Terrorist Networks Project

Africa File, April 4, 2024: Mali and Russia Explore Mali’s Mineral Wealth; Niger Plays the Field; the Kremlin’s Red Sea Ambitions in Eritrea

Mali and Russia are increasingly cooperating on mineral extraction to boost both countries’ revenues. Russian companies have made several road-map agreements with Mali for gold refinery construction, geological mapping, and civil nuclear power cooperation since March 25. The Malian and Russian governments also signed several cooperation agreements on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production on March 31. The signing of these cooperation agreements is a step forward in implementing several memoranda of understanding and high-level discussions held between the two countries in 2023 and 2024.

Africa File, March 28, 2024: Islamic State Resurgent in Mozambique; al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive

ISMP is massing forces, temporarily holding and governing territory, and operating across a geographic scope unseen since at least 2022. ISMP began increasing its rate of attacks in December 2023 and maintained a higher rate in January and February 2024 as part of the Islamic State’s global “Kill Them Where You Find Them” attack campaign. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) recorded that ISMP has initiated 57 attacks since December 19, 2023. This rate is more than double the roughly nine attacks per month it averaged from January to November 2023. The group carried out six attacks in the first half of March, putting it on pace to surpass its monthly average in 2023 despite its offensive peaking in February. The group has sustained this increased activity despite Mozambique’s annual rainy season from January to March, when adverse weather conditions have historically caused attacks to decrease.

JNIM Encroaches on Guinea; al Shabaab Hotel Attack

Al Qaeda–linked militants in Mali have increased attacks along Mali’s border with Guinea as part of an ongoing campaign to degrade Malian lines of communication around the capital. The al Qaeda–linked militants are unlikely to expand attacks into Guinea, but sustained activity along the Guinean border creates opportunities for the militants to use Guinea as a rear support zone.

Foreign Fighters and Jihadi Rivalry in the Sahel; Somalia Backslides

ISSP has expanded its areas of control and established itself as a hub for foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe since early 2023, which increases the group’s transnational threat risk. ISSP began resurging in the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after the withdrawal of French forces in 2021. The UN observed that the territory under ISSP control doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali that its al Qaeda–linked rivals and communal militias previously controlled.

Africa File, March 7, 2024: JNIM Strengthening Near Bamako; Kremlin and Nigeria Discuss Partnership

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian branch conducted its first VBIED attack in southern Mali since 2022, likely to support the group’s efforts to isolate a district capital near the border with Mauritania. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), conducted a large-scale complex attack targeting a Malian army base near Kwala, 100 miles north of Mali’s capital, on February 28. JNIM militants commenced the attack with a suicide VBIED followed by approximately 100 attackers that stormed the Malian army position.

Russia Eyes Gulf of Guinea, JNIM Massacres Civilians in Burkina Faso

Russia and Togo are increasing ties as the Kremlin aims to expand its influence beyond the Sahel in West Africa. French-based investigative news site Africa Intelligence reported on February 19 that a contingent of 30 Russian military advisers that recently arrived in Togo are helping Togolese troops build a new military camp on the border with Burkina Faso. The purpose of the camp is to defend against Salafi-jihadi attacks that largely emanate from Burkina Faso.

Hamas and Iran in Nigeria; Turkey Capitalizes on Horn of Africa Tensions

The Africa File will provide weekly analysis and assessments of state and non-state actors’ activities in Africa that threaten US personnel and the numerous US national security interests on the continent. US national security interests in Africa include preventing adversaries from using Africa as a base to launch attacks or evade sanctions, ensuring access to strategic minerals and economic markets that are crucial to US supply chains, working with partners to manage potentially destabilizing migration flows to Europe and the US, disrupting transnational crime networks that support illicit markets worldwide, and promoting democracy to prevent the spread of anti-Western authoritarianism. Prominent actors on the African continent that threaten these interests include state powers such as China, Iran, and Russia, as well as non-state groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda. The Africa File distills open-source information to assess these actors’ campaigns and related security and political issues in Africa that could affect their efforts. Irregular editions may be published based on current events.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, February 15, 2024: Wagner Strikes Gold in Mali, and al Shabaab Terrorizes Mogadishu

The Wagner Group and Malian army took control of an artisanal gold mine in northeastern Mali, which will bolster the Kremlin’s sanctions evasion efforts. Wagner and Malian forces captured the Intahaka mine in Mali’s Gao region on February 9. The mine is the largest artisanal mine in northern Mali. Multiple armed groups—including the regional al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates—have controlled and taxed the mine in recent years.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Special Update: Senegal Election Crisis Destabilizes Another Western Partner

Key Takeaway: The ongoing election crisis in Senegal is destabilizing a crucial democratic US ally in turbulent West Africa, which threatens to further weaken America’s position in the region. Disputed elections and a continued lack of economic prospects for Senegalese youth would likely erode democratic legitimacy in Senegal and increase political instability in the coming years. Russia has capitalized on the rise of authoritarian regimes emerging from democratic erosion and instability in other West African countries to gain a foothold in the region. Al Qaeda–affiliated militants in western Mali could also take advantage of instability to expand into Senegal, which would further destabilize the country and create more avenues for security cooperation with Russia. Senegal’s highly professional military is unlikely to launch a coup to take advantage of the unrest, but the spate of coups across Africa since 2020 underscores the risk of such an event.

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