Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Jan 16, 2025 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros

January 16, 2025, 7:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on January 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion.[2] Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery.[3] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.[4] Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.[5]

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast.[6] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations.[7] North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future.[8] South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast.[9] North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.[10] The agreement outlines the UK's commitment to Ukraine's possible future NATO membership as a means to guarantee Ukraine's security and calls for strengthening bilateral defense and security ties, building consensus on Ukraine's NATO membership prospects, enhancing maritime security, expanding economic and trade cooperation, and boosting collaboration  in the energy, climate, and justice spheres. Starmer highlighted during a press conference on January 16 that the UK intends to provide military aid to Ukraine annually and will provide Ukraine with a loan backed by funds from frozen Russian assets.[11] Starmer highlighted that the UK will also expand its training program for Ukrainian military personnel and provide Ukraine with 150 artillery barrels and a new Danish-funded mobile air defense system.[12]

Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that unspecified sources stated that Russia and Transnistria are discussing the possibility of Russia buying gas for Transnistria on the European spot market through Moldovan gas company Natural Gaz DC between January and April 2025.[13] Kommersant stated that Moscow tentatively proposed using Russian budget funds to buy up to three million cubic meters per day of gas that would cover Transnistria's domestic consumption but would not support producing Transnistria's electricity exports to Moldova. Kommersant estimated that this volume of gas would likely cost Russia $164 million from January to April 2025. Natural Gaz DC co-owner Arkady Vikol stated on January 15 that the company had signed a contract with Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz to supply two-to-three million cubic meters of European gas per day to Transnistria.[14] Transnistria President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia would provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery method.[15] Russia is likely seeking alternative routes to supply Transnistria with gas as the Trans-Balkan pipeline transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Ukraine stopped transiting Russian gas through its territory on January 1, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on January 15 that Ukraine was in discussions to help Transnistria but that the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine is "generally unacceptable."[16] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have recently noted how Russia is trying to use its artificially created gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections, and Russia may cease gas supplies to Transnistria again in April 2025.[17]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
  • The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
  • Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in their main salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on January 16. Geolocated footage published on January 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced from the international border to central Uspenovka (south of Korenevo and just across the Russian-Ukrainian border).[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Makhnovka (south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[19] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Makhnovka.[20] Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), and Chechen Akhmat “Pressa” group are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Nikolayevo-Darino (northwest of Sudzha); drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha); drone operators of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Uspenovka; and drone operators of the ”Irlandsty" and "Zarya" detachments and the ”Dozor” reconnaissance detachment are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya (north of Suzha).[21]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on January 15 and 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.[22]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian source claimed on January 15 that Russian forces advanced into Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[23] Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Topoli; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 15 and 16.[24]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 15 that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[25] Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zeleny Hai, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Novoserhiivka, and Tverdokhlibove on January 15 and 16.[26] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction stated that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Borova direction on January 8 and 9 consisting of 20 vehicles and noted that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults at lower echelons two to three times per month in the area.[27] The Ukrainian spokesperson stated that Russian forces took measures to protect the vehicles from Ukrainian drone strikes during the January 8 to 9 mechanized assault, but that Ukrainian forces destroyed 16 of the 20 armored vehicles.

