Toplines
An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in central Moscow City on August 1, potentially targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko. It is unclear as of this writing if the explosion killed or injured Chayko. Russian officials reported that an IED detonated at a restaurant in central Moscow City on August 1.[1] Russian officials stated that the detonation killed the woman who reportedly carried the explosive disguised as a gift, a security guard, and one of the restaurant’s patrons. Russian officials reported that 21 people sustained injuries in the blast, but did not disclose additional information about the incident, specify the identities of the casualties, or blame a responsible actor. Multiple independent and insider Russian sources claimed that the explosion may have been an assassination attempt against Chayko, who was reportedly celebrating his 55th birthday at the restaurant in conjunction with his May 2026 appointment as VKS commander.[2] Russian sources claimed that the explosion may have injured Chayko’s daughter, Maria.[3] Baza, a Russian source affiliated with Russian law enforcement, reported that two injured people later died in the hospital, bringing the death toll to five.[4] Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported that the event was heavily guarded, and sources claimed that personnel from the Russian Federal Protective Service (FSO), a Russian state security agency responsible for protecting high-ranking government officials, were guarding the event but were off duty.[5] A Russian insider source further claimed that high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officials, government officials, Russian State Duma deputies, and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) generals were in attendance at the private event at the restaurant.[6]
Neither official nor unofficial sources have confirmed Chayko’s status following the attack, but Chayko has an extensive service history in Ukraine. Chayko served as the chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and was the overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in three separate periods between September 2019 and December 2022.[7] Chayko subsequently served as a commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD) between February 24, 2022, and May 26, 2022, during which he oversaw failed Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv City at the start of the full-scale invasion.[8] Chayko notably commanded Russian forces responsible for widespread violence against civilians in Kyiv Oblast in 2022, including in Bucha.[9] The Russian MoD again appointed Chayko as the commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in December 2024 during the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.[10] The Russian MoD appointed Chayko to the position of commander-in-chief of the VKS in May 2026 amidst domestic criticisms of Russian air defense and air campaign failures.[11] The VKS is responsible for air-launched glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline and rear areas, and such glide bomb strikes have in part been enabling Russian infantry advances on the ground and are increasingly striking Ukrainian cities further from the frontline.[12]
Russian forces are leveraging new jet-powered Banderol loitering munitions and Geran-4 Seeker drones in their strike campaigns against Ukraine’s Black Sea port infrastructure and railway infrastructure. Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk stated to Bloomberg on July 31 that 80 percent of recent Russian strikes against the ports in the greater Odesa City area have involved Banderol loitering munitions.[13] Vlasiuk stated that Russian forces aim to use the Banderol to fill the gap between their cheap, slow Shahed-type drones and the faster and more accurate Kh-101 cruise missiles. Vlasiuk noted that the cheap Banderol drones contain a 150-kilogram warhead that is bigger than a Shahed warhead and that the Banderol can fly faster than Ukrainian drone interceptors. Bloomberg added that the Banderol has a relatively short range of a few hundred kilometers, so Russian forces have been launching strikes on Odesa City from occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi assessed that recently published photos of Russia’s jet-powered Geran-4 Seeker drones, which Militarnyi noted Russian forces are widely using to strike port infrastructure and ships in the Black Sea, show that Russian forces have reworked the drone’s nose to include an optoelectronic guidance system.[14] Militarnyi added that the Geran-4 drones also include an additional fixed camera, which open-source analysts have identified as a Chinese 180-degree wide-angle camera that likely provides Russian forces with primary terrain overviews and broad situational awareness.[15]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that Russian forces are mostly using Geran-4 drones in their strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, especially against rolling stock in border and frontline areas, from July 19 to 31.[16] The milblogger claimed that the largest number of damaged rolling stock in the second half of July occurred in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian forces are mostly targeting locomotives while only occasionally striking traction substations, rail tracks, and rail depots.
Key Takeaways
- An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in central Moscow City on August 1, potentially targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko. It is unclear as of this writing if the explosion killed or injured Chayko.
- Russian forces are leveraging new jet-powered Banderol loitering munitions and Geran-4 Seeker drones in their strike campaigns against Ukraine’s Black Sea port infrastructure and railway infrastructure.
