Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin is positively portraying data about Russia’s economic performance that actually shows a strained economy. Putin claimed on May 15 that the Russian government’s economic measures began to generate “restrained, but still positive results” in March 2026.[1] Putin claimed that Russian wholesale trade increased by eight percent in March 2025, that retail trade increased by 6.2 percent, that industrial production increased by 2.3 percent, and that manufacturing increased by three percent. Putin claimed that Russia’s GDP grew by 1.8 percent in March and that unemployment remained low at 2.2 percent. Russian independent source The Bell noted that Putin did not mention that data from the Russian Ministry of Economic Development showed that Russian year-on-year GDP declined in January and February 2026, nor that the ministry decreased its annual GDP growth forecast for 2026 from 1.3 percent to 0.4 percent.[2]
Ukrainian intelligence indicates that the Russian government has already significantly exceeded its budget deficit plans for 2026 and is increasing its spending. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on May 12 that Russia’s budget deficit reached $78.4 billion in the first four months of 2026, almost twice as much as in the same period in 2025 and more than 150 percent of Russia‘s planned deficit of $50.5 billion for all of 2026.[3] The SZRU reported that Russian government spending for the first four months of 2026 was $235 billion, 15.7 percent more than the first four months of 2025, and that military spending, social programs, and support for unspecified sectors of the economy are taking up increasing shares of Russian government spending. The SZRU reported that the Russian government tried to offset increased spending by raising the Value Added Tax (VAT) rate in January 2026.[4] The SZRU reported that the Russian government will likely increase domestic borrowing, though it already spent $14.8 billion in interest on its public debt in the first four months of 2026.[5] Forbes reported on May 13 that data from the business intelligence firm Kontur. Fokus indicates that 209,000 small- and medium-sized businesses closed in Russia in the first quarter of 2026, in part due to the higher VAT rates – almost nine percent more than in the first quarter of 2025.[6]
Russian regional governments are also increasing spending to recruit for the war effort, hampering the Russian federal government’s ability to offset these costs. Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on May 15 that Russian regional governments more than doubled their average monthly spending on military recruiters and recruitment bonuses from 358 million rubles (about $4.92 million) in 2025 to 802 million rubles (about $11.02 million) in 2026.[7] Regional expenditures likely further strain the federal budget as Moscow regularly loans the regional governments money and forgives those debts, as it did most recently on May 14 for Arkhangelsk, Kaluga, Lipetsk, Orenburg, Smolensk, and Tula Oblasts.[8]
Putin tacitly acknowledged the recent strain in the Russian economy, but the numbers he presented are consistent with an economy sustained by heavy state spending and war-related demand rather than private-sector growth. Putin has repeatedly framed Russia’s low unemployment rates as a sign of economic health, ignoring how these figures demonstrate how the war in Ukraine is worsening Russia’s yearslong struggles with labor shortages and that a tight labor market can fuel inflation.[9] Monetary bonuses for military recruits that remove individuals from the civilian labor market are worsening the labor shortage. These bonuses are also driving consumer spending as government payouts give individuals and families additional money to spend. Low unemployment and high government transfers to consumers can intensify inflationary pressure, however, and compel the government to adopt economically sub-optimal policies such as increasing taxes and borrowing.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia has been reconnoitering decision-making centers in and near Kyiv City for possible future strikes. Zelensky stated on May 15 that Ukrainian intelligence obtained Russian documents outlining plans for strikes against roughly 20 political and military facilities that high-ranking Ukrainian officials frequent.[10] Zelensky published reconnaissance photos from early March 2026, reportedly from the Russian plans of an underground tunnel, a presidential administration building, and a presidential residence in and near Kyiv City.[11] Zelensky reported that Russian authorities have been forming the plans for a “long time” but have been more actively reconnoitering possible targets since the start of the Iran conflict – likely in order to take advantage of Ukraine’s Patriot interceptor shortages. The Kremlin threatened to strike decision-making centers in Kyiv City if Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City on May 9, and Zelensky’s report suggests that Moscow has not abandoned its plans for such strikes in the future, even as the ceasefire has passed.[12]
Sanctions relief for Russia, particularly when coupled with the slowing supplies of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine, would increase the already significant threat that Russian missile strikes pose to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasyuk stated on May 15 that Russia produced the Kh-101 cruise missiles that it used in the May 14 strike series in the second quarter of 2026, indicating that Russian forces are launching missiles almost immediately after production and are not stockpiling missiles.[13] Vlasyuk stated that the Russian missiles still use a significant number of Western components, including those manufactured in late 2025 and early 2026, despite ongoing sanctions. Vlasyuk highlighted, however, how US efforts to stop supplies of Western artificial intelligence (AI) modules to Russia have likely prevented Russia from widely using AI in its Shahed drones. Ukrainian source Militarnyi similarly reported on May 14 that ballistic missile debris from late 2025 and early 2026 showed that Russia was launching recently produced missiles.[14]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 11 that Ukraine’s interception rate for Russian Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles since January 2026 has been 88 percent, but Russian cruise missile strikes have nonetheless caused significant civilian damage and harm.[15] Ukraine’s interception rate of Russian ballistic missiles has been much lower as Ukraine has had to rely on US-made Patriot systems and interceptors.[16] Russia has repeatedly demanded sanctions relief during talks to end its war in Ukraine.[17] Easing sanctions would significantly increase the threat of devastating missile strikes against Ukraine, particularly as Western supplies of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine are slowing due to the ongoing war in the Middle East. Sanctions relief would likely benefit Russian cruise and ballistic missile production, allowing Russia to launch more missiles per strike package to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and increase the likelihood of successful hits.
