Toplines
Ukrainian forces conducted their largest combined missile and drone strike package against strategic targets in Moscow Oblast on the night of September 19 to 20, ahead of the final day of voting in the Russian State Duma elections. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of September 19 to 20 in the absence of a Russian agreement to the energy ceasefire that US President Donald Trump proposed on September 14.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reaffirmed Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual energy strikes moratorium, while Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected each proposal thus far.[2]
Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed on September 20 that Russian air defenses downed over 1600 Ukrainian drones since September 19, including 450 on the approaches to Moscow City — the largest Ukrainian strike package against Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian Gazpromneft-Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya Raion, Moscow City (roughly 450 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on the night of September 19 to 20, causing a large fire and damaging the refinery’s AVT-6 primary oil processing unit, another complex oil processing unit, and an isomerization unit.[4] The Gazpromneft-Moscow Refinery is one of Russia’s largest oil refineries with an annual processing capacity of about 12 million tons of oil. Ukrainian defense manufacturer FirePoint reported that its FP-1 drones hit the Moscow Oil Refinery and Russian logistics company Modern Warehouse Technologies LLC warehouses near Sofyino (roughly 450 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[5] FirePoint reported that the strikes forced the Moscow Oil Refinery to pause refining operations and that the total percentage of offline Russian refining capacity increased from 10 to 14 percent as a result.[6] Geolocated footage published on September 20 shows large fires at the Gazpromneft-Moscow Oil Refinery and at the Modern Warehouse Technologies LLC near Sofyino.[7] Russian officials acknowledged Ukrainian strikes in 17 Moscow municipalities and that the strikes caused fires at the refinery and the warehouse complex.[8] Zelensky reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces used FP-1, RZ-100, MICH-2000, Palyanytsia-type, Vendetta-type, Lyutyi-type, Bars-type, and Sichen long-range strike drones; Flamingo cruise missiles; and a new “Pelican” strike vehicle in the strike package.[9] There is conflicting reporting about what the Pelican strike vehicle may be. A Russian milblogger claimed that Zelensky’s statement about the “Pelican” referred to Ukraine’s newly developed FP-7 ballistic missile but noted that the FP-7’s stated range of 300 kilometers is not large enough to reach Moscow from Ukraine.[10] A different Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported that the Pelican strike vehicle is a one-way attack drone, not an FP-7 ballistic missile.[11] ISW is unable to independently verify whether Ukrainian forces used FP-7 ballistic missiles in the September 19 to 20 strike package.[12]
Russia’s failure to defend against the Ukrainian strikes prompted discontent among Russians, including in the ultranationalist information space, as the State Duma elections concluded. Russian authorities in Moscow Oblast notably did not activate air alert sirens or warn civilians of incoming air threats with short message service (SMS) messages on September 20, though Russian authorities did restrict mobile service — one of the countermeasures that Russian authorities employ during Ukrainian strikes — without major announcements. Moscow Oblast residents complained that Moscow authorities did not sound air alert sirens or send SMS notifications of incoming strike danger as Russian authorities had done during much smaller strike packages.[13] Some residents complained on the Telegram channel of Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov before the channel closed comments. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger criticized Russian authorities’ reporting on the strikes, stating that these official responses undermine the public’s trust in Russian authorities and that mobile service restrictions do “not really help.”[14] Russian authorities appear to have prioritized achieving a high voter turnout at the Duma elections over public safety, even though Ukrainian forces hit Russian strategic oil and logistics infrastructure and did not deliberately target Russian polling stations or other electoral infrastructure.
The Kremlin is presenting the initial and pre-determined September 18 to 20 State Duma election results as confirmation of Russian society’s broad support for the war effort in Ukraine despite the ruling United Russia Party’s exit numbers being granted a comparatively conservative margin. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) reported on September 20 that initial results from the first 13.88 percent of ballots show that: United Russia received 57.54 percent of the vote, the Communist Party (CPRF) received 13.67 percent, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) received 9.27 percent thus far.[15] Russian CEC Head Ella Pamfilova stated that the CEC will release the full preliminary results at 1100 local time on September 21 and the final results on September 25.[16] United Russia received 49.82 percent of the vote, the CPRF received 18.93 percent, and the LDPR received 7.55 percent in the 2021 Duma elections, so the initial results of the 2026 election represent a minor increase for United Russia.[17] United Russia’s victory is far short of a sweeping victory that United Russia would have liked to project to bolster their claims of Russians uniting around United Russia and Putin, likely because of the need to acknowledge societal discontent from the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[18]
Russian officials presented these initial figures as confirmation of Russian society’s support for the war in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the election results will confirm Russian political parties’ and voters’ commitment to supporting Putin’s foreign policy.[19] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated that United Russia will continue to support Putin’s foreign policy objectives and efforts to achieve victory over Russia’s “enemies.”[20] The Kremlin has recently taken great efforts to cast United Russia as the chief party responsible for implementing Putin’s policies and as the victory party in Ukraine, and to cast the election as a referendum on the war in Ukraine itself.[21] The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance acknowledging genuine societal discontent over the war in Ukraine with efforts to present major political events such as the Duma elections as confirmation of widespread support for the war effort.
