Toplines
Russian forces are replicating aspects of their Summer-Fall 2025 battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that set conditions for late 2025 advances near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole to prepare for offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. BAI refers to the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[1] Russian forces conducted a campaign that generated partial BAI effects to facilitate subsequent ground advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions over several months in late 2025.[2] Russian forces used a combination of drones, missiles, and glide bombs in their 2025 BAI campaign to strike targets such as Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), vehicles, training grounds, and railways and isolate Ukrainian logistics in both Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole. Russian forces appear to again be engaging in a similar BAI campaign in 2026, now targeting Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — the cities that make up the northern tip of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
The main objective of the ongoing Russian BAI campaign against the Fortress Belt — as with previous BAI campaigns — is to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics. Ukrainian and Russian sources have repeatedly commented on the negative effects that Russian strikes are having on Ukrainian logistics, recently noting that nighttime logistics missions in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk are difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct.[3] Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian locomotives that are critical for Ukrainian logistics, for example, and the Russian military command reportedly provided Russian troops with 1,000 Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions in July 2026 and issued orders to intensify strikes against Ukrainian logistics in and near Kramatorsk.[4] Russian forces are also starting to strike major bridges in the Fortress Belt area to further disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Geolocated footage posted on August 2 shows the aftermath of a recent Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike that heavily damaged the Cherivkovsky Bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River in eastern Slovyansk.[5] The bridge connects Slovyansk to the H-20 highway and leads to Kramatorsk. Russian milbloggers noted that the bridge served as an important Ukrainian logistics route between Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and claimed that it was one of three bridges in Slovyansk capable of handling heavy vehicles.[6]
The ongoing Russian BAI campaign aims to shape the battlefield ahead of planned Russian offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the future, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term. Russian forces have been infiltrating Kostyantynivka in recent months but have not seized the city, despite Russian claims otherwise.[7] The situation in and near the city is deteriorating, however, and fighting will likely continue in Kostyantynivka for several weeks as Russian forces try to consolidate the positions they have gained through infiltrations.[8] Russian infiltrators are already starting to move north of the city toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[9] Russian forces are also attempting to infiltrate and seize Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk), but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have entered the town.[10] Russian forces nonetheless are likely preparing now for intended future offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Russia’s 2025 BAI campaigns notably took months to set conditions for subsequent advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[11]
Russian forces appear to be more heavily relying on glide bomb strikes in their 2026 BAI campaign compared to their 2025 campaigns. ISW has observed numerous reports of Russian glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and nearby settlements in recent weeks.[12] These glide bomb strikes likely aim to penetrate and destroy hardened Ukrainian targets, such as bridges and strongpoints.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 3 that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions in Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk) with FAB-250 and FAB-500 glide bombs and LMUR helicopter-launched air-to-surface missiles.[14] Russian forces also recently struck Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – a major logistics hub along several highways to Donetsk Oblast — three times in late July 2026, suggesting that Russian forces have resumed their use of longer-range glide bombs to strike logistics hubs further from the frontline.[15] ISW recently assessed that Russian glide bomb strikes are enabling infantry advances in and near Kostyantynivka, as the strikes turn the cities into rubble that Russian infiltrators can exploit for concealment.[16] Russian forces may be increasingly turning to glide bombs in their BAI campaigns as Ukrainian counter-drone measures and electronic warfare (EW) systems degrade Russia’s ability to use drones at the same scale as previously.[17]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced more personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on August 3. Zelensky appointed Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov as the head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service and Internal Affairs Minister General Ihor Klymenko as the Defense Council secretary.[18] Zelensky stated that Umerov will continue to coordinate work to secure drone deals with partner states, including in the Middle East, and to oversee the negotiation process with the United States.[19] Zelensky also dismissed Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Olha Stefanishyna from her position.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces are replicating aspects of their Summer-Fall 2025 battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that set conditions for late 2025 advances near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole to prepare for offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
- The main objective of the ongoing Russian BAI campaign against the Fortress Belt — as with previous BAI campaigns — is to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics.
- The ongoing Russian BAI campaign aims to shape the battlefield ahead of planned Russian offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the future, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term.
- Russian forces appear to be more heavily relying on glide bomb strikes in their 2026 BAI campaign compared to their 2025 campaigns.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced more personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on August 3.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on August 3.