A Russian state-owned polling institution recently began door-to-door surveys and recorded slightly higher approval and trust ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin after falling for weeks. A poll from the Russian state-owned polling institution All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) for the week of May 4 to 10 found that Putin’s approval rating increased by 1.2 percent from 65.6 percent during the week of April 13 to 19.[18] The VTsIOM poll also found that Putin’s trust rating reached 72.1 percent, a 1.1 percent increase compared to the week of April 13 to 19. VTsIOM noted that it recently altered its polling methodology to introduce door-to-door surveys as well as telephone surveys. VTsIOM claimed that the change was due to recent restrictions on mobile communications, new anti-spam filters, and growing instances of telephone fraud. The slight rise in Putin’s ratings comes after a VTsIOM poll from April 13 to 19 marked the seventh week in a row of declining ratings.[19]
Russia and Ukraine each exchanged 250 prisoners on May 15 as part of the larger 1000-for-1000 prisoner exchange they agreed to as part of the Victory Day ceasefire.[20] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukraine received 250 prisoners, including prisoners of war (POWs) who had been in Russian detention since 2022 and four civilian prisoners whom Russian forces captured in the Sumy direction in 2025.[21] The United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[22]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is positively portraying data about Russia’s economic performance that actually shows a strained economy.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia has been reconnoitering decision-making centers in and near Kyiv City for possible future strikes.
- Sanctions relief for Russia, particularly when coupled with the slowing supplies of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine, would increase the already significant threat that Russian missile strikes pose to Ukraine.
- A Russian state-owned polling institution recently began door-to-door surveys and recorded slightly higher approval and trust ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin after falling for weeks.
- Russia and Ukraine each exchanged 250 prisoners on May 15 as part of the larger 1000-for-1000 prisoner exchange they agreed to as part of the Victory Day ceasefire.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kharkiv and Kostyantynivka directions.
- Russian forces launched six missiles and 141 drones toward Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Ryazan Oblast, naval assets in the Republic of Dagestan, and aircraft in Krasnodar Krai.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast, naval vessels based in the Republic of Dagestan, and aircraft in Krasnodar Krai overnight on May 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 15 that Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery and a small missile boat and minesweeper at the Kapiysk Naval Base in the Republic of Dagestan.[23] The Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of Russia’s five largest oil refineries and has a refining capacity of 17.1 million tons of petroleum products per year.[24] Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows a fire at the Ryazan Oil Refinery, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Russian service reported that satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian strikes damaged a pipeline between the oil tank storage area and a workshop.[25] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov acknowledged Ukrainian strikes against an unspecified enterprise in the oblast.[26] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukraine’s SOF struck a Russian Be-200 multirole amphibious aircraft and Ka-27 ship-based multirole helicopter at the Yeysk Airbase in Krasnodar Krai, and geolocated footage published on May 15 confirms the strikes.[27]
Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries continue to constrain Russian fuel production. Two industry sources told Reuters on May 14 that the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant suspended operations on May 14 following a Ukrainian strike against the plant on May 13, causing a fire.[28] The industry sources stated that the Astrakhan plant processed 1.8 million tons of stable gas condensate, 800,000 tons of gasoline in 2024, 600,000 tons of diesel, and 300,000 tons of fuel oil in 2024.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 15 but did not make confirmed advances, while Ukrainian forces conducted frequent counterattacks.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Nova Sich (north of Sumy City) and in Myropillya, south of Yunakivka, and northeast of Mala Rybytsya (all northeast of Sumy City).[30]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on May 15 that elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Chaikivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 15 that Russian forces also advanced west of Rybalkyne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33]
Russian forces continue to struggle to field combat vehicles in northern Kharkiv Oblast. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the South Slobozhansk direction (northern Kharkiv Oblast) reported on May 15 that Ukrainian drone strikes and wooded terrain are preventing Russian forces from using combat vehicles to aid advances in the area.[34]
Ukrainian forces recently liberated Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk). The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force and 16th Army Corps reported Odradne’s liberation on May 15, and geolocated footage published on May 15 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Odradne.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued infiltration missions and limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 15.[36] Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in western Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[37]
A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 15 that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[38] Russian sources have repeatedly made unconfirmed claims that Russian forces advanced in or seized Petropavlivka, including three times since January 2026.[39]