- Ukrainian forces recently struck multiple oil refineries, a strategic bomber base, and a Wildberries warehouse in Russia.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 2.
- Russia launched 133 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces recently struck multiple oil refineries and other oil infrastructure in Russia. Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City (about 500 kilometers from the international border) overnight on August 1 to 2.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Saratov Oil Refinery has an annual refining capacity of about seven million tons.[18] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a fire near the Saratov Oil Refinery.[19] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Bashneft Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border), on August 2.[20] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows smoke at the Bashneft refinery.[21] Bashkortostan Republic Head Radiy Khabirov claimed that Russian forces repelled a large-scale drone strike against the region and shot down one drone over an industrial zone in Ufa, after which a fire broke out.[22] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the oil tank farm of the Lyudinovskya oil depot in Kaluga Oblast overnight.[23] Footage published on August 2 reportedly shows smoke rising from the Omsk Oil Refinery near Omsk City (about 2,500 kilometers from the international border).[24] Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaly Khotsenko claimed that drone debris caused a fire in a field near Omsk City.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones did not reach the refinery in Omsk City.[26]
Ukrainian forces struck a major strategic bomber base in Russia as part of wider efforts to reduce Russia’s capability to conduct long-range air-launched missile strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Engels-2 Air Base near Saratov City overnight.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused a fire and noted that Engels-2 is one of the main Russian aviation bases housing strategic bombers.[28] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a fire near the Engels-2 Air Base.[29]
Ukrainian forces struck a Wildberries warehouse (Russia’s closest Amazon equivalent) in Samara Oblast – the 17th strike on Wildberries facilities since July 18.[30] Brovdi reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Wildberries warehouse in Novosemeykino, Samara Oblast (roughly 820 kilometers from the frontline).[31] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows smoke at the warehouse.[32] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev and Wildberries’ press office confirmed the warehouse strike.[33]
Ukrainian forces continue their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Krasnodar Krai. A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) unit reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Tor-M2 air defense system, a Nebo-S radar station, and a Gamma-S1M radar station in Yeysk (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline); a Nebo-U radar station in Primorsko-Akhtarsk (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline); a Kasta-2E2 radar station in Kamyshevatskaya (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline); a 37T radar station in Prigibskiy; and a Kasta-2E2 radar station in Shabelskoye (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline).[34] The Ukrainian USF unit noted that these strikes aim to complicate Russian efforts to protect Russian airfields and Shahed drone launch pads. Geolocated footage from the USF unit confirms the strikes on the Kasta-2E2 radar in Shabelskoye and north of Kamyshevatskaya.[35]
Ukraine’s successful strikes against the deep Russian rear continue to generate complaints among the Russian milblogger community about Russia’s insufficient official response to the strikes. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger complained on August 2 that Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russia have not decreased for the second month in a row, such that even a high Russian interception rate cannot guarantee the security of infrastructure in the Russian rear.[36] The milblogger also complained that Russian authorities have not been publicly and honestly addressing the problems that Russia is facing due to Ukraine’s long-range strikes.[37] The milblogger criticized Russian officials’ repeated claims that falling drone or missile “debris” is the cause of damage to Russian infrastructure, instead of directly referring to successful Ukrainian strikes.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 1 and 2 but did not advance.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in border areas of western Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Olkhozhemchugov, Kursk Oblast (roughly four kilometers from the international border), on August 1, and a drone storage, preparation, and launch site near Navlya, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 69 kilometers from the international border), on the night of August 1 to 2.[39]
Russian forces continue to conduct guided glide bomb strikes against civilian infrastructure in northern Sumy Oblast. Sumy Oblast Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported on August 2 that Russian forces launched six guided glide bomb strikes against Kovpakiv Raion in Sumy City, damaging infrastructure facilities and transport in the area.[40]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central, eastern, and southeastern Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[41] ISW recently assessed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater, including this part of the frontline that has been largely stagnant for nearly two years.[42]
