Iran Update, February 19, 2025

 

 

 

 

Iran Update, February 19, 2025

Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

NOTE: CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime. 

The Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference.[1] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution, and therefore, the composition of its attendees will influence the trajectory of the post-Assad Syrian state. Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim told Turkish state media on February 19 that the Syrian interim government expects armed groups to disarm and integrate into the new Syrian army and for the political wings of these armed groups to dissolve.[2] Daghim called out the SDF and PYD specifically, arguing that the PYD ”must be dissolved“ because the SDF “operates outside the authority of the Damascus government.”[3] The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[4] Daghim’s call for the PYD to ”dissolve” differs from recent reports that Turkey wants to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the PYD, to participate in the political system in Damascus.[5] Daghim confirmed that the Preparatory Committee “has not and will not communicate with the Syrian Democratic Forces or any other military group” but that the interim government is continuing to negotiate disarmament terms with the SDF.[6] There appear to be several outstanding issues in the negotiations between the interim government and the SDF. An SDF commander stated that the SDF and AANES agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17, suggesting that figures formerly associated with the SDF could participate in the conference if the SDF dissolves before the conference.[7]

The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions. The SDF fought Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)’s predecessor organizations and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) throughout the 2010s in Syria and had several political disagreements.[8] The PYD, for example, did not join Syrian opposition organizations.[9] Sunni Arab opposition groups have accused the SDF of cooperating with the Assad regime and have historically viewed the group with suspicion.[10] The Preparatory Committee is mostly comprised of pro-HTS figures who are loyal to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara. Daghim previously headed the SNA Moral Guidance Department and has previously criticized the SDF.[11] Daghim stated on January 31 that the SDF is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[12] Daghim nonetheless appears to be distinguishing the PYD, a dominant component of the SDF, from other Syrian components by calling for its dissolution. The SDF’s leaders, many of whom are Kurdish, are likely reluctant to integrate into an organization that includes groups that have repeatedly committed human rights abuses against Kurds. SDF leaders almost certainly recognize that ongoing Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks in northern Syria pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF and Kurds.[13] The SDF is therefore unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active attacks.

Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. The Shia Coordination Framework is a relatively loose alliance of several small and major Iraqi parties, some of whom could attempt to ally with Sadr prior to or after elections to improve their political positions. Iraqi media reported on February 18 that Sadr’s Shia National Movement registered to participate in the parliamentary elections.[14] Sadr called on his supporters to update their voter registration on February 19.[15] Sadr’s movement withdrew from Parliament in 2022 amid political deadlock following the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[16] The movement’s withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to form the largest bloc in parliament. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could therefore threaten the Shia Coordination Framework’s majority in parliament, especially if he manages to co-opt smaller parties.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh al Fayyadh. The PMC is responsible for ensuring that militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) answer to the Iraqi federal government.[17] The Iraqi parliament is scheduled to vote on the PMF Law in its next session.[18] The PMF Law would force some PMF commanders and leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire due to their age. Some Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework members agreed on February 17 to add an amendment to the law that enables the Iraqi prime minister to extend the retirement age for PMF commanders and officials.[19] This amendment would enable Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to postpone Fayyadh‘s retirement. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc reportedly seek to quickly pass the PMF Law, even if the passage of this law causes Fayyadh’s removal.[20] Parliamentary sources told Iraqi media on February 19 that parliamentarians from the Badr Organization and Sudani oppose Fayyadh’s removal because they are concerned that a “hardline alternative” could replace Fayyadh.[21] It is not clear who the Badr Organization would consider a ”hardliner,” though it may be a reference to more extreme Iranian-backed groups like Kataib Hezbollah. The Shia Coordination Framework members who oppose Fayyadh also reportedly believe that the retirement of veteran PMF leaders could weaken the organization.

