This is a live product that CTP-ISW will update regularly. The latest changes to our assessments and data are bolded. We last updated the indicator list on February 3, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET.
The recent protests in Iran marked the most serious domestic unrest that the Islamic Republic has ever faced. The protests threatened to alter the character of the regime fundamentally or even topple it.
The unprecedented brutal crackdown that the regime is conducting has broadly suppressed the protests for the moment and will likely control them in the short term if no other factors intervene. The internet blackout, now extended to efforts to find and confiscate Starlink and other satellite communications dishes, makes assessing the current extent of protest activity difficult. The regime has responded to this protest wave with much more force and lethality than in any previous wave, indicating its fear that it can lose control of the situation. The regime cannot sustain its crackdown indefinitely, however, meaning that protests could reappear as the crackdown eases. CTP-ISW will not attempt to forecast the effects of possible US or other international action in support of the protesters at this time, since the nature and likelihood of such action remain extremely unclear. CTP-ISW has observed indicators that separatist militias are seeking to take advantage of the protest movement to position themselves for post-regime pushes for autonomy and independence, highlighting the importance of thoughtful and careful planning for post-regime scenarios.
This publication identifies indicators of reduced regime stability and the degree to which we have observed evidence that those indicators have been tripped (that is, that a given indicator now points toward regime instability). Indicators are presented as tripped, partially tripped, or unobserved. When indicators are shown as unobserved, that simply means that we have not seen evidence using open-source information.
This publication highlights what open-source information reveals about the protests and their implications for regime stability. This publication is not an assessment of the likelihood of distinct scenarios, however. The regime could transform fundamentally or collapse without many of the indicators tripped. Conversely, the regime could retain power and persist in its current form even after most indicators have tripped. Indeed, many of the indicators presented here have tripped in previous major protest waves in Iran without significantly affecting the regime. The indicators that we have observed should therefore be understood as signs of regime instability that could increase the likelihood of some kind of regime change in Iran, but that may also fall short of generating major change. Forecasting how the security situation in Iran will evolve is difficult at this moment, especially due to the unique circumstances. The regime has never before faced large-scale protests and the simultaneous risk of military escalation with the United States and Israel. This situation could change how both protesters and the regime act in ways that make some of these indicators misleading. We will try to forecast where the regime is headed based on open-source information, nevertheless. Our running assessments and forecasts can be found above and in our daily Iran update here.
Our analysis focuses on the Iranian internal security apparatus, which the regime has spent decades optimizing for domestic repression. Our core assumption is that the regime will survive as long as its leaders and security forces retain the ability and willingness to suppress domestic unrest. The ability and willingness of the security forces to suppress protests violently and lethally are thus among the most significant factors in determining the trajectory of the regime. The officers involved in protest crackdowns are generally part of one of three security services: the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij Organization, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[1] The first regime line of defense is the LEC, which is the national police force. If regular police officers cannot contain protests, the LEC deploys the Special Units, which are its highly trained anti-riot force. The LEC has around 200,000-300,000 members, though it is unclear how many belong to the Special Units.[2] The Basij is a paramilitary force responsible for civil defense and social control. In the early stages of protests, the regime often deploys its low-level Basij units to supplement the LEC and conduct intelligence and protest suppression functions. The Basij has an estimated 450,000 personnel, many of whom are not fit for protest suppression, such as those who manage propaganda and socio-cultural programs for the regime.[3] If the LEC and low-level Basij are insufficient to control protests, the regime will deploy its elite Basij units, which receive extensive ideological training and are designed for brutal repression. In the most extreme cases, the regime deploys the IRGC Ground Forces—conventional military units that are dispersed across major cities and towns—to apply extreme force against protesters. The IRGC Ground Forces have around 150,000 members distributed across 32 regional units.[4] The only remaining force that the regime has at its disposal beyond those already identified is the conventional military known as the Artesh. The Artesh Ground Forces consist of around 350,000 personnel.[5] The regime has, in some cases, deployed Artesh members to guard key facilities during countrywide protests in order to create bandwidth for the other security services to focus on repression. Iranian leaders have long hesitated to involve the Artesh further in protest crackdowns, however, because the Artesh has been a significantly less ideological force and does not receive extensive training in crowd control.
