Toplines
Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman and are criticizing the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military. Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 that the situation in the Lyman direction is increasingly deteriorating for Russian forces and that Russian forces had to withdraw from unspecified forward positions in the area.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the area for months, despite the fact that the Russian military command reported and other milbloggers’ maps depicted an “optimistic view” of the situation.[2] The milblogger argued that “beautiful reports” — a term milbloggers have coined to refer to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces and misinformation about the state of the frontlines —need to be “absolutely forbidden.” Ukrainian forces recently demonstrated their full control over Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman), just days after Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russian forces control the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers notably acknowledged Ukraine’s refutation about Svyatohirsk and have been increasingly expressing frustration about Russian officials’ false claims of advance, particularly around Lyman. Russian milbloggers also highlighted how these false reports create operational risks for Russian forces, because Russian forces cannot call for fire missions on locations Russian forces earlier claimed to control, and because units in adjacent sectors may plan operations based on inaccurate battlefield assessments.[4]
The current extent of the frontline in the Lyman direction remains unclear due to limited open evidence about Ukrainian forces’ progress during a recent counteroffensive. ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates the likely extent of Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction. Additional publicly available information will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction over time. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.
The Kremlin is conducting increasingly expansionary fiscal policy amid high war spending, which stifles Russia’s economic growth and forces Russian authorities to sacrifice non-war related spending, likely at the expense of citizens’ wellbeing. The Russian Ministry of Finance published on September 9 a preliminary assessment of the federal budget that shows that the Russian federal budget deficit reached 5.8 trillion rubles ($67.87 billion or 2.5 percent of Russian GDP) between January and August 2026, which is 1.5 times higher than the Russian budget deficit in the same period in 2025.[5] Russian authorities notably forecasted the budget deficit to be 3.8 trillion rubles ($44.47 billion or 1.6 percent of Russia’s GDP) for all of 2026 — an estimate that is approximately 35 percent lower than the actual budget deficit as of September. The ministry’s data suggests that the two main causes of an increased budget deficit are rising expenditures relative to total revenues and declining oil and gas revenues. The data indicates that Russian budget expenditures grew to 31.72 trillion rubles ($371.17 billion), a 14.7 percent rise from January-August 2025, at a faster rate than Russian budget revenue, which rose by 9.2 percent to 25.93 trillion rubles ($303.42 billion). The Russian Ministry of Finance reported that the unanticipated rise in federal budget expenditures during this period was due to the conclusion and advance payment of government contracts, likely defense-related contracts. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 9 that the Russian government is not discussing raising taxes due to the rising budget deficit and that the deficit itself should not be a cause for concern as the economy remains stable.[6] Bloomberg reported on August 27 that the Russian government cut spending on non-war related budget items by 35 percent following a cash shortage in April 2026, indicating that Russia’s war-related spending increased enough to both offset the non-war related spending reductions and increase budget expenditures by 48 percent from 2025 to 2026.[7]
The Russian Central Bank published a document on August 31 on the main directions of Russian monetary policy from 2027 to 2029, outlining three forecast scenarios for the economy, including a “pro-inflationary” scenario that forecasts the Russian inflation rate to be between 4.5 and 5.5 percent and GDP growth to reach between one and two percent in 2027.[8] These numbers align with the Russian Central Bank’s September 2 survey of Russian economists who forecasted a 4.6 percent inflation rate and 1.2 percent GDP growth in 2027.[9] These forecasted figures indicate continued high inflation and weak growth figures, driven by the Russian government’s expansionary fiscal policy, tight monetary policy, and war-focused economy.[10] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently prioritized combating inflation at the expense of growth and investment in an effort to downplay the effects of the Russian war spending and international sanctions against Russia ahead of the upcoming State Duma elections slated for September 18-20.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s high defense spending and tight monetary policy are crowding out the Russian economy, leading to stagnant GDP growth and high inflation, and forcing Putin to cut non-war related spending, likely at the expense of the wellbeing of Russian citizens.[12]
Russia may be attempting to establish a rough analogue to Ukraine’s Brave1 defense platform in order to support decentralized procurement for good and limited defense articles that would bolster Russian air defense of industrial infrastructure. Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec launched the first Russian industrial marketplace that claims to enable companies to advertise products, search for ready-made solutions, and build supply chains on September 9.[13] Rostec stated that the platform features over 1,250 civilian products produced by over 180 companies and research organizations and noted that the most in-demand listings are counter-drone solutions, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and aerostatic and aerodynamic systems — all goods relevant for military and defense solutions required for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Rostech stated that 60 percent of applications to join the new platform came from Russian corporations and large businesses, although the full composition of the platform’s user base remains unclear, and it is uncertain whether Russian military personnel can or will use it as Ukrainian units use the Brave1 platform.