Russian forces are reportedly slightly increasing their use of unmanned ground systems (UGVs) in the Borova and Lyman directions amid continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 15.[40]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 15 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots in occupied Rovenky (129 kilometers from the frontline) and Yepifanivka (67 kilometers from the frontline) and a technical and materiel warehouse in occupied Raihorodka (79 kilometers from the frontline) on May 14 or overnight on May 14 to 15.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 15 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Lyman near Dibrova.[42]
The Russian military command appears to be piecemealing elements of Russian forces in the Kupyansk and Borova directions to reinforce efforts in the Lyman direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on May 15 that the Russian military command attached an assault detachment of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], [Moscow Military District [MMD]) operating in the Kupyansk direction to the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) in the Slovyansk direction.[43] This reported tactical control reassignment is the second observed instance of Russia piecemealing forces for the 144th Motorized Rifle Division in recent days. The source had reported on May 12 that the Russian command similarly attached a company of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) operating in the Borova direction to support the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division.[44]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in and near Kostyantynivka as Russian forces continued infiltration missions into the city. Geolocated footage published on May 13 and 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Ivanopillya and in central and eastern Kostyantynivka, respectively.[45] Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in northern Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), contrary to Russian claims.[46] Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was likely an infiltration mission.[47]
Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Dobropillya direction on May 15.[48]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk), as Russian forces continued offensive operations north, northwest, west, and southwest of Pokrovsk on May 15.[49]
Russian forces used the May 9 – 11 ceasefire to accumulate forces in the Pokrovsk area and are actively leveraging urban development and greenery for camouflage. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi reported on May 15 that Russian forces near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are now intensifying assaults after pausing offensive operations and accumulating forces during the May 9 to 11 ceasefire.[50] Polevyi stated that Russian forces are leveraging cover and concealment from spring foliage and urban areas to bring equipment, vehicles, and artillery to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, including camouflaging howitzers under garbage containers.
Russian forces continued near Novopavlivka itself and northeast and south of Novopavlivka on May 15 but did not advance.[51]
Russian forces continued limited attacks east and southeast of Oleksandrivka on May 14 and 15 but did not advance.[52]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including in Mariupol. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian electronic warfare (EW) equipment in Dmytrivka (either roughly 80 or 110 kilometers from the frontline) on May 14 or the night of May 14 to 15.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck an MR-232 Bussol-S radar station and an optoelectronic module at a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coastal technical intelligence post in occupied Mariupol (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricant warehouse in occupied Mariupol. Ukrainian drones have recently begun reconnoitering and interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in and near Mariupol, causing concern in the Russian milblogger community.[54]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to present infiltrators raising flags as alleged evidence of seizures. Geolocated footage published on May 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in eastern Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Russian forces raising Russian flags in Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[55] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Charivne.[56]
Russian forces are reportedly trying to advance toward Verkhnya Tersa (west of Hulyaipole) from the south, likely due to Ukrainian successes west and northwest of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attacking Zaliznychne (southwest of Hulyaipole and southeast of Verkhnya Tersa), Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole and south of Verkhnya Tersa), and Charivne (south of Verkhnya Tersa).[57] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon with armored vehicles and motorcycles near Hulyaipilske in the past day and noted that this is a shift from Russia’s usual tactics using small infantry groups.
Ukrainian sources continue to note how Russian officials have repeatedly claimed the seizures of settlements in the Orikhiv direction, even as the frontline remains largely unchanged. A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Orikhiv direction stated that Russian forces have been attempting to storm Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) for several years.[58] The commander stated that Russian reports often claim that Russian forces had seized or cleared the settlement, including Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s claim in late 2025 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[59] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces have controlled Mala Tokmachka since 2023. The commander estimated that Russian forces had lost about 2,000 soldiers during their attempts to seize Mala Tokmachka. The commander noted that areas closer to Verbove (southeast of Mala Tokmachka) are contested “gray zones.” A Russian milblogger disputed the Ukrainian commander’s statements, claiming that Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka (just west of Mala Tokmachka) are largely “gray zones.”[60] The milblogger acknowledged, however, that it is difficult for Russian forces to gain a foothold in the settlements.