Numerous sources, including domestic Russian election observers, reported large-scale election violations and manipulation of the vote count in the September 18 to 20 voting period. Russian election authorities reportedly engaged in ballot stuffing, detained or disqualified several hundred observers from the CPRF and the opposition Yabloko Party (after banning Yabloko candidates from participating in the elections at all), and threatened to dismiss some public sector employees who did not vote.[22] Individuals wearing Russian military uniforms reportedly stopped voters at polling stations in Novosibirsk and issued conscription notices or attempted to convince voters to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[23]
Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized details on the second phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which included liberating Shandryholove, Derylove, and Drobysheve (all northwest of Lyman). Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi stated on September 20 that Ukrainian forces liberated 50 square kilometers as part of Phase Two of Operationl Vivaldi and eliminated 800 Russian personnel.[24] Biletsky noted that the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps prepared for ground operations by landing a wave of drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) over 10 kilometers behind the frontline to harass the Russian tactical rear and facilitate combined arms operations. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated through Operational Vivaldi a limited ability to break out of positional warfare and reintroduce limited elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level, likely facilitated in part by this use of UGVs.[25]
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)’s St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Border Directorate published an order closing the Russian side of the border opposite Narva in northeastern Estonia from September 16 to 26.[26] The order prohibits Russian citizens from operating small vessels in the segment of the Narva River from the Bolshaya Cheremukha River to the Kriusha River; prohibits hunting and transporting firearms within a specifically defined area five kilometers from Russia’s international border with Estonia and in Slantsy Raion (Leningrad Oblast); and prohibits visiting these same areas at night. The Estonian Interior Ministry stated on September 20 that the situation on Estonia’s eastern border with Russia remains calm.[27]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces conducted their largest combined missile and drone strike package against strategic targets in Moscow Oblast on the night of September 19 to 20, ahead of the final day of voting in the Russian State Duma elections.
- Russia’s failure to defend against the Ukrainian strikes prompted discontent among Russians, including in the ultranationalist information space, as the State Duma elections concluded.
- The Kremlin is presenting the initial and pre-determined September 18 to 20 State Duma election results as confirmation of Russian society’s broad support for the war effort in Ukraine despite the ruling United Russia Party’s exit numbers being granted a comparatively conservative margin.
- Numerous sources, including domestic Russian election observers, reported large-scale election violations and manipulation of the vote count in the September 18 to 20 voting period.
- Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized details on the second phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which included liberating Shandryholove, Derylove, and Drobysheve (all northwest of Lyman).
- The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)’s St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Border Directorate published an order closing the Russian side of the border opposite Narva in northeastern Estonia from September 16 to 26.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range strike against a likely Russian energy facility on the night of September 19 to 20.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for additional reporting on recent Ukrainian strikes against Moscow Oblast.
Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range strike against a likely Russian energy facility overnight on September 19 to 20. Zelensky reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified enterprise in Voronezh Oblast.[28] Geolocated footage published on September 19 shows a large fire near Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data confirms that there were multiple heat anomalies in western Voronezh City near the Nika PetroTech energy facility (roughly 185 kilometers from the international border).[29]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 19 and 20 but did not advance.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 19 and 20 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hoptivka.[31]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 19 and 20 but did not advance.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 19 and 20 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Zapadne.[33] ISW observed footage posted on September 19 purportedly showing Russian servicemembers operating near Doroshivka (north of Kupyansk), but ISW cannot verify the date the footage was taken on, nor that the servicemembers in the footage were Russian.[34] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces refuted claims that Russian forces have entered Doroshivka.[35] The source stated that Russian sources claimed Russian forces advanced in Doroshivka, Tishchenivka (south of Doroshivka), and Zapadne (southeast of Doroshivka), but that, in reality, only a few Russian personnel have managed to infiltrate into Tishchenivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Zapadne, advanced east of Zapadne, and advanced into eastern Doroshivka.[36]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Borova on September 19 and 20 but did not advance.[37]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 19 and 20 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[38]
Russian milbloggers continue to criticize the Kremlin’s greatly exaggerated claims about Russian advances in the Lyman direction amid a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. A Russian milblogger refuted the Russian MoD’s September 19 claims that Russian forces are clearing small Ukrainian infantry groups in Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) and Lyman, stating that Svyatohirsk is at least 20 kilometers from the frontline and that Russian forces do not control Lyman.[39] Putin claimed that Russian forces seized Svyatohirsk on September 1.[40] Ukrainian forces conducted significant counteroffensive operations in the Lyman direction over the last several months, eliminating a previously-held Russian salient north of Lyman.[41] ISW has not observed any evidence that Russian forces currently hold any positions in Svyatohirsk or Lyman.
Ukrainian forces conducted a frontline strike against Russian military assets east of Slovyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone production facility near Siversk, Donetsk Oblast (east of Slovyansk and roughly 12 kilometers from the frontline).[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions on September 19 and 20 but did not advance.[43]
Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk. Kramatorsk Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported on September 20 that Russian forces conducted two glide bomb strikes against an evacuation point in Kramatorsk, injuring two and damaging a preschool, an educational institution, and four high-rise buildings.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northwestern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in northwestern Kostyantynivka during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 19.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces are maintaining positions in the Dobropillya direction despite Russian infiltration efforts. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions east of Hannivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission, based on geolocated footage published on September 19.[46] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 20 that small groups of Russian servicemembers conducted infiltration missions east of Dobropillya.[47] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Novooleksandrivka and Vasylivka (both south of Dobropillya), areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate northward toward Svitle (south of Dobropillya) from Shevchenko (south of Svitle). Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate towards Hannivka, Kucheriv Yar, and Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Hannivka, Kucheriv Yar, Stepy, Hruzke, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Novomykolaivka, and Novoandriivka (all north and northeast of Kucheriv Yar); Svyatohorivka (west of Hannivka); eastern and southern Dobropillya; and Chernihivka, Krasnopodillya, Novohryshyne, Dobropillya (the smaller of two settlements in this area named Dobropillya), and Matyasheve (all south of Dobropillya) — all areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions. A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces are infiltrating into Dobropillya (the smaller of two settlements in Mashovets also reported that fighting is ongoing in Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya) and that a Russian infantry group infiltrated the southern outskirts of Svitle, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bilytske and control Svitle. A Russian milblogger also acknowledged on September 20 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Kucheriv Yar, Svitle, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Stepy.[48]
Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and strike activity appears to be preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions in the Dobropillya direction. Mashovets reported on September 20 that the Russian military command of the Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) is concentrating its main offensive efforts at the junction of the areas of responsibility (AoR) of the 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), near Chernihivka, Vodyanske, and Matyasheve (all south of Dobropillya).[49] Mashovets reported that Russian forces accumulated assault infantry and up to 30 unspecified light motorized vehicles near Zatyshok (southeast of Dobropillya) in preparation for a future push toward Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya) but that Ukrainian forces identified and destroyed the equipment concentration before Russian forces could use it to attack. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is attempting to seize at least one settlement near Dobropillya to accumulate infantry before launching a subsequent assault against Dobropillya itself, rather than attempting an immediate infiltration into the approaches to Dobropillya. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drone activity quickly detect and eliminate most small Russian infiltration groups, which remain Russian forces’ primary unit of maneuver in the Dobropillya direction. Mashovets added that Russian forces have increased the size of most of their infiltration groups from two-to-three to up to 10-12 personnel but have still not managed to consolidate positions in areas where they have previously infiltrated and subsequently not achieved any of their objectives in the Dobropillya direction. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have not consolidated positions in Vilne or Novyi Donbas (both east of Dobropillya), which hampers their objective of conducting a large push toward Dobropillya from the east. Ukrainian General Staff offensive intensity data since August 1, 2026, indicates that Russian forces have maintained the highest offensive tempo on the frontline toward Dobropillya, averaging 32 attacks per day.[50] Russian forces made very few gains toward Dobropillya despite their high offensive tempo, however.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Serhiivka and south of Raipole (both southwest of Dobropillya).[51]
