Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used his September 8 phone call with US President Donald Trump to push Putin’s misrepresentation of the battlefield situation. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 8 that Putin and Trump discussed the results of Putin’s September 6 meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner and prospects for ending the war.[1] Ushakov claimed that Putin gave Trump an “objective and thorough” overview of the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine and explained ways in which the US can quickly resolve the war.[2] Putin’s understanding of the war is, in fact, severely distorted by the Russian military’s systematic lying, which is emboldening Putin to insist on his maximalist demands.[3] Putin regularly makes absurd and aggrandizing claims of Russian advances on the battlefield to construct a narrative of continuous and inevitable Russian military success.[4] Putin likely used the call with Trump to present his distorted picture of the frontline in an attempt to convince Trump that the US should force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands ostensibly before Ukraine’s battlefield situation worsens.
Senior Kremlin officials parroted Putin’s claims about the battlefield situation and doubled down on Putin’s demands for Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the situation for Ukraine worsens each day and that Russian peace terms will harden as the war continues.[5] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that US negotiators are recognizing the “realities on the ground” and that negotiations must address the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine — a shorthand the Kremlin often uses to discuss its original war aims from 2021 and 2022.[6] Kremlin officials’ statements demonstrate that Putin’s negotiating position has not changed since the US offered a 28-point peace plan very favorable to Russia in November 2025, despite the fact that the trajectory of the war has notably shifted in Ukraine’s favor.
The Kremlin is notably maintaining its long-standing position that Ukraine accept all of Russia’s demands even as the battlefield dynamics have fundamentally changed. Russia has previously rejected as insufficient even the 2025 28-point peace plan, with Russian officials insisting that any peace agreement must reflect the “realities on the ground” and eliminate the “root causes” of the war.[7] The 28-point plan was predicated on the idea that the frontline situation was shifting in Russia’s favor following a period of relatively notable Russian gains. ISW assesses that Russian forces made net advances of 2,403.77 square kilometers (2,485.22 square kilometers including infiltrations) across the frontline between May 20 and November 20, 2025, when discussions of the 28-point plan became public. Russian forces made significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Hulyaipole directions in that period. But the frontline dynamics in the past six months have been very different: ISW assesses that Russian forces suffered net losses of territory into which they had advanced — 195.19 square kilometers — and gained a net 361.47 square kilometers, including infiltrations across the frontline between March 8 and September 8, 2026, following Witkoff and Kushner’s visit to Kyiv.[8]
Ukrainian forces made significant gains on the battlefield in Winter and Spring 2026.[9] They launched the Oleksandrivka counteroffensive in Spring/Summer 2026 that liberated 26 settlements and over 745 square kilometers in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[10] Russian forces, on the other hand, continue struggling to reach, let alone seize, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka — Ukraine’s heavily defended Fortress Belt — contrary to continuous Russian claims that Russian forces’ rate of advance is consistent with Putin’s most recent deadline to seize the whole of Donetsk Oblast by December 31, 2026.[11] Ukrainian forces have also changed the dynamics of the war in important ways beyond the front line since 2025. They have launched successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil refineries, airfields, marketplaces, and other military assets that are damaging the Russian economy and degrading Russia’s military capabilities.[12] The Kremlin refuses to adjust its negotiation position on the war in Ukraine based on the true state of the war and remains committed to its original war demands.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express support for US proposals for intensifying negotiations by moving to a trilateral format. Zelensky stated on September 7 that Ukraine wants to resume trilateral negotiations with the US and Russia in September or October 2026 — in line with Witkoff and Kushner’s September 6 proposal for resuming negotiations in that format.[13] Zelensky noted that there are no concrete plans for these trilateral meetings at this time, however. Kremlin officials have repeatedly refused trilateral meetings and attempted to delay such meetings or send lower-level officials to participate.[14] Zelensky’s demonstrated support for the US proposal for serious negotiations contrasts with the Kremlin’s insistence on Ukrainian capitulation and repeated rejection of compromises that would enable meaningful negotiations.
