Toplines
The Kremlin appears to be conducting a targeted information campaign that aims to highlight the claimed Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka to the Trump administration and Western information space. US President Donald Trump spoke by phone with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 4.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on July 4 that the United States initiated a phone call between Trump and Putin on July 4 and that Trump and Putin discussed the upcoming NATO summit, the war in Ukraine, and military-political and economic issues.[2] Trump also spoke with Zelensky about the current situation on the frontline and ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the war.[3] Ushakov claimed that Putin emphasized that Ukraine’s European partners have a false perception of the state of the frontline but that Putin told Trump about the “real” battlefield situation in which Russian forces are advancing across the entire theater.[4] Ushakov noted that Putin claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka, which Ushakov emphasized as an important step toward the Russian seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Ushakov claimed that Russian forces will “certainly” seize the rest of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on his English-language Telegram channel on July 4 that the alleged Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka is a clear victory for Russia on the battlefield and an important step in seizing Donbas and achieving Russia’s war aims.[5]
Russian forces have infiltrated into but not seized Kostyantynivka, however, despite Putin’s and Medvedev’s claims. Kremlin officials regularly aggrandize tactical Russian advances and present false and fabricated evidence as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort attempting to portray the Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing — a coordinated information campaign that aims to pressure Ukraine and its partners into capitulating to Russia’s demands in negotiations.[6] The Kremlin likely anticipated that Putin would speak with Trump to congratulate him on the Independence Day holiday in the United States and knowingly staged meetings between Putin and several Russian commanders on July 3, in which Putin claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka and made additional aggrandized claims, ahead of the July 4 call. Putin likely aimed to use the call to present his exaggerated claims of advance to Trump and convince him that Russia is winning on the battlefield.[7] Putin’s aggrandized claims of advance come as the Trump administration is increasingly speaking publicly about Ukrainian successes on the battlefield, including about Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure and tactical Ukrainian advances in several frontline sectors in Winter and Spring 2026.[8] Putin and other Kremlin officials are likely purposefully injecting the false narratives that Russian forces will imminently seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast into the Western information space in order to convince the West to capitulate to the demands that Russia cannot secure militarily.
Russia is using a short-term ceasefire proposal it knows Ukraine will logically reject as part of Russia’s expanded cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Ukraine as the unwilling negotiator. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on July 4 a shelling ceasefire in Kostyantynivka from 1200 to 1800 Moscow time on July 6 to allow Russian forces to transfer the bodies of Ukrainian troops killed in action (KIA) to Ukraine.[9] The Russian MoD claimed on July 5 that over 20 foreign media sources expressed their desire to travel to Kostyantynivka to cover the KIA transfer, but that Ukraine ultimately rejected the Russian ceasefire proposal.[10] Ukrainian officials have not provided a public response to the Russian proposal as of this writing. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated into but not consolidated positions or seized Kostyantynivka, and Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers continued to refute on July 4 and 5 Russia’s claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka.[11] Ukraine’s 19th Army Corps stated on July 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence throughout Kostyantynivka and are striking the Russian groups that continue to infiltrate into the city.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Kostyantynivka, including in northwestern Kostyantynivka where fighting continues and where Russian forces have not consolidated their positions.[13] The Russian MoD likely knew that Ukraine would reject its proposal because Russian forces do not control the city but because Russian forces would likely take advantage of any ceasefire to further infiltrate and consolidate positions under the guise of retrieving Ukraine’s KIA. Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly ordered a temporary ceasefire near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk in late October 2025 to allow journalists to “see” the Ukrainian forces whom Russian forces had allegedly encircled in those areas.[14] Russian forces had not encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk or Pokrovsk at the time of the ceasefire proposal or any time following, however. ISW continues to assess that these short-term ceasefire proposals do not represent a Russian diplomatic concession but allow Russian forces to stockpile weapons and equipment and conduct rotations, reinforcements, and logistics, all while aiming to shape Western perceptions of Russia’s steady frontline advances and willingness to negotiate.[15]
Russia continues to face mounting manpower allocation challenges as it struggles to build out a robust air defense umbrella to defend Russia’s vast rear. Germany-based Russian opposition outlet Echo reported on July 5 that Russian state energy operator Gazprom signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to create mobile fire groups for the protection of Russian gas infrastructure.[16] Echo reported that soldiers serving in mobile fire groups will receive monthly compensation of 200,000 rubles ($2,598) from Gazprom when undergoing two months of training as well as a salary and other payments from the Russian MoD. The Gazprom documents reportedly noted that the mobile fire team contract is different than the standard military service contract and allows Russians to maintain their civilian employment during military training. The document reportedly states that the mobile fire group members will only protect infrastructure in the region in which they signed the contract and that the mobile fire group contract also concludes an agreement for service in the mobilization reserve for three years. The Russian Nevsky Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) also reported on July 4 that it is recruiting for mobile fire groups to defend against Ukrainian long-range drone strikes.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 5 that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are operating as part of mobile fire groups countering Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea.[18] The Russian milblogger claimed on July 5 that Russia will not be able to stabilize the ongoing fuel crisis until it builds an air defense system that can address Ukrainian strike threats now and in the future.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russian repairs of damaged oil refineries are useless in the face of repeated Ukrainian strikes. The Russian Nevsky Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade have also been active along the frontline, with ISW last observing reports that elements of the Nevsky Brigade were operating in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka area in August 2026 and that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were operating in the Sumy direction in May 2026.[20] Russian recruitment efforts for mobile fire groups demonstrate Russia’s competing force generation requirements for both the rear and on the frontline that will likely continue to strain Russia’s recruitment effort and staffing levels within the Russian military.[21]
