Toplines
Russia is escalating strikes against Ukrainian-Moldovan border infrastructure in conjunction with its campaign against Ukrainian port and maritime infrastructure. Russian forces have increasingly targeted Ukraine-Moldova border infrastructure along key routes that Ukraine uses to conduct imports and exports with Europe in August 2026.[1] Russian forces have struck the Zatoka and Mayakyi bridges (southwest and west of Odesa City respectively), as well as the Vynohradivka-Vulcănești, Reni-Giurgiulești, and Tabakyi border crossings (all northwest of Izmail) between late July and late August 2026.[2] A Ukrainian State Border Guards Service spokesperson stated on August 25 that Russian forces struck border crossings along the Moldova-Odesa Oblast border three times since August 20.[3] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are striking Ukraine’s transportation and border infrastructure to disrupt its international ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Moldova. Russian forces are likely increasingly targeting Ukrainian GLOCs in this area to further disrupt Ukraine’s land-based export routes amid its parallel campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure affecting Ukraine’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to specifically prevent Ukrainian grain exports and generally degrade the Ukrainian economy.[4] Russian forces are likely intensifying such strikes as part of a dual effort to both isolate Ukraine from Europe and degrade Ukraine’s ability to export grain and other exports, while also creating an environment of insecurity to dissuade Moldova, Romania, and international shippers from using these crossings.
Russian forces are using the strikes along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to achieve broader political effects. Russian military leadership is increasingly incorporating strikes on Ukraine’s border areas into its broader strike packages as an intimidation tactic meant to create a perception that Moldovan accession into any western structures becomes a liability to those structures. These Russian strikes increase regional political and commercial risks as Russia seeks to deter Romania and Moldova from supporting Ukraine. Russia is increasingly acceptant of the risk that strikes in border areas pose and is increasingly using them to test Moldovan and NATO responses to incursions and their air defenses while normalizing these violations.
The Kremlin is attempting to address concerns about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree that set conditions for nationalization of critical infrastructure facilities. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov claimed on August 24 that Putin’s decree authorizing the Russian government to take over management of critical infrastructure facilities failing to adequately protect their assets against drone strikes or other security threats or to restore a damaged facility in a timely manner does not entail nationalization, but rather temporary management to address security-related risks.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 25 that Russian critical infrastructure facilities face the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes, but their owners do not always pay due attention to security.[6] Putin’s August 24 decree fails to specify the requirements or deadlines that could trigger the temporary management takeover that can only end at Putin’s personal discretion, however, setting conditions for Russia’s indefinite seizure of private assets.[7] Kremlin officials are likely rushing to address the opacity of the original decree, as Russian information space voices have questioned its practicality or enforceability.[8]
Russian official statements do not appear to have calmed the nerves of the Russian domestic populace and business community, however. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on August 24 that the mechanism raised questions among experts and market participants due to the unclear grounds for initiating the management takeover and the responsibility boundaries between facility owners and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[9] Independent Russian media outlet The Bell reported on August 24 that it is difficult for private companies to protect their facilities, since only Rosgvardia (Russia’s heavily militarized internal security force), the Russian MoD, security and intelligence agencies, and private military contractors can interfere with a drone in any way, including by jamming its signal, shooting at it, or intercepting it.[10] The decree in its current form does not meaningfully contribute to Russian efforts to protect critical infrastructure facilities but rather sets conditions for widespread nationalization of Russian private assets under the pretext of defending critical enterprises against Ukrainian strikes.
Russia launched another satellite into orbit on August 24 for military purposes, potentially as part of its broader efforts to establish a Rassvet (Russian analogue to Starlink) satellite constellation. The Russian MoD reported that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) launched a Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle with an unspecified payload from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast and successfully inserted the spacecraft into an orbit on the morning of August 24.[11] The Russian MoD reported that VKS ground assets established communication with the spacecraft and assumed operational control over the system. Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed that Soyuz-2.1b may have been carrying a GLONASS-K1 satellite as part of Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) but noted that there is currently insufficient data to confirm the payload.[12] ISW cannot independently verify the type or status of the spacecraft.
Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to strike the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on August 23, likely in an attempt to prevent Russian forces from launching the satellite into orbit.[13] Russian forces have previously used the Plesetsk Cosmodrome to test-launch Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) satellites for Russia’s Rassvet constellation and other military satellites, including GLONASS.[14] Ukrainian forces have previously struck several Russian rocket-production and launch sites and space communications centers in an effort to prevent Russia from launching satellites into orbit and establishing the Rassvet constellation.[15]
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe reportedly arrived in Moscow on an unscheduled trip, marking what would be Ratcliffe’s first visit to Russia since becoming CIA director. Sources familiar with the situation told CBS on August 25 that Ratcliffe arrived in Moscow City for unspecified meetings, and flight data indicates that a US Air Force plane landed at Vnukovo Airport in Moscow City on the morning of August 25 and departed four hours later.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied any knowledge of a US military plane landing at any Moscow Airport.[17]
Key Takeaways
- Russia is escalating strikes against Ukrainian-Moldovan border infrastructure in conjunction with its campaign against Ukrainian port and maritime infrastructure.
- Russian forces are using the strikes along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to achieve broader political effects.
- The Kremlin is attempting to address concerns about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree that set conditions for nationalization of critical infrastructure facilities.
- Russia launched another satellite into orbit on August 24 for military purposes, potentially as part of its broader efforts to establish a Rassvet (Russian analogue to Starlink) satellite constellation.
- US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe reportedly arrived in Moscow on an unscheduled trip, marking what would be Ratcliffe’s first visit to Russia since becoming CIA director.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and energy infrastructure. Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 150 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 375 kilometers from the frontline), which is a key refining enterprise in southern Russia with a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year.[18] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev confirmed a fire at the refinery.[19] Satellite imagery taken on the morning of August 25 shows smoke plums rising from the Afipsky refinery.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and damaged two gas separation units at the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant in Astrakhan Oblast (roughly 630 kilometers from the international border), which produces natural gas, gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, liquefied hydrocarbon gas, and technical sulfur and has a processing capacity of up to 12 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar reported that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast (roughly 190 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 24 to 25 and caused the facility to suspend operations.[21]
Ukrainian and Russian sources provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 25 that Ukraine’s August 24 strikes against the Millerovo Air Base in Rostov Oblast damaged a Russian MiG-29 fighter jet.[22] Russian Lukoil Permnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Perm Krai has reportedly ceased operations as of August 24 following Ukraine’s August 21 strike.[23]
The Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian Black Sea ports is causing severe export bottlenecks and losses for the Russian agricultural sector. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on August 24 that the Russian grain market is suffering a steep decline due to intensifying Ukrainian strikes against Russian grain terminals in the Azov-Black Sea basin, which account for 88 percent of Russian grain export capacity.[24] The price of fourth-class wheat in southern Russia reportedly fell by 19 percent between August 17 and 23, and the forecast for August exports fell from 3.1 to 1.8 million tons of wheat and decreased to 44.6 million tons for the harvest season in 2026 and 2027.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances, as Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 25 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Vovkivka and southeast of Brusky (both northwest of Sumy City).[26] The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces control Novokostyantynivka (formerly Pershe Travnya) (north of Sumy City), contrary to the Russian MoD’s August 24 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[27]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 25 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Zemlyanyi Yar (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 24 and 25 but did not advance.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk. A Ukrainian assault regiment reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces liberated northern Zapadne and advanced southwest of Dvorichna (both north of Kupyansk).[31]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian artillery position northeast of Nove according to geolocated footage published on August 18, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely regained control over Katerynivka and Nove (both southeast of Borova), advanced east of Novomykhailivka (east of Borova), and maintain control over Novyi Myr (southeast of Borova) contrary to Russian claims.[32] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Ridkodub-Nove line (southeast of Borova) and continue attacking Russian positions from the north to slow Russian advances in the area.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian technological infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Peresvet-M specialized electronic warfare (EW) system in occupied Luhansk City.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman and east of Slovyansk on August 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Ozerne (southeast of Lyman) and advanced northwest and south of the settlement, as well as west of Pyskunivka and southeast of Mykolaivka (both east of Slovyansk).