Toplines
Ukrainian forces appear to be conducting a concerted suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Russian air defense assets in Russian border regions as part of their broader campaign targeting Russian economic and military assets within Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian MiG-29 fighter jet and a Kamov Ka-52 helicopter at the Millerovo Air Base in Dolotinka, two air-surveillance radars and an air-defense sensor in Rostov Oblast, and an air surveillance radar system and a shelter for the Zala-type reconnaissance drone crew in occupied Crimea on the night of August 23 to 24.[1] Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking the MiG-29 fighter jet.[2] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a series of strikes against Russian strike and air defense assets in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea on the night of August 22 to 23.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukraine’s August 23 strike damaged Russian Su-33 and MiG-29 fighter jets and an Orion-type strike and reconnaissance drone in Krasnodar Krai.[4] Geolocated footage published on August 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian aircraft in Krasnodar Krai.[5]
Ukrainian forces also struck Ozon (another Russian analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) logistics centers in Makhachkala, the Republic of Dagestan; Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai; and Enem, the Republic of Adygea on the night of August 23 to 24, according to geolocated footage published on August 24.[6] The Ozon Press Service confirmed on August 24 that Ukrainian strikes caused fires at logistics centers in the Republic of Dagestan and Krasnodar Krai.[7] ISW has observed evidence of Ukrainian forces intensifying their strike campaign against Ozon warehouses since August 22.[8] Russian forces have been heavily targeting Wildberries logistics centers across Russia since roughly July 17 and are now appearing to be expanding their strike campaign to Ozon warehouses as part of Ukraine’s systematic strike campaign against Russian marketplaces.[9]
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the widespread nationalization of Russian private assets under the broad pretext of defending critical enterprises against Ukrainian strikes, likely in part to generate additional state revenues. Putin signed a decree on August 24 that authorizes the Russian government to seize Russian “critical infrastructure facilities” that fail to adequately protect their assets, including against drone strikes, or restore a damaged facility in a timely manner.[10] The decree defines “critical infrastructure facilities” as any fuel, energy, industrial, communications, utilities, transport, or essential services facilities, and essentially allows the Kremlin to seize any enterprise of its choice, leaving almost all privately-owned infrastructure in Russia vulnerable to nationalization. The decree allows the Russian government to assume “temporary management” over critical facilities that can end only at Putin’s personal discretion, setting conditions for Russia’s indefinite seizure of private assets. The decree designates the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) — an entity responsible for channeling revenues from Russian nationalized property into the Russian federal budget — as the manager for any property seized under the decree.[11] The Kremlin could also use the decree to alleviate the burden from the strained Russian economy and avoid subsidizing Russian private enterprises, such as Wildberries and Ozon, which Ukrainian strikes have extensively damaged.[12] ISW has repeatedly assessed that Putin is becoming increasingly desperate for economic relief as the financial cost of the war in Ukraine rises and is likely setting conditions for the broader nationalization of private assets to support state revenues.[13]
Russia is introducing additional relief measures for Russian enterprises in an effort to mitigate economic damage that Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign imposes. The Russian Ministry of Finance reportedly proposed on August 24 the extension of tax and insurance payment deadlines for Wildberries and other retailers and legal entities until July 28, 2027.[14] The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed that the government would provide support to legal entities and individual entrepreneurs whose losses exceed five percent of their annual income. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed that these support measures will reduce the financial burden on affected entrepreneurs and will help enterprises resume operations.
Russian milbloggers have recently acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian marketplaces has strained the Russian economy and have criticized Russian marketplaces for taking advantage of Russian state benefits. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Ozon and Wildberries collectively employ over 1.2 million sellers and deliver goods to collectively 100 million customers in Russia.[15] The milblogger claimed that Russia will attempt to redistribute Ozon’s logistical flows and strengthen its air defense to protect its assets against further Ukrainian strikes. A Russian insider source claimed on August 24 that Wildberries has been seeking money from the Russian government to repair the damage from strikes instead of strengthening the security of its facilities on its own.[16] The source also added that Ozon’s entire policy is based on the desire to maintain “excess profits.” The Kremlin appears to be attempting to alleviate the burden from Russian business owners at the expense of economic efficiency, likely in an effort to appease an increasingly dissatisfied population amidst intensifying Ukrainian strikes.[17]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to protect an aging cadre of loyalists by manipulating mandatory retirement ages, this time extending Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin’s term until August 7, 2027.[18] Bastrykin has served as the Russian Investigative Committee Head since 2010 and will turn 73 years old in August 2026, reaching the standard mandatory retirement age.[19] Putin notably signed a law in March 2021 that removes the mandatory retirement age for senior presidential appointees, allowing them to serve past the age of 70.[20] Putin also amended another law in October 2024 that states that an Investigative Committee official can serve until the maximum age of 65 in order to allow Bastrykin to serve until he turns 70.[21] Putin appears to continue to raise the retirement age of government and military officials to retain an aging cadre of loyalists and keep his inner circle in positions of power.[22] Putin’s repeated extension of Bastrykin’s term likely indicates that Putin will continue using Bastrykin’s leadership of the Investigative Committee to support Putin’s escalating campaign to nationalize Russian economic assets and maintain Putin’s domestic law enforcement priorities.[23]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces appear to be conducting a concerted suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Russian air defense assets in Russian border regions as part of their broader campaign targeting Russian economic and military assets within Russia and occupied Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the widespread nationalization of Russian private assets under the broad pretext of defending critical enterprises against Ukrainian strikes, likely in part to generate additional state revenues.