Fayyadh met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in Tehran on February 18, which may indicate that Fayyadh sought Iranian support to retain his position.[22] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s support for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely including those that operate within the PMF, during his meeting with Fayyadh.[23] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei similarly stated during a meeting with Sudani in Tehran in early January 2025 that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[24]

Some elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel. A group calling itself the al Burhan Special Combat Force and claiming to be a part of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced its formation on February 14.[25] The group said that it would defend Iraqi territory and citizens from “occupation inside and outside of Iraq,” presumably a reference to the United States and Israel. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to cease attacks against US forces in January 2024. The Quds Force commander’s order caused some apparent frustration among more extreme Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, which did not ”initially agree” to the directive.[26] Some Nujaba fighters may be frustrated by the failure of Iranian-backed groups to respond to reports that the Iraqi federal government may reconsider the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by the end of 2026.[27]

Iranian-backed Iraqi groups similarly stopped attacks targeting Israel in November 2024 due to threats that Israel may strike Iraqi-backed groups in the country, and some fighters may be increasingly frustrated about the lack of attacks targeting Israel. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—of which Nujaba is a member—frequently said that its attacks targeted “our occupiers” in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, a clear reference to Israel.[28]  Iran and its partners and proxies have claimed that Israeli intelligence organizations also operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] The al Burhan Special Combat Force’s reference to ”occupation” inside Iraq could refer to these organizations.

Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.[30] Bloomberg reported on February 18 that Iranian oil exports to China increased by 82 percent between January 1 and February 1, citing data from intelligence firm Kpler.[31] Iranian oil exports to China previously peaked just before US President Donald Trump imposed “maximum pressure“ sanctions on Iran for the first time in 2018.[32] Unspecified traders in the oil market told Bloomberg that Iran and China have increasingly used “ship-to-ship transfers” and “alternative receiving terminals” to confront logistical issues caused by US sanctions.[33] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on February 14 that the United States aims to reduce Iranian oil exports by more than 90 percent.[34]

Iran seeks to increase economic cooperation with Russia to mitigate the impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, but it is unclear whether this cooperation will meaningfully improve Iranian economic conditions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin met with Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on February 18 to discuss monetary and banking cooperation.[35] The officials will discuss exchange rates and the implementation of the second and third phases of the Mir-Shetab banking system.[36] Iran and Russia implemented the first phase of the Mir-Shetab system in November 2024 to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[37] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in Tehran on February 18 to discuss the implementation of the Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement.[38] Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh and Russian Transport Minister Roman Vladimirovich Starovoyt also signed the 2025 Roadmap for Transport and Transit Cooperation in Tehran on February 18.[39] The agreement includes the completion of the Rasht-Astara Railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[40] Iran and Russia have discussed the construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway for several years, and it is unclear whether this agreement will accelerate the construction of the railway.[41]

The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19.[42] The sources denied Iraqi media reports that the Syrian interim government asked Iran to resume relations. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Constitution: The Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference. The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions.
• Shia Iraqi Politics: Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh al Fayyadh.
• Iraqi Militia Friction: Some elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel.
• Iranian Oil Exports: Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.
• Syrian Stabilization: The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.

Syria

HTS-led General Security Forces entered Jarabulus along the Syria-Turkey border on February 18 to assume control of security in the town.[44] Jarabulus is less than three kilometers from SDF positions that Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have struck in recent days. Anti-SDF media claimed that a Turkish army convoy entered Jarabulus, north of Manbij, from Turkey and headed toward the Manbij countryside in January 2025.[45]

Turkish aircraft targeted the SDF along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River on February 19. Turkish aircraft struck SDF tunnels east of Jarabulus.[46]

Turkey continued to target SDF positions near the Qara Qozak Bridge on February 19. Turkish aircraft struck several SDF positions near Sarrin, likely to isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead west of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[47]

Anti-SDF media claimed that Turkish aircraft struck SDF positions near Maskanah and Deir Hafer, southeast of Manbij, on February 18.[48]

Anti-SDF media reported on February 19 that SNA reinforcements deployed to the Tishreen Dam, which is a contested territory in northern Syria.[49] The SNA has engaged the SDF near the dam since December 2024.[50]