A Russian drone spent just under one hour flying in Moldovan and Romanian airspace on September 8. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that a Shahed-type drone entered Moldovan airspace from the direction of Ukraine, flew into Romanian airspace, and finally returned to Moldovan airspace before crashing near Mihăileni Vechi, Moldova, on the afternoon of September 8.[15] A Ukrainian open-source channel claimed that the drone was a Geran-4, but ISW cannot independently confirm this.[16] The Romanian and Moldovan official reports about the drone’s flight path and the time-ticks of its movements support the assertion that it was jet-powered, however. Russia has significantly increased its use of jet-powered Geran drones in recent weeks.[17]
Romanian authorities reported other likely Russian drones over and near Romanian territory in recent days. NATO forces reacted to a group of air targets moving near Romania’s border with Ukraine on September 6, and Romanian forces found unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) off the coast of Romania on September 3 and 4.[18]
The Kremlin benefits from such drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspace, particularly if Russia is using its faster jet-powered drones that limit the reaction times of states neighboring Ukraine. ISW has no basis to assess whether the Russian drones’ flights over and near Moldova and Romania were intentional. Moscow nonetheless likely sees such drone incursions into Moldovan and Romanian airspace as advantageous even if unintentional because they serve to focus NATO’s attention on its own defenses, call into question NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense guarantee, and support efforts to deter NATO states from supporting Ukraine. Russia’s possible use of its faster Geran-4 drones gives Moldovan and NATO forces even shorter time frames during which they can react.[19] Challenges for Moldovan and NATO air defenses defending against such drones increase, especially if NATO and Moldovan forces continue not to engage with aerial threats until they cross national borders. A Russian Geran-4 drone can fly at up to 450 kilometers per hour and can reach the Moldovan border from Odesa City within six minutes and the Romanian border within 20 minutes. These incursions using Russia’s latest Geran modifications aim to further test NATO and Moldovan defenses and the response of the entire NATO alliance.
Russian and open-source sources continue to report unconfirmed Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman. ISW is not prepared to assess the extent or results of these counterattacks at this time, however. Russian and open-source sources have increased reporting about ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman in recent days.[20] Ukrainian forces recently proved that Ukrainian forces control Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) and that Russian forces are not present in the settlement, which Russian milbloggers acknowledged.[21] There is limited evidence to assess Russian and Ukrainian control of terrain in the Lyman direction at this time, however. ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction, and additional publicly available information will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction over time. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used his September 8 phone call with US President Donald Trump to push Putin’s misrepresentation of the battlefield situation.
- The Kremlin is notably maintaining its long-standing position that Ukraine accept all of Russia’s demands even as the battlefield dynamics have fundamentally changed.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express support for US proposals for intensifying negotiations by moving to a trilateral format.
- A Russian drone spent just under one hour flying in Moldovan and Romanian airspace on September 8.
- The Kremlin benefits from such drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspace, particularly if Russia is using its faster jet-powered drones that limit the reaction times of states neighboring Ukraine.
- Russian and open-source sources continue to report unconfirmed Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman. ISW is not prepared to assess the extent or results of these counterattacks at this time, however.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against oil infrastructure in Russia. Russia launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles, 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 166 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against oil infrastructure in Russia. Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov City on the night of September 7 to 8 (roughly 460 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on September 8.[22] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin acknowledged on September 8 that Ukrainian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Saratov City.[23]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 7 and 8 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[24] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on September 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Novokostyantynivka (both north of Sumy City).[25]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions northeast of Kharkiv City in the Vovchansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed on September 8 that Russian forces are infiltrating Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City) and the forested area south of the settlement.[26]
The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers remain conflicted about the baselessly claimed encirclement of Ukrainian forces between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions. The Russian MoD claimed on September 8 that Russian forces seized Dovhenke and Bereznyky (both east of Vovchansk) and “tightened” the supposed encirclement between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions.[27] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on September 8 that Russian forces strengthened the claimed encirclement.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger, however, acknowledged on September 8 that Ukrainian forces are able to bypass the claimed encirclement and rotate their personnel.[29] The Russian MoD has notably not claimed the seizure of Nefedivka or Chorne (both west of Dovhenke and Bereznyky), which are both necessary to complete an encirclement, indicating that Russian forces do not control enough territory in the area to trap Ukrainian forces.[30]
