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The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely.
The precise nature of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25 has obscured the significant damage inflicted on critical Iranian military infrastructure.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah.
Israeli forces are transitioning to the third phase of their operations in the northern Gaza Strip, which will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip on December 31. This reduction in forces is part of what the IDF has described as its third phase in the strip, which also involves ending major combat operations, releasing reservists, transitioning to “targeted raids,” and establishing a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units and rendered others combat ineffective, particularly in the northern Gaza strip, since the beginning of the clearing operations. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time. Decreased Israeli pressure would, in fact, allow Hamas to rebuild its military capabilities and infrastructure. Hamas maintains a conventional military structure, meaning that it should be able to quickly replace commanders who have died in the war. Several recently killed Hamas battalion and brigade commanders had led their units for many years, suggesting that they had the ability and time to develop successors to take their place. Such reconstitution is inconsistent with the stated Israeli war aims, which are to destroy Hamas militarily and politically.
Iran has increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The United States and the E3 confirmed in a joint statement on December 28 that Iran has increased its enrichment rate of 60 percent purity uranium. Iran has been stockpiling 60 percent HEU since April 2021. Iran decreased its enrichment rate and HEU stockpile after it reached an informal nuclear agreement with the United States in August 2023. Western media reported that the United States refroze Iranian financial assets released as part of the agreement in October. Iran’s current stockpile of 60 percent HEU stands at 128.3 kilograms as of October 28.
Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. A one-way drone struck a commercial vessel off the coast of India, causing structural damage to the ship, on December 23. The vessel is partially Israeli-owned. Israeli media reported that Iran was responsible for the attack, which is consistent with the ongoing anti-shipping campaign that Iran and the Houthi movement have conducted around the Bab al Mandeb in recent weeks. This attack follows the Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claiming on December 22 that it conducted an unspecified attack on a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea. There is no evidence that the Islamic Resistance of Iraq conducted an attack into the Mediterranean Sea at the time of writing. The claim, nevertheless, signals the readiness of the Iraqi group to participate in the Iran-led attack campaign on maritime targets. Finally, a senior commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, threatened to expand the anti-shipping campaign to the Mediterranean Sea and Strait of Gibraltar on December 23. Naghdi frequently makes inflammatory threats toward Iranian adversaries, but his statement is particularly noteworthy given the drone attack off the Indian coast and the claimed attack by the Islamic Resistance of Iraq. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely messaging their capability and willingness to widen geographically their anti-shipping attack campaign in response to the United States forming a multinational naval task force to safeguard commercial traffic around the Red Sea.
This report presents the order of battle (ORBAT) of the al Qassem Brigades at the brigade and the battalion level. The lack of adequate reporting on Hamas’ units at the company level and below precludes a more detailed presentation of those echelons. This ORBAT presents the formal structure of the al Qassem Brigades during the Israeli ground operation in Israel. The actual structure of the al Qassem Brigades may change as the ground operation progresses and Israeli forces destroy Hamas units or render them combat ineffective.
Israeli forces are transitioning from clearing operations to holding operations in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip, such as Beit Hanoun and the al Shati camp, are beginning to execute tasks analogous to the US military definition of a holding operation. A holding operation “involves disrupting [enemy] activities in an area and providing a good security environment for the population” and “focuses on securing the population.” The Israeli Defense Minister said on December 18 that the IDF is preparing to transition to a “day after” the war and that Israel will begin bringing back the local population in some areas of the strip. The IDF redeployed some of the units responsible for clearing Beit Hanoun and al Shati camp and backfilled them with new units to hold the areas.The backfilling units are continuing lower intensity operations, such as raids against infrastructure and clashing with small cells of Palestinian fighters.The hold phase is defined by a decreased level of violence, but it still requires holding forces to engage and eliminate enemy forces and infrastructure to provide security.
Palestinian militias are attempting to resist Israeli advances north and east of Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that it detonated multiple claymore-type, anti-personnel mines targeting ten Israeli soldiers east of Khan Younis. The militia also claimed that it inflicted five casualties during a small arms clash with Israeli forces along the Israeli forward line of advance in al Qarara, north of Khan Younis . The al Qassem Brigades separately mortared Israeli soldiers advancing north and east of Khan Younis. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed that it conducted four mortar and rocket attacks on Israeli forces advancing into Khan Younis. Al Quds Brigades fighters fired tandem-charge rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at an Israeli armored personnel carrier east of Khan Younis. The National Resistance Brigade—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—used mortars against Israeli forces advancing east of Khan Younis. Residents published footage of audible small arms fire east of Khan Younis on December 12. The BBC reported on December 11 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had captured most of the four main towns east of Khan Younis.
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis as Palestinian militias attempt to resist Israeli advances. Israeli forces located several tunnel shafts and a Hamas military headquarters as they advanced in Khan Younis. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged three Palestinian fighters as they emerged from a tunnel in central Khan Younis and fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).Hamas maintains an extensive tunnel system across the Gaza Strip, which Israeli forces have destroyed as they have advanced. Israeli forces also raided a mosque from which Hamas fighters were operating. The IDF said the Hamas fighters detonated an IED near Israeli forces.