Russian forces are intensifying first-person-view (FPV) drone strikes against Kharkiv City. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Forces’ Center for Unmanned Systems Dmytro Batinov stated on August 2 that Russian forces are intensifying FPV drone strikes, including with fiber optic FPV drones, against civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City.[43] Batinov stated that Russian forces are sometimes launching drones with forced remote-detonation mechanisms. Batinov stated that Russian forces are primarily launching drones against Kharkiv City from Russian territory. Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated on August 2 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City 109 times in July 2026, including 51 FPV drone strikes.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kupyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on August 1 and 2 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in these areas.[47]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk Occupation Administration Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck trucks along the E-40 Luhansk City-Alchevsk highway and in the Bilokurakyne municipal okrug.[48]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[50] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian forces have seized and are clearing Lyman, alleging that only small Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage groups remain in the town.[51]
Russian forces continue to use glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield for future offensive operations against Slovyansk. Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh stated that Russian forces conducted a FAB-250 glide bomb strike against the city on the morning of August 2.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka tactical area on August 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southeast of Vasyutynske and north of Pershomarivka (both north of Kostyantynivka).[54]
Russian forces continue to rely on glide bomb strikes to destroy buildings and enable infiltration missions and subsequent advances within Kostyantynivka. An officer of a Ukrainian special forces unit reported that Russian forces continue infiltration missions within Kostyantynivka and often hide in basements or ruined buildings to wait for reinforcements.[55] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka area also stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of dense foliage levels during the summertime to conceal infiltrations into the city.[56]
Russian forces also continue glide bomb strikes against other cities in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt to prepare the battlefield for future offensive operations. The Ukrainian National Police reported on August 2 that Russian forces conducted two KAB-250 guided glide bomb strikes against Druzhkivka, killing two civilians and wounding two more.[57]
Ukrainian forces are striking drone control points in the Russian near rear south of Kostyantynivka, likely in part to hinder continued Russian strikes against Ukrainian logistic routes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) on August 1.[58] The Ukrainian officer and NCO operating near Kostyantynivka stated that the large number of Russian first-person view drones, such as Molniyas, are complicating Ukrainian logistics in and near the city.[59] The NCO added that Russian forces are using Molniya drones that can fly up to 20 kilometers and aircraft-type drones can fly up to 40 kilometers for such strikes, complicating nighttime Ukrainian logistics missions through Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 1 and 2 but did not advance.[60]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in eastern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[61]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on August 1 and 2 but did not advance.[62]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast throughout July 2026. Geolocated footage published on July 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian vehicle on the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway southwest of occupied Berezivka (roughly 11 kilometers from the frontline).[63] Geolocated footage published on July 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian vehicles in a column west of Novohrodivka and southeast of Malynivka (roughly 17 and 20 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[64]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck five electrical substations in occupied Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) and the Zuivka combined heat and power plant (CHPP) in Zuivka (just east of Donetsk City and roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[65]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 1 and 2 but did not advance.[66]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in occupied Yablukove (north of Hulyaipole and roughly six kilometers from the frontline) on August 1.[67] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in Topolyna (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline), Mykilske (possibly referring to the settlement of Mykilske in Donetsk Oblast roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline), and Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[68] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on three fuel tankers near Prymorsk (roughly 92 kilometers from the frontline).[69] Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko posted footage on August 1 showing Ukrainian forces striking a camouflaged Russian fuel tanker near Melitopol (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[70]
Russian forces continue to use the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) for military purposes. Geolocated footage posted on August 1 shows unspecified Chechen Akhmat elements deploying and training with Kuryer unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) within reactor unit number 3 of the ZNPP.[71]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 2.