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign near occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, including against major Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) supplying Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a cargo ship carrying ammunition near Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[61] A Russian milblogger posted footage on May 15 reportedly showing the aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike against vehicles along the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk highway in Berdyansky Raion.[62]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 15 but did not advance.[63]
Russian forces circulated footage of a Russian strike on United Nations (UN) humanitarian mission vehicles in Kherson City on May 14, confirming Ukrainian reports of a Russian strike against UN vehicles in the area.[64]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on the night of May 14 to 15. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system in occupied Khutorok (roughly 156 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea.[65]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 14 to May 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea; one Kh-35 anti-ship missile from occupied Crimea; and 141 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-35 missile and 130 drones, while five Kh-31P missiles failed to reach their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that seven drones struck six locations and that debris fell at seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck port, residential, and railway infrastructure in Odesa, Zaporizhia, and Chernihiv oblasts.[67] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on May 15 that Russian strikes on energy infrastructure caused power outages in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[68] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky updated the casualty count from the Russian strike on the residential building in Kyiv City on May 14, stating that the strike killed 24 civilians, including three children, and injured at least 48.[69]
Russian forces have reportedly recently increased their drone flights near Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that it recorded more than 160 Russian drones flying near the South Ukraine, Rivne, and Chornobyl NPPs on March 13 to 14.[70]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on May 15 that Russia is pressuring Belarus to conduct offensive operations against Ukraine or an unspecified NATO state.[71] Zelensky stated that Russian officials are pressuring Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko during meetings to use Belarusian forces in operations either into Chernihiv and Kyiv oblasts or against an unspecified NATO state.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79756
[2] https://t.me/thebell_io/37540; https://thebell dot io/tosklivyy-prognoz-pravitelstva-problemy-starmera-i-mertsa-i-chto-my-uznali-ob-ii-iz-otchetov-bigtekhov
[3] https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/byudzhetnyi-defitsyt-rf-uzhe-perevyshchyv-likvidni-rezervy
[4] https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/byudzhetnyi-defitsyt-rf-uzhe-perevyshchyv-likvidni-rezervy
[5] https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/byudzhetnyi-defitsyt-rf-uzhe-perevyshchyv-likvidni-rezervy
[6] https://www.forbes dot ru/svoi-biznes/560817-mira-v-kotorom-my-nacinali-net-brendy-i-zavedenia-zakryvsiesa-v-2026-godu
[7] https://t.me/istories_media/12232; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2026/05/15/recruitment/index.html
[8] http://government dot ru/docs/58724/; https://t.me/astrapress/112614; https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/29/02/2024/65e05eb89a7947472e7da20b; http://government dot ru/dep_news/58643/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/
[10] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/mayemo-spravedlivo-ta-vidchutno-vidpovidati-na-rosijski-udar-104441
[11] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19074
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/
[13] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rakety-h-101-vygotovyly-2-kvartali-2026/; https://www.ft.com/content/c48c2190-f0f3-485d-a0bb-da56fe8c094d?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-3/; https://www.npr.org/2026/05/15/nx-s1-5823388/death-toll-in-attack-on-kyiv-apartment-building-now-stands-at-24
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-5/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/
[18] https://wciom dot ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-prezidenta-pravitelstva-i-politicheskikh-partii-15052026
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/
[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/63648; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/20244
[21] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2055193844757549417 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19057 ; https://suspilne dot media/1311233-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-obmin-polonenimi-8/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/pershyj-etap-obminu-1000-na-1000-z-rosijskogo-polonu-povernulysya-205-ukrayincziv/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/mayemo-spravedlivo-ta-vidchutno-vidpovidati-na-rosijski-udar-104441; https://suspilne dot media/1311162-u-kievi-trivae-rozbir-zavaliv-pisla-udaru-rf-ermaku-obrali-zapobiznij-zahid-1542-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1778848693&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[22] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8424
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38684
[24] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8442; https://t.me/DIUkraine/8441
[25] https://t.me/supernova_plus/51899 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2055125683219956030; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20575 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2055291763028574297; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/97871
[26] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/6325
[27] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1258587209407809; https://t.me/usf_army/1920; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/sbs-urazyly-v-yejsku-vorozhyj-litak-amfibiyu-altayr-ta-gvyntokryl-ka-27/ ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-vijskovyj-aerodrom-u-rosijskomu-yejsku/; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2055182210286649798; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2354
[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/gazproms-astrakhan-gas-plant-halted-motor-fuel-output-after-may-13-drone-attack-2026-05-14/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/
[29] https://t.me/rybar/80289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685; https://t.me/uvkkursk/372
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/210647 ; https://t.me/rybar/80289