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 16 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Terny and Kolodyazi, east of Lyman near Zarichne, and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on January 15 and 16.[28] Russian sources claimed on January 16 that Russian forces are conducting artillery strikes on Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) in preparation for an assault on the settlement.[29] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 15 and 16.[31] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces conducted five mechanized assaults of unspecified echelons in the area on January 14 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian infantry fighting vehicles, 39 motorcycles, and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[32]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 16. Geolocated footage published on January 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized all of Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[34] Russian forces continued attacking within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 15 and 16.[35] Ukraine‘s Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 16 that Russian forces are using the pipes of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal to accumulate forces and move deeper within Chasiv Yar during foggy weather.[36] Elements of the Russian 78th ”Sever-Akhmat” Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37] Elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in central Chasiv Yar.[38]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced within Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 16. Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Toretsk.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Toretsk.[40] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and south of Toretsk near Leonidivka on January 15 and 16.[41] Zaporozhets reported on January 16 that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction are conducting assaults in small groups under mortar and first-person view (FPV) drone cover.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces exploiting Ukrainian manpower shortages to find weak points in Ukrainian defenses to attack in Toretsk.[43] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 16. Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45] Geolocated footage posted on January 15 shows that Russian forces recently conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of five vehicles near Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east, northeast, and north of Kotylne (southwest of Pokrovsk); into Kotlyne and Udachne (west of Kotlyne); and to eastern Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Baranivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Shevchenko, and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Uspenivka on January 15 and 16.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Zvirove and near Kotlyne and that Ukrainian counterattacks prevented Russian forces from completing the seizure of Uspenivka.[49] Russian milblogger claimed that Russian advances near Baranivka are aimed at eliminating the Ukrainian pocket between Pokrovsk and Toretsk.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are using drones with fiber optic cables in the Pokrovsk direction in order to counter Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).[51] Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) and the "Atlant" Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction, and elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are reportedly operating in Lysivka.[52]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 16. Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south and southeast of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove) during an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) from two sides and need to advance roughly three kilometers to Ulakly in order to eliminate the Ukrainian Dachne-Ulakly-Kostyantynopil pocket.[54] ISW has only observed confirmation that Russian positions at the northern bound of the pocket near Shevchenko (northwest of Kurakhove) and the southern bound of the pocket near Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove) are roughly 6.3 kilometers apart. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka and Stari Terny; west of Kurakhove near Ulakly, Dachne, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Yantarne; on January 15 and 16.[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge near Kostyantynopil.[56] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Ulakly and near Dachne; drone operators of the "Grachi" Spetsnaz detachment and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Ulakly; and elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[57]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 16. Geolocated footage published on January 15 indicates that Russian forces recently entered Vremivka (immediately west of Velyka Novosilka) and marginally advanced along Shyroka and Heroia streets in southern Vremivka.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 16 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer deep and two kilometers wide west of Vremivka.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 15 and 16 that Russian forces also advanced into central Vremivka and near Velyka Novosilka.[60] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne on January 15 and 16.[61]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka (both northwest of Robotyne), Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 15 and 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.[62] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka, and elements of the 417th Reconnaissance Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[63]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.[64]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 55 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Bryansk oblasts.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 34 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Mykolaiv oblasts; that 18 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; that several drones struck a farm in Chernihiv Oblast; and that debris from downed drones damaged residential homes in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported on January 16 that debris from downed Russian drones also damaged civilian property and buildings in Solomyanskyi, Holosiivskyi, Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, and Pechersk raions of Kyiv City and that Russian forces launched a Molniya drone strike against civilians in Slobidskyi Raion of Kharkiv City.[66] UK outlet The Guardian reported on January 16 that a Russian drone flew near the Ukrainian Mariinskyi Palace near the president’s office as British Prime Minister Keir Starmer arrived in Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[67]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 15 that Russian forces launched the large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight from January 14 to 15 in response to Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes against targets in Russia and the purported January 11 Russkaya compressor station strike in Krasnodar Krai.[68] ISW recently assessed that the Russian January 14-15 strikes were likely a continuation of ongoing Russian efforts to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.[69

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain on January 16 about Russian infantry shortages and high loss rates.[70] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military's current shortage of infantry soldiers initially stemmed from heavy losses in Spring and Summer 2022 and delays in announcing the partial reserve callup in September 2022.[71] The milblogger complained that Russian forces were able to regain the initiative in Fall 2023 but then there was no significant force buildup in 2024, so Russia's current offensive operations are "eating up reinforcements like crazy." The milblogger attributed Russia's high casualty rates to poor combat planning and organization, including problems in interbranch cooperation, due to insufficient communication and aerial reconnaissance assets and incompetency among parts of the Russian command staff. The milblogger complained that the Russian military command is not withdrawing units to the rear for rest and replenishment and to integrate new reinforcements, causing "erosion" within Russia's experienced units.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council Alexander Volfovich accused unspecified Western actors on January 16 of planning to occupy Belarussian border regions with “peacekeeping forces” and implicitly threatened western states with the use of nuclear weapons, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and Oreshnik missiles.[72]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20019; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8610

[2] https://t.me/gusev_36/3356

[3] https://t.me/vchkogpu/54091 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879626069432828274 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879630061407699038 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879641341480841367 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879786749788102832 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879818354929877111 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879852949800964159 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75378 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32180 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32183 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32190 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32193 https://t.me/andriyshTime/32195 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32210 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/92646 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75362 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24681 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32187;  https://t.me/dva_majors/62538; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84521; https://t.me/bazabazon/34366 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/34367

[4] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8610

[5] https://t.me/shot_shot/76309

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024; ] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2024

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2024;

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025

[10] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ugoda-pro-storichne-partnerstvo-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-spoluchen-95461; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/16/velikobritaniya-i-ukraina-podpisali-soglashenie-o-partnerstve-srokom-na-100-let ; https://t.me/sotaproject/92662 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75383;

[11] https://suspilne dot media/926535-ukraina-i-britania-pidpisali-ugodu-pro-storicnu-spivpracu/; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/16/velikobritaniya-i-ukraina-podpisali-soglashenie-o-partnerstve-srokom-na-100-let;

[12] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/16/velikobritaniya-i-ukraina-podpisali-soglashenie-o-partnerstve-srokom-na-100-let; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2025/jan/16/keir-starmer-announces-100-year-pact-with-ukraine-and-new-mobile-air-defense-system-video