Russian forces continue to employ human safari tactics and target civilian infrastructure in Kherson City. Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on August 2 that Russian forces struck a civilian vehicle in Kherson City, killing one civilian and injuring two.[72] Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against an educational facility in Kherson City.[73]
Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. Brovdi stated on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in Henichesk (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline) and Novooleksiivka in Kherson Oblast (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[74] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck 13 power nodes in Crimea within the past 72 hours, bringing the total Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy assets in occupied Ukraine to 177 since July 1.[75] Reuters reported on August 1 that locals in Massandra, Crimea (roughly 260 kilometers from the frontline) are creating programs to supply people with hot meals after Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure have caused widespread power outages.[76]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text for more reports about Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 1 to 2 and during the day on August 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 133 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones; Banderol loitering munitions; and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 109 drones; that 24 strike drones hit 19 locations; and that debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv and Kyiv oblasts overnight and transport, industrial, cultural, and educational infrastructure in Poltava, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts during the day on August 2.[78] Ukrainian online retailer Rozetka reported on August 2 that Russian Shahed-type drones struck its largest warehouse in Kyiv Oblast overnight – the second strike on the company’s warehouses in the past day.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck Ukraine’s postal service Nova Poshta terminal and gas station in Kharkiv Oblast.[80]
Russian strikes against Ukraine’s Black Sea port infrastructure continue to damage Ukraine’s grain export economy. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 2 that Russian forces struck tanks with fuel at the Odesa City Port; two sea tugboats, port infrastructure, and two dry cargo ships in the Mykolaiv City Port; a dry cargo ship in the Black Sea eight kilometers east of Zatoka, Odesa Oblast; and another dry cargo ship in an unspecified area of the Black Sea on the night of August 1 to 2 and during the day on August 2.[81] Geolocated footage published on August 1 also shows damage to a rail bridge in Zatoka after a reported Russian strike.[82] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk told Bloomberg on July 31 that Russian strikes have damaged more than 20 ships near the Black Sea and substantially slowed cargo flows in the shipping corridor.[83] The Economist reported on July 30 that Russian forces conducted at least 56 strikes against Odesa Oblast port infrastructure in July 2026, killing 26 port workers and sailors.[84] The Economist noted that the recent Russian strike campaign against port infrastructure coincided with Ukraine’s harvest season, with Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotsky assessing that Ukraine will face a serious challenge if Russian forces double or triple their strikes in the future. Pletenchuk told The Economist that some Ukrainian air defenses have moved out to sea where Ukrainian forces have mounted machine guns on patrol boats. The head of Odesa City-based maritime services company Trident Maritime, Oleksiy Smolyar, stated that large shipping companies have been avoiding Ukraine since Spring 2026 as the costs of insurance and the high risk of losses have outweighed the fees. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s resumption of its strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea aims to degrade the Ukrainian economy, reduce Ukraine’s export capacity, and, in part, respond to Ukraine’s recent strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Azov and Black seas.[85]
Ukrainian gas stations are reportedly facing diesel shortages that are unrelated to the ongoing Russian strike campaign against gas stations. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger attempted to tie the Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian rail infrastructure to the ongoing campaign against Ukrainian gas stations that aims to create fuel shortages in Ukraine, noting that railways are one of the main channels for fuel supplies.[86] Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported on July 31 that fuel expert and founder of the Prime group of companies, Dmitry Lyushkin, noted that some Ukrainian gas station networks have implemented restrictions on the quantities of diesel sales and forecasted that limits will increase before August 15.[87] Lyushkin, however, attributed the restrictions to market participants’ earlier predictions that they did not need to buy higher fuel volumes due to expected lower seasonal demand as well as to the shift of large wholesale demand to retail gas stations – not ongoing Russian strikes against Ukrainian gas stations.
Russian forces appear to be resuming longer-range glide bomb strikes, likely as part of efforts to keep Russian aviation further away from the frontline and Ukrainian air defenses. Open-source analyst Clement Molin noted on August 2 that Russian forces recently conducted glide bomb strikes against Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which is more than 80 kilometers from the frontline and more than 150 kilometers from the likely bomb launch point.[88] Molin assessed that Russian forces may have used the new UMPB-5R kit that allows glide bombs to fly 150 kilometers or more. Russian forces struck Pavlohrad with glide bombs on July 20, 23, and 30.[89] Militarnyi noted that Russian forces used only a few of the UMPB-5R jet-powered glide bombs for the first time in late Spring-early Summer 2026.[90] Militarnyi added, however, that Russian forces may have used the new UMPK-500 glide kit, which enables FAB glide bombs to fly more than 100 kilometers and which Russian Su-34 aircraft reportedly received in late October 2025, for the recent strikes on Pavlohrad.[91] Militarnyi also assessed that Russian forces may have used the long-range Grom-E1 hybrid missile glide bomb that includes the rocket engine from the Kh-38 tactical missile and has a range of up to 120 kilometers.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 2 that Russian forces struck 16 Ukrainian regions and launched about 1,900 drones, almost 1,600 glide bombs, and 144 missiles in the past week (July 26 to August 1).[92]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus is completing August 2025 plans to create a new special operations brigade stationed near the Belarusian-Ukrainian international border. Belarusian Special Operations Forces Commander Colonel Alexander Ilyukevich announced on August 2 that Belarus is completing the creation of the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade near Gomel City, approximately 40 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine.[93] Then Belarusian Special Operations Forces Commander Major General Vadim Denisenko announced the creation of the brigade in August 2025.[94]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/388240; https://t.me/tass_agency/388250