Indicators that the Regime is Losing the Ability or Willingness to Control the Population Through Force
Tripped (Observed since CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET):
- Regime framing of protesters in extreme terms, such as “terrorists”—indicates that the regime is trying to generate buy-in among reluctant security personnel or generate a sense of fear among protesters and security personnel considering defection
- Senior officials engaging Chinese, Russian, or North Korean representatives—indicates that the regime is seeking help with repression
Partially Tripped (Partially observed since CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET): N/A
Previously Tripped (Observed before CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET, but not since then):
- Security forces withdrawing or retreating from protest scenes—indicated that security forces lacked the will or ability to control certain protests
- Security personnel defecting or refusing to repress protests—indicated that the regime lost control of some security forces
- Deployment of IRGC conventional units for repression—indicated that the LEC and Basij had failed to control the protests or were not available in sufficient numbers to do so
- Damning leaks about regime activities and data—indicated that there was dissent among some regime personnel
- Simultaneous protests in major cities and rural areas—indicated that protests could have strained the bandwidth of security forces
- Iranian leaders moving financial assets out of Iran—indicated that some regime officials were losing confidence in the system
- Deployment of foreign militias for repression—indicated that the regime sought to free bandwidth for security forces or was concerned about security personnel defections
- Unusually high rate of security force casualties—indicated that protesters were increasingly violent or capable
- Iranian officials applying for asylum—indicated that there was dissent or defections among Iranian officials
- New appointments for positions involved in regime repression—indicated that the regime was dissatisfied or had some critical issue with the incumbents in those positions
- Regime offering recruitment incentives for security forces—indicated that the regime was trying to bolster security forces’ manpower or replace defectors
Previously Partially Tripped (Partially observed before CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET, but not since then):
- Destruction of key facilities or regime symbols—indicated that security forces were degraded under mounting strain
- Expanding insurgent operations in border regions—indicated that security forces were degraded under mounting strain
- Deployment of the Artesh to guard key locations—indicated that the regime sought to free bandwidth for security forces
- Regime offering salary increases or other financial incentives to security personnel—indicated that the regime was concerned about the morale of security forces
- Deployment of elite Basij units for repression—indicated that the LEC had failed to control the protests
Unobserved:
- Deployment of the Artesh for repression—would indicate that the regime has become desperate and willing to risk using an untrained and less ideological force
- Deployment of IRGC units outside the Ground Forces for repression—would indicate that the regime has become desperate and willing to risk using an untrained force
- Protesters occupying city centers for extended periods or accessing sensitive locations—indicates that security forces lack the ability to control certain protests
- Sustained protests without an accompanying crackdown—would indicate that security forces lack the will or ability to control certain protests
- Regime encouraging vigilantism to suppress protests—would indicate that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
- Elevated rates of non-protest-related crime—could indicate that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
- Protesters communicating and coordinating across cities and provinces—would indicate that the protesters have some form or organization
- Protesters using sophisticated weapons or tactics—would indicate that protesters are increasingly capable
- Protesters identifying themselves under certain banners or labels—would indicate that the protesters have some form or organization
- Significant protest activity appearing rapidly in unusual areas—could indicate that protesters are planning and coordinating
- Senior officials breaking from regime rhetoric and talking points—would indicate that there are divisions in regime leadership
- Senior officials leaving Iran for unusual business—could indicate that some are fleeing or preparing to do so
- Damning leaks of highly sensitive regime information—would indicate that there is dissent among the seniormost Iranian officials
- Senior officials meeting with low-level security personnel—would indicate that the regime is concerned about the morale of security forces
- Easing the internet shutdown without reduced protest activity—could indicate that there are defections among regime personnel responsible for the shutdown
- State media publishing anti-regime content or information that is sympathetic to protesters—would indicate that there are defections among state media personnel
Evidence for Tripped and Partially Tripped Indicators
Tripped (Observed since CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET):
- Regime framing of protesters in extreme terms, such as “terrorists”
- Iranian officials and state media have repeatedly described protesters as “armed terrorists.”[6]
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Fox News on January 14 that protesters used ISIS-style tactics to attack security forces.[7]
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi described protesters as “foreign and domestic terrorist actors” in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal.[8]
- Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf described the recent protests as a “terrorist war in the style of ISIS” that was orchestrated by the United States and Israel.[9]
- Senior officials engaging Chinese, Russian, or North Korean representatives
- Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani held a phone call with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, almost certainly to discuss the ongoing protests in Iran.[10]
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev on January 16 and emphasized the responsibility of all countries in the SCO to cooperate to prevent and counter terrorism.[11] The SCO includes Russia and the People’s Republic of China.