[13] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7432742; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/16/kommersant-rossiya-obsuzhdaet-zakupku-gaza-dlya-pridnestrovya-v-evrope

[14] https://newsmaker dot md/rus/novosti/moldavskaya-kompaniya-natural-gaz-d-c-podtverdila-dogovorennost-s-tiraspoltransgaz/

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011525

[16] https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/interview/2025/01/15/7202599/

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425

[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8132; https://t.me/vremjazov/1607

[19] https://t.me/rusich_army/20140

[20] https://t.me/rusich_army/20140

[21]https://t.me/wargonzo/24314; https://t.me/wargonzo/24313 ; https://t.me/Rabochyput/20228 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62556; https://t.me/dva_majors/62570 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151461; https://t.me/gymanpomosch/2993 ; https://t.me/TOF_VMF/4111; https://t.me/voin_dv/12812 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18752 ;https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151451 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84511 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8132 ; https://t.me/vremjazov/1607 ; https://t.me/Irishstrike/102; https://t.me/dva_majors/62548; https://t.me/Irishstrike/102

 

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3654 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/296277 

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099  

[25] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30536

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l ; https://t.me/synegubov/12710; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24022; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099  

[27] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/926361-vtratili-80-tehniki-aku-trivalij-cas-gotuvali-recnik-3-i-osbr-rozpoviv-pro-vidbitta-sturmu-rosian-na-harkivsini/

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099   

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/296285; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22456

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151463

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027

[32] https://t.me/edelweiss10tg/1594; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/926231-znisili-39-motocikliv-ta-vzali-v-polon-okupanta-bila-siverska-zsu-vidbili-pat-sturmiv/; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879785231181586842 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1879798486448939325

[33] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1879933868087865847; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1879934367994376706; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/59

[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/24296; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84518 

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099  

[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/16/u-chasovomu-yari-rosiyany-hovayutsya-v-trubah-kanalu-i-nakopychuyutsya-pid-prykryttyam-tumanu/

[37] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5425 

[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31399; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1879933868087865847; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1879934367994376706; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/59

[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1879615743404523630; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/579

[40] https://t.me/rybar/67191; https://t.me/dva_majors/62540 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84537

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4099  

[42] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/16/u-chasovomu-yari-rosiyany-hovayutsya-v-trubah-kanalu-i-nakopychuyutsya-pid-prykryttyam-tumanu/

[43] https://t.me/yurasumy/20595 

[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151439

[45] https://t.me/sokoly_foksa_47/132; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8131

[46] https://x.com/CinC_AFU/status/1879610701200945477; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1879618846090240069/history

[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/20593; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61458; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61454; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61445

[48]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl

[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61445 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61454 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61458

[50] https://t.me/yurasumy/20594

[51] https://t.me/sashakots/51326; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84527

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31395 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51326 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51319 ;

[53] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1879816396647145694; https://t.me/brygada23/680; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8130

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61458; https://t.me/yurasumy/20592

[55]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61458 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24296 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22448

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/296379; https://t.me/tass_agency/296380

[57]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61455 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84564 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13271 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13270

[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8125; https://t.me/prolibertate110/1022

[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/12816

[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61453; https://t.me/yurasumy/20591; https://t.me/vrogov/18757 ; https://ria dot ru/20250116/vojska-1994010772.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch; https://t.me/wargonzo/24296; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84530 

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl; https://t.me/vrogov/18757 ; https://ria dot ru/20250116/vojska-1994010772.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch; https://t.me/dva_majors/62540; https://t.me/wargonzo/24296; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151478; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84530  

[62]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P1WLyFnKnTGbmSTVSLh92cx6MKh5AaDs22aa1MUNqufZKQsf8fY9JUbpTzAFp6F2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sRbVQVb4NrfjEiTKA6oeWwN9b9SdsL5f8RC9KVuJjn5WRvgo8VgFGwk5wgzXPEBFl ;

[63]https://t.me/dva_majors/62561 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84542 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62560 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31382 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16534

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20027  

[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/26984

[66]https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/739 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72540 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4027 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/926317-u-kievi-prolunali-vibuhi-ppo-pracuvalo-po-bezpilotniku/; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/740 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/741 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12714 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72554 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2056

[67] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/16/keir-starmer-hails-closer-than-ever-partnership-with-ukraine-on-kyiv-visit

[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/47929 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025

[69] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1880

[71] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1880

[72] https://t.me/tass_agency/296293; https://t.me/tass_agency/296298 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/296318 ; https://www.sb dot by/articles/zalog-ukrepleniya-belorusskoy-gosudarstvennosti.html ; https://belta dot by/society/view/volfovich-iskander-m-i-oreshnik-pozvoljajut-nanesti-nepriemlemyj-uscherb-ljubomu-agressoru-689189-2025/

 

 
 

Tags

Ukraine Project
Ukraine