HTS-led General Security Forces arrested individuals in al Qatifah, Rif Dimashq, southern Syria, on February 19 who attempted to smuggle weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah.[51] HTS-led Syrian security forces have worked with the Lebanese Armed Forces in recent weeks to interdict weapons shipments to Hezbollah.[52] Iran has historically used Syria to transport funds and weapons to Hezbollah, and Hezbollah has used Syria to store and manufacture weapons. The fall of the Assad regime and subsequent flight of numerous Iranian-backed actors from Syria disrupted the ground lines of communication in Syria that Iran previously used to transport weapons, personnel, and materiel to its proxies. It is unlikely that these networks have fully collapsed, however. Syrian border forces recently seized a weapons shipment to Hezbollah in Rif Dimashq on January 25.[53]

Syrian media reported on February 19 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed Brigadier General Jamil al Saleh as commander of the 74th Division.[54] Saleh defected from the Syrian Arab Army early in the Syrian Civil War and subsequently served as a commander in the HTS-allied Jaysh al Izza.[55] The Syrian Defense Ministry has not confirmed Saleh’s appointment at the time of this writing.

The IDF Air Force conducted a series of airstrikes targeting former Assad regime military equipment in Sasa, Rif Dimashq Province, on February 19.[56] Syrian media reported that the IDF destroyed several armored vehicles and tanks.[57] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the interim Syrian government did not seize the equipment after the fall of the Assad regime.[58]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji discussed political cooperation with Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri on February 19.[59] Araji is a member of the Badr Organization and had been rumored as a possible prime minister candidate in 2022.[60]

The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on February 19 that Turkey killed nine Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters in Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.[61] Iraqi media reported that Turkey struck PKK positions in the Matin Mountains, Duhok Province.[62]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The Gaza Strip

A senior Hamas official claimed on February 19 that Hamas is willing to release all remaining Israeli hostages in a single exchange during the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[63] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer will lead the Israeli delegation in negotiations for the second phase of the agreement.[64]

 

Lebanon

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on February 19 that the IDF recently established an observation post on a ridge along the Markaba-Houla Road in southern Lebanon.[65] The ridge overlooks Margaliot in northern Israel and is one of the five strategically significant positions in southern Lebanon that the IDF will continue to hold after its withdrawal on February 18 under the ceasefire agreement.[66]

West Bank

Nothing Significant to Report.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces concluded the second phase of the “Great Prophet 19” military exercise in southwestern Iran on February 19.[67] The IRGC Ground Forces paratroopers conducted a jump from an Antonov-74 aircraft.[68] The IRGC Ground Forces also unveiled a tank protection system that is reportedly equipped with cage armor and an electronic warfare system designed to counter missile and drone attacks.[69] The IRGC Ground Forces have probably observed the use of cage armor in Ukraine, but the Russians could also provide the IRGC Ground Forces with lessons learned to improve these capabilities. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims, and Iranian officials have previously exaggerated Iran’s military capabilities.

Senior Iranian officials met with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani in Tehran on February 19 to discuss bilateral ties and regional issues.[70] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei blamed the United States for blocking the transfer of Iranian funds from South Korea to Iran via Qatar during a meeting with Thani. Khamenei urged Qatar to resist US pressure and transfer the funds to Iran. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized the need to accelerate the implementation of bilateral agreements and stated that Iran seeks to enhance economic cooperation with Qatar.[71] Iran and the United States reached an agreement in August 2023 in which the United States would release $6 billion worth of frozen Iranian assets and several Iranian prisoners in exchange for the release of five US nationals detained in Iran. The outbreak of the October 7 War in October 2023 delayed the release of the frozen Iranian assets.[72]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

 

[1] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375

[2] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375

[3] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375

[4] https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/the-ypgpyd-during-the-syrian-conflict/summary/

[5] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-turkeys-vision-kurds-syria ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375

[6] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375

[7] https://x.com/abo_omar_idleb/status/1891746244030054851    https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1891844163886514205; https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1891851341602971818 ;

