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David Osborne brings over 20 years of senior fundraising expertise across diverse sectors, including public policy and advocacy, social services and community impact, education, and faith-based organizations.
A Sarasota, Florida native, he earned both a BA and MA from Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio and an MBA from Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, Maryland.
Benjamin Cordola is an ArcGIS Geospatial Researcher at ISW and holds a B.A. in Russian and Geography from Middlebury College, where his thesis studied the design and ideology of Soviet cartography. Benjamin successfully completed the Summer 2024 Internship Program at ISW and was previously a summer fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He has also worked as an intern for EducationUSA Russia and at an immigration law firm in Madrid, Spain.
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine.
The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice. The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Preparatory Committee started sending invitations to over one thousand Syrians nationwide and internationally on February 23 calling for attendees to report the next day to Damascus. The Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim said that over 600 invitees arrived in Damascus on February 24. The short notice prevented the attendance of invitees from outside of Syria and likely decreased participation from remote provinces like Hasakah and Raqqa, given the travel and planning requirements inherent for international travel and travel through lines of control within Syria.
Donggyu (Alfred) Han is a China Researcher at ISW, specializing in the Korean Peninsula and its relations with China. Originally from South Korea, he studied in China and the United States, where he acquired Chinese language skills. He is a veteran of the Republic of Korea Army, discharged with the rank of sergeant, and served as an interpreter for US-ROK military exercises in the intelligence department.
Daria Novikov is a Russia Researcher on the Russia and Ukraine portfolio at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Prior to joining the ISW, she worked with a Track II diplomatic initiative, where her research concerned European security regimes, the Russian domestic industrial base (DIB), and arms control agreements. Daria’s professional interests include information and influence operations, sanction-evading military cooperation among U.S. adversaries, and hybrid warfare.
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred on February 23 to the draft Istanbul Protocol crafted in 2022 as a "guidepost" for future negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Russia's demands in the draft agreement were made in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. The draft agreement does not reflect the situation today in which Ukraine has liberated 50 percent of the territory Russian forces have seized since 2022 and largely forced a year-long Russian offensive to a standstill. The Istanbul draft agreement surrenders Ukraine's sovereignty and prohibits any efforts by Ukraine or any other state to maintain Ukrainian armed forces adequate to deter or defend against, a future Russian attack. It also explicitly ruled out many actions Trump Administration officials have identified as parts of a peace agreement acceptable to the US.
Russia dedicated staggering amounts of manpower and equipment to several major offensive efforts in Ukraine in 2024, intending to degrade Ukrainian defenses and seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
The United States can use the enormous challenges Russia will face in 2025 as leverage to secure critical concessions in ongoing negotiations to end the war by continuing and even expanding military support to Ukraine.