat_kruk.npu/reel/DY4GH88ovJr/ ; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/12049; https://www.facebook.com/reel/4583086011973479
[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212635
[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212644
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39327 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39327 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116085 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212681
[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212681
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116085
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39327
[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72598; https://t.me/wargonzo/34531; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351
[55] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2061011216244334978 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2061003031525638399 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ULNak_p9HQ
[56] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060751108759334912; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2421; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36049; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36057; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2416 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36057
[57] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2060993267198574808; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2060438700970889674; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2884
[58] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2060758572762337509?s=20; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2060758503522779542?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/reel/993722033355449
[59] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2060757204660343073; https://t.me/voin_dv/19673
[60] https://t.me/rybar/80699
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39353; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39330; https://t.me/wargonzo/34531
[62] https://t.me/rybar/80699
[63] https://hr.npu dot gov.ua/news/na-khersonshchyni-vnaslidok-rosiiskykh-obstriliv-postrazhdaly-chetvero-liudei-sered-postrazhdalykh-troie-pratsivnykiv-politsii?v=6a1be05f807f1; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1319653-dron-rf-atakuvav-avto-patrulnih-u-hersoni-troe-poranenih/
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/; https://t.me/police_su_region/36889
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39351; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[66] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/100464
[67] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36057; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2416 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2060294866488213653?s=20
[68] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/8247
[69] https://t.me/Aksenov82/9636
[70] https://t.me/razvozhaev/21168
[71] https://t.me/Aksenov82/9636; https://t.me/razvozhaev/21168
[72] https://t.me/rybar/80698
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/63369
[74] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/64951; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29485 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18yaVpS61J/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29812 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/64956 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/41013 ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/10389;
[75] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/kozhen-susid-rosiyi-pochuv-slova-pro-virmeniyu-narod-yakoyi-104701 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[76] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/378135
