The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran. Most updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas Monday updates also include events from the preceding weekend, collected after ISW-CTP’s 2:00 PM ET Friday data cutoff. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.
Key Takeaways
- The Houthis have shifted their tactics toward increasingly targeting Saudi oil facilities, likely after recognizing that their naval blockade of Saudi vessels in the Red Sea has failed to compel Saudi Arabia to meet Houthi demands in Yemen.
- The National Resistance Forces (NRF), which is a component of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), conducted a counteroffensive in southern Hudaydah Governorate on September 5, possibly to relieve Houthi pressure on NRF forces near Taiz City. The principal challenge for the NRF will be exploiting any tactical offensive successes, however. One intermediate NRF and ROYG objective is to capture al Jarrahi, a crossroads town that lies astride a major Houthi supply line between Hudaydah City and Taiz City, and its environs.
- Hudaydah could be the ultimate objective of the offensive, but NRF and ROYG-aligned forces will need to seize intermediate objectives long before Hudaydah. Hudaydah is critical to both Houthi civilian and military goods, and its loss would be a significant setback for the Houthis.
Toplines
The Houthis have shifted their tactics toward increasingly targeting Saudi oil facilities, likely after recognizing that their naval blockade of Saudi vessels in the Red Sea has failed to compel Saudi Arabia to meet Houthi demands in Yemen. Western media reported in August 2026 that Saudi Arabia has largely diverted its oil exports away from the Red Sea and is instead exporting its oil primarily from Yanbu Port, north of the Bab al Mandeb and Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, through the Suez Canal since the Houthis imposed a naval blockade against Saudi vessels in the Red Sea in late July.[1] Saudi Arabia’s ability to reroute its oil exports has almost certainly reduced the blockade’s economic impact on Saudi Arabia. The Houthis last targeted a Saudi vessel off the coast of Yanbu on August 24.[2] The lack of Houthi attacks on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea in recent weeks suggests that the Houthis either cannot target vessels, which is unlikely, or recognize that the blockade has failed to impose sufficient pressure on Saudi Arabia.
The Houthis are likely adapting by increasingly targeting Saudi oil facilities to increase the costs of Saudi military operations in Yemen as part of a broader Houthi effort to compel Saudi Arabia to concede to its demands. The Houthis struck Saudi oil facilities in Abha, Jizan, and Najran, and a Saudi military base in Khamis Mushait with ballistic missiles and drones on September 8.[3] These strikes follow a likely Houthi ballistic missile attack targeting Jizan on September 7.[4] Official Houthi media stated on September 8 that the group will continue to target Saudi Arabia’s “economic arteries” until Saudi Arabia ceases all military operations in Yemen, lifts its blockade on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, pays Houthi officials’ salaries, and pays the Houthis war reparations for Saudi and Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)-aligned military operations in Yemen.[5] The Houthis are likely attacking Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil in order to try to raise Saudi political and economic costs to an untenable level and compel Saudi leaders to terminate military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.[6] The Houthis previously employed a similar tactic in 2022 by targeting an oil facility at Jizan, which directly preceded the ceasefire agreement in 2022.[7]
The National Resistance Forces (NRF), which is a component of ROYG, and other ROYG-aligned forces conducted a counteroffensive in southern Hudaydah Governorate on September 5, possibly to relieve Houthi pressure on NRF and ROYG-aligned forces near Taiz City.[8] ROYG military media claimed on September 5 that the NRF advanced into and established control over Hays District in southern Hudaydah Governorate on Yemen’s Red Sea coastal plain.[9] These counterattacks are a response to Houthi attacks on NRF and ROYG forces in Hudaydah and Taiz governorates.[10] The Houthis have engaged NRF and ROYG-aligned forces in western Taiz Governorate between Taiz City and Mokha Port.[11] The NRF counteroffensive on the coastal plain may seek to force the Houthis to divert forces from Taiz to defend against the new NRF and ROYG-aligned threat in southern Hudaydah, thereby relieving pressure around Taiz. One intermediate NRF and ROYG-aligned objective is to capture al Jarrahi, a crossroads town that lies astride a major Houthi supply line between Hudaydah City and Taiz City, and its environs.[12] This threat could convince Houthi leaders to redirect forces from the Taiz City front toward al Jarrahi to meet NRF and other ROYG-aligned forces moving northwards.
ROYG leaders may be publicly discussing their intent to capture Hudaydah City from the Houthis in order to generate an informational effect that could also compel the Houthis to divert forces from the Taiz City front.[13] ROYG leaders have described the ROYG-aligned counteroffensive in southern Hudaydah Governorate as the start of a campaign to capture the Houthis’ main seaport at Hudaydah City and deny the Houthis access to the Red Sea.[14] Hudaydah is critical to both Houthi civilian and military goods, and its loss would be a significant setback for the Houthis.[15] Threats to Hudaydah could, therefore, prompt the Houthis to divert forces from other fronts to deal with this new threat.