[2] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/08/01/v-kafe-na-kudrinskoy-ploschadi-v-moskve-proizoshel-vzryv-est-postradavshie; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2065; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9349;
[3] https://t.me/ENews112/28336; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9349; https://t.me/rentv_news/219333
[4] https://t.me/bazabazon/47971; https://t.me/istories_media/13075
[5] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2070; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8860736?tg; https://t.me/astrapress/120887
[6] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2058; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2059; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2060; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2064
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-1-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Russian20General20Officer20Guide20ISW20May2011202022.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-18/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-32/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/The-Russian-Military-Forecasting-the-Threat.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-26/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11/; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-middle-east-government-and-politics-e3756976cf33cf5de29aa62d61ea7eb6
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-1-2024/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/ ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-aviabomb-umpb-5r-reaktyvnym-dvygunom/; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1367840-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-pavlogradu-zaginula-ludina-stalasa-pozeza-u-bagatopoverhivci/; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2083795682075222349?s=46; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/
[13] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-31/russia-s-cheap-upgraded-cruise-missiles-pound-black-sea-ports
[14] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiyany-modernizuvaly-geran-4-syker/
[15] https://x.com/HEMemarian/status/2079947862037713063
[16] https://t.me/rybar/82141
[17] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20270; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2690; https://t.me/usf_army/2279; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9022
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9022
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/120900; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7977; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27723; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083759688219251025;https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2083759938321404317
[20] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2690
[21] https://t.me/astrapress/120947
[22] https://t.me/radiyhabirov/13538
[23] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20270; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712
[24] https://t.me/supernova_plus/57274;https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2083906043541655714
[25] https://t.me/HocenkoVP/8710
[26] https://t.me/milinfolive/177023
[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20270; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2690; https://t.me/usf_army/2279; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9022
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712
[29] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27742
[30] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/08/02/ukraina-snova-biet-po-skladam-wildberries-atakovan-uzhe-17-y-teper-v-samarskoy-oblasti-on-zagorelsya-i-polnostyu-slozhilsya-fotografii-i-video
[31] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2688
[32] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083800731400687746; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27835; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27806; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2083823669714034967
[33] https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/1444; https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1671
[34] https://t.me/army_1usc/1181
[35] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2083882814789894551; https://x.com/1usc_army/status/2083786294304367063; https://t.me/army_1usc/1181; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2083876548810101212
[36] https://t.me/rybar/82156
[37] https://t.me/rybar/82159
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696; https://t.me/wargonzo/35952; https://t.me/severnnyi/8889
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712
[40] https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3021
[41] https://x.com/DarknessVery/status/2083889934440521779; https://t.me/andreevkamapping/17; https://t.me/andreevkamapping/25; https://t.me/andreevkamapping/28; https://t.me/andreevkamapping/31; https://t.me/jacksons_dairy/13280
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/
[43] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1367478-ne-torkatisa-droniv-pererizati-optovolokno-vijskovij-pro-bezpeku-dla-ziteliv-harkova-pisla-posilenna-atak-fpv/
[44] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1369662-u-lipni-rosiani-ponad-50-raz-atakuvali-harkiv-fpv-dronami-terehov/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4428
[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/8889; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696; https://t.me/wargonzo/35952
[46] https://t.me/divgen/82852
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41714; https://t.me/wargonzo/35952; https://t.me/grvZapad/19316
[48] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/5364