- Russia launched 181 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets on August 3.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck one of the largest Wildberries warehouses (Russia’s closest Amazon equivalent) in central Russia on August 3, as Ukraine’s targeting of Wildberries facilities continues to cause significant financial damage to the company. Wildberries’ press service reported on August 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a logistics facility in Vladimir Oblast and caused a fire.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 3 shows smoke rising from a Wildberries warehouse in Khryastovo, Vladimir Oblast (roughly 625 kilometers from the international border).[22] Vladimir Oblast Governor Alexander Avdeev acknowledged that the strike damaged the warehouse.[23] Russian opposition source Astra reported that the strike caused the 176,000-square-meter facility to suspend operations.[24] Forbes’ Russia service reported on August 2 that the recent Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries facilities destroyed at least 900,000 square meters of warehouse space in July 2026 — amounting to over 17 percent of the total 5.2 million square meters of Wildberries logistics infrastructure — and inflicted roughly 280 billion rubles (about $3.48 billion) worth of damage to sellers.[25] Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Alexander Maslennikov acknowledged on July 29 that Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries facilities are causing economic losses and affecting small businesses in Russia.[26]
Russian mobile fire groups intercepted a Ukrainian drone strike over a beach in Krasnodar Krai. Geolocated footage posted on August 3 shows Russian mobile fire groups engaging and downing a Ukrainian drone at the Arkhipo-Osipovka beach near Gelendzhik.[27]
Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Black and Azov seas continues to strain Russian maritime exports, including by raising insurance rates. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on August 3, citing the Russian Price Index Center, that the number of Russian bulk carriers purposed for Russian coal exports in the Black Sea fell by 21 percent in July 2026 due to increased shipping risks, likely as Ukraine has intensified its strikes against Russian vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov in recent weeks.[28] Price Index Center analysts stated that insurance companies are refusing to insure vessels entering the Azov-Black Sea basin and that Russian authorities are moving medium- and large-tonnage bulk carriers to other waters while placing some small-tonnage vessels in cold storage until the situation returns to normal.
Ukrainian cruise missile strikes on the Russian rear have forced Russia to resume its use of valuable Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence source reported on August 2 that Russian forces have activated their A-50U AWACS aircraft over Ulyanovsk and Samara oblasts almost daily since June 23, 2026, to repel Ukrainian cruise missile strikes.[29] The source noted that Russian forces in the area did not use the aircraft between June 4 and 22. Another Ukrainian source reported on August 2 that Russian forces sortied an A-50U aircraft in Ulyanovsk Oblast to intercept Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missiles in the area.[30] Russian milbloggers have previously complained that Russia lacks sufficient AWACS aircraft to maintain surveillance and detect low-flying missiles, and Ukrainian forces have notably struck Russian AWACS aircraft at several points throughout the war, contributing to shortages.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 3 shows Ukrainian forces shelling a Russian position northeast of Korenok (northwest of Sumy City), after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[32]
Russian forces continue efforts to fabricate advances that do not translate to doctrinal control of terrain in northern Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) and Velyka Pysarivka Head Serhiy Bespalko reported on August 3 that Russian forces attempted to use a drone to remotely drop a flag on the roof of a tall building in Velyka Pysarivka (southeast of Sumy City) but that Ukrainian forces quickly destroyed the flag.[33] Bespalko added that Russian shelling of the settlement intensified in 2026, increasing the number of civilian casualties. ISW recently assessed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater even though this sector of the front has been largely stagnant for nearly two years.[34] Staged flag raisings appear to be part of this wider effort.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
The Russian MoD continues to spread false claims of Russian seizures in northern Ukraine, including in the Kharkiv and Velykyi Burluk directions, to further the Russian narrative that Russian forces are advancing across the entire theater.[35] The Russian MoD claimed on August 3 that Russian forces seized Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City).[36] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on July 25 that Russian forces do not control Bilyi Kolodyaz, contrary to earlier Russian claims of seizing it, but noted that Russian infantry have begun to infiltrate the settlement and its surrounding forests.[37] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces questioned the Russian MoD’s August 3 claim about Bilyi Kolodyaz, citing unconfirmed reports that the Russian military command replaced commanders operating in the area after they were implicated in the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage purportedly showing a Russian flag raising in Bilyi Kolodyaz.[38]
The Russian MoD claimed on August 3 that Russian forces seized Ustinivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[39] A source reported that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian officials likely “rushed” the announcement of the seizure of Ustinivka, as the area is still a contested “gray zone.”[40]
Ukrainian forces continue to destroy Russian equipment in the Russian rear to prevent vehicle deployments to the frontline. A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on August 3 that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed several Russian tanks in the Russian near rear.[41] The brigade noted that Russian forces were moving one of the tanks through an unspecified settlement in broad daylight.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk, south of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), in northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk), and west of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 3 that Russian forces control central Kupyansk as Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from the outskirts of the town.[44] The milblogger claimed that there is fighting for the bridge over the Oskil River within Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.
Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov posted footage on August 3 of Ukrainian forces striking and destroying a Russian 2S44 Giatsint-K wheeled self-propelled artillery gun in the Kupyansk direction, marking the second confirmed destruction of such a Russian system since 2022.[45]
Ukrainian forces are conducting both defensive and offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine’s 2nd National Guard Corps spokesperson Volodymyr Dehtyaryov reported on August 3 that Ukrainian forces are conducting two operations in Kharkiv Oblast, one defensive operation north and east of Kharkiv City and one offensive operation in the Kupyansk direction.[46] Dehtyaryov stated that Ukrainian forces are trying to push Russian forces away from the international border and to maintain full fire control over Kupyansk and the GLOCs that Russian forces use to move forces into Kupyansk. Dehtyaryov stated that Russian forces currently lack sufficient manpower to break through Ukrainian defenses in Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes in the area as Ukrainian forces lack countermeasures, such as destroying the aircraft Russian forces use to launch the bombs.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 2 and 3 but did not advance.[47]
Russian forces targeted Kharkiv Oblast Police as they were attempting to evacuate civilians northwest of Borova. Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich reported on August 3 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against police officers who were attempting to evacuate civilians from Fedorivka (northwest of Borova), destroying one police vehicle and damaging another.[48]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
See topline text for more reports about Russian activity in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka directions.
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage posted on August 2 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position on the northwestern shoreline of Velykyi Bakai Lake northwest of Ozerne (northeast of Slovyansk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[49]
Russian forces continue to strike civilian infrastructure in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the cities ahead of planned future offensive operations. The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on August 3 that Russian strikes damaged at least 15 homes in Slovyansk and started fires at residential buildings in Kramatorsk.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on August 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 3 that Russian forces advanced to the eastern and southern outskirts of Izhevka (north of Kostyantynivka), northwest and southeast of Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka between the city and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka), west of Molocharka (just north of Kostyantynivka), west of Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka), and east of Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka and south of Druzhkivka).[52] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[53]
Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian gas stations in frontline areas. The Russian MoD claimed on August 2 that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) struck a gas station in Kramatorsk.[54] A Ukrainian fuel expert notably recently assessed that ongoing diesel shortages in Ukraine are not related to Russia’s strikes against gas stations.[55]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 2 and 3 but did not advance.[56]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows Ukrainian forces shelling a Russian-occupied building in northern Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasnopodillya and west of Vodyanske (both north of Pokrovsk) — areas in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[58]
Russian forces are improving their drone and glide bomb strikes to facilitate advances near Pokrovsk. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 3 that Russian forces are trying to push Ukrainian forces out of Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) to use the settlements as bridgeheads.[59] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are constantly improving their drones, including by changing their frequencies almost daily to circumvent Ukrainian drone suppression. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are also increasing the number of glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions and frontline settlements. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces recently struck Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to intimidate local civilians. Open-source analysts and Ukrainian defense sources recently assessed that the Russian glide bomb strikes against Pavlohrad in late July 2026 indicate that Russian forces have resumed using one of several longer-range bombs.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 3 but did not advance.[61]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 3 that Ukrainian forces have continued successful tactical counterattacks to liberate territory in the Oleksandrivka direction since mid-July 2026.[62] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely advanced near Filiya (south of Novopavlivka and northeast of Oleksandrivka) and reached the western bank of the Mokri Yaly River in the area north of Hrushivske (just southwest of Filiya) such that Russian infiltration groups likely completely withdrew from the Filiya area and have dug in south of the settlement. Ukrainian forces also reportedly reached the Mokri Yaly River south of Hrushivske, where Russian forces reportedly only maintain a few positions west of the river. Mashovets added that Russian forces are trying to push Ukrainian forces from the northern outskirts of Dachne (southeast of Filiya on the northern bank of the Vovcha River), implying that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the area. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Myrne (east of Oleksandrivka), possibly advanced southwest of the settlement, and likely seized Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka and southwest of Myrne). Several small Russian infiltration groups of two to four servicemembers reportedly remain near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad (northwest of Voskresenka). Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Maliivka (just south of Voskresenka) and toward Komyshuvakha (just south of Maliivka) and are operating about 1.5 kilometers from Komyshuvakha’s western outskirts and within two kilometers from the area north of the settlement.[63] Ukrainian forces also reportedly entered Zaporizke (southeast of Oleksandrivka and southwest of Komyshuvakha) and seized Novohryhorivka (southwest of Zaporizke). Mashovets reported that Russian forces infiltrated near Verbove and on the southern outskirts of Berezove (just north of Zaporizke) and in the area between Berezove and Zaporizke. Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Kalynivske and Novohryhorivka (south of Kalynivske). Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Rybne (south of Oleksandrivka and west of Novohryhorivka) and advanced south of Rybne and to the area northeast of Pavlivka (southeast of Rybne).