Hudaydah could be the ultimate objective of this offensive, but NRF and ROYG-aligned forces will need to seize intermediate objectives long before Hudaydah. An NRF and ROYG-aligned campaign to capture Hudaydah City would be difficult to sustain, however, because such a campaign would require a considerable military force operating along extensive supply lines that are far removed from the NRF’s long-held defensive positions.[16] Al Jarrahi is a more feasible intermediate operational objective after the capture of Hays District.[17] Offensive operations by Yemeni forces that meet committed defensive action by hostile Yemeni forces in this war usually fail to achieve major operational- or strategic-level breakthroughs. This phenomenon was evident in Marib in Fall 2021, for example, when Houthi assaults could only gradually take territory.[18] Major breakthroughs during this war most often occur when the opposing force collapses or retreats for political reasons.
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
The Iranian regime has reportedly deployed security forces across Iran, likely in order to try to prevent domestic unrest amid Iran’s worsening economic crisis and recent fuel price hikes. An anti-regime media outlet posted footage from September 7 of Iranian Basij and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) special units deployed in Tehran, Khorramabad in Lorestan Province, and Tabriz in East Azerbaijan Province.[19] The outlet separately claimed that the regime also deployed security forces to several other cities, including Esfahan, Abadan in Khuzestan Province, and Shiraz in Fars Province.[20] CTP-ISW is unable to confirm the veracity of these reports, however.
These reports, if accurate, are notable because the government deployed security forces on the same day it increased gasoline prices.[21] A previous fuel price increase in 2019 triggered large-scale protests across Iran, and the regime just faced its largest protest wave in January 2026 over economic grievances.[22] The regime’s decision to raise gasoline prices despite the risk of renewed unrest emphasizes the severity of Iran’s economic situation.
The price hikes and the deployments come as the United States has intensified its efforts to pressure Iran’s economy. The US Treasury Department announced on September 8 new sanctions against 36 targets supporting Iran’s aviation sector that allow Iran to move weapons, personnel, and illicit cargo, for example.[23] One Iran analyst noted that Iran’s aviation sector is a major earner of hard currency for the regime.[24]
Iranian media reported that Iran’s naval forces used Qassem Basir ballistic missiles in their failed September 6 attack on the US Navy aircraft carrier USS George Washington.[25] The Qassem Basir is a solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with a 1,200-kilometer range and a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). The MaRV allows missiles to maneuver mid-flight, which can help them evade air defenses.[26] US officials previously told the Wall Street Journal in July 2026 that Iranian forces had adapted to US defenses and begun using high-speed missiles that maneuver in the air to target US bases, likely referring to missiles equipped with MaRVs.[27] Iranian outlet Tabnak stated on September 7 that Iran is shifting its focus from extending its missile range to improving missile accuracy, mobility, survivability, and operational flexibility.[28]
A US military official said that US forces lost an outdated underwater drone due to a malfunction after the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) claimed that it captured an Anduril Dive-LD autonomous undersea vessel.[29] The US official did not confirm the Iranian claim that Iran’s navy has the submarine.[30] The official added that the defective drone was surveying regional waters in support of ongoing US operations, carried no classified sonar or radar equipment, and collected no sensitive data.[31] The IRGC claimed that the drone was an Anduril Dive-LD, which would be inconsistent with the US military official’s report that the drone was outdated. The Dive-LD is a new long-endurance, deep-diving autonomous undersea vehicle designed for defense missions, including subsea intelligence and surveillance, mine warfare, and payload deployment at depths up to 6,000 meters.[32]
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
The Iraqi federal government has reportedly issued a memorandum that appears designed to restrict the movement and activities of senior Iranian security and military officials in Iraq, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.[33] Lebanese media, citing “reliable” Iraqi sources, reported on September 6 that the memorandum stipulates that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi must approve any Iranian official’s visit to Iraq.[34] The sources added that the Council of Ministers will also evaluate the “political and economic repercussions” of such visits for Iraq.[35] The federal government reportedly must also verify the Iranian official’s schedule.[36] The memorandum states that approved visits can only occur in official government buildings in Baghdad, according to the Iraqi sources.[37] Any Iranian officials with approved visits to Iraq are then to be warned against interfering in Iraqi affairs.[38] The memorandum also reportedly explicitly restricts Iranian officials with security or military backgrounds from visiting Iraq.[39] It is unclear how and if the Iraqi federal government will enforce this while IRGC members are reportedly advising Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq.[40] Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Sadegh is also reportedly a Quds Force member.[41] The Iraqi sources noted that Ghaani’s visit to Iraq in early July to attend former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral procession violated an earlier version of this memorandum.[42] Ghaani met with Shia Coordination Framework officials and Iraqi militia leaders in August, reportedly urging against the militias handing over their weapons to the government as part of the federal government’s disarmament campaign.[43] The new memorandum comes amid the Iraqi government’s continued efforts to restrict weapons to the state and ongoing US efforts to pressure the government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Shia Coordination Framework discussed the legislation concerning the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) during a framework meeting on September 7.[44] The framework released a statement following the meeting and stated that they discussed passing the PMF law in a way that “regulates the PMF’s work and strengthens the PMF’s role within state institutions.”[45] The framework’s statement is likely referring to the Popular Mobilization Authority draft law. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew a previous iteration of the draft law from Parliament in August 2025, reportedly due to US pressure.[46] Iraqi and regional media have recently released conflicting reports on the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to amend the draft law. An informed source told Iraqi media on August 30 that the Iraqi federal government will soon refer the PMF law to Parliament after removing two paragraphs in the draft law.[47] A senior Iraqi government source separately told UK-based Qatari-owned media on August 25 that unspecified actors made several amendments to a PMF-affiliated “draft law” that aim to limit the PMF’s operational powers.[48] Zaydi is likely behind such amendments given his recent actions to consolidate his individual power as prime minister, such as placing several security institutions under a re-established executive office that answers directly to him. The amended version of the PMF draft law has not yet been made public.
