Toplines
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi proposed a headquarters restructuring to support the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast during a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 26.[1] Zelensky announced that two new formations would be established under the command of Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky and 1st Corps (Azov National Guard) Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko. The announcement did not contain information about the deployment or reallocation of combat forces or the structure of the new formations.
Russian forces are conducting two main efforts attacking the northern and southern tips of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast — Russia’s primary objective in its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Russian forces have intensified efforts to advance toward Slovyansk from the eastern and southeastern directions following unsuccessful attempts to attack Slovyansk from the northeast through Lyman at the beginning of the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[2] Russian forces are also actively advancing in Kostyantynivka in the south of the Fortress Belt, but Ukrainian forces continue to have a limited presence in the settlement.
Russian forces continue to infiltrate into and around Kostyantynivka as part of the broader campaign to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast, while Ukrainian forces continue holding positions in northern and northwestern parts of the city. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 26 that Russian main body elements have yet to enter most of Kostyantynivka to consolidate the penetrations that have been made by lead elements consisting of small infantry groups within and around Kostyantynivka.[3] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka but recently withdrew their main body elements from southeastern Kostyantynivka to the eastern bank of the Kryvyi Torets River.[4] Mashovets added that individual Ukrainian forces continue to operate in central and southeastern Kostyantynivka as far south as the northern outskirts of Ivanopillya. Mashovets reported on August 26 that Russian forces recently infiltrated along the Novodmytrivka-Molocharka line north of Kostyantynivka up into Stinky in an effort to outflank Ukrainian forces east of Kostyantynivka and west of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces seized Illinivka, are operating northwest of Stepanivka, and infiltrated north of the Dovha Balka – Illinivka road (all southwest of Kostyantynivka).
Russian officials have repeatedly emphasized the seizure of Kostyantynivka as an important step toward setting conditions to capture the entire Slovyansk-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk agglomeration and all of Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka in October 2025 and have been trying to seize the city for roughly the past 10 months.[6] The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka as early as July 5, contrary to available evidence of Ukrainian forces maintaining their positions in the city.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russian infiltrations and limited advances in and around Kostyantynivka will not enable Russian forces to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the remainder of the Fortress Belt or all of Donetsk Oblast, even if Russian forces complete the seizure of the city.[8]
Russian forces are meanwhile intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Slovyansk that aims to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and set conditions for Russian ground offensive operations against Slovyansk. BAI refers to the use of airpower for strikes against targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term. Russian forces have been heavily striking Slovyansk and its environs in recent months to degrade Ukrainian logistics and defenses ahead of dedicated ground operations to seize the city.[9] Slovyansk Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on August 26 that Russian forces began using Smerch and Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), in addition to glide bombs and strike drones, against Slovyansk and have increased the strike density in the surrounding area.[10] Lyakh noted that Russian forces conducted at least five glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk on the morning of August 26 and that Russian airstrikes damaged at least 13 residential buildings. Russian forces also conducted five FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Raihorodok (just northeast of Slovyansk) according to geolocated footage published on August 25.[11]
Russian forces have been intensifying their BAI campaign against Slovyansk over the last several months, particularly with glide bombs, and are now bringing MLRS into this effort. ISW previously assessed that Russian glide bomb strikes are enabling infantry advances in and near Kostyantynivka, as the strikes turn portions of the city into rubble that Russian infiltrators can exploit for cover and concealment, and Russian forces are likely applying lessons learned from Kostyantynivka to set conditions for future offensives against Slovyansk.[12] Russian forces still need to secure several tactical objectives before they can begin an offensive against Slovyansk, however, including seizing several large settlements east and southeast of Slovyansk such as Rai-Oleksandrivka and Mykolaivka and the surrounding areas. Russian forces are nonetheless actively preparing the battlespace for intended future offensive ground operations against Slovyansk.