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin appears to be conducting a targeted information campaign that aims to highlight the claimed Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka to the Trump administration and Western information space.
- Russia is using a short-term ceasefire proposal it knows Ukraine will logically reject as part of Russia’s expanded cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Ukraine as the unwilling negotiator.
- Russia continues to face mounting manpower allocation challenges as it struggles to build out a robust air defense umbrella to defend Russia’s vast rear.
- Russian forces launched 4 missiles and 125 drones against Ukraine on the night of July 4 to 5.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 5
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Acting Belgorod Oblast Governor Alexander Shuvaev claimed on June 5 that a Ukrainian drone strike moderately injured Dmitry Pankov, the head of Grayvoronsky Okrug, in Golovchino, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 15 kilometers from the international border).[22]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 4 and 5 but did not advance.[23]
Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian electrical substations in Sumy Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 5 that Russian forces conducted a Geran-4 drone strike against a 110kV substation in Dyakivka (northwest of Sumy City).[24] Geolocated footage published on July 5 confirms the strike against the electrical substation.[25]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 4 and 5 but did not advance.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction in early June. Geolocated footage captured on June 5 and published on June 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[27] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 4 and 5 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[29] A source reporting on Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 5 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova) and Nyzhnya Zhuravka (southwest of Borivska Andriivka).[30]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 141 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 4 to 5.[31] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck two electrical substation transformers in occupied Lozivskyi (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline) and Pokrovske (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) between July 1 and 5.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 4 and 5 but did not advance.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yampil (northeast of Slovyansk) and in western Zakitne (east of Slovyansk).[34]
Ukrainian forces maintain positions southwest of Kostyantynivka as Russian forces continue infiltration missions within the city. Geolocated footage published on July 3 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in southeastern Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in the area.[35] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northeastern Kostyantynivka and in northeastern Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[36]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be spreading more artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage to claim advances in Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 3 from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) shows Russian forces raising flags in northern and central Kostyantynivka.[37] ISW is not prepared to assess if the footage was altered with AI at this time. The appearance of the footage and the relative timeline on which the Russian MoD posted it are consistent with a wider pattern of Russian sources publishing footage, including likely AI-altered footage, to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains for informational effects.[38]
Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes to prepare the battlefield in Kramatorsk. The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on July 4 that Russian forces conducted an airstrike against Kramatorsk, damaging a commercial enterprise and injuring five.[39]
See topline for more information about the situation in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 4 and 5 but did not advance.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 5 that Russian forces conducted four guided FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against a Ukrainian drone control center near Dobropillya.[41] Another Russian milblogger posted footage on June 5 purporting to show Russian forces conducting four D-30SN glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Dobropillya.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 4 and 5 but did not advance.[43] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on July 5 that it struck and destroyed a high-rise building in Pokrovsk that Russian forces have long been using as a base for drone operators and training with instructors from the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.[44] The 7th Corps reported that Russian forces stored ammunition with poisonous chemicals in the building. The 7th Corps reported that Russian forces have long prioritized using southern Pokrovsk for accumulating personnel, particularly drone operators, and that Russian forces have been using Wi-Fi bridges, routers, antennas, and Starlink terminals to counter Ukrainian first-point view (FPV) drones and simplify Russian logistics in the area.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 5 but did not advance.[45]
Ukrainian forces are continuing counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka and Novopavlivka directions. French open-source analyst Clement Molin reported on July 4 that analysis of airstrikes and recent satellite images show that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the Komar direction (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[46] Molin stated that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Novopavlivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka and west of Novopavlivka) and that Ukrainian forces entered Piddubne (east of Oleksandrivka). Molin stated that Russian forces maintain positions near Filiya (just east of Ivanivka) and that Russia’s main forces in the area remain behind the Mokri Yaly River. Molin stated that Russian forces are conducting massive airstrikes, especially against Ukrainian drone teams, artillery positions, and ground lines of communications (GLOCs), north and west of the Vovcha River.