Russian officials have been increasingly shifting responsibility for air defense to individual enterprises and regional governments since late May 2026.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 9 that Russian private businesses and other government organizations lacked clarity on how and whence to obtain measures to counter Ukrainian drones and claimed that the marketplace is meant to address this issue.[15] Russia has long been struggling to defend its vast rear due to the lack of air defense systems, manpower shortages, and civil-military coordination issues.[16] Russian Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Governor Dmitry Atryukhov reported on September 9 that Russian air defense downed a drone in Novy Urengoy, and geolocated footage published on September 9 shows smoke plumes rising from the Novy Urengoy Condensate Preparation Plant (roughly 3,000 kilometers from Russia’s international border with Ukraine).[17] The fact that Ukrainian drones penetrated so deeply into the Russian rear demonstrated how Russia’s air defenses remain inadequate to protect such a large area, and how poor coordination between industry and the military has left industrial targets exposed.
Russian forces have reportedly suffered over 1.5 million personnel casualties thus far in the war. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 9 that Russian forces suffered over 1.5 million casualties (roughly one percent of the Russian population) since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[18] ISW has evidence to assess that Russian forces have gained an additional 12.12 percent of Ukrainian territory in this time period. (Russian forces occupied about seven percent of Ukraine’s territory in Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast since 2014.) Russian forces continue suffering significant personnel losses while achieving marginal battlefield gains.[19]
Key Takeaways
- Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman and are criticizing the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military.
- The Kremlin is conducting increasingly expansionary fiscal policy amid high war spending, which stifles Russian economic growth and forces Russian authorities to sacrifice non-war related spending, likely at the expense of citizens’ wellbeing.
- Russia may be attempting to establish a rough analogue to Ukraine’s Brave1 defense platform in order to support decentralized procurement for good and limited defense articles that would bolster Russian air defense of industrial infrastructure.
- Russian forces have reportedly suffered over 1.5 million personnel casualties thus far in the war.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 9.
- Ukrainian forces struck multiple military targets along the Black Sea coast of Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 8-9, in part to reduce Russia’s cruise missile strike capabilities. Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles and S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions and 196 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for additional reports on Ukrainian strikes in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
Ukrainian forces struck multiple military targets along the Black Sea coast of Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 8-9, in part to reduce Russia’s cruise missile strike capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 9 that Ukrainian forces struck targets at a naval base in Novorossiysk (about 343 kilometers from the frontline), including a terminal to load oil, military port facilities, and warships carrying Kalibr cruise missiles in the past day.[20] The Ukrainian Navy reported that Ukrainian forces used a Ukrainian Neptune cruise missile to strike the Kalibr cruise missile-equipped Project 11356 Admiral Essen frigate at the Novorossiysk base on the night of September 8-9.[21] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi added that Ukrainian forces struck several Russian military vessels, including missile-equipped ships, at the naval base; a Su-33 fighter jet and a Mi-8 helicopter in Anapa (approximately 308 kilometers from the frontline); and two S-300/S-400 air defense radars near Gelendzhik (approximately 366 kilometers from the frontline).[22] Ukrainian strikes also started a fire at an oil terminal in Novorossiysk, according to geolocated footage published on September 9.[23] Russian officials confirmed on September 9 that Ukrainian forces struck Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik, and Anapa overnight.[24]
An open-source intelligence source posted on September 9 satellite imagery showing that Ukraine’s September 6 strike against an oil refinery in Ryazan City (approximately 485 kilometers from the international border) damaged the facility and that repairs of the facility’s ELOU AVT-3 and AVT-4 crude oil refining units are still ongoing following earlier Ukrainian strikes.[25]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 8 and 9 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[26] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 9 that Russian forces slightly withdrew southwest of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) due to Ukrainian shelling and consolidated positions in eastern Stepok (east of Sumy City).[27]
Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight how Russian battlefield maps in northern Sumy Oblast are divorced from reality and sometimes off by up to 10 kilometers.[28] The spokesperson of the Ukrainian 8th Airborne Army Corps reported that Russian officials have falsely claimed that Russian forces seized 12 settlements in the corps’ area of responsibility since January 2026 and that their maps show contested “gray zones” as Russian-controlled. The spokesperson added that Russian forces are struggling to advance because the replacement rate is slower than that of 2025. High-ranking Russian military commanders routinely present exaggerated Russian advances as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.[29]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 9 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 9 that Russian forces seized Ozerne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[31] A Russian milblogger posted a map on September 9 that claimed that Russian forces advanced into Dovhenke (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) from the northwest and bypassed Vilkhuvatka (just north of Dovhenke) from the west, as opposed to from the southeast as ISW previously assessed.[32]
Some Russian milbloggers are starting to contest the official Russian narrative that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian troops northeast of Kharkiv City. A Russian milblogger refuted on September 9 the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces’ claim from September 3 that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian troops between the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions.[33] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have only encircled up to 500 Ukrainian soldiers in the area and that Ukrainian forces continue to use drones to strike Russian forces and to deliver supplies to allegedly encircled Ukrainian units, making it difficult for Russian forces to quickly clear the supposed encirclement. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have not encircled any Ukrainian forces in the area, given the lack of evidence of an encirclement.[34] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces also refuted on September 9 Russian MoD claims that Russian forces seized Dovhenke, Ozerne, and Bereznyky (just southeast of Ozerne) — the seizure of which multiple Russian sources framed as part of Russia’s encirclement efforts.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Sources continue to criticize the Russian military command for exaggerating Russian gains near Kupyansk. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 9 that Russian soldiers are complaining that the Russian military command is deploying reinforcements to secure alleged seized positions near Kupyansk where Ukrainian forces in fact have long maintained positions.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s exaggerations of Russian gains stem largely from the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military.[37]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 9 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[38] A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 9 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub and Katerynivka (both southeast of Borova).[39]
