Terrorist Networks Project

Horn of Africa. Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, to lease a naval port that will give it Red Sea access in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland. The port deal has severely strained Somali-Ethiopian relations and increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment in southern Somalia, which will likely weaken regional counterterrorism cooperation and energize al Shabaab. Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat, while the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) strong ties with the Ethiopian government will strengthen the Emiratis’ position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, to lease a naval port that will give it Red Sea access in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland. The port deal has severely strained Somali-Ethiopian relations and increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment in southern Somalia, which will likely weaken regional counterterrorism cooperation and energize al Shabaab. Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat, while the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) strong ties with the Ethiopian government will strengthen the Emiratis’ position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Western counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel over the past decade have failed, which contributed to governance collapse and the rise of military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger that have exacerbated the regional insurgency. Western troops have been conducting counterterrorism operations in the Sahel since French troops entered Mali in 2013 to liberate jihadist-controlled cities in northern Mali. French troops remained in Mali until 2022 as part of Operation Barkhane, which aimed to contain the spread of Salafi-jihadi groups and limit their ability to pose transnational threats. Other Western partners provided an array of advisory, logistical, and training support to regional militaries to enable Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to improve their own security. The West aimed to contain the Salafi-jihadi groups by killing or capturing Salafi-jihadi cells and building state capacity in each country. However, the Western partners’ strategy failed to protect the local population, address poor governance, and reconcile local political dynamics that drove insecurity. These shortcomings enabled the Salafi-jihadi insurgency to recover in Mali after the initial French military successes in 2013 and spread into Burkina Faso and Niger. The level of violence in all three countries rose every year between 2017 and 2021. Military leaders in all three countries used popular discontent stemming from frustrations with corruption and continued instability to justify five coups between 2020 and 2023.

Al Qaeda’s affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa may exploit the latest Israel-Hamas war to target their regional or Western adversaries under the pretext of supporting Hamas. These attacks would simultaneously advance the affiliates’ transnational propaganda narratives while furthering their preexisting local campaigns. Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate will likely increase the rate and scale of attacks in Kenya and against US and Kenyan forces in the Horn of Africa. The group’s Sahelian affiliate is unlikely to do the same against UN peacekeepers or foreigners because international disengagement from the region has removed many potential targets and incentives.

Turkey began an air incursion against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on October 1, which will likely impede the SDF’s ability to execute operations against ISIS. Iranian and Iranian-backed forces are deploying to the Israeli-Syrian border, which may enable ISIS to embed itself in the population in Deir ez Zor and conduct attacks to incite sectarian tension in Damascus. ISIS will likely take advantage of the changing Iranian and SDF priorities to accelerate ISIS’s campaigns of isolating regime and SDF units to prepare to build support among the population.

Key Takeaways:

Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attacks against civilians in eastern Syria are contributing to popular grievances and may cause the tribal insurgency to expand geographically. CTP is tracking several indicators that would suggest either a contraction or expansion of the tribal insurgency in northeastern Syria.

Mali. The resumption of fighting between the Malian government and non-jihadist Tuareg rebels will likely enable al Qaeda–linked militants to further ingratiate themselves with communities in northern Mali, potentially establishing de facto control and shadow governance in some nominally rebel-controlled areas. Growing control in northern Mali will enable al Qaeda–linked militants to pose a greater transnational threat.

Pakistan. Afghan Taliban and Pakistani officials met in Kabul on September 21 to resolve hostilities over border-security issues, including cross-border Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks. The Taliban refused to publicly mention measures against the TTP, which suggests it will not stop the group from conducting attacks in Pakistan.

Afghanistan. Iran claimed it conducted raids targeting IS-affiliated militants in West Azerbaijan Province who Iran alleged were planning coordinated bomb attacks in Tehran, Iran. Iranian state media suggested these militants were connected to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and ISIS.

The tribal insurgency against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has maintained a steady rate of attacks over two weeks, and this insurgency’s objectives mean it will likely unintentionally support ISIS lines of effort. ISIS possibly is executing a military deception operation that aims to increase the success of ISIS defensive action over the next few weeks while preparing for future ISIS offensive action against the SDF over the next few months.

Al Qaeda–linked and IS-linked militants are continuing to expand in northern Mali and threatening to control major population centers. Al Qaeda–linked militants are exploiting the void left by withdrawing UN forces to besiege and coerce regional capitals in northern Mali, while IS-linked militants are setting conditions to control a regional capital they have encircled since April. Both groups’ growing control over northern Mali increases the risk that they could generate a transnational attack threat.

Rival Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions met and demonstrated their first sign of reconciliation after eight months, which indicates the TTP is trying to reduce internal tensions. A TTP faction could defect to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) as ISKP positions itself as an alternative to the TTP.

Iraq and Syria. Local tribes are resisting the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) campaign against the Deir ez Zor Military Council (DMC), which could enable ISIS to re-embed itself into in local Sunni Deir ez Zor tribes.

Pakistan. Pakistan deployed security forces to protect state energy infrastructure from ongoing protests. The protests may continue through mid-September because the Pakistani government cannot address the issues that prompted them. Deploying additional police to address the protests could disrupt Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban are conducting an information campaign that frames Tajikistan as responsible for the actions of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The framing aims to deflect responsibility for the Taliban’s inability to defeat ISKP and prevent attacks beyond Afghanistan.