Ukrainian strikes appear to be creating morale and logistics problems within Russian units and inhibiting Russian advances in the Dobropillya direction. A Ukrainian brigade reported on September 20 that Ukrainian drone activity is causing supply shortages in Russian units, preventing the repair of motorized equipment, and increasing the risk involved in small group infiltration missions, causing Russian personnel to refuse orders and sabotage the operations of smaller units.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Novopavlivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on September 20, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[53]
Russian forces previously conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Oleksandrivka. Russian forces previously conducted an infiltration mission in southwestern Andriivka, according to footage published on September 2 and geolocated on September 20, showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in the settlement.[54] It is unclear whether Russian infiltrators remain in Andriivka as of September 20, however.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations west of Hulyaipole on September 19 and 20 but did not advance.[55]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations toward and west of Orikhiv on September 20, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[56]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 anti-aircraft missile system near Ukrainka (one of two settlements roughly either 16 or 39 kilometers from the frontline).[57] Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian fuel and ammunition warehouse in occupied Zelenyi Hai (roughly 46 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 19.[58]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 20.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired versus intercepted as of August 11.[59]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 20 that Russian forces launched 138 Shahed- (about half of which were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones, that an unspecified number of drones struck 17 locations, and that drone debris hit five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a shopping center, warehouses, and residential infrastructure in Dnipro City and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; commercial and agricultural enterprises, warehouses, and residential infrastructure in Kyiv City and Odesa Oblast; residential infrastructure in Poltava Oblast; and civilian and transport infrastructure — including railway infrastructure — in Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts.[61]
Zelensky reported on September 20 that Russian forces conducted over 2,000 long-range drone strikes (of which most were jet-powered), 1,700 glide bomb strikes, and 19 missile strikes of various types against Ukraine in the past week (since about September 13).[62]
Russian strikes continue to degrade Ukraine’s economy. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 20 that Russian ballistic missile strikes in September 2026 disabled Ukraine’s three remaining major steel plants, including the Metinvest and ArcelorMittal plants in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, killing 17 workers.[63] FT reported that Russian forces have struck the Metinvest plan in Zaporizhia Oblast four times in less than a month and that the three factories make up 90 percent of Ukraine’s total steel output. FT noted that Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure have destroyed five million square meters of Ukraine’s modern warehouse infrastructure, including 900,000 square meters in recent months. Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi estimated that Ukraine could lose $1.5 billion in tax revenue and has a $27 billion shortfall due to Russian strikes.
Russian forces appear to be exploiting Ukrainian air defense shortages to strike radar stations with jet-powered drones. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 19 that Russian forces have been increasingly striking radar stations in the past two weeks (since about September 5) with jet-powered Shahed drones after a long period of struggling to counter these systems.[64] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces can currently only effectively counter Russian jet-powered drones with air-to-air missiles, of which Ukrainian forces currently have a shortage. Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces have targeted Ukrainian radar systems in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts with Geran-4 jet-powered drones since early September 2026, likely in an effort to degrade Ukraine’s air defense umbrella ahead of the winter.[65] The Russian milblogger acknowledged, however, that verifying the types of radars Russian forces struck and whether they may have struck decoys remains difficult.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-gotova-dotrimuvatisya-rezhimu-pripinennya-povitryan-106265; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[3] https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/21849
[4] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42305
[5] https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2101556689480659394; https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2101590734088405500
[6] https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2101590734088405500 ; https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2101743366845411547
[7] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2101549933073461362; https://t.me/supernova_plus/60242 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/31238 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2101510644306522373 ; https://t.me/moscowmap; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2101564804565528965 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2596 https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2101490820436180996 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/31185?single ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/31193 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2101498353758384466 ; https://x.com/ElsoTheArgie/status/2101486400411402487
[8] https://t.me/vorobiev_live/12826 ; https://t.me/vorobiev_live/12827 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/21845
[9] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101574764024242177
