Toplines

Senior Iranian officials continue to demand guarantees against future US-Israeli attacks as a precondition for negotiations, and the Iranian regime likely views recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz as one such guarantee. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stated on May 14 that the United States must satisfy Iranian “confidence-building” measures before Iran will negotiate.[1] The regime has consistently pursued recognition for its control over the strait and likely views recognized control over the strait as a deterrent against future US or Israeli military action, which means that recognition effectively serves as a “confidence-building” measure.

Jafari’s statements likely reflect the Iranian regime’s position and decision-making, given his position and relative influence within the regime at this time. The Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters oversees the regime’s internal messaging and cognitive warfare apparatus, which means it is the principal mechanism through which the IRGC shapes political discourse, including by suppressing opposition to hardline factions.[2] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Jafari’s statements likely reflect the negotiating position of IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi, who appears to currently be playing a central decision-making role in Iran.[3] Jafari has a close relationship with Vahidi that dates to the Iran-Iraq War, and Jafari previously served as IRGC commander from 2007 to 2019.[4] Jafari and other senior IRGC officials, including Vahidi, also reportedly supported Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession after the death of Ali Khamenei.[5]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not appear to have made a clear commitment to support US efforts to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump asserted that the PRC “would like to be of help” in reopening the strait after meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping from May 13 to 15.[6] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that he is expecting the PRC to work “behind the scenes” to influence Iran to open the strait because reopening the strait would serve PRC interests.[7] PRC readouts and statements on the summit downplayed discussions on Iran, however, and reiterated standard rhetoric on the issue.[8]

Iran’s assertion of control over the strait is inconsistent with the stated PRC position. PRC Ambassador to the United Nations Fu Cong emphasized in April that the safety and security of shipping lanes must be secured.[9] He added that the PRC does not support Iranian attacks on Gulf states or the ”blockade“ on the Strait of Hormuz and expressed hope that “normal” navigation will resume soon. The PRC likely recognizes that any Iranian authority over transit through the strait would increase PRC dependence on Iran and establish a problematic precedent for international maritime law and freedom of navigation. The PRC appears unwilling to involve itself in a manner necessary to reopen and secure the strait, however.

Iran may have decided to deprioritize certain restrictive measures in the Strait of Hormuz, such as toll collection, in order to encourage states such as the PRC to cooperate with Iran and implicitly recognize its control over the strait. Iranian officials previously emphasized their ability to impose tolls on vessels transiting the strait, but Iran only announced its first toll payment on April 23.[10] Iran has exempted so-called “friendly” countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, and Malaysia, from toll requirements, which suggests that Iran now prioritizes securing international recognition of its control over the strait over toll collection.[11] The PRC has explicitly opposed the toll system, and its vessels have continued to transit the strait via the Iranian-approved route through the strait, although it is unclear if these vessels paid any tolls.[12] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is likely prioritizing the implementation of the protocol over the tolls at this time in order to present itself as a reasonable actor that is willing to “open” the strait to “free” travel without tolls.[13] Iran may calculate that reducing overtly problematic measures such as tolls will encourage more states to cooperate with Iranian procedures and, therefore, strengthen Iranian authority over the strait. Legitimizing any aspect of Iranian control over the strait, with or without tolls, is extremely detrimental to global shipping. Iranian officials have not indicated any willingness to relinquish control over the strait. Officials claim that Iran will “open” the strait while preserving Iran’s authority to regulate and permit vessel transit, which would leave Iran with the ability to restrict international shipping at its discretion and target any country, including through attacks on civilian vessels.[14]

The Iranian regime is attempting to ease economic pressures that the US naval blockade on Iranian ports is imposing upon the Iranian economy. The United States has continued to enforce the blockade, which will continue to impose economic pressure on Iran. The US Navy redirected three vessels between 4:00 PM ET on May 14 and 9:00 AM ET on May 15.[15] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that US forces have redirected 75 commercial vessels and disabled four since the blockade began on April 13.[16]