Arabian Peninsula
See topline section.
[1] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/12/saudi-arabia-iran-oil-red-sea-houthi-suez-canal-strait-hormuz.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/26/business/saudi-oil-houthis-iran.html
[2] https://t.me/army21ye/3656 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2091886604499464207?s=20
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-yemen-says-73-injured-houthi-attacks-kingdom-2026-09-08/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-7-2026/; https://www.ft.com/content/9ffb0fb3-51f6-4aa8-9270-a949196bf441?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[5] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3783809.htm ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-18-2026/ ;
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-18-2026/
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/02/world/middleeast/yemen-cease-fire.html
[8] https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2096275835468529748?s=20
[9] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2096263625287631044?s=20 ; https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2096275835468529748?s=20
[10] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/05/yemen-ground-fighting-escalates-houthi-rebels-government-forces ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/04/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-red-sea-strait.html ; https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/middle-east-north-africa/yemen/houthis-escalate-yemens-western-front ; https://www.2dec dot net/news83237.html
[11] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2097351887104217093?s=20
[12] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2096263625287631044?s=20 ; https://www.2dec dot net/news83237.html
[13] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5315551-محافظ-الحديدة-لـالشرق-الأوسط-قواتنا-تتقدم-وعازمون-على-تحرير-كامل-الساحل ; https://www.2dec dot net/news83205.html
[14] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5315551-محافظ-الحديدة-لـالشرق-الأوسط-قواتنا-تتقدم-وعازمون-على-تحرير-كامل-الساحل ; https://www.2dec dot net/news83205.html
[15] https://thearabweekly dot com/why-decisive-victory-hodeidah-crucial
[16] https://t.me/BenTzionM/8278
[17] https://www.2dec dot net/news83251.html ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2096263625287631044?s=20
[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-59459750
[19] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2097227046069948716?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2097229762758328468?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2097316525459829167
[20] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609081765
[21] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1405061610577 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6939422
[22] https://apnews.com/article/iran-subsidized-gasoline-price-increase-ec18d69bf4e977fefc9c92b8f8f62215 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-27-2026/
[23] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0623/
[24] https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2097359149226950937?s=20
[25] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1378032/
[26] https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-land-defense/defense-news-army-2025/iran-deploys-new-qassem-basir-ballistic-missile-to-counter-us-most-advanced-air-defense-systems
[27] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/two-u-s-servicemembers-killed-one-missing-in-iran-missile-attack-on-jordan-a59f9699
[28] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1393283/
[29] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/06/17/3692139/
[30] https://x.com/JM_Szuba/status/2097384440511045637?s=20
[31] https://x.com/JM_Szuba/status/2097384440511045637?s=20
[32] https://www.anduril.com/dive-ld
[33] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[34] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[35] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[36] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[37] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[38] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[39] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[40] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6903100/شهادت-۴-پاسدار-از-کاشان-در-حمله-شب-گذشته-آمریکا-و-رژیم-سعودی ; https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2086453446916337936 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/
[41] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-703845
[42] https://www.almodon dot com/arabworld/2026/09/06/%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A7
[43] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-قا-ني-يرسم-خطا-حمر-في-بغداد-لا-حصر-لسلاح-الفصا-ل-ولا-صدام-مع-الدولة ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-قا-ني-في-بغداد-لبحث-سلاح-الفصا-ل-ومسار-تصدير-النفط-عبر-هرمز
[44] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/نواب-ر-يس-الوزرا-تعكر-اجتماع-ال-طار-التنسيقي-وتثير-خلافا-بين-المالكي-والخزعلي
[45] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/نواب-ر-يس-الوزرا-تعكر-اجتماع-ال-طار-التنسيقي-وتثير-خلافا-بين-المالكي-والخزعلي
[46] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/270820253
[47] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/بلا-ركان-ولا-مهندس-حذف-فقرات-الفيتو-ال-ميركي-تقرب-الحشد-من-الهيكلة-والتقاعد
[48] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/خاص-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-يعاود-الظهور-معدلاً-أمام-البرلمان-العراقي