Russian forces are adjusting their logistics practices in response to Ukrainian intermediate-range drone strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows a Russian cargo truck on fire after a Ukrainian strike along the H-20 Donetsk City-Mariupol east of Berezove (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).[47] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on July 5 that Russian forces are transferring forces through Mariupol in small groups, under the cover of civilian transport, and with mobile fire groups.[48]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 4 and 5 but did not advance.[49]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on July 5 that Ukrainian forces have essentially stopped Russian advances in the Zaporizhia direction and forced Russian forces to move to an active defense in some areas.[50] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have cleared Prymorske (west of Orikhiv), seized the road junction between Prymorske and Stepnohirsk (south of Prymorske), and gained a foothold in Plavni (south of Stepnohirsk).[51] Mashovets reported that Russian forces maintain positions on the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk and conducted infiltration missions north of Stepove (southeast of Stepnohirsk). Mashovets noted that Russian forces have likely withdrawn their main forces from the area south of Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky (both just east of Stepove) but maintain a limited presence of infiltrators within both settlements. Mashovets reported that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in the Nesteryanka-Novoandriivka direction (southwest of Orikhiv) in an attempt to reach the dominant height west of Orikhiv. Mashovets stated that small Russian groups infiltrated the area northwest of Nesteryanka and north of the road between Shcherbaky and Novoandriivka. Mashovets acknowledged that Russian forces infiltrated north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv) and between Novodanylivka (between Orikhiv and Robotyne) and Novopokrovka (southeast of Orikhiv). Mashovets reported that Russian forces withdrew from areas near Mala Tokmachka, Bilohirya, and Luhivske (all southeast of Orikhiv).
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on July 5 that elements of the Russian 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are likely operating in the Orikhiv direction.[52] Mashovets previously forecasted in April 2026 that the Russian military command may have redeployed elements of the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to the Orikhiv direction.[53] ISW last observed elements of the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical areas as of July 3.[54]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 5.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Preobrazhenka (either roughly 42 or 67 kilometers from the frontline).[55] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck three electrical substations in occupied Kherson Oblast between July 1 and 5, including a substation in occupied Henichesk (roughly 116 kilometers from the frontline); a substation in occupied Overyanivka (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline); and an electrical substation transformer in occupied Preobrazhenka.[56] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence account reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Semenivka (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline), and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the depot.[57]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Hvardiiske military airfield, where Russian forces base operational-tactical and naval aviation aircraft and conduct combat sorties, logistics, and aircraft maintenance, on the night of July 4 to 5.[58] Magyar reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces struck 10 substations in occupied Crimea between July 1 and 5, including substations in Kovylne (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline), Stepne (roughly 127 kilometers from the frontline), Yany Kapu (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline), Traktove (either roughly 110 or 167 kilometers from the frontline), Nyva (one of several settlements between 120 and 262 kilometers from the frontline), Zymyne (roughly 138 kilometers from the frontline), Bakhchysarai (roughly 225 kilometers from the frontline), Saky (roughly 174 kilometers from the frontline), Karyerne (roughly 163 kilometers from the frontline), and Slovyanske (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[59]
Ukrainian strikes continue to inhibit train traffic through occupied Crimea. The Russian occupation Southern Suburban Passenger Company stated on July 5 that it is suspending traffic on the Bakhchysarai-Inkerman-1 railway section until further notice, likely due to Ukrainian strikes against Crimea.[60]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-31 anti-radar missile from the Black Sea and three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also launched 125 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 112 drones and the three Kh-59/69 missiles and noted that the Kh-31 missile did not reach its target. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that four drones struck three locations and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transportation, commercial, and residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and gas stations in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[62] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 5 that Russian forces launched about 2,200 strike drones, over 1,730 guided glide bombs, and 106 missiles of various types – almost half of which were ballistic missiles – in the past week (between June 28 and July 4).[63]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus continues to support Russia with gasoline supplies amidst intensifying gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported on July 5, citing data from Russian independent Center for Price Indexes, that Russian imports of Belarusian gasoline reached an all-time high of 141,000 tons from June 1 to June 25 – an increase in 2.4 times compared to all of May 2026.[64] Vedomosti noted, citing expert sources, that Russia imported only 1,000 tons of Belarusian gasoline in June 2025. Vedomosti noted that a sharp increase in Russian purchases of Belarusian gasoline will partially help the Kremlin stabilize the domestic fuel market but will not fully mitigate the gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-ss-105257; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19790 ;http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80225
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80225
[3] https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-ss-105257; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19790
