Toplines
Russian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk as they continue prioritizing efforts to secure favorable positions east and southeast of the city in preparation for frontal assaults towards Slovyansk and the rest of the Fortress Belt. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forward units in the Slovyansk direction are advancing across several tactical areas simultaneously and added that the command of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) reinforces assault infantry presence immediately after successful infiltrations and the consolidation of positions.[1] Mashovets reported that Russian forces reached the southeastern outskirts of Pyskunivka (east of Slovyansk) from the east and northeast from positions they have seized on the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donetsk River, indicating that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Zakitne (northeast of Pyskunivka) and Kryva Luka (southeast of Pyskunivka).[2] Mashovets reported that Russian forces also infiltrated into the southern and southeastern outskirts of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) from western Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk). Russian forces are likely attempting to seize Mykolaivka to set conditions for future Russian attacks against Slovyansk from the east as Ukrainian defenses have stalled Russian efforts to advance from the Lyman and Yampil directions to the northeast. ISW observed evidence on August 22 indicating that Russian forces infiltrated south of Rai-Oleksandrivka.[3] ISW additionally observed reports on August 23 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian infiltration mission in Mykolaivka.[4] Mashovets reported that Russian forces also infiltrated through Markove and up to Zapovidne (both southeast of Slovyansk) and infiltrated through three other settlements along the E-40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway in an attempt to consolidate positions on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and reach the Siverskyi Donets River just east of Slovyansk.[5] Russian forces are likely prioritizing attacks on the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and from Rai-Oleksandrivka toward Mykolaivka in an attempt to seize local tactical heights and create more favorable conditions for an offensive against Slovyansk that bypasses difficult terrain and tough Ukrainian defenses to the northeast. Russian forces are thus conducting a dual tactical effort to connect elements operating near Kryva Luka and Rai-Oleksandrivka to launch an assault against the settlement simultaneously from dominant terrain to the east and south.
Russian forces prioritized offensive operations against Slovyansk from the northeast through Lyman at the beginning of their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive but have largely been unsuccessful in this direction.[6] Russian forces previously attempted to outflank Slovyansk from the northeast through Lyman, but strong Ukrainian defenses combined with difficult terrain and water features, including the Siverskyi Donets River that flows north and northeast of Slovyansk and surrounding canals, have challenged Russian advances from the northeast.[7] Russian forces likely view Mykolaivka as a primary tactical objective because its potential seizure would facilitate Russian assaults westward towards Slovyansk, bypassing difficult canalizing terrain features. It remains extremely unlikely that Russian forces will be able to achieve significant tactical or operational gains in the Slovyansk direction west of Mykolaivka rapidly, however, as Russian forces still must seize more settlements to set conditions for future attacks on Slovyansk from this direction. Russian forces have faced significant operational challenges since 2014 in efforts to seize Slovyansk and the northern portion of the Fortress Belt more broadly.[8]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to set unrealistic deadlines for the Russian military to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, likely in part because of his misunderstanding of the battlefield realities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 23 that Putin most recently ordered the Russian military to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast by December 31, 2026 and noted that Putin’s main operational objectives in Ukraine remain the seizure of Kostyantynivka, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk cities in Donetsk Oblast — all part of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt defense line.[9] Zelensky stated that Russian forces have suffered around 267,000 personnel casualties, including about 155,000 killed, along the entire frontline since the beginning of 2026 and that roughly 70 to 80 percent of all Russian losses occur in the Kostyantynivka direction. Zelensky added that the Kremlin is preparing to mobilize around 300,000 servicemembers following the September 18-20 State Duma elections in part to reinforce Russian positions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Putin has given Russian forces 15 separate deadlines since 2022 to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces have failed to meet any of them.[10] Russian forces control roughly 21,170 square kilometers (or roughly 79.89 percent) of Donetsk Oblast and roughly 26,624 square kilometers (or roughly 99.77 percent) of Luhansk Oblast, according to the evidence that ISW has observed. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s deadlines for its military objectives remain divorced from the reality of Russian forces’ battlefield performance and that Russian forces are highly unlikely to seize Donbas by the end of 2026, if at all.[11]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly presented a joint Ukraine-US-Europe proposal on August 23 to end the war in Ukraine that offers significant Ukrainian concessions even as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to refuse to compromise on any of their core demands. Zelensky stated on August 23 that Ukraine developed a negotiations proposal during talks with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, which outlines three key priorities to end the war: a ceasefire, a reciprocal withdrawal of Russian and Ukrainian forces from the current front line, and security guarantees from the European Union (EU) and NATO.[12] Zelensky noted that the US and European parties have already agreed to the proposal and that the US plans to discuss the plan with both Ukraine and Russia. Zelensky’s most recent peace proposal demonstrates Ukraine’s continuous determination to end the war even at the expense of significant concessions. The Kremlin, by contrast, has continuously rejected all Ukrainian, European, and US peace proposals and constantly reiterates its insistence on Ukrainian surrender to all its demands.[13] An unspecified source told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 23 that Witkoff and Kushner have indefinitely postponed their visits to Ukraine and Russia, but ISW has not observed any evidence to support or refute this claim.[14]
Ukrainian forces are conducting an intermediate-range strike campaign in occupied Ukraine, including occupied Crimea, and Russia, in a concerted effort to degrade Russia’s strike and air defense capabilities. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 23 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian Su-33 and MiG-29 fighter jets, an Orion-type strike and reconnaissance drone, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) unit, and integrated air-defense system (IADS) assets in Krasnodar Krai, Russia; air-defense sensors and SAM systems in Rostov Oblast, Russia; and air-surveillance radars in occupied Crimea.[15] Ukraine has intensified its intermediate- and long-range strikes through a sustained suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses campaign (SEAD / DEAD) in order to degrade Russia’s ability to reliably defend its rear areas in occupied Ukraine and southern Russia against Ukrainian strikes.[16]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk as they continue prioritizing efforts to secure favorable positions east and southeast of the city in preparation for frontal assaults towards Slovyansk and the rest of the Fortress Belt.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to set unrealistic deadlines for the Russian military to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast likely in part because of his misunderstanding of the battlefield realities.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly presented a joint Ukraine-US-Europe proposal on August 23 to end the war in Ukraine that offers significant Ukrainian concessions even as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to refuse to compromise on any of their core demands.