[10] https://t.me/milinfolive/179830
[11] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8184
[12] https://www dot techtimes.com/articles/323333/20260806/ukraines-fp-7-ballistic-missile-nears-combat-freeing-kyiv-us-target-authorization.htm
[13] https://verstka dot media/zhiteli-moskvy-i-oblasti-pozhalovalis-na-otsutstvie-opoveshhenij-vo-vremya-ataki-bpla-v-poslednij-den-vyborov
[14] https://t.me/rybar/83310
[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/09/2026/6aaffecf7a56686a50a4a86c?from=newsfeed
[16] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6ab028e4e376a1d978790b5c ; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/pamfilova-predvaritelnye-itogi-vyborov-podvedut-21-sentyabrya-v-1100.html
[17] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/09/2026/6aaffecf7a56686a50a4a86c?from=newsfeed
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[19] https://ria dot ru/20260920/lavrov-2119077330.html
[20] https://ria dot ru/20260920/medvedev-2119107469.html
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[22] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2101637656765407341 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/118825 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/99513 ; https://t.me/astrapress/125640 ; https://t.me/rkomivoice/1324 ; https://mir24 dot Atv/news/16685775?ysclid=mu8e8yvblf82626738 ; https://t.me/markhaev_official/2778 ; https://t.me/sikazankov/1692 ; https://t.me/astrapress/125651 ; https://t.me/deputatdumy/10975 ; https://t.me/istories_media/13606 ; https://kprf dot ru/activity/elections/247593.html ; https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/24142
[23] https://t.me/sotaproject/118823; https://t.me/roman_nasvyazi/1175 ;
[24] https://t.me/ab3army/7495 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407840-sili-oboroni-zvilnili-se-tri-sela-na-doneccini-pid-cas-operacii-vivaldi/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/20/%c2%ab%e2%80%9evivaldi%e2%80%9c-nabyraye-obertiv%c2%bb-3-j-korpus-vzyav-pid-kontrol-shandrygolove-derylove-ta-drobysheve/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/
[26] https://kingisepplo dot ru/index.php/pogranichnaya-zona.html
[27] https://x.com/sisemin/status/2101660011210453267
[28] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101574764024242177
[29] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2101444700888572149; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2101463284809388156; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:2026-09-18..2026-09-19;@39.035,51.686,14.272z
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302; https://t.me/wargonzo/37066; https://t.me/severnnyi/9374
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302; https://t.me/severnnyi/9374
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302; https://t.me/wargonzo/37066; https://t.me/severnnyi/9374;
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302; https://t.me/wargonzo/37066; https://t.me/grvZapad/19826; https://t.me/grvZapad/19827
[34] https://t.me/Osintpen/3576; https://t.me/rashepilo/4964; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13009; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101352977252397467
[35] https://t.me/grvZapad/19827
[36] https://t.me/divgen/84081
[37] https://t.me/grvZapad/19826; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37066 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19826 ;
[39] https://t.me/milinfolive/179815 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42306
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37066
[44] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407938-armia-rf-atakuvala-evakuacijnij-punkt-u-kramatorsku-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75218; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/20/dvi-lyudyny-poraneno-vorog-skynuv-aviabomby-na-zhytlovu-zabudovu-kramatorska/
[45] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2101430106543517983; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2101317131690246472; https://t.me/Volyn100obrTrO/4039
[46] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2101345976963194970; https://www.instagram.com/1omegasof?stkn=cG51cnp0MWR0c2Fm;
[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3603 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3604
[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56061
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3603 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3604
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41674 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42214 [Data taken from the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily 0800 SITREP between August 1, 2026, and September 20, 2026]
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56053
[52] https://t.me/rubizh3018/5582
[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/37066
[54] https://t.me/SkifskiGrifony/752; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13012
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42300 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42302
[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/37066 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99266
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42306
[58] https://t.me/risk_dept/723; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2101355736093610181; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2101321064282267738
[59] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/79128
[61] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32137 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32151 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32132 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28750; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28749 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28748; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28762 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32152; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2931 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/57998; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34747 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20454; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20516 ;https://www.facebook.com/ZabolotNAtalia/posts/pfbid0yvPTY4qu2q4n9dhMxh52yjMybbGZecUvVRmdAsq6QSzN5YepSRnPAwC3KE5T8MCHl?locale=uk_UA ; https://suspilne dot media/vinnytsia/1407794-na-vinniccini-cerez-ataku-bpla-postrazdav-obekt-zaliznicnoi-infrastrukturi/; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid02ZWb1PTZUDg2ei7EaXkG1UJxv2E9gU5djyWmvTBuTEJSujyWw2QP5AQF5J6pYJBnGl?rdid=sk5tIsQv6Q8Nx2TY# ; https://t.me/vilkul/17988; https://t.me/kyivoda/57899; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7548; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7549; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20516
[62] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101582419245633900 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20967
[63] https://www.ft.com/content/0ecc81ad-2119-4763-90fb-ba5d399d913d
[64] https://t.me/rybar/83289
[65] https://t.me/milinfolive/179810; https://t.me/milinfolive/179842