Ukrainian forces continue to strike electrical substations in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 3 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations near Kremenivka, Topolyne (both roughly 90 kilometers from the front), and Mykilske (roughly 50 kilometers from the front) as well as three substations in Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the front).[64] Magyar reported that Ukrainian forces have struck a total of 187 power nodes in occupied Ukraine since July 1.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) and advanced to eastern Lisne (west of Vozdvyzhivka).[66]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 2 and 3 but did not advance.[67]
Russian forces recently struck a bridge in western Zaporizhia Oblast, likely as part of efforts to interdict Ukraine’s main logistics hub in Orikhiv. Geolocated footage published on August 3 shows Russian forces striking a bridge along the T-0803 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway over the Kinska River in central Orikhiv with glide bombs.[68]
Russian milbloggers continue to rebuke Russian officials’ lies about the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger noted on August 3 that footage of Ukrainian strikes against Russian fuel tankers refutes Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky’s recent claims that Russian authorities are taking control of the situation along the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[69] Balitsky previously claimed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20 that Russian forces had fully secured the route and significantly degraded Ukrainian drone strikes in the area, drawing significant backlash from the Russian milblogger community.[70] Another Russian milblogger added on August 2 that Ukrainian forces are conducting coordinated and well-prepared drone strikes, including a recent strike against a fuel tanker convoy near Prymorske (roughly 180 kilometers from the front).[71]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 3.
Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse and a Russian artillery brigade’s repair and restoration base near Nove Zhyttya (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline), material and technical warehouses near Okunivka and Naumivka (roughly 137 and 161 kilometers from the frontline, respectively), and a communications hub near Toka (roughly 121 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 2 to 3.[72] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces struck gas distribution stations in Kolosky (either roughly 118 or 160 kilometers from the frontline) and Nyva (either roughly 125 or 160 kilometers from the frontline).[73]
Ukrainian forces continue to innovate their use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to carry other strike platforms. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 3 that Ukrainian forces conducted FPV drone strikes against a control vehicle for a Russian Podlet radar system and a Parol-4 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) radar interrogator in occupied Crimea at the end of July 2026.[74] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces launched the drones from Magura USVs to carry the FPVs. Ukrainian forces used a USV in mid-July 2026 to deploy an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast in the first unmanned amphibious assault mission.[75]
Occupied Crimea continues to face fuel, power, and water shortages amid intensifying Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine. The GUR reported on August 3 that residents across occupied Crimea experienced prolonged blackouts, as 1.4 million residents were without power between July 14 and 20.[76] The GUR stated that residents of occupied Alushta, Simferopol, and Yevpatoriya experienced water outages for seven, six, and five consecutive days, respectively, and that some other unspecified settlements experienced power outages for over 10 consecutive days. The GUR reported that gasoline was available once every two to three days at most gas stations in Crimea in July 2026, resulting in long lines. The GUR, citing unspecified Russian data, stated that fuel prices in Crimea and Sevastopol were 18 and 25 percent higher than the average price in Russia, respectively. The GUR reported that food prices have also increased more in Crimea than in Russia.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 181 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 163 drones, 14 drones struck 13 locations, and that drone debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, energy, and port infrastructure in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[78] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on August 3 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts.[79]
Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian areas near and on the Black Sea. The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service reported on August 3 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-type drone strike against a civilian tugboat in the Black Sea, causing a fire.[80] The Ukrainian Ministry of Community and Territorial Development reported on August 3 that Russian forces struck transport infrastructure facilities in Odesa Oblast and civilian vessels in the ports of the greater Odesa and Danube regions, injuring 10 people.[81] The ministry reported that Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure, having struck five seaport facilities, three civilian vessels in ports, and two ships in the Ukrainian sea corridor in the first three days of August 2026. The ministry stated that Russian forces struck 67 seaport facilities, 35 civilian vessels in ports, and 22 ships in the Ukrainian sea corridor in total in July 2026.[82]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/CP_0017_MCCAFFREY_BATTLEFIELD_AIR_INTERDICTION.PDF