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20667 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/63651; https://t.me/mod_russia/63652
[33] https://t.me/rybar/80290
[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/vyhodyt-za-posylkamy-abo-pomichayemo-sygnaturu-dronari-rozkryly-detali-polyuvan-na-vorozhu-pihotu/; https://youtu dot be/K6KgBBWhnPU?t=2656
[35] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2055157311459746110; https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2620; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35707; https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2620; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11927; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2055155652616749427; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23505; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2055155652616749427; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2055155652616749427
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20667 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20669
[37] https://t.me/svarog_usf/903 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11922
[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51788 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18557
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2026/
[40] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20667 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34176 ; https://youtu.be/K6KgBBWhnPU ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/vidtyaguye-artyleriyu-minomety-maksymalno-daleko-poblyzu-lymana-vorog-tikaye-v-tyl-vid-droniv-trijky/
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38684
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43130 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20667 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/375876 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34176 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18557
[43] https://t.me/gvZapad/18561
[44] https://t.me/gvZapad/18538; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054934891763019835; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/5060; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054945094172627212; https://t.me/SVOBARS13/97; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054929976164528188; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33127
[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054942439635337703; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33145;
[47] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054952759514763317; https://www.instagram.com/19armycorps/reel/DYUjNUPoYLQ/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685; https://t.me/wargonzo/34176; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/210647
[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/pozycziyi-maskuyut-pid-kontejnery-zi-smittyam-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvno-zavodyt-v-mista-tehniku-ta-artyleriyu/; https://youtu.be/K6KgBBWhnPU?t=583
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13985
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38684
[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/
[55] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2055209879065731575; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2055210035299471784; https://t.me/polk_210/6506; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11926; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2055205376212267152; https://t.me/voin_dv/19539; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11928; https://t.me/Osintpen/2856
[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/63651; https://t.me/mod_russia/63662
[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/diye-hvylyamy-ne-daye-pidtyagnuty-rezervy-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-vorog-atakuvav-broneyu-ta-motoczyklamy/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU
[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/hto-volodiye-maloyu-tokmachkoyu-toj-volodiye-svitom-yak-rosiya-chetvertyj-rik-zahoplyuye-odne-selo-na-zaporizhzhi/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1AyjjabZBZ/
[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43137
[61] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2354
[62] https://t.me/romanov_92/53209
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38654 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38666 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13985 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38685; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13995
[64] GRAPHIC FOOTAGE https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35709; https://t.me/OCHA_Ukraine/3244 ; . https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/svidomyj-udar-po-avtivkah-oon-rosiyany-vidverto-hyzuyutsya-atakoyu-na-gumanitarnu-misiyu-v-hersoni/; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid0g7QZsj6ZU2bM7vhBMHcAaxCCMpQui1hCWF3J6oiqjXWNTokR8dbBcC5KVVt827Cxl?__cft__[0]=AZY2iVxrGjKAGq14FwoRaGLxqW3UodiuHEQI3E73yg8RLJOYDbXwL7ZGeEXZ7rrF3Pj2CKznnd75fnXBcJ-ws_mmZP_Ao1RqvR9yqUCIRd2HiKMsq1G8KgJpKc0icMpyg2H0siFraQ7zxnMBKIKUkYJBlpbQHWeLq7pQ9T2dK1Zf0Fax3OEYf_5vDwcU_ow7C10&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/
[65] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1311231-u-sbs-zaavili-pro-urazenna-u-okupovanomu-krimu-zrgk-pancir-s1/ ; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/15mgwGdxDBk/
[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/61910
[67] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29108; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16048; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16035 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16062 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/63911; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/15/vorog-vnochi-teroryzuvav-odeshhynu-raketno-dronovymy-udaramy/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1311419-rf-zavdala-udaru-po-odnomu-z-portiv-velikoi-odesi-zaznali-travm-pracivniki-pidpriemstv/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/39972; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/39969; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8097
[68] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4966
[69] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2055183966668275983 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19053; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19047
[70] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2054893387061272953?s=46
[71] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19074; https://suspilne dot media/1311529-zelenskij-rosia-rozgladae-plani-ataki-na-ukrainu-z-teritorii-bilorusi/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19078; https://suspilne dot media/1311612-zelenskij-doruciv-posiliti-prikordonna-cerez-zagrozu-z-boku-bilorusi/