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Pitfalls%20of%20Relying%20on%20Kurdish%20Forces%20to%20Counter%20ISIS.pdf

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-kurds-and-democratic-union-party-pyd

[10] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-battle-for-raqqa-and-the-challenges-after-liberation/

[11] https://english dot enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/09/two-movements-in-national-army-consensus-only-in-statements-eyes-on-tahrir-al-sham/

[12] https://x.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1885445974174138559

[13] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699 

[14] https://www.nrttv dot com/detail/45935

[15] https://baghdadtoday dot news/268291-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AB-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87.html

[16] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[18] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/516973/%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84

 

[19] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A

[20] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A

[21] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A

[22] https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1891936329073676317 ; https://www dot presstv.ir/Detail/2025/02/18/743033/Iran%E2%80%99s-top-security-official-meets-Hashd-al-Sha%E2%80%99abi-chief- ; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/851372

[23] https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1891936329073676317

[24] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27900

[25] SITE Intelligence Group. ”Iraq-based Shi’ite Paramilitary Group Disavows Alleged Combat Unit Formed to Confront ”Occupation,” February 17, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-18-2024

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[28] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1549 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis

[29] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/kurdistan/150120241

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-set-reimpose-maximum-pressure-iran-official-says-2025-02-04/

[31] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/oil-flows-from-iran-to-china-jump-as-traders-work-around-curbs?sref=RR1m1tD8

[32] https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46213.html

[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/oil-flows-from-iran-to-china-jump-as-traders-work-around-curbs?sref=RR1m1tD8

[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qmO-d2V4u4 7:00-8:00;

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/oil-flows-from-iran-to-china-jump-as-traders-work-around-curbs?sref=RR1m1tD8

[35] https://x.com/GhamariVafa/status/1892074853638750489

[36] https://x.com/GhamariVafa/status/1892074853638750489 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024

[38] https://president dot ir/fa/157594

[39] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6383470/

[40] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85756327/Russia-to-begin-studies-for-Rasht-Astara-railway-Minister

[41] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85756327/Russia-to-begin-studies-for-Rasht-Astara-railway-Minister

[42] https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%9F

[43] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iranian-commander-discusses-the-state-of-the-axis-of-resistance?mkt_tok=NDc1LVBCUS05NzEAAAGYldaQE-zafH_ly2Yk0tfxKDwOg-oXnkIgl0imf18sximDNZOEa1UCs8BDMX-DcJGu6iJ60wNBJEr0gmBeZwjSd-2Cvqdi_RMessliQ_KGqjRFX-fE

[44] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1891940139485516194 ; https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1891972862682050771 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136243 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136200

[45] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133616

[46] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136262

[47] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1892166375486980113 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136232

[48] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1891936816401404347

[49] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/1933cb1d315f4db3a4f4dcc5ef40753a ;   https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136244

[50] Iran Update, December 17, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War

[51] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1892139477075694023

[52] https://t.me/damascusv011/27633

[53] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883437468126748911

[54] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1892181978578817470 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136248

[55] https://x.com/poptop084593715/status/1874044947986595958

[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1891955165911027917 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1891984964918644931 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1892145003717083542

[57] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1892137670291185694

[58] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19602

[59] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/516992/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%87%D8%B0%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA

[60] https://ina dot iq/eng/20929-al-araji-apologizes-for-running-for-prime-minister.html

[61] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-9-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-0

[62] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83

[63] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/senior-hamas-official-terror-group-prepared-to-free-all-hostages-in-single-swap-in-phase-2-of-deal/

[64] https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-gaza-ceasefire-news-02-19-2025-216d76819c2d4e700f7042b49556433d ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/saar-israel-to-begin-talks-on-phase-2-of-hostage-deal-this-week-demanding-complete-demilitarization-of-gaza/

[65] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19611

[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19560 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-17-2025

[67] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403120100612/

[68] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384454/

[69] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384446;

https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384436

[70] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384544

[71] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384544

[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-signals-iran-wont-access-its-6-bln-qatar-any-time-soon-2023-10-12/