- LEC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan met with the PRC ambassador to Iran in Tehran to finalize a security deal between the LEC and PRC Public Security Ministry.[12]
- Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.[13] Larijani has overseen the brutal regime crackdown on public dissent.[14]
Partially Tripped (Partially observed since CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET): N/A
CTP-ISW observed or partially observed the following indicators before 9:00 AM ET on January 29, 2026, but these indicators are no longer tripped or partially tripped. We have noted the date when we last observed these indicators. These indicators retain the ability to become tripped or partially tripped again, however:
Previously Tripped (Observed before CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET, but not since then):
- Security forces withdrawing or retreating from protest scenes (Last observed: January 9)
- Security Forces have retreated from protests in Bushehr City, Bushehr Province, and Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, due to the size and intensity of protests.[15]
- Security personnel defecting or refusing to repress protests (Last observed: January 22)
- The regime reportedly arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah who refused to fire at protesters.[16] The IRGC Intelligence Organization separately stated that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment,” which suggests that some Iranian security personnel may have defected or that the regime is concerned about this possibility.[17]
- Israeli outlet Mako reported that hundreds of junior and mid-level officers in the IRGC and Basij have defected, citing Western intelligence agencies.[18] CTP-ISW cannot verify the report.
- The US State Department’s Persian-language X account reported that the regime sentenced a security officer to death for refusing to shoot at protesters.[19]
- Deployment of IRGC conventional units for repression (Last observed: January 12)
- The regime has deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to suppress protests in Kermanshah.[20] The regime may have deployed conventional IRGC units to suppress protests elsewhere, such as Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, and Ilam Province, as well.[21] Armed Forces General Staff-run media threatened to deploy the IRGC Saberin Special Forces Brigade and units under the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base to suppress protests.[22]
- Damning leaks about regime activities and data (Last observed: January 25)
- An LEC officer from an unspecified Kurdish-majority city in northwestern Iran told TIME that security forces disagree over whether a “massive” regime crackdown on protests will contain the protests or incite further unrest. The officer said that all of the officers at his station believe the regime is collapsing.[23] Iranian sources, including some from the Presidential Office and Supreme National Security Council, have spoken to Western media, reporting extremely high protest death numbers. Such leaks likely reflect dissent among regime personnel.[24]
- Iran International reported that security forces killed at least 12,000 protesters, citing information received from several Iranian sources, including a source close to the Supreme National Security Council, two sources in the presidential office, and several sources from the IRGC in Mashhad, Kermanshah, and Esfahan.[25]
- The New York Times reported that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Supreme National Security Council on January 9 to crush the protests “by any means necessary,” citing two Iranian officials briefed on the directive.[26] The officials said that security forces were ordered to shoot to kill and “show no mercy.”
- Two senior Iranian officials told TIME that 30,000 people may have been killed on January 8 and 9.[27]
- Simultaneous protests in major cities and rural areas (Last observed: January 13)
- CTP-ISW has published daily protest maps since December 29, 2025, showing how protests have fluctuated across major cities, such as Tehran and Mashhad, and less-populated areas simultaneously. CTP-ISW assessed on January 15 that the Iranian regime’s extreme securitization of society and brutal crackdown on protests appear to have suppressed the protest movement for now.[28]
- CTP-ISW has recorded zero protest activity across Iran since January 14.
- Iranian leaders moving financial assets out of Iran (Last observed: January 14)
- US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant said that Iranian leaders are moving “tens of millions of dollars” abroad.[29]
- Israeli media reported that regime officials have moved around 1.5 billion US dollars out of Iran and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, has moved 328 million US dollars of that total to Dubai.[30]
- Deployment of foreign militias for repression (Last observed: January 17)
- Anti-regime media reported that around 800 Iranian-backed Iraqi militiamen have traveled to Iran to suppress protests.[31] A Fox News correspondent similarly reported that Iranian officials have asked Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to intervene in support of the regime.[32]
- An Iraqi security source told CNN that nearly 5,000 Iranian-backed militia fighters entered Iran from southern Iraq. A European military source likewise confirmed to CNN that 800 Shia fighters entered Iran to support the crackdown.[33]
- Iran International reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters were responsible for a significant portion of the killings on January 8 and 9.[34]
- Unusually high rate of security force casualties (Last observed: January 19)
- IRGC-affiliated media reported 121 regime security personnel deaths as of January 12.[35] Some estimates indicate that the security forces have incurred as many as 500 personnel deaths. This represents a dramatic escalation from the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini protests, during which around 70 security personnel died.[36] The Mahsa Amini protests had been the deadliest protest wave for security personnel until the current protests.
