The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran. Most updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas Monday updates also include events from the preceding weekend, collected after ISW-CTP’s 2:00 PM ET Friday data cutoff. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.
Key Takeaways
- The Houthis are attempting to either secure control of Yemeni oil and gas resources or force Saudi Arabia to fund salaries of Houthi government employees, either of which would solidify their political control in Yemen and weaken the Yemeni government.
- Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi demanded that Saudi Arabia stop “depriving” Yemen of the country’s oil, gas, and other natural resource wealth during a speech on September 21. This demand indicates that the Houthis aim to control Yemen’s oil and gas reserves because Abdulmalik views the Houthi authorities as “Yemen,” not the internationally-recognized government.
- The Houthis reportedly rejected earlier Saudi-proposed truce offers that would have resumed Houthi-Yemeni government negotiations on oil production and exports and civil servant salaries but did not appear to explicitly guarantee Houthi access to fuel revenues and salary funding.
- The Houthis appear to be threatening Saudi Arabia’s international partners to isolate Saudi Arabia and prevent Saudi partners from forming a coalition against Houthi efforts in the Red Sea.
- The Houthis damaged an Italian Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet during an attack targeting King Fahd Air Base in Taif, Saudi Arabia, on September 17. Italy deployed fighter jets to support defensive operations against Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia. It is unclear whether the Houthis intentionally targeted the aircraft, but the Houthis questioned why the aircraft was there.
- The Houthis may perceive this air defense mission as a potential hindrance to the group’s offensive campaign against Saudi Arabia, which consists chiefly of attacks on Saudi oil facilities, amid various countries’ defensive support for Saudi Arabia.
- A Houthi attack that damages European aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia to support Saudi efforts to defend against Iranian attacks also supports Iranian objectives to break the coalition defending Gulf states against Iran.
Toplines
The Houthis are attempting to either secure control of Yemeni oil and gas resources or force Saudi Arabia to fund salaries of Houthi government employees, either of which would solidify their political control in Yemen and weaken the Yemeni government. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi demanded that Saudi Arabia stop “depriving” Yemen of the country’s oil, gas, and other natural resource wealth during a speech on September 21.[1] This demand indicates that the Houthis aim to control Yemen’s oil and gas reserves because Abdulmalik views the Houthi authorities as “Yemen,” not the internationally-recognized government.[2] The dire economic situation in Houthi-controlled areas could threaten Houthi long-term control, so securing greater revenue through military or diplomatic action would satisfy their strategic objectives of solidifying control.[3] Control of the oil and gas fields would also place the Houthis in control of most of Yemen’s economically viable areas and resources, thus permanently solidifying their political control of Yemen.
The Houthis reportedly rejected earlier Saudi-proposed truce offers that would have resumed Houthi-Yemeni government negotiations on oil production and exports and civil servant salaries.[4] The Houthis have consistently demanded that Saudi Arabia fund civil servant salaries in Sanaa as part of a 2023 Houthi-Saudi agreement.[5] Saudi Arabia’s latest truce offer does not appear to explicitly guarantee Houthi access to fuel revenues and salary funding, however. The truce would have forced the Houthis to stop military action, while the Houthis believe they have the upper hand, without guaranteeing that the Houthis would accomplish their objectives. The Houthis’ rejection of this alleged Saudi proposal may indicate that they are unwilling to accept truce offers that do not improve their economic position through either control of Yemeni oil and gas or increased revenues from salary payments.[6]
The Houthis likely intend to secure control of Yemeni oil and gas to alleviate dire economic conditions in Houthi-controlled territory and advance the group’s objective of controlling all of Yemen.[7] The Houthis require revenue to retain control of Houthi-controlled territory and to fund their military operations to achieve their ultimate objective to control all of Yemeni territory.[8] Saudi recent measures against the Houthis, including traffic controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, have restricted the flow of fuel, funding, weapons, and goods into Houthi-controlled territory and rendered the group unable to pay its officials.[9] US airstrikes during Operation Rough Rider in 2025 also damaged facilities at Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port and supply lines between Hudaydah and Sanaa, further hindering Houthi commercial and smuggling activity.[10]
The Houthis appear to be threatening Saudi Arabia’s international partners to isolate Saudi Arabia and prevent Saudi partners from forming a coalition against Houthi efforts in the Red Sea. The Houthis damaged an Italian Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet during an attack targeting King Fahd Air Base in Taif, Saudi Arabia, on September 17.[11] It is unclear whether the Houthis intentionally targeted the aircraft. Senior Italian government sources stated that Italy redeployed Italian military aircraft from the King Fahd Air Base to elsewhere following the attack, according to Italian media on September 22.[12] Houthi officials reportedly told Italian officials that the group does not seek conflict with Italy but questioned why Italy had deployed military aircraft to Saudi bases.[13] Italy has long deployed fighter jets at Saudi bases as part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) but deployed, alongside other countries, additional fighter jets to Saudi Arabia in March 2026 to protect Gulf states’ airspace from Iranian attacks.[14] The Houthis may perceive this air defense mission as a potential hindrance to the group’s offensive campaign against Saudi Arabia, which consists chiefly of attacks on Saudi oil facilities, amid various countries’ defensive support for Saudi Arabia.[15] A Houthi attack that damages European aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia to support Saudi efforts to defend against Iranian attacks also supports Iranian objectives to break the coalition defending Gulf states against Iran.
