Toplines

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei may be trying to reduce President Masoud Pezeshkian and other “pragmatist” officials’ ability to influence the regime’s approach toward the United States in the current conflict. Senior cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, who has familial ties to Mojtaba, claimed on August 3 that Mojtaba formally warned Pezeshkian in a written statement that he would accept Pezeshkian’s resignation if Pezeshkian tried to resign again.[1] Kharrazi claimed that the warning caused Pezeshkian to “back down.”[2] Mojtaba may have made this warning to prevent Pezeshkian from using the threat of his resignation to influence regime policies. Four senior Iranian officials told the New York Times on July 4 that Pezeshkian previously threatened to resign if Mojtaba rejected the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU), which increased pressure on Mojtaba to approve the deal.[3] Mojtaba stated on June 18 that he had authorized the MoU despite holding “a different opinion in principle” and emphasized that Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) are responsible for protecting Iranian and Axis of Resistance interests.[4] ISW-CTP assessed on June 18 that Mojtaba likely placed responsibility for the agreement on Pezeshkian and the SNSC to distance himself from any failure resulting from the MoU or negotiations.[5] Kharrazi does not appear to hold significant influence over current regime decision-making, and he provided no evidence to substantiate his claims. His remarks are nevertheless noteworthy given his familial ties to Mojtaba Khamenei and Kamal Kharrazi, who previously served as a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader.[6]

Kharrazi’s comments come as a contingent of “pragmatist” regime officials has directly and indirectly questioned how much effort the regime should exert to control the Strait of Hormuz. Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who played a central role in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, warned on August 3 that a prolonged closure or “short-term exploitation” of the Strait of Hormuz could generate an international consensus against Iran, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[7] Zarif added that Iran has a time-sensitive window of opportunity to capitalize on its control of the strait and argued that Iran should use the strait as leverage in negotiations to recover economically and avoid further US military action.[8] Zarif previously served as the vice president for strategic affairs under President Masoud Pezeshkian, who has similarly advocated for a diplomatic settlement to end the war.[9] Pezeshkian stated on August 2 that all SNSC members supported the MoU and that Iran must strive to compel the United States to uphold it, suggesting that Pezeshkian supports a return to the MoU and may, therefore, not support continued fighting over the Strait of Hormuz.[10] An Iranian media outlet that was previously associated with Iran’s chief negotiator and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also argued in July that Iran does not have to allocate excessive resources to controlling the strait, particularly if doing so requires Iran to sacrifice other objectives, such as preserving its nuclear program or ensuring regime stability.[11] Araghchi, who is also part of Iran’s negotiating delegation, also reportedly expressed support for a recent US- and Qatari-formulated proposal in which inbound traffic in the Strait of Hormuz would go through Iranian waters while outbound traffic would pass through Omani waters.[12]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) faction that currently appears to be dominating regime decision-making has likely not diverged from its maximalist positions and will likely maintain these positions in reported upcoming talks with the United States. US President Donald Trump announced on August 2 that US and Iranian officials would soon meet to discuss reopening the Strait of Hormuz and nuclear issues.[13] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Mohsen Rezaei, whom ISW-CTP assesses is part of the IRGC faction controlling regime decision-making, stated on August 3 that Iran will not allow the use of a second corridor in the strait “under any circumstances.”[14] It is unclear whether Rezaei was referring to the recent proposal about inbound and outbound traffic or the current southern route along the Omani coast, but Rezaei’s statement nevertheless highlights his view that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz must only pass through Iran’s traffic separation scheme. The Wall Street Journal separately reported on August 3 that Iranian negotiators supported the proposal on inbound and outbound traffic but that they are awaiting approval from the IRGC.[15] This report highlights how the IRGC continues to wield outsized authority in the regime. On August 2, IRGC-affiliated media denied that Iran had agreed to reopen the strait. The Assembly of Experts, which is an 88-member clerical body that is responsible for appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader, separately described on August 3 “calls for surrender” in negotiations with the United States as an “unforgivable betrayal” and grounds for legal action.[16]

The IRGC continued to use force to assert Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz on August 2, which reflects the IRGC’s unwillingness to compromise on its control over the waterway. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 2 that an explosion occurred near a civilian vessel off the coast of Oman.[17] An Iranian projectile or mine may have exploded near the tanker. The IRGC Navy has repeatedly attacked vessels attempting to transit through the strait using the southern route along Oman’s coast because traffic on this route undermines Iranian efforts to assert full control over the strait.

Mojtaba may be trying to increase his control over key regime institutions. Kharrazi claimed that Mojtaba wants to replace SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr with Major General Mohsen Rezaei.[18] The SNSC is the regime’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body.[19] IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi previously pressured Pezeshkian to appoint Zolghadr as the SNSC secretary.[20] Mojtaba appointed Rezaei as one of his military advisers in March.[21] Rezaei’s appointment as a military adviser was one of only three political appointments that Mojtaba has made since becoming Supreme Leader in March.[22] Mojtaba’s reported desire to replace Zolghadr with Rezaei may reflect an effort by Mojtaba to assert more direct control over the SNSC by removing Vahidi’s appointee and replacing him with Rezaei, who is part of his inner circle. Iranian outlet Tabnak, which is affiliated with Rezaei, notably circulated Kharrazi’s claim.[23]