[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on August 24 and 25 but did not advance.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[38] The Russian MoD claimed on August 25 that Russian forces seized Hannivka (just north of Dobropillya).[39] ISW observed evidence that Ukrainian forces were operating within Hannivka as of August 22.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions on August 24 and 25 but did not advance.[41]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on August 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian cargo train west of occupied Rybynske, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 77 kilometers from the frontline).[42]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 24 and 25 but did not advance.[43] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian “Spirit-030” portable satellite Internet terminal that Russian forces were using as a Starlink alternative.[44]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24 and 25 but did not advance.[45]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and technological infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel, lubricants, and ammunition depot in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 103 kilometers from the frontline) and several materiel warehouses in occupied Prymorske (roughly 91 kilometers from the frontline).[46] A Ukrainian regiment commander reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics hub in a former Epicenter shopping center in occupied Melitopol (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[47]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 25.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Starlink satellite communications jamming station in occupied Myrne (roughly 206 kilometers from the frontline).[48]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[49]
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast; a Kh-31P anti-radiation missile from Bryansk Oblast; and 150 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Parodiya-type drones, including jet-powered drones, from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and Hvardiiske, occupied Crimea.[50] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 124 drones, that an unspecified number of aerial systems hit 17 locations, and that drone debris fell at seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, logistical, agricultural, and railway infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[51] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts.[52]
Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian railway infrastructure. Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) CEO Oleksandr Pertsovsk reported on August 25 that Russian forces struck a commuter train in Mykolaiv Oblast.[53]
Russian forces have begun limited deployment of fully autonomous fixed-wing strike drones. Ukrainian military experts and officials told the New York Times (NYT) on August 24 that a Russian fully autonomous AI-guided Molniya-type fixed-wing strike drone hit a gas station in Zaporizhzhia City on July 6.[54] NYT stated that drone debris analysis suggests that the drone was equipped with the Nvidia Jetson Orin computer module and that the drone used computer vision to autonomously target and strike the gas station. Russian use of fully autonomous strike systems that lack human oversight to verify targets is likely to lead to intensified civilian casualties and other mistakes, complicating the attribution of responsibility for war crimes.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/izmail.rda/posts/pfbid0fat8wr1T9hNQmxkwVbomzirQvUD5fvTffASuyC1fXURAKFvyB56E6wFCCP21cuuNl; https://www.facebook.com/SouthernBorderUkraine/posts/pfbid0bzWXzPcZfAEkEBa1PWurNPjTve13KJjYQWh2nNBFUVZzWjbynJ9LTj1V27xRM849l; https://t.me/DPSUkr/34665; https://t.me/UkraineCustoms/6526; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20452; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[2] https://www.facebook.com/izmail.rda/posts/pfbid0fat8wr1T9hNQmxkwVbomzirQvUD5fvTffASuyC1fXURAKFvyB56E6wFCCP21cuuNl; https://www.facebook.com/SouthernBorderUkraine/posts/pfbid0bzWXzPcZfAEkEBa1PWurNPjTve13KJjYQWh2nNBFUVZzWjbynJ9LTj1V27xRM849l; https://t.me/DPSUkr/34665; https://t.me/UkraineCustoms/6526; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20452; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[3] https://suspilne dot media/1386810-ukraina-otrimala-tehnologii-storm-shadow-rf-vdarila-po-cernigivsini-postrazdali-diti1644-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787658727&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/391816 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/391817
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/391906
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/
[8] https://t.me/sashakots/63952; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/26239
[9] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8907413
[10] https://thebell dot io/chto-oznachaet-ukaz-putina-ob-otbore-nezashchishchennogo-biznesa-nvidia-prismotrelas-k-ocherednoy-ii-kompanii-kane-uesta-otmenyayut-po-zvonku
[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/66735 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/391719 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66740
[12] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-launches-soyuz-2-1b-rocket-carrying-unknown-military-satellite/
[13] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinski-drony-doletily-do-arhangelskoyi-oblasti-zvidky-zapuskayut-suputnyky-rassvet-ta-mbr/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/123045 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/117780 ; https://t.me/severrealii/34130
[14] https://x.com/mod_russia/status/1516887801098289154 ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2024/09/23/7476345/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79724 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/
[16] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-director-john-ratcliffe-russia-secret-trip/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/25/vo-vnukovo-priletel-voenno-transportnyy-samolet-vvs-ssha-kogo-on-privez-neizvestno; https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/rch4555#41572b9e;