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41714; https://t.me/wargonzo/35952;
[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/35952
[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/388264; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/
[52] https://www.facebook.com/Vadymlyakh/posts/pfbid023qBxLirFgnBAQSra5sDHsjahKnKcMmTGY6VAdS6fGE561nNfKZCQycQoMFzFtpUQl
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41714; https://t.me/wargonzo/35952;
[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33621
[55] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1369464-bagato-protivnika-namagaetsa-infiltuvatisa-v-same-misto-oficer-pro-situaciu-v-kostantinivci/
[56] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1369608-logistika-postijno-pid-udarom-armia-rf-dolitae-bpla-na-40-kilometriv-v-til-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku-vijskovij/
[57] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/73124
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712
[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1369608-logistika-postijno-pid-udarom-armia-rf-dolitae-bpla-na-40-kilometriv-v-til-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku-vijskovij/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1369464-bagato-protivnika-namagaetsa-infiltuvatisa-v-same-misto-oficer-pro-situaciu-v-kostantinivci/
[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/35952; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/417143
[61] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2083564763016049110; https://t.me/svoboda_army/3860
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712
[63] https://t.me/Radisnyi_93/580; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2083200723446100353
[64] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2083648175923929180; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10257
[65] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2689
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41694; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41696; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41714; https://t.me/wargonzo/35952; https://t.me/voin_dv/20499
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41712
[68] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2689
[69] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2083896998566969744; https://t.me/andriyshTime/64660
[70] https://t.me/andriyshTime/64660
[71] https://x.com/AquilaTrenta/status/2083571723014738429 ; https://x.com/AquilaTrenta/status/2083581793765052716 ; https://t.me/actual_energodar/9365; https://t.me/actual_energodar/9364
[72] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14293
[73] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2083626471449313656; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30288;https://www.instagram.com/reel/DbgKAs0MhDz/;https://t.me/guardpolice/11688
[74] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2689
[75] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2689
[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/crimean-families-queue-hot-meals-ukraine-hits-power-supply-2026-08-01/;
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/71167
[78] https://www.facebook.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid02rE1yGFmHnUYGqJrgMBGwVKffb1w2KG9oUmz1fNF24bG1ytShEa1baFGe1gAhYphAl; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1369556-poskodzeni-ceh-i-angar-vijska-rf-geranami-ta-gerberami-atakuvali-pidpriemstvo-u-korukivci/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30852; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1369674-rosiani-zavdali-udaru-bezpilotnikom-po-pidpriemstvu-u-pisocini/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1369688-u-savincah-na-harkivsini-vnaslidok-vlucanna-poskodzeno-budinok-kulturi/; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/1740; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1369612-u-poltavskomu-rajoni-rosijski-bpla-vlucili-u-pidpriemstva-ta-obekt-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi/; https://www.facebook.com/rozetka.ua/posts/1466007355555238?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/astrapress/120985
[79] https://www.facebook.com/rozetka.ua/posts/1466007355555238?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/astrapress/120985
[80] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120522; https://t.me/notes_veterans/28966; https://t.me/notes_veterans/28942
[81] https://t.me/mod_russia/66189
[82] https://t.me/Osintpen/3280; https://t.me/notes_veterans/28957; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30291; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46014; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120543
[83] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-31/russia-s-cheap-upgraded-cruise-missiles-pound-black-sea-ports
[84] https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/07/30/russian-strikes-may-keep-ukraines-grain-from-reaching-markets
[85] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[86] https://t.me/rybar/82141
[87] https://www.unian dot ua/economics/energetics/limiti-na-prodazh-dizelya-yaki-obmezhennya-vzhe-diyut-na-ukrajinskih-azs-13457328.html
[88] https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2083795682075222349?s=46
[89] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-aviabomb-umpb-5r-reaktyvnym-dvygunom/#google_vignette; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1367840-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-pavlogradu-zaginula-ludina-stalasa-pozeza-u-bagatopoverhivci/; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1359336-rf-uperse-vdarila-kabom-po-pavlogradu-cerez-vlucanna-u-bagatopoverhivku-e-zertvi/; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1362032-vijska-rf-vdarili-kabom-po-pidpriemstvu-harcovoi-promislovosti-u-pavlogradi-troe-ludej-zaginuli-ponad-10-poraneni/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31113
[90] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-aviabomb-umpb-5r-reaktyvnym-dvygunom/#google_vignette; https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/rosiya-pochala-vyrobnytstvo-modernizovanyh-aviabomb-iz-dalnistyu-do-200-km-gur/
[91] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/novi-umpk-dlya-su-34-aviatsiya-rf-otrymala-mozhlyvist-zastosovuvaty-fab-500t-na-ponad-100-km/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-aviabomb-umpb-5r-reaktyvnym-dvygunom/#google_vignette
[92] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20269
[93] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6a6f49fa9a79473beb6b6b56; https://t.me/tass_agency/388342
[94] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/27976147