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/
[3] https://t.me/grvZapad/19330; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://t.me/mod_russia/66229; https://t.me/sashakots/63503; https://t.me/epoddubny/28489; https://t.me/t3mny/2415; https://t.me/mod_russia/65850; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/28/%c2%abodnorazovi%c2%bb-shturmovyky-ta-royi-droniv-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-slov%e2%80%99yanskomu-napryamku/;
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://www.facebook.com/andrei.pivovarsky/posts/pfbid0YMvNK1WXo21VmU93pGoypXBFejiWc5qi8UuYtGK9XmNvTWG3YTeXf9Zx1wh1VCrml; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2084222416234889227?s=20 ; https://t.me/Brigada_VARYAG/14
[5] https://t.me/milinfolive/177056; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2084033906030854510?s=20 ; https://x.com/vbhljvendjtve1/status/2084021986184053065?s=20 ; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2084206447894675823?s=20 ; https://x.com/ExileUA/status/2084191028244832402?s=20; https://x.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2084142360473342358?s=20 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54781; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/279299
[6] https://t.me/wargonzo/35991; https://t.me/epoddubny/28481; https://t.me/sashakots/63503
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/;
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/;
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://t.me/milinfolive/177024; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[14] https://t.me/mod_russia/66226; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120568
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[18] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/6952026-60757; https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/6942026-60753
[19] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-uchasnikiv-naradi-kerivnikiv-zakord-105673
[20] https://president dot gov.ua/documents/6962026-60761
[21] https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1672
[22] https://x.com/Shayan86/status/2084265887071101251; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2084164280199569673
[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/388419; https://t.me/tass_agency/388449; https://t.me/avdeev_o_vazhnom/10418; https://t.me/avdeev_o_vazhnom/10417
[24] https://t.me/astrapress/121057 ; https://t.me/astrapress/121072
[25] https://www dot forbes.ru/biznes/565776-spasenie-utopausih-kak-vyzivaet-biznes-posle-atak-na-sklady-wildberries?utm_source=suspilne.media&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=suspilne.media&utm_referrer=suspilne.media
[26] https://www dot vedomosti.ru/politics/characters/2026/07/29/1217163-aleksandr-maslennikov-sibir-nezasluzhenno-nedoosmislena-i-nedoosvoena
[27] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2084216736182644797?s=20; https://t.me/supernova_plus/57319
[28] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/8860991
[29] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13384 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rf-perejshla-do-cherguvannya-litakiv-a-50u/
[30] https://t.me/dronebomber/38738 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7978
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025/; https://en.defence-ua dot com/analysis/russia_can_keep_no_more_than_four_a_50u_awacs_aircraft_flying_that_matters_for_future_gripen_operations_in_ukraine-18697.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_94/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_29-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-21/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/
[32] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1738777427150874; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12599
[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/03/velyki-brehuny-u-velykij-pysarivczi-rosijski-desantnyky-sprobuvaly-vlashtuvaty-dronovyj-flagovtyk/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1477609224169322; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1370180-vijskovi-rf-za-dopomogou-drona-namagalisa-vstanoviti-svij-prapor-u-velikij-pisarivci-aka-situacia-v-gromadi/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/66236
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/8902; https://t.me/severnnyi/8864
[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/66236; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/20862; https://t.me/divgen/82862
[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/8902
[41] https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/52630-video-vid-gartu-ne-vtechesh-dronari-derzhprikordonsluzhbi-nazdognali-ta-urazili-vorozhi-tanki
