Ukraine’s ability to force the Russian military to divert its efforts to advance is a positive indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war.

North Korea has sent troops to support Russia in Ukraine, deepening their cooperation since Russia's 2022 invasion.

The war in Ukraine offers many important lessons for the defense of Taiwan against possible aggression by the People’s Republic of China.

This paper primarily aims to offer a new framework for Ukrainian forces and their Western backers to break the current positional warfare and restore maneuver to the battlefield.

The Kremlin will likely seek to influence the October 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections to help secure a Georgian Dream Party victory in order to derail Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Integration efforts.

Latest from ISW

Iran Update, November 24, 2024

A top adviser to the Iranian supreme leader discussed Lebanon and ceasefire negotiations, nuclear policy, and a potential Iranian response to Israel’s October 25 strike. Lebanese Hezbollah is likely firing large numbers of rockets at Israel to pressure the Israeli government during ongoing ceasefire negotiations. Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2024

Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023. Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024. Russian forces notably have not been able to restore operational maneuver seen during the initial months of Russia's full-scale invasion, and the current Russian tactical advances, although quicker now than in the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024, is still far below the Russian rate of advance in March 2022. Russian forces have succeeded in taking advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, contrary to an incorrect previous ISW assessment that forecasted otherwise. ISW presents the following courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may be considering given Russian forces’ recent advances.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. Russian forces conducted a complex strike against critical infrastructure and industrial enterprises in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the morning of November 21, that reportedly included a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile fired from Tambov Oblast, seven Kh-101 cruise missiles fired from Volgograd Oblast, and an experimental medium-range ballistic missile with reentry vehicles – likely a modified RS-26 “Rubezh” intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) - fired from Astrakhan Oblast.