- Russia is introducing additional relief measures for Russian enterprises in an effort to mitigate economic damage that Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign imposes.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to protect an aging cadre of loyalists by manipulating mandatory retirement ages, this time extending Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin’s term until August 7, 2027.
- Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, six Kh-31P/Kh-59 guided aerial missiles, and 143 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk and Hulyaipole directions and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kamensky military-industrial plant in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces rocket fuel for multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) munitions, as well as other missile systems and air-launched weapons. Geolocated footage published on August 23 shows smoke plumes rising from the 91st Central Reserve Automotive Equipment Base (Military unit 48670) in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky.[25] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi also reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai.[26] Geolocated imagery published on August 23 shows smoke rising from a substation in Kursk Oblast, reportedly following a Ukrainian strike.[27]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 23 and 24 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 24 that Russian forces seized Pershe Travnya (northwest of Sumy City).[29]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 23 and 24 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 24 but did not advance.[32] Russian forces struck a claimed Ukrainian observation post in Prykolotne (north of Velykyi Burluk) using a FAB-3000 glide bomb, according to geolocated footage published on August 24.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 23 and 24 but did not advance.[34]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 23 and 24 but did not advance. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in a windbreak east of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova), according to geolocated footage published on August 23, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area despite Russian claims.[35]
Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian logistics and infrastructure in the Borova and Kupyansk directions. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces are prioritizing coordinated strikes to counter Ukrainian drone capabilities and disrupt Ukrainian logistics in Izyum (southwest of Borova).[36] The Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are repeatedly striking Izyum and are likely targeting Ukrainian temporary deployment points, communications stations, and ammunition depots in the area due to its function as a Ukrainian rear logistics and command hub.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian fuel and logistics infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck material and technical warehouses in occupied Stepne (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline) and Khrustalne (roughly 86 kilometers from the frontline).[37] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot in occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline).[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Dibrova (southwest of Lyman) according to geolocated footage published on August 23.[39]
Russian forces continue attempts to isolate Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk). A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces are attempting to isolate fortified Ukrainian positions between Mykolaivka and Slovyansk, building off the August 18 claimed seizure of Orikhuvatka (south of Mykolaivka).[40] The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces have not established firm positions in Zapovidne (southwest of Orikhuvatka), however, and that the area surrounding the settlement remains a contested gray zone.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on August 23 and 24 but did not advance.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 23 and 24 but did not make confirmed advances.[42] The Russian MoD claimed on August 24 that Russian forces seized Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[43]
Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Hannivka (just north of Dobropillya) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on August 22.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions on August 23 and 24 but did not advance.[45]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone laboratory of the Russian 89th Separate Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) (reportedly of the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Vilkhivchyk (formerly Novopetrivka) (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline).[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Staromlynivka (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline).[47]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction. Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian infiltrators from central and southern Novosoloshyne (northwest of Hulyaipole) and northern Shyroke (west of Hulyaipole) according to geolocated footage published on August 23.[48]
Russian sources continue to post likely AI-altered footage of flag-raising events as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at exaggerating Russian advances. Russian sources published likely AI-altered footage on August 23 purporting to show elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[49] The Russian MoD subsequently claimed that Russian forces seized Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[50]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Orikhiv according to geolocated footage published on August 23.[51]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and technological infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck several Russian material and technical warehouses near occupied Viktorivka (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline).[52] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck the Arkhangel drone training facility in occupied Kyrylivka (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline).[53]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 24.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and personnel in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Strilkove (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline).[54] Brovdi reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Rosgvardia base in occupied Strilkove and a Geran-type strike drone relay system in occupied Zaliznyi Port (roughly 47 kilometers from the frontline).[55] Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone operators in Oleshky (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) using a MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jet and Armement Air-Sol Modulaire guided bombs, according to geolocated footage published on August 24.[56]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range drone strike campaign against military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff and Brovdi reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ST-68 radar station in occupied Rozdolne (roughly 111 kilometers from the frontline).[57] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on August 24 that Ukrainian forces likely struck a power substation in Saki Raion (roughly 175 kilometers from the frontline) and an aircraft parking lot at the Dzhankoi military airfield (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline).[58] The source also reported overnight power outages in occupied Yalta (roughly 261 kilometers from the frontline) following presumed Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.[59]
Russian authorities instituted a temporary maritime ban on sailing off the southwestern coast of occupied Crimea. A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on August 24 that Russian naval authorities issued a ban in effect from August 26 until September 5 on sailing off the southwestern coasts of occupied Crimea between Cape Tarkhakut and Cape Sarych.[60] The source did not provide an explanation for the ban.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[61]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles from occupied Crimea; six Kh-31P/Kh-59 guided aerial missiles from the Black Sea; and 143 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Banderol-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and Hvardiiske, occupied Crimea.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed one Onyx anti-ship missile, two Kh-31P/Kh-59, two Banderol guided aerial missiles, and 109 drones; that an unspecified number of aerial systems hit 22 locations; and that drone debris fell at five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, transportation, port, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Odesa oblasts.[63] The Main Directorate of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reported on August 23 that Russian forces struck an armored rescue vehicle responding to an emergency in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast.[64] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on August 24 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[65]