[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80225
[5] https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/151
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/;
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/65295
[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/65316; https://t.me/mod_russia/65318
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ;
[12] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1053060433848724
[13] https://t.me/motopatriot78/53345; https://t.me/motopatriot78/53346
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2025/
[16] https://t.me/echoonline_news/27999
[17] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/5231 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/95650
[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/95645
[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/95648
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/ ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7960
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[22] https://t.me/aleksandr_shuvaev/516
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40761; https://t.me/wargonzo/35294; https://t.me/severnnyi/8587; https://t.me/severnnyi/8595
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/65308
[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12403; https://t.me/rt_russian/285507
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40761; https://t.me/severnnyi/8587;
[27] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073436728497455249 ; https://www.instagram.com/4otmbr.2mb.fpv/reel/DaDZ4o-NsTz/
[28] https://t.me/grvZapad/19059
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763; https://t.me/wargonzo/35294; https://t.me/grvZapad/19059
[30] https://t.me/grvZapad/19059
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40787
[32] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2557
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40761 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/65296 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/65314 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35294 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19059 ; https://t.me/divgen/82193
[34] https://t.me/divgen/82193
[35] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073427228164071591; https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/221
[36] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073431796281205085; https://t.me/VARTOVI_36/845; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073467148027019431; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073467159485813155; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073467136979148910
[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073454027770151175; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073454036397752388; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073454040386588793; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/34395; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073421618982830088; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073421638293413950; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073421645692227705; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073421649605509122; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073421653653012551; https://t.me/mod_russia/65260
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/
[39] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/67770
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40761 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35294 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/53347
[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/35302
[42] https://t.me/infomil_live/31386
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40788 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40761 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/118463
[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/05/u-pokrovsku-urazheno-punkt-pidgotovky-pilotiv-bpla-ta-instruktoriv-rubikon/ ; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BgJQWJx6S/
[45] https://t.me/sashakots/62930
[46] https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2073450068829483286?s=20
[47] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2073743659829215510; https://t.me/WS_videos/4203
[48] https://t.me/andriyshTime/62236
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40788; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40763 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40761; https://t.me/wargonzo/35294
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3485
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3485
[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3484
[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/
[54] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073097021498511859; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2073097059113005155
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40787
[56] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2557
[57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2073751675148325242; https://t.me/region_22ua/64515 https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;l:fires_all,countries,earth;@33.601,46.606,11.943z
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40787
[59] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2557
[60] https://ug-ppk dot ru/news/novosti/dvizhenie-prigorodnykh-poezdov-na-uchastke-bakhchisaray-inkerman-1-vremenno-priostanovleno/ ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1347618-u-krimu-prizupinili-ruh-elektricok-na-dilanci-bahcisaraj-inkerman-1
[61] https://t.me/kpszsu/67362
[62] https://t.me/synegubov/23501 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30638 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23494; https://t.me/synegubov/23497; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4259; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4261 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23491 ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2781 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1347430-rf-vdarila-po-azs-u-sumah-troh-zinok-ggospitalizuvali/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/67793; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43405; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43407; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43408
[63] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19801
[64] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/05/import-v-rossiyu-belorusskogo-benzina-dostig-istoricheskogo-maksimuma ; https://www dot vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2026/07/03/1210840-import-belorusskogo-benzina-v-iyune-dostig-rekorda