[17] https://tass dot ru/politika/28042945 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/391910
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42012
[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/391859 ; https://t.me/kondratyevvi/10916
[20] https://x.com/kromark/status/2092196270647443956; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2092121653568209354
[21] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/6795
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42014 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/
[23] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-perm-oil-refinery-halted-operations-after-august-21-drone-attack-sources-2026-08-24/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[24] https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/rf-vtrachaie-zernovyi-eksport-zupynka-portiv-koshtuvatyme-moskvi-milyardy; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/25/rosijskyj-zernovyj-eksport-sypletsya-cziny-na-pshenyczyu-vpaly-na-19/
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007; https://t.me/wargonzo/36427; https://t.me/severnnyi/9125
[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/3375; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33759
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122145319701020644&id=61580619330534&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=eu8jvrYBEHEhftNk ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1386962-novokostantinivka-na-sumsini-zalisaetsa-pid-kontrolem-sil-oboroni-ukraini-uv-kursk/
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36427 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9125
[29] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55486
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9125
[31] https://t.me/rug_international/507 ; https://armyinform [dot] com.ua/2026/08/25/shturmovyj-polk-r-u-g-zvilnyv-lisovyj-masyv-na-kup%ca%bcyanshhyni/ ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19566
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12787 ; https://t.me/endspiell/4196
[33] https://t.me/grvZapad/19558
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42014
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36427 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19558
[36] https://t.me/divgen/83441 ; https://t.me/divgen/83436
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36427
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007 ; https://t.me/rybar/82667
[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/66762
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007
[42] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2092214643221516549; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2092180905863287194
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007; https://t.me/wargonzo/36427
[44] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1434518065402934 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1386906-zsu-znisili-rosijskij-zaminnik-starlink-na-gulajpilskomu-napramku/
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42005; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42007; https://t.me/wargonzo/36427 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46826
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42014
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/25/u-melitopoli-znyshheno-logistychnyj-hab-yakyj-okupanty-oblashtuvaly-v-kolyshnomu-epiczentri-detali-operacziyi/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42014;
[49] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[50] https://t.me/kpszsu/74399
[51] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31347; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4279; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4281; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4284; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4285; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1386862-zaginuli-korovi-na-fermi-gorili-3-000-m-na-odnomu-z-pidpriemstv-vid-vecora-i-protagom-noci-rf-atakuvala-korukivsinu/; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28304; https://www.facebook.com/policechernigivshchini/posts/pfbid04Sv33GjjtBAzg9pvR8MXCqviExvJVu49GWW9ErdpygWgsk4CJfBkypq6rtrQgPLrl; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31599; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28304; https://t.me/vilkul/17649; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31600; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31603; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28311; https://t.me/vilkul/17650; https://t.me/vilkul/17659; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4533; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4534; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4535; https://t.me/synegubov/25137; https://t.me/synegubov/25176; https://t.me/synegubov/25177; https://t.me/synegubov/25178; https://t.me/synegubov/25138; https://t.me/synegubov/25175; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7314; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7315; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46820; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66470; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46869; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46873; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46884; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66510; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66513; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/66523; https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid0WxGNnE9AYHCJnMyj87k11JeLeRTP2VD8EDFtFuYLRDuZ5cXyrKkLN7F91q9L3hQAl?locale=ru_RU ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1386986-u-mikolaevi-bpla-pociliv-u-primiskij-potag/; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8416;
[52] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5349
[53] https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid0WxGNnE9AYHCJnMyj87k11JeLeRTP2VD8EDFtFuYLRDuZ5cXyrKkLN7F91q9L3hQAl?locale=ru_RU ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1386986-u-mikolaevi-bpla-pociliv-u-primiskij-potag/; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8416;
[54] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/24/world/europe/russia-drones-autonomous-ai-kill-ukraine-war.html