The United Russia Party is reportedly planning to increase its control over State Duma committees to establish United Russia as the dominant force in Russian domestic politics. Sources in the Kremlin and Russian State Duma told Russian state-aligned business newspaper Vedomosti on August 26 that United Russia lower house deputy speaker Pyotr Tolstoy is the leading candidate to replace Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Leonid Slutsky as the State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson following the September State Duma elections.[13] Tolstoy and Slutsky have both repeatedly promoted ultranationalist narratives against the West and publicly rejected meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[14] The potential replacement of Slutsky, a Kremlin loyalist and advocate of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with a United Russia politician, indicates the growing prioritization of United Russia party membership in Duma committees.[15] The Kremlin uses Duma deputies on the International Affairs and Defense committees to amplify state narratives about Russian foreign policy and the war in Ukraine.[16] Tolstoy’s potential appointment is likely part of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to strengthen United Russia’s control over the State Duma and turn it into the executor of a pro-war and ultranationalist informal Russian state ideology.[17]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi proposed a headquarters restructuring to support the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast during a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 26.
- Russian forces are conducting two main efforts, attacking the northern and southern tips of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast — Russia’s primary objective in its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
- Russian forces continue to infiltrate into and around Kostyantynivka as part of the broader campaign to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast, while Ukrainian forces continue holding positions in northern and northwestern parts of the city.
- Russian forces are meanwhile intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Slovyansk that aims to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and set conditions for Russian ground offensive operations against Slovyansk.
- The United Russia Party is reportedly planning to increase its control over State Duma committees to establish United Russia as the dominant force in Russian domestic politics.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya and Kupyansk directions.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and dual-use logistics infrastructure and Russian military assets. Russia launched 162 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and dual-use logistics infrastructure and Russian military assets. Ukrainian officials reported on August 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod (roughly 775 kilometers from the frontline).[18] Geolocated footage published on August 25 shows a large smoke plume over the Kstovo Oil Refinery.[19] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged on August 26 that Ukrainian strikes damaged an unspecified industrial facility.[20] Geolocated footage published on August 25 shows a large fire at a Wildberries logistics center in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast (roughly 370 kilometers from the international border).[21] Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov acknowledged on August 26 that Ukrainian strikes destroyed a Wildberries logistics center.[22]
Geolocated footage published on August 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Kasta-2E2 radar system near Lantonovo (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline) and an S-400 air defense missile system near Golovativka (roughly 207 kilometers from the frontline), both in Rostov Oblast, as well as a Podlyot-1K radar system near Grivenskoye, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 248 kilometers from the frontline).[23]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces launched strikes against Russian servicemembers in western Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and south of Andriivka (southwest of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on August 26, after likely Russian infiltration missions, indicating that Russian forces have likely infiltrated throughout Andriivka.[24]
Ukrainian forces maintain control over Pysarivka (north of Sumy City), contrary to Russian claims. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Pysarivka.[25] Russian sources published footage on August 26 purporting to show Russian forces conducting a flag-raising mission in northwestern Pysarivka (north of Sumy City) to claim that Russian forces have seized the village.[26] ISW has reason to assess that some aspects of this footage were likely AI-altered, but that Russian forces may have infiltrated into the settlement. Russian forces have recently leaned into combining Russian MoD claims with doctored or AI-altered footage to distribute aggrandized claims of advance throughout the information space as part of an ongoing cognitive warfare effort. The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces refuted these Russian claims.[27]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 25 and 26 but did not advance.[28]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 26.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on August 25.[29]
Russian reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces are likely advancing southeast of Borova. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Katerynivka, Nove, and Ridkodub (all southeast of Borova) and seized the area between Nove and Katerynivka.[30] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces near the Shandryholove salient (south of Borova) are under threat of Ukrainian encirclement and assessed that Russian forces are likely losing control of Shandryholove. Russian forces struck Ukrainian infantry near Nove, according to geolocated footage published on August 24.[31] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 26 that Russian forces advanced south of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova) along the Borova-Raihorodka highway and that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking near Ridkodub.[32]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure and military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military training center and a fuel and lubricants depot in occupied Prychepylivka (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline).[33] Ukrainian forces struck Russian Kamaz trucks near occupied Rodakove and Bilokurakyne (roughly 84 and 64 kilometers from the frontline, respectively), according to geolocated footage published on August 25.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions southeast of Lyman and east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in eastern Dibrova (southeast of Lyman) and north of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions, according to geolocated footage published on August 25 and 26.[35]
See topline text for additional reports on Russian offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction.