A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF reported on September 8 that heavy fighting is ongoing in Kozacha Lopan and along the E-105 Kharkiv City-Belgorod City highway north of Hoptivka (both north of Kharkiv City).[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on September 7 and 8 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[32] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on September 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[33] The source claimed that the Russian military command is preparing for wintertime by ordering the creation of lists of personnel who are to remain in Kupyansk, which the source assessed indicates that the command does not expect fighting for Kupyansk to end in the fall.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a field artillery depot supplying elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) just east of occupied Teple (roughly 118 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 6 to 7, according to geolocated footage published on September 7.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Slovyansk direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 8 that Russian forces do not hold positions east of Lyman, west of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman), in northwestern Zarichne (northeast of Lyman), and in northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman) — areas where ISW either observed evidence to assess that Russian forces previously advanced or observed Russian claims that Russian forces maintain positions.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 8 that Russian forces advanced west of Rai-Oleksandrivka and north of Yurkivka (both west of Slovyansk).[36]
Ukrainian military officials continue to deny Russian claims of advances in Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk). The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction and the commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the area reported that the Russian military command is lying about alleged Russian successes near Svyatohirsk and is ordering troops to reach the Siverskyi Donets and Oskil rivers.[37] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are accumulating forces and increasing the number of assaults in the Lyman direction but are not advancing due to Ukrainian strikes, while the commander noted that some Russian infiltration missions are successful as the long flight time of Ukrainian drones to the infiltrators allows Russian forces time to hide. The spokesperson added that Russian forces are struggling to bring in new artillery guns to replace destroyed ones and are using more multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) due to their longer ranges, which allow Russian forces to fire them further from the frontline. The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces are also increasing their use of drones to accommodate their artillery losses.
Russian forces continue to strike bridges in Kramatorsk and infrastructure in Druzhkivka as part of efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the Fortress Belt and prepare the battlefield for future offensive operations. Russian sources claimed on September 8 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike that destroyed a bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River just north of Kramatorsk on the eastern outskirts of Yasnohirka (just north of Kramatorsk).[38] One Russian milblogger claimed that the strike only damaged one lane on the bridge but did not completely disrupt traffic, however.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that this is the third crossing Russian forces have struck in and near Kramatorsk in August and September.[40] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on September 8 that Russian forces have been using guided glide bombs to strike Druzhkivka and destroy areas where Ukrainian forces may be located. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have increasingly leveraged glide bomb strikes in their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that aims to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics.[41]
Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka and continued infiltration missions around the city. Russian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on September 2.[42] Geolocated footage published on August 31 and September 1, 4, and 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking likely Russian infiltrators north of Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka), in central and south of Popasne (north of Kostyantynivka), and in northern Kostyantynivka.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Chervone and Raiske (the smaller of two settlements named Raiske in the area southwest of Druzhkivka).[44]
A Russian milblogger acknowledged that the Russian MoD asked them to not post footage from the area south of Druzhkivka before the MoD, suggesting that the MoD is carefully controlling the information space as Moscow aims to create a false reality of significant Russian advances along the frontline. The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Raiske and added that the Russian MoD advised them to not post about the alleged advance sooner.[45] The milblogger assessed that the MoD would likely post footage of Russian forces raising flags in the settlement on September 9. Russian sources have been posting likely AI-generated or AI-altered footage in an attempt to justify claimed Russian advances on the front while the Russian MoD has similarly made exaggerated claims of advances.[46] The Russian MoD’s and Russian milbloggers’ reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 7 and 8 but did not advance.[47]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces recently seized Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Vasylivka (just east of Myrne), according to geolocated footage published on September 8 showing Ukrainian artillery strikes against two Russian ammunition depots in Myrne.[48]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 7 and 8 but did not advance.[49]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 8. A Ukrainian servicemember reported on September 7 that Russian forces are increasingly less likely to engage in open battle in the Oleksandrivka direction and are instead setting up defenses using camouflaged dugouts in windbreaks.[50]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site near occupied Donetsk City and a Russian control point near occupied Velyka Novoselivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 13 kilometers from the frontline) on September 7 or the night of September 7 to 8.[51]
Open sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against Donetsk City. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account reported on September 8 that Ukraine’s August 26 strike against Donetsk City killed the commander of the Operations Directorate of the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Moiseenko and the deputy commander of the Air Defense Department of the 41st CAA Lieutenant Colonel Denis Pavlov.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 7 and 8 but did not advance.[53]
Russian forces reportedly formed additional assault groups to support offensive operations in the Orikhiv direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on September 8 that the Russian military command formed approximately 120 assault groups, totaling roughly 150,000 personnel.[54] The spokesperson emphasized that the Russian forces cannot mass forces near Orikhiv or cause significant damage to Ukrainian logistics in the area. The Russian military command likely continues to concentrate forces in the Orikhiv direction to sustain pressure against Ukrainian positions in the area but is not pursuing objectives beyond its current effort to advance on Orikhiv from the south.[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign targeting Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 8 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points in occupied Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) on September 7 or overnight into September 8.[56]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 8.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[57]