- Ukrainian forces are conducting an intermediate-range strike campaign in occupied Ukraine, including occupied Crimea, and Russia in a concerted effort to degrade Russia’s strike and air defense capabilities.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign targeting Russian logistics, fuel, and electrical infrastructure. Russian forces launched 127 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign targeting Russian logistics, fuel, and electrical infrastructure. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the 500 kV Taman electrical substation in Starotitarovskaya, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 267 kilometers from the frontline), between August 17 and 22.[17] Russian opposition source Astra reported on August 23 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kurskaya power substation in the Medvensky District, Kursk Oblast (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[18] Astra posted footage on August 23 showing smoke plumes rising from an Ozon warehouse (another analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) in Orenburg City, Orenburg Oblast, following a reported Ukrainian strike.[19] Orenburg City Mayor acknowledged on August 23 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at an Ozon logistics complex in Orenburg City.[20] The Ozon Logistics Complex claimed on August 23 that the company evacuated more than 300 employees following the Ukrainian strike, and that the company suspended all deliveries to its Orenburg Oblast warehouse.[21]
Ukrainian forces recently destroyed a Russian ballistic missile launcher near the international border. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 23 that Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M ballistic missile launcher in an unspecified location in Russia near the international border as part of Ukraine’s ongoing effort to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes by hitting launchers to mitigate Ukraine’s extreme shortage of interceptor missiles.[22]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Velykyi Prykil (east of Sumy City).[24]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers northwest of Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission according to geolocated footage published on August 23.[25]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized Lyman and advanced east of Hrafske and south of Starytsya (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[26]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on August 23, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-1500 glide bomb strike near Kurhanne (north of Velykyi Burluk).[28]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets and fuel infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a technical equipment warehouse near Chaiky, Belgorod Oblast (north of Kharkiv City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border).[30] Ukrainian forces struck a fuel service station near Urazovo, Belgorod Oblast (east of Velykyi Burluk and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border) according to geolocated footage published on August 23.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk on August 23, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[32]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast and southeast of Borova on August 22 and 23 but did not advance.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian electrical and logistics infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit near occupied Kadiivka (roughly 57 kilometers from the frontline).[34] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert ”Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck three electrical substations near occupied Novodarivka (roughly either 132 or 135 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Rovenky (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Babycheve (roughly 28 kilometers from the frontline).[35] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the 500 kV electrical substation “Pobeda” near occupied Prokhladne, Donetsk Oblast, but Brovdi was very likely referring to occupied Prokhladne, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline).
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
See topline text for additional reports on Russian offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction.
Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, purposefully hunting civilians. Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Ukrainian civilian on a bicycle west of Pershomarivka (just east of Kramatorsk and north of Kostyantynivka) according to geolocated footage published on August 22.[36] Russian opposition source Astra noted that the official Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) posted the footage showing elements of its 2nd Artillery Brigade striking the civilian with an FPV drone before subsequently deleting the footage, likely because it appears to show an unequivocal war crime.[37] Russian forces conducted an FPV drone strike against a civilian car near Druzhkivka, killing one and injuring another according to geolocated footage published on August 22.[38] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war and encourages Russian forces to commit war crimes.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 22 and 23 but did not advance.[40] Russian forces conducted four FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Bilozerske (north of Dobropillya) and five FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against a Ukrainian position north of Svyathorivka (west of Dobropillya) according to geolocated footage published on August 22.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 22 and 23 but did not advance.[42]
Russian forces are reportedly resuming assault operations north of Pokrovsk toward Dobropillya. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 23 that Russian forces have intensified first-person view (FPV) and Molniya drone strikes and have accumulated reserves to resume intensified assault operations in preparation for assaults toward Dobropillya.[43] The brigade noted that Russian forces mainly move on foot and have decreased the use of transport equipment. Russian efforts in this sector are likely intended to form the southern part of a wide encirclement of the Ukrainian fortress belt together with Russian offensive operations north of Slovyansk.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on August 22 and 23 but did not advance.[44]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range drone strike campaign against energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck several electrical substations in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including electrical substations near occupied Hirne (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline), Urzuf (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline), Topolyne (roughly 92 kilometers from the frontline), Mykilske (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline), and Dukuchaievsk (roughly 71 kilometers from the frontline).[45]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 22 and 23 but did not advance.[46]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian electrical substations near occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Bilmak (roughly 44 kilometers from the frontline) between August 17 and 22.[47]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 23.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range drone strike campaign against energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 22 that Ukrainian forces struck 27 power plants in occupied southern Ukraine and Crimea between August 17 and 22, bringing the total number of struck power plants to 267 between August 1 and August 22.[48] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck 36 Russian vessels in the Azov and Black Seas between August 1 and August 22, bringing the total of struck Russian vessels to 242 since the start of the Ukrainian strike campaign on July 6, 2026. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a gas turbine power plant and an electrical substation in occupied Karierne (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline); a gas turbine power plant in occupied Naumivka (roughly 162 kilometers from the frontline); gas distribution stations in occupied Yevpatoria and occupied Olenivka (roughly 151 and 128 kilometers from the frontline, respectively); the Ternivka gas distribution station in occupied Kholmivka (roughly 235 kilometers from the frontline); the Volodymyrivka gas distribution center in Volodymyrivka (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline); and electrical substations in occupied Klyuchi (roughly 206 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Shchevbetivka (roughly 243 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Alupka (roughly 270 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Ponyzivka (roughly 268 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Haspra (roughly 270 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Malyi Mayak (roughly 258 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Hannivka (roughly 192 kilometers from the frontline).
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[49]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 127 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Crimea.[50] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 97 drones, that 27 strike drones hit 22 locations, and that drone debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged agricultural, residential and electrical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[51]
Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian railway infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported on August 23 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap Geran-type drone strike against an electric train at the Lymanivka station in Kharkiv Oblast, killing one and injuring four civilians.[52] The Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) Board Chairman reported that Russian forces struck a Zhytomyr-Odesa passenger train on August 23, which had 593 people onboard, including 15 children, but did not cause any injuries because Ukrainian officials were able to recognize the threat and evacuate the train in time.[53]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3568
[2] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3567
[3] https://t.me/edelweiss10tg/2938
[4] https://t.me/nikolaevka_online/33458
[5] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3568
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-geospatial-intelligence-terrain-analysis/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-6/
[9] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1385566-kostantinivka-slovansk-ta-kramatorsk-e-golovnimi-napramkami-rosijskogo-nastupu-zelenskij/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25-24/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/
[12] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/ukraine-us-agree-on-key-ideas-to-end-the-1787493402.html
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025/;
[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/391644
[15] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2755
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[17] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2754
[18] https://t.me/astrapress/123016
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/122959
[20] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/23/ukrainskie-drony-atakovali-vtoroy-sklad-ozon-v-orenburge; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-online-retailer-ozon-warehouse-orenburg-region-hit-drone-attack-governor-2026-08-23/
[22] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4156766-ukrainski-vijskovi-urazili-rosijsku-puskovu-ustanovku-iskander-poblizu-nasih-kordoniv-zelenskij.html
[23]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36381 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9105
[24] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33735
[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12770; https://t.me/ombr72/12482
[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33738
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/36381
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/66715
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987
[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41990
[31] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2091462990784540791 ; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4032
[32] https://t.me/grvZapad/19535
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19535
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41990
[35] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2754
[36] https://x.com/JoKo47696474602/status/2091296821435875764; https://x.com/Monitor807/status/2091240011853173108; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2091426045689737288
[37] https://t.me/astrapress/122978
[38] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2091454463202476091; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2091454941898412181; https://t.me/Hollander2022/2165
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987
[41] https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2091199141682495800; https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2091199280518173067; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30697; https://t.me/Osintpen/3378; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30709
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41984; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987
[43] https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1543054274529004&set=a.299468502220927
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987
[45] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2754
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41984 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36381 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20807
[47] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2754
[48] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2754
[49] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[50] https://t.me/kpszsu/74113
[51]https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1E3e8Vd7DX/ ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31259 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25040 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/198w1GGexE/ ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17xJxVbabQ/?mibextid=wwXIfr ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/44504 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46706
[52] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1385740-rf-vdarila-po-elektricci-u-lozivskij-gromadi-e-zagibla-sered-poranenih-ditina/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/11095
[53] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/197CS7PAbr