Russian forces continue to strike gas stations across Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported on August 23 and 24 that Russian forces struck gas stations in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts.[66]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko issued a statement congratulating Ukraine on its Independence Day. Lukashenko congratulated Ukraine on its Independence Day on August 24 and stated that he is confident that Belarusians and Ukrainians will preserve their “unbreakable” ties and restore mutually beneficial cooperation, despite the present geopolitical turmoil.[67] Lukashenko added that Belarus remains open to Ukrainians regardless of how much external forces pull both countries in different directions, and expressed hope that Ukrainians find their “own answers” to the challenges facing Ukraine.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[2] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091857867531866115; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2091851358034923890; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2091869094374981950; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2091662133595435331
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[4] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42003 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[5] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091564800237039718?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091564802178949469?s=20 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2755
[6] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091677212655100081; https://x.com/thetect0nic/status/2091692417573417014; https://x.com/thetect0nic/status/2091677878840684741; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091663497205613004; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2091657657807741434; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091646566289346856; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091642773858300111; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091644862718169445; https://t.me/warriorsukrainian/118166 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091811191328854209; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2091677212655100081; https://x.com/thetect0nic/status/2091692417573417014; https://x.com/thetect0nic/status/2091677878840684741
[7] https://ir dot ozon.com/ru/sth/ozon-soobshchaet-ob-intsidentah-na-skladah-31a8234e?_rr=1&abt_att=1&origin_referer=yandex.com ; https://t.me/tass_agency/391688 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/391671
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/
[10] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202608240009
[11] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202304250033
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/
[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/amp/1110886
[15] https://t.me/dva_majors/97884
[16] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2300
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/
[18] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202608240011
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/
[21] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-prodlenii-polnomochiy-glavy-sk-posle-70-let/33158190.html ; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/10/24/how-russia-returned-to-gerontocracy-a86797
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2025/
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42002
[25] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2091828386268155988; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2091726235168829619; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2091732430885683657; https://x.com/Vijesti11111/status/2091763987138449886
[26] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[27] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091595381649944671?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091595386536304968?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091596262306906265?s=20
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41991 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36402 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9114
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/66742
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41991 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36402 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9114 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46817
[31] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15907
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994
[33] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30720 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3384
[34]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41991 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36402 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19544 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9114
[35] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2091653130832511323 ; https://t.me/operationall_space/12912
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46792
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42003
[38] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[39] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2091631118059790707 ; https://t.me/BV25org/3222 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12778
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46809 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41991 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36402 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46815
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41991 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55442 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36402 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121814
[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/66744
[44] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2091554311461298534; https://t.me/zola_of_renovation/19481
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41994 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41991 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121814
[46] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42003
[48] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5500 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2091559564961321129 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2091564182479208541 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12775
[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/20823 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2091815607641456800 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12780 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3387
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/66742
[51] https://t.me/ZS42MSD/8789 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2091553447728533845
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42003
[53] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42003
[55] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[56] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091623806259322884?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2091623808213954895?s=20 ; https://t.me/forpost_34/388
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42003; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2760
[58] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108014; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108016
[59] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108028
[60] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108035
[61] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/74294
[63] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19ohoLYd9J/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31296; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4250 https://t.me/bryzynskyi/4330; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31309; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31318 ; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4276; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31579; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4526; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4529; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4530; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02eUEN2pWDKUkuvvZpRJdcwTHhcqECZrjUukqXjNwA3Pzjj1dwEeRsRetVzrT1Q6Sml; https://suspilne dot media/1385936-den-nezaleznosti-ukraini-do-kieva-pribuli-evropejski-lideri-1643-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787555722&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1386182-ne-culi-zvuku-drona-ocevidci-rozpovili-pro-ataku-rf-na-epicentr-v-odesi/ https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72528
[64] https://www.facebook.com/DSNSDon/posts/pfbid02DUFNXztVMZtBrskqnL5mikwCg6jUM9Js97TnE6QeZQgXpCsRebJFtHPEgS299wCBl
[65] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7671 ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5346
[66] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19ohoLYd9J/ ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1385906-rosiani-atakuvali-azs-na-cernigivsini-poranena-59-ricna-pracivnica-avtozapravnoi-stancii/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31296; https://x.com/99Dominik/status/2091801559025787244; https://x.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2091741801199919111; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4529; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4530 https://suspilne dot media/1385936-den-nezaleznosti-ukraini-do-kieva-pribuli-evropejski-lideri-1643-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787555722&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[67] https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/pozdravlenie-narodu-ukrainy; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-uveren-chto-belarus-i-ukraina-v-buduschem-vosstanovjat-vzaimovygodnoe-sotrudnichestvo-797229-2026/; https://t.me/pul_1/22432
