China Project

The narrative that the 2024 presidential election is a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge as the dominant narrative in the mid to long term.

The CCP used a recent report about US evacuation plans for Taiwan to advance information operations that aim to degrade United States-Taiwan security cooperation.

China questioned the United States’ motives for re-joining the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in a likely attempt to establish conditions to discredit US global leadership.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s call for “large domestic [economic] circulation” that can withstand “extreme circumstances” is likely a long-term push to create a sanction-resistant Chinese economy while engaging with, but not becoming reliant upon, the international economic environment.

This page collects ISW China Team's China–Taiwan Weekly Updates, which focus on the Chinese Communist Party's paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. ISW began publishing the China–Taiwan Weekly Update on April 24, 2023.

Ongoing sexual harassment scandals primarily within the DPP may increase the domestic appeal of TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je, who promotes cross-strait policies broadly emphasizing economic and political engagement with China. The scandals began on May 31 when a DPP Women’s Department employee said she was sexually harassed during her time with the party. Some sexual harassment claims are also arising in the KMT against tangential party figures. KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih claimed solidarity with all victims of sexual assault. The TPP under their presidential candidate Ko Wen-je has not faced harassment allegations. Ko attacked the DPP for not doing enough for the victims. In concert with societal criticism, this prompted DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to publicly apologize and launch three internal party processes to prevent further sexual harassment in the DPP. Ko’s June 4–8 visit to Japan along with absence of sexual harassment allegations toward members of his party has distanced him from press coverage of the scandals. He frames his candidacy as an alternative to the DPP and KMT that can better manage cross-strait relations via unspecified economic and political engagement. He does this without providing details about his policy platform. This framing positions Ko as the candidate who could pick up swing voters offput by the DPP-centric sexual assault scandal but also wary of the KMT’s deep support for the 1992 Consensus.

2024 Taiwanese presidential candidates are basing their cross-strait policy positions within the “peace vs war” framework, which may provide China greater influence over their election narratives through the PRC-supported framework.

Xi Jinping stressed the need to establish China’s national security risk monitoring and early warning system, which could serve as a tool to implement the CCP’s holistic security concept.

The People’s Liberation Army debates on the strategic role of hybrid warfare may mean the CCP’s ongoing “unification” campaigns targeting Taiwan do not primarily rely on military force.
The recent appointment of Xie Feng as Chinese Ambassador to the United States is unlikely to initiate a thawing of Sino-American relations by the CCP.

The dominant but contested domestic framing of the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election as a choice between peace and war likely supports CCP efforts to coerce Taiwan into supporting cross-strait engagement. Framing the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace, regardless of the election result, likely supports the CCP’s objective to alter Taiwan’s security policy towards the United States.

Complementary CCP industrial and anti-espionage policies may facilitate the long-term expansion of China’s domestic industrial base and supply chain security.

Kuomintang (KMT) presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih emphasizes the preservation of peace over clear cross-strait policy positions, possibly to create a pragmatic image in the eyes of Taiwanese voters.

• The CCP has raided three business intelligence firms in line with the anti-espionage law it adopted in April, which will likely advance the CCP’s goal of technological and manufacturing self-reliance.
• Chinese and KMT-leaning media outlets expanded an existing debate over the future of US-Taiwan relations amid the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, which could lead to the election of a candidate that is less supportive of US-Taiwan relations than the current administration.
• China framed the Taiwan-US Defense Industry Forum as a reckless contribution to military tensions, likely to promote Taiwanese skepticism towards US-Taiwan security cooperation.

The Military Service Law reform that came into effect on May 1 may enable faster Chinese mobilization during the event of a conflict. The Military Service Law reform stated that all levels of government in conjunction with military agencies should cooperate to implement the reforms and standardize local conscription organizations. This indicates that the CCP bureaucratic apparatus aims to enhance its capability to deliver information in a timely fashion across locations such as universities and local party offices. The reformed Military Service Law also emphasized recruiting “high-quality soldiers” with pertinent technological prowess, especially college students. This portion of the reform fits within existing PLA efforts to technologically modernize the force and its personnel. The Military Service Law reform does not indicate that Xi ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare for imminent military conflict around Taiwan.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Shandong aircraft carrier strike group conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea from April 13 to April 24, likely to maintain operational readiness and demonstrate the ability to isolate the Philippines during Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit.

China may attempt to expand the state security apparatus’ reach in foreign companies via the new anti-espionage law revision.

Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman and potential presidential candidate Ko Wen-je refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, likely to broaden his appeal to KMT and DPP leaning voters in the upcoming 2024 Taiwanese presidential election.

The KMT is portraying Taiwanese Vice President and DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) as out-of-touch with popular concerns possibly to center the presidential election narrative around livelihood issues while the KMT formulates its cross-strait election messaging.

Potential KMT presidential candidate Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou) may frame himself as preserving cross-strait stability and Republic of China (ROC) autonomy by promoting a foreign policy that does not align Taiwan explicitly with the United States or China.

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. This update covers developments through April 21 at Noon Eastern Time.