The Iranian regime is simultaneously taking measures to preserve necessary economic resources, such as foreign currency and raw materials, while attempting to keep the Iranian public calm ahead of expected shortages. The regime remains concerned that prolonged economic strain could trigger social unrest in Iran. The Agricultural Jihad Ministry introduced a new foreign exchange ceiling and updated the official price references within its import system for rice and oil-based products on May 15 in an attempt to evade food shortages and avoid mass price inflation.[17] An official from Mobarakeh Steel Company emphasized in a statement on May 15 that Iran has sufficient domestic steel supplies, even though the combined force destroyed the facilities responsible for about 25 to 30 percent of Iran’s annual steel output.[18] The combined force struck the Mobarakeh Steel Company’s facilities during the war. Mobarakeh Steel Company also recently shut down a project that led to the cutting of 1,000 jobs, according to a contractor employee who partnered with the company.[19] Iran’s Energy Consumption Optimization Director also asserted on May 15 that 76 petrochemical complexes remain operational with a combined capacity of 100 million tons of petrochemicals annually, and Iran has continued efforts to import raw materials to offset shortages.[20] Israeli strikes on at least two Iranian petrochemical complexes rendered ”more than 85 percent of Iran’s petrochemical export capacity inoperable” during the most recent war, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[21] The Iranian government is also designing a support package for firms affected by internet disruptions.[22]

Iranian leaders also appear to be emphasizing internal unity as economic pressures mount. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s social media accounts called for national unity in resisting external pressure in a statement made in celebration of Persian Language Day on May 15.[23] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei attempted to reinforce domestic cohesion by thanking Kurdish communities for safeguarding Iran’s borders on a visit to Kurdistan Province in western Iran on May 15.[24] These regime efforts come after an Iranian intelligence assessment warned that worsening economic conditions could trigger renewed unrest during a Supreme National Security Council meeting in April 2026, according to informed sources speaking to anti-regime media.[25]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced on May 15 that it will accelerate efforts to double the export capacity in Fujairah in order to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reduce the UAE’s strategic vulnerability.[26] Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed directed the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to fast-track the West–East Pipeline project, which would increase the UAE’s crude export capacity from Fujairah to as much as 3.6 million barrels per day by 2027.[27] This increases the export capacity from Fujairah by an additional 1.8 million barrels per day. The UAE currently exports 1.8 million barrels per day through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran launched several drone and missile attacks targeting the Fujairah oil field and pipeline during the most recent war.[28] The UAE’s initiative reflects a broader strategy that Gulf states are adopting to safeguard energy exports from future disruption through chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is similarly leaning on its East-West pipeline to Yanbu on its Red Sea coast.[29]

Unspecified Western diplomats told Western media on May 14 that Saudi Arabia is discussing pursuing a potential non-aggression pact with Iran after the war.[30] It is unclear how much meaningful progress there has been towards such a pact.[31] Iran repeatedly attacked Gulf states’ civilian infrastructure while claiming to target US military assets.[32] Iran could theoretically attack Gulf states under the guise of targeting US assets in each country, even under such a pact.

The recent war has showcased the UAE’s adoption of a more assertive posture against Iran amid its deepening security ties with Israel. Bloomberg reported on May 15 that the UAE unsuccessfully attempted to persuade fellow Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, to participate in a coordinated attack on Iran shortly after the US-Israeli campaign began.[33] The UAE’s efforts to rally the other Gulf states ultimately failed, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia conducted strikes on Iran independently.[34] The UAE also appears to have blocked a joint statement that Iran sought to issue at the BRICS Foreign Ministers summit that would have condemned the US-Israeli war against Iran.[35] A representative from India, the summit‘s host, cited ”differing views among some members,” likely in reference to the UAE’s blocking of the statement.[36] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi suggested that certain countries prevented consensus on portions of the statement and reiterated that Iran’s military actions have targeted US bases, even when located in other regional countries.[37] Araghchi’s statement is false: the Iranian military targeted civilian infrastructure across the Gulf countries and fired into major cities.[38] The UAE is showcasing a more aggressive diplomatic and military posture towards Iran as it has deepened security ties with Israel during the war. A senior Israeli official characterized the UAE-Israeli relationship as a “tightening alliance” to Israeli media on May 14.[39] Israel and the UAE have been expanding their defense cooperation since the UAE normalized its relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords in 2020.[40]