- An unspecified Iranian official told Reuters that at least 5,000 people have been killed in the protests in Iran, including about 500 security personnel.[37]
- Iranian officials applying for asylum (Last observed: January 18)
- Diplomatic sources told anti-regime media on January 18 that several Iranian diplomats have privately contacted European authorities in recent weeks to discuss or submit asylum requests. Alireza Jeyrani Hokmabad, who is a senior official at the Iranian permanent mission to the United Nations in Geneva, reportedly left his post and applied for asylum in Switzerland.[38]
- New appointments for positions involved in regime repression (Last observed: January 28)
- The IranCell Communications Services Company Board of Directors replaced CEO Alireza Rafiei with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani.[39] Filterwatch reported that Rafiei was removed for “treason” because he was “delaying orders to cut connectivity.”[40]
- Brigadier General Jafar Motamed replaced Rear Admiral Mehdi Khajeh Amiri as coordination deputy of Iran’s Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[41]
- Brigadier General Hossein Maroufi was appointed as the IRGC cultural, social, and media affairs deputy.[42]
- IRIB President Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy director.[43] Jebelli appointed Hamed Fatehi Poladi as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General.[44]
- Regime offering recruitment incentives for security forces (Last observed: January 28)
- LEC Public Service Organization announced that it is reducing mandatory service time, allowing deployment delays, assigning recruits to units based on skill sets, and forgiving absences from mandatory service for conscripts.[45]
Previously Partially Tripped (Partially observed before CTP-ISW last updated this publication on January 29, 2026, at 9:00 AM ET, but not since then):
- Destruction of key facilities or regime symbols (Last observed: January 12)
- Protesters have set fire to government buildings and institutions across Iran.[46] Protesters have also set fire to regime symbols, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran flag and statues of regime figures.[47]CTP-ISW assessed on January 15 that the Iranian regime’s extreme securitization of society and brutal crackdown on protests appear to have suppressed the protest movement for now.
- CTP-ISW has recorded zero protest activity across Iran since January 14.
- Expanding insurgent operations in border regions (Last observed: January 13)
- The Mobarizoun Popular Front has conducted two attacks targeting Iranian security officers in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in response to regime repression.[48]
- The Kurdistan National Guard announced that its “Zagros Tornado units” attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.[49]
- The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) claimed responsibility for an attack on IRGC positions in Kermanshah Province that killed an unspecified number of IRGC personnel.[50]
- Deployment of the Artesh to guard key locations (Last observed: January 10)
- An Iranian social media user published a video of Artesh forces deployed in Karaj, Alborz Province.[51]
- Regime offering salary increases or other financial incentives to security personnel (Last observed: January 19)
- Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman Ebrahim Azizi said that parliament plans to increase the salaries of the armed forces.[52]
- Deployment of elite Basij units for repression (Last observed: January 18)
- Tehran residents told the Wall Street Journal that Basij members have patrolled Tehran’s streets on motorbikes in recent days, with some shouting, “Don’t come out! We’ll shoot you!”[53] CTP-ISW assessed on January 18 that those Basij members may belong to the Imam Ali Battalions, which are an elite, anti-riot force that is known for its common use of motorbikes for crowd control and intimidation.[54]
CTP-ISW has observed the following counter-indicators for tripped and partially tripped indicators.