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41718; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41734; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15845; https://t.me/wargonzo/35979; https://t.me/dva_majors/96941; https://t.me/grvZapad/19330; https://t.me/grvZapad/19334;
[43] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33624
[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/96941
[45] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/31950
[46] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1370202-u-hartii-rozpovili-pro-sansi-rosian-prorvati-liniu-oboroni-na-harkivsini/
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/35979; https://t.me/grvZapad/19330; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41734
[48] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1370154-fpv-dron-atakuvav-ekipaz-policii-aki-namagalisa-zdisniti-evakuacii-z-fedorivki-kupanskogo-rajonu-kanasevic/
[49] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2084018011359637995
[50] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70570
[51]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41716 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41718 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41734 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35979
[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33627
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/96941
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/66224
[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41718; https://t.me/wargonzo/35979
[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12597; https://www.instagram.com/reels/Dbiq5Mqqy0D/
[58] https://t.me/divgen/82881
[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1370378-rosijski-vijska-namagautsa-vitisniti-oboronciv-z-udacnogo-ta-kotlinogo-komunikacijnica-152-oebr/
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41718
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3540
[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3541
[64] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2694
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41718; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41734; https://t.me/wargonzo/35979 https://t.me/voin_dv/20515; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46071
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46071
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41718; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41734
[68] https://t.me/ZS42MSD/8514 ; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2084194046986097089?s=20
[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/96941
[70] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80309
[71] https://t.me/milinfolive/177025
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41733
[73] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2694
[74] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9026
[75] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/
[76] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/krym-bez-svitla-vody-i-palnoho-yak-kreml-lataie-propahandystsku-vitrynu-analytics.html
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/71299
[78] https://www.facebook.com/Ministry.for.infrastructure/posts/pfbid02pM2W6TpQx85kkXtQ9KKk4aSo2pQujYyg67vkqqYq3AgcgWZzN52d1JYcK6vwvV1Kl?__cft__[0]=AZYNiiT_pk2otlJO9qNjfTNmosvZEiWPghYkXYa5bgFJAHXH1eqB46gGWlZzHQmfi20zv6Inx14lKP-kME1P_ByVL0hObfvnqyjDKnFWW8hor5j-xpr_4ac3Tp1nl06KplbrybxHbwg5_7SnSFQjYKDNjvYeHZLMKXvxCqxBM7mzdA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/1369922-strilanina-v-odesi-rosijski-obstrili-zaporizza-ta-udari-po-skladah-rozetka-1622-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1785763145&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4152; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31153; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31178 ; https://t.me/vilkul/17396 ; https://t.me/vilkul/17405 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/03/udar-rf-po-azs-pid-kryvym-rogom-troye-zagyblyh-sered-nyh-8-richna-dytyna/; https://t.me/vilkul/17406; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17133; https://t.me/synegubov/24456; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02pBJjbC1NVDb2dcAv3yC1ugp6kQz75iiXpLtVa92TcCsuTtUhuqWyfEEpJQg3czVGl; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18277
[79] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7543
[80] https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1370618-rosijskij-dron-atakuvav-civilnij-buksir-ekipaz-vratuvali-prikordonniki/; https://www.facebook.com/MaritimeGuardStateBorderService/posts/pfbid0f1zyiS7yQDqQZwighLRjbkKRxwvJpm5Lkmiv2zgSU943igg5JvBwFpSvsu4edEg4l
[81] https://www.facebook.com/Ministry.for.infrastructure/posts/pfbid02pM2W6TpQx85kkXtQ9KKk4aSo2pQujYyg67vkqqYq3AgcgWZzN52d1JYcK6vwvV1Kl?__cft__[0]=AZYNiiT_pk2otlJO9qNjfTNmosvZEiWPghYkXYa5bgFJAHXH1eqB46gGWlZzHQmfi20zv6Inx14lKP-kME1P_ByVL0hObfvnqyjDKnFWW8hor5j-xpr_4ac3Tp1nl06KplbrybxHbwg5_7SnSFQjYKDNjvYeHZLMKXvxCqxBM7mzdA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/1369922-strilanina-v-odesi-rosijski-obstrili-zaporizza-ta-udari-po-skladah-rozetka-1622-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1785763145&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[82] https://x.com/RedHibana/status/2084240276114063603; https://t.me/mod_russia/66148