See topline text for additional analysis about the evolving situation regarding the ongoing Ukrainian operations near Borova and Lyman.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems in Fashchivka (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline) on September 8 or the night of September 8 to 9.[40] Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Buk-M2 air defense systems using a HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) near Baranykivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 8.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
See topline text for further information on Ukrainian counterattacks north of Lyman.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 8 and 9 but did not advance.[42] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 9 that Russian forces control the southern part of Lyman and Maslyakivka (southeast of Lyman).[43]
Russian forces continue to use glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield for future offensive operations against Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces conducted five guided glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk on the morning of September 9, injuring at least nine people.[44] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Druzhkivka direction reported on September 9 that Russian forces are launching dozens of guided glide bombs against Druzhkivka a day.[45] Russian glide bomb strikes against the cities in the Fortress Belt aim in part to create ruins that Russian infiltrators can use for cover and concealment in the future.[46]
Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces likely conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), based on geolocated footage published on September 8 that shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in the area.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 9 that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces established a foothold on the outskirts of Druzhkivka but did not specify where.[48]
Russian forces are employing “human safari” tactics to purposefully hunt civilians in Druzhkivka. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Druzhkivka direction reported on September 9 that Russian forces use “human safari” tactics when purposefully hunting civilians and transport infrastructure in Druzhkivka with first-person view (FPV) drones.[49]
Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Dobropillya direction. Russian forces likely recently infiltrated southeast of Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), based on geolocated footage published on September 8 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the railway in the area.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 9 that Russian forces advanced west of Serhiivka and southeast of Hulive (both northwest of Pokrovsk).[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 8 and 9 but did not advance.[53]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strike drone storage, preparation, and launch site near Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline); a drone depot in Dokuchaievsk (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline); and an ammunition depot in Selydove (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) on September 8 or on the night of September 8 to 9.[54]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 8 and 9 but did not advance.[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian vehicle in occupied Dniprorudne (directly on the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir southwest of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on September 5.[56]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 9.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian project 12150 Mangust-class high-speed patrol boat in Kozacha Bay in Sevastopol (roughly 233 kilometers from the frontline), an electronic reconnaissance antenna system in Olenivka (about 230 kilometers from the frontline), and an antenna of a separate command-and-measurement system in Vityne (roughly 161 kilometers from the frontline) on September 8 or the night of September 8-9.[57] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged on September 9 that Ukrainian drones struck several locations in occupied Sevastopol.[58]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[59]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea; S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from the Sea of Azov; and 196 Shahed-type strike drones (including jet-powered drones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 165 drones; that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 23 locations; and that debris struck four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, railway, port, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[61] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on September 9 that Russian drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Sumy, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblasts.[62]
Russian forces continue to escalate strikes against Ukrainian-Moldovan border infrastructure. Ukrainian and Moldovan officials reported on September 9 that Russian forces struck the Tudora-Starokozache border checkpoint between Odesa Oblast and Moldova, killing two people, injuring three, and forcing the checkpoint to suspend operations.[63] Geolocated footage published on September 9 shows Russian drone debris scattered across the border crossing.[64] Russian forces have struck border crossings along the Moldova-Odesa Oblast border four times since August 20.[65]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian forces arrived in Russia to participate in anti-aircraft missile system training exercises. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 9 that Belarusian servicemembers, including those from a radio-technical brigade, arrived at a Russian training ground to participate in anti-aircraft missile training exercises.[66]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55837 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47401
[2] https://t.me/dva_majors/98751
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/ ;https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/
[5] https://minfin dot gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=40580-predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar-avgust_2026_goda
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/394559
[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-27/russia-was-forced-to-cut-spending-after-running-out-of-cash
[8] https://www.cbr.ru/about_br/publ/ondkp/on_2027_2029/
[9] https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/ddkp/mo_br/