- Security forces retaining the bandwidth to confront and prevent anti-regime militancy (counter-indicator for “expanding insurgent operations in border regions”)
- The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) claimed that the Iranian regime conducted a drone and ballistic missile attack on a Kurdistan National Army base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[55]
- The IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base and LEC killed an alleged Ansar al Furqan leader and arrested 11 other Ansar al Furqan fighters in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[56] Ansar al Furqan denied the incident.[57]
[1] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance/
[2] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf
[3] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf
[4] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf
[5] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf
[6] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/382934 ; https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-fighting-war-against-terrorists-parliament-speaker-tells-tehran-rally-253bc47e?reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
[7] https://x.com/FoxNews/status/2011542072130687300?s=20
[8] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/irans-regime-defends-its-crackdown-46a2f59a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqeiaQSxgzWfrxbV6XMFu6Mnet_YWMN2VD8c7jxnNTUSU38p5y_XGAJWsNSpiKQ%3D&gaa_ts=69711c01&gaa_sig=hd8v7NWKvHWdWY8ssIvkY3qz5B8FlT-7VOIOhSGlwvAMYXlFg8CyzYS9GwbHFmZw8KNCbApWnO7HgOlOnp8jqA%3D%3D
[9] https://x.com/RadioFarda_/status/2015421286441521629?s=20
[10] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/177481
[11] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/383598 ; https://eng.sectsco.org/20260114/2127277.html
[12] https://t.me/defapress_ir/47769
[13] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79084; https://t.me/isna94/364919
[14] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0364
[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-protests-internet-shutdown.html ; https://x.com/HengawO/status/2009656318974447637
[16] https://x.com/HengawO/status/2009326792146903541
[17] https://t.me/iribnews/311193
[18] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-world/2026_q1/Article-7348c2531cddb91026.htm
[19] https://x.com/USABehFarsi/status/2014307365978243497?s=20
[20] https://t.me/mehrnews/343631
[21] https://x.com/KurdistanHRN_En/status/2010076030682194039?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/FSeifikaran/status/2009430036848541843
[22] https://t.me/defapress_ir/47091
[23] https://time.com/7345092/iran-protests-death-toll-regime-crackdown/
[24] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601130145; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-protest-death-toll-over-12000-feared-higher-video-bodies-at-morgue/
[25] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601130145
[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/25/world/middleeast/iran-how-crackdown-was-done.html
[27] https://time.com/7357635/more-than-30000-killed-in-iran-say-senior-officials/
[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-15-2026
[29] https://x.com/ksadjadpour/status/2011637306617143374?s=20
[30] https://x.com/c14israel/status/2011543437460586850?s=20
[31] https://www.iranintl.com/202601071200
[32] https://x.com/LucasFoxNews/status/2010356533687623730?s=20
[33] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-protests-trump-01-15-26?post-id=cmkfvlp6900003b6sluxfzszc
[34] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2012475430993891531 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2012400646473802122
[35] tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/10/21/3491793
[36] https://x.com/Alfoneh/status/1605184629501304833
[37] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/iranian-official-says-verified-deaths-iran-protests-reaches-least-5000-2026-01-18/
[38] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601186707
[39] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/383923
[40] https://filter.watch/english/2026/01/15/iran-enters-a-new-age-of-digital-isolation-2/
[41] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/808564/
[42] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/11/07/3502651/
[43] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1404/11/07/3502544/
[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6734468
[45] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/271657
[46] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2009388719824847227 ; https://x.com/allahbakhshii/status/2009691546548093236?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/zarGEOINT/status/2010823089462931879
[47] https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2009417105154949439 ; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/2007997012890034359
[48] https://t.me/jmmfront/104 ; https://www.radiozamaneh dot com/874567/; https://t.me/jmmfront/119
[49] https://x.com/KRDonlineTV/status/2009759244363440449
[50] https://x.com/PAKenglishh/status/2011137160376959056
[51] https://t.me/kianmeli1/77103
[52] https://t.me/defapress_ir/47267
[53] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iranian-regime-seeks-to-project-normality-after-quelling-protests-a7ba6781?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdMR0hsyhlRQzxcs4xPl6wGHxp4RrS9xLEcu_xDmug05wtoo8CQ0fcO_0vMcgw%3D&gaa_ts=696ceb4f&gaa_sig=QxSfMyct48HWzTP2TfaxcGKtsc7MmBiDra7EQCvYNA5ZIwF54NUmNinIvftbjfDN4F897cwtGFHN_qtoxThlDw%3D%3D
[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-18-2026/
[55] https://x.com/PAKenglishh/status/2013849514482823261
[56] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/384309
[57] SITE Intelligence Group, “Ansar al Furqan Denies Iranian Regime Claims of Killing Leader and Arresting Fighters in Balochistan, Vows ’Punishment,’” January 21, 2026, available by subscription at https://www.siteintelgroup.com.