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast; an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts and occupied Crimea; and an unspecified number of Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh Oblasts.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 166 Shahed-type strike drones (more than half of which were jet-powered) and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 175 air targets, including two ballistic or Onyx missiles, 31 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and 142 drones; that an unspecified number of missiles and drones struck 29 locations; and that debris fell at nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, transport, port, administrative, and commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts and that the strikes mainly targeted Odesa and Kyiv oblasts.[59] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces struck the broadcasting building of the “We Are Ukraine” television channel in Kyiv City while journalists were live on air, destroying part of the building and injuring at least five people.[60] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck defense industrial infrastructure and military assets in Kyiv City and Oblast and the Chornomorsk Port in Odesa Oblast.[61]
Russian forces continued strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure on September 8. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia and Ukrainian officials reported on September 8 that Russian forces struck passenger trains in Zaporizhzhia City and on the Sumy City-Kyiv City route in Sumy City, killing at least one railway worker.[62]
Ukrainian forces are beginning to intercept Russian Banderol loitering munitions with interceptor drones. Ukrainian defense platform Brave1 reported on September 7 that Ukrainian defense manufacturers have created an interceptor that is already downing the jet-powered Banderols and that the interceptor drone has a lower production cost than that of the Banderols.[63] Russian forces have been leaning into Banderols and jet-powered Geran drones for their long-range strike packages against Ukraine, as these drones fly at faster speeds than older strike drone variants, making it more difficult for Ukraine to intercept them and allowing Russia to inflict significant damage with comparatively smaller strike packages.[64]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80716
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80716
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/
[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/394348; https://t.me/tass_agency/394356; https://t.me/tass_agency/394358; https://t.me/tass_agency/394381; https://t.me/tass_agency/394382; https://t.me/tass_agency/394383 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55798 ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/384294
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/394385 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2139214/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2139214/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/90055 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2139408/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/
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[15] https://www.army dot md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-11; https://www.mapn dot ro/cpresa/19394_precizari
[16] https://t.me/oko_gora/20526
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/
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[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/ ; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2097246426551955493 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19702 ; https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.60944340613919%2C37.89403590940674&z=10 ; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2097140235922551011
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[22] https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/2097206660049539376?s=20 ; https://x.com/KJ_X23/status/2097209647199396034?s=20 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30503 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2097155630549041440?s=20 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2097156076768469503?s=20
[23] https://t.me/busargin_r/12074 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394286; https://t.me/tass_agency/394306; https://t.me/tass_agency/394313
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42156 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42160 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55801 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36777 ;
[25] https://t.me/severnnyi/9262
[26] https://t.me/severnnyi/9262
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/67135 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67147
[28] https://t.me/epoddubny/28982 ; https://t.me/sashakots/64317 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122871; https://t.me/epoddubny/28982; https://t.me/sashakots/64317
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[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/9262
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42156 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42160 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36777 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19702
[33] https://t.me/grvZapad/19702
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[40] https://t.me/sashakots/64297
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
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[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2096971166451724397 ; https://t.me/official24ombr/2601 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2096993620855259177; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2096995062898909348 ; https://t.me/official24ombr/2623 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2096985583272833485; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2096985566357213521; https://t.me/oaembr46/2975 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2096975442666217484 ;
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[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55796
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[52] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2097301185245991132
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https://t.me/mod_russia/67142
[62] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8476; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8477; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74025; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3214;
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