[10] https://www.cbr dot ru/Collection/Collection/File/62342/bulletin_26-06.pdf
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/
[13] https://t.me/rostecru/12731
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[15] https://t.me/rybar/83004
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/
[17] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2097689010000859230; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2097690277628576251; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2097690400450376133; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2097690400450376133; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2097695668991320421;https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2097696802460057743;https://x.com/LayBay_ish/status/2097689879496814857;https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30586 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/59624 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30587 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30585 ; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2097690400450376133?s=20
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42170
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/
[20] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2097611206307574079
[21] https://www.facebook.com/navy.mil.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0yRDtEfNfQSKpqMopXRL7mvhcyig5epcQJgDipQQjjSmS5fZmy21sckxGXcWDpkBSl?locale=uk_UA
[22] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2802 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2435
[23] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2097558521705636343; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30555
[24] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/10971; https://t.me/tass_agency/394502; https://t.me/tass_agency/394503
[25] https://t.me/exile_plus/2477
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42171; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42168; https://t.me/severnnyi/9272 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47394; https://t.me/wargonzo/36806; https://t.me/dva_majors/98735
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/9272
[28] https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/09/malyuvannya-peremog-na-karti-abo-yak-rosiya-zahopyla-12-naselenyh-punktiv-na-sumshhyni/
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42171; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42168; https://t.me/dva_majors/98735; https://t.me/severnnyi/9272; https://t.me/wargonzo/36806; https://t.me/arx_spn/30984
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/67171
[32] https://t.me/divgen/83802
[33] https://t.me/arx_spn/30984; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/
[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/9277; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/
[36] https://t.me/grvZapad/19710
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/36806 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19711
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/36806 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19711
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42175
[41]https://x.com/WritingFates/status/2097335712844583397s=20 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2097329295278383294; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/209733734921869159; https://t.me/k_2army/1497
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42171; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42168; https://t.me/wargonzo/36806; https://t.me/dva_majors/98735
[43] https://t.me/grvZapad/19711
[44] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid023ZhjjhfHqX9ewx6uEqGPhdmKg3k8zUT1Q6UKME24PpsxvN73DvU7YggadJpwJzYol; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1399216-rosiani-vdarili-po-kramatorsku-patma-aviabombami-cetvero-civilnih-poraneni/; https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/6633 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/09/rosiyany-vdaryly-po-kramatorsku-pyatma-aviabombamy-9-czyvilnyh-poraneni/
[45] https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/09/09/fpv-polyuyut-na-lyudej-prosto-na-vulyczyah-druzhkivka-opynylasya-pid-shhodennym-terorom-okupantiv/
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12916; https://t.me/bbs117_army/138
[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/67176
[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/09/fpv-polyuyut-na-lyudej-prosto-na-vulyczyah-druzhkivka-opynylasya-pid-shhodennym-terorom-okupantiv/
[50] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DdA0fEgMDTl/; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2097608681974374411?s=20
[51]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42168 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122942 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47394 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98735
[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33840
[53]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42168 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47394 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122942
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42175
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42168; https://t.me/wargonzo/36806 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47394 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98735
[56] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2097678219948310529 ; https://t.me/orcocide128/18
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42175
[58] https://t.me/razvozhaev/23700
[59] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/77395
[61] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31665 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31904 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28544 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25553 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25578 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25579 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25579 ; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv_region/19453 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7458 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7461 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20535 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20537 ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3774 ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34634 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74083 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48008
[62] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5405
[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/1399352-dpsu-rosia-hoce-porusiti-logistiku-atakami-na-punkti-propusku/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2097581459200479281 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20771 ; https://www.facebook.com/100069377072398/posts/1400605928928630/?rdid=4X7ULMQwurIrFLJ7# ; https://www.facebook.com/100064704725226/posts/1535369971963146/?mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=jXN2gJGr0D6fa9Cw# ; https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/2097601169925231059?s=20 ; https://t.me/DPSUkr/34923
[64] https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2097580483861270632 ; https://hromadske dot radio/news/2026/09/09/unochi-rf-atakuvala-punkt-propusku-starokozache-na-kordoni-z-moldovoiu-ie-zahybli-ta-poraneni
[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/
[66] https://t.me/modmilby/58614
