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The PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its law enforcement activities against Taiwan.
Iranian interest in the progress of Gaza Strip ceasefire-hostage negotiations suggests that elements of the Iranian regime are likely delaying a retaliatory strike on Israel until ceasefire talks conclude. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that newly appointed Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is scheduled to meet Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Tehran "in the coming days." Thani kept Iranian officials apprised of negotiation progress during the August 15-16 ceasefire talks.
The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts. A Crimean occupation official, who had volunteered to fight as part of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), claimed on August 19 that his platoon redeployed from the Robotyne and Verbove area in western Zaporizhia Oblast to “defend” Kursk Oblast.
The African Union (AU) and UN are advancing plans for an AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia after the current AU mission expires, at the end of 2024.
The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing maintaining the initiative in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN suggested on August 20 that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground attack into Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
The People’s Republic of China began aggressively challenging Taiwan’s jurisdiction over its outlying islands, especially Kinmen, in February 2024. Repeated Chinese Coast Guard incursions in Taiwan-controlled waters around Kinmen aim to normalize the PRC’s "law enforcement" jurisdiction in the area.
Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have continued signaling that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi warned on August 20 that Iran will “definitely” retaliate against Israel “at the suitable time and place.” Fadavi also warned that Israel “will be punished more severely than before,” likely referring to the large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to cause greater damage to Israel than it did in its April 2024 attack in order to restore deterrence with Israel.
Ukrainian forces continued attacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on August 20 and recently made additional advances. Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo. Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces have destroyed at least one pontoon bridge across the Seim as of August 19 that was visible on August 17.
The United States, Israel, and international mediators plan to continue ceasefire talks despite Hamas’ rejection of the latest ceasefire-hostage proposal.... An anonymous US official said that the Biden administration still expects a resumption of talks from the key negotiating partners later this week. Hamas [ ] rejected the ceasefire-hostage proposal produced in the most recent round of talks in Doha and continues to support the July 2024 ceasefire-hostage proposal.