The Houthis have made threats against other Saudi partners. Abdulmalik also warned Pakistan and Turkey, Saudi Arabia’s mutual defense treaty allies under the “Mecca Pact,” not to support Saudi Arabia on September 21, for example.[16] The Houthis view their strike campaign in Saudi Arabia as fundamental to efforts to maximize Saudi political and economic costs, which the group believes will compel Saudi Arabia to submit to Houthi demands.[17] Continued Houthi threats, if effective in deterring Saudi allies, would accordingly weaken Saudi air defenses, increase the efficacy of the Houthis’ strike campaign, and keep Saudi Arabia relatively isolated and unsupported against the group.
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
Nothing significant to report.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni met with Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsen Naqvi in Tehran on September 21. Naqvi’s visit to Tehran comes amid Pakistan’s attempts to pressure Iran to force the Houthis to end or limit their campaign against Saudi Arabia, Pakistani mediation efforts between the United States and Iran, and continued economic and border security issues between Iran and Pakistan.[18] An economy-focused Iranian media outlet speculated on September 22 that the meeting could have been about Pakistan’s mediation between the United States and Iran, finding ways to reduce tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and bilateral cooperation, likely in reference to trade and border security.[19] This outlet’s speculation is consistent with a September 18 Financial Times (FT) report that Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir had asked Iranian officials to force the Houthis to stop their attacks on Saudi territory and oil infrastructure.[20] Bloomberg reported on August 24 that Munir and Naqvi met with Pezeshkian and other Iranian officials to reduce tensions between the United States and Iran amid kinetic exchanges in the Strait of Hormuz.[21] Iran and Pakistan agreed in July to expand bilateral trade and cross-border commerce from three billion US dollars to at least 10 billion US dollars, which ISW-CTP continues to assess is part of a likely Iranian effort to mitigate the economic effects of the US naval blockade and sanctions on the Iranian economy.[22]
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
See topline section.
Arabian Peninsula
Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to engage Houthi fighters in mountainous areas near Jabal Kahbub on the Lahij-Taiz Governorate border in southwestern Yemen on September 21 and 22.[23] Jabal Kahbub sits approximately 30 kilometers north of Houthi positions by the Bab al Mandeb Strait, which would provide Yemeni government-aligned forces advantageous high ground above Houthi forces along the relatively open Red Sea coastal plain. Homeland Shield Forces and Southern Giants Brigades, which are military factions aligned with the Yemeni government, re-established control of Jabal Kahbub on the Lahij-Taiz Governorate border on September 17 and have since been defending their position.[24]

[1] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2102133125551706502
[2] https://t.me/army21ye/3690
[3] https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/09/21/نقص-للوقود-في-صنعاء-والحوثي-يخصص-المخزون-لعملياته
[4] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/NewspaperArticles/arab/904897/الرياض-توسط-غروندبرغ-لدى-صنعاء–لا-أذن-يمنية-مصغية
[5] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/03/29/saudi-payments-houthi-war-entry-irgc-yemen/
[6] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/NewspaperArticles/arab/904897/الرياض-توسط-غروندبرغ-لدى-صنعاء–لا-أذن-يمنية-مصغية
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/ ; https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/09/21/نقص-للوقود-في-صنعاء-والحوثي-يخصص-المخزون-لعملياته
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[9] https://alhurra.com/en/19358 ; https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2015/03/30/saudi-led-forces-strike-yemen-rebels-blockade-ports/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/houthi-escalation-calculus-following-cautious-entry-into-the-iran-war/
[11] https://theaviationist dot com/2026/09/18/italian-eurofighter-hit-saudi-arabia/ ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/8374 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2102157109097869706?s=20
[12] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2102157109097869706?s=20 ; https://www.repubblica dot it/esteri/2026/09/22/news/italia_yemen_descalation_base_aerei_ta_if_houthi-425599202/
[13] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2102157109097869706?s=20
[14] https://www.notizie dot it/en/Saudi-Arabia-destroyed-Italian-fighter-plane–Crosetto-speaks/ ; https://theaviationist dot com/2026/07/31/task-force-air-arabia/
[15] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-21/uk-close-to-helping-saudi-arabia-counter-houthi-attacks ; https://edition.cnn.com/2026/09/10/politics/us-military-support-saudi-arabia-houthi-iran-yemen ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2086341452062245037
[16] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2102133125551706502 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-turkey-pakistan-sign-joint-defence-deal-amid-regional-turmoil-2026-08-07/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-16-2026/
[18] https://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/06/30/3702751/ ; https://t.me/mehrnews/415248
[19] https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%BE%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-64/4296744-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86
[20] https://www.ft.com/content/dc6b63b3-2853-48eb-88cb-33b9c46d1a31?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[21] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-25/pakistan-army-chief-ends-tehran-visit-us-iran-mediation-push
[22] https://farsnews dot ir/AliShafieeAghdam/1784724013495455026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-july-22-2026#_edn491efb1434f39b23ef02f0255287879849
[23] https://x.com/alamalikah/status/2102124501718761936 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2102120731941171566?s=20 ; https://x.com/alamalikah/status/2102119822297297288?s=20 ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5321173-معارك-تعز-وباب-المندب-تكبح-هجمات-الحوثيين-للتوغل-شرقاً ; https://x.com/diralwatan/status/2102439112334557206?s=20
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-17-2026 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/اليمن-معارك-في-تعز-ولحج-وغارات-على-المخا-وتأهّب-عسكري-بعدن?blockId=block_477869 ; https://x.com/alamalikah/status/2100331113767911589 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2100333780724597198?s=20