Russian forces are employing tactics to impede Ukrainian drone operators from identifying and tracking them. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 26 that Russian forces use dense vegetation and are constructing shelters that resemble burrows with only one opening for personnel movement, rather than traditional dugouts, to complicate their identification for Ukrainian drone operators.[36] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces sharply increase the intensity of attacks in several areas at once for several days after days with lower activity. The spokesperson added that Russian forces accumulate in large groups approximately 10 kilometers from the frontline but disperse into small groups of two to three servicemembers each as they approach the frontline positions, complicating Ukrainian drone operators’ ability to track their movement.
See topline text for additional reports about Russian offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in central Chervone (northwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on August 25.[37] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 26 that Russian forces have infiltrated north of Stinky (northeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces have likely infiltrated through Novodmytrivka (southwest of Stinky), and to the Central Market along Bakhmutska Street in northeastern Kostyantynivka.[38]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction. Geolocated footage published on August 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Vodyanske and in Krasnopodillya (both south of Dobropillya).[39] Ukrainian forces also either maintained positions or advanced in Matyasheve and west of Vodyanske (south of Dobropillya) and in Dobropillya (southwest of Dobropillya), as the same geolocated footage indicates that there are no Russian positions in these areas, contrary to Russian claims. A Russian milblogger published a map on August 26 and claimed that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya) and advanced near Novovodyane, Bilozetske (both north of Dobropillya), and Dobropillya itself.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 25 and 26 but did not advance.[41]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Novopavlivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in southwestern Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on August 26.[42]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized multiple settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction, including in areas that Ukrainian forces previously liberated. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recaptured Yalta and Zaporizhzhia (both northeast of Oleksandrivka).[43] Ukrainian forces reported the liberation of Yalta and its environs as of August 12.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 26 that Russian forces seized Nizhenka (southwest of Oleksandrivka), and Russian sources published footage purporting to show elements of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) raising a flag in the settlement.[45] ISW assesses that the footage is likely AI-altered. Nizhenka is about 11 kilometers from the closest observed Russian infiltration zone and from the closest assessed Russian advance. The Russian MoD’s claim notably ignores all the gains Ukrainian forces made in their January to August 2025 counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivka direction.[46] The Russian MoD and Russian sources likely seek to discredit the Ukrainian counteroffensive operation and maintain the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces advancing on all fronts simultaneously, as they have done previously with doctored or AI-altered footage.[47]
Ukrainian forces continue intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian materiel and equipment depot in Svobodne (one of multiple settlements between 81 and 121 kilometers from the frontline) and ammunition depots in Staryi Krym (104 kilometers from the frontline) and Velyka Novosilka (about 17 kilometers from the frontline).[48] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence channel that frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes reported that Ukrainian forces struck an abandoned industrial facility where Russia reportedly assembles drones and the headquarters of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic, Southern Military District) in Donetsk City (about 66 kilometers from the frontline) with drones and Flamingo ballistic missiles.[49] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a shopping mall in Donetsk City.[50]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 25 and 26 but did not advance.[51] A commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on August 26 that Ukrainian forces are in some cases using up to 10 drones against individual Russian personnel.[52]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in central Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces held positions, according to geolocated footage published on August 26.[53]
False reporting from Russian military units to their commanders impeded Russian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in Spring 2026. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated on August 26 that false reporting prevented Russian forces from establishing logistics and clearing the Russian-controlled area near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) in mid-spring 2026.[54] The milblogger’s complaint is the latest in a series of complaints about so-called “beautiful reports,” in which Russian battlefield commanders exaggerate claimed advances to their own commanders, causing the high military command to factor in false advances to Russian operational-level planning.[55] A leaked map from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from April 2026 in western Zaporizhia Oblast demonstrates the severe impact of these beautiful reports on operational planning in the area and likely continues to hinder Russian operations here.[56]
Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov ordered on August 26 the mandatory evacuation of children and their parents from nine frontline settlements southwest and southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.[57]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military equipment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces striking Russian transport vehicles near occupied Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast (about 27 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on August 24.[58]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 26.
Russian forces continued their strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in frontline Kherson City on August 26. Ukrainian state-owned energy company Naftogaz reported that Russian glide bomb strikes on August 26 severely damaged the Kherson Thermal Power Plant.[59]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kasta radar station near occupied Kacha, a repair and recovery base near occupied Pervomaiske, material and technical warehouses near occupied Novoivanivka, and a Geran- and Gerbera-type drone relay near occupied Chornomorske (all between roughly 116 and 266 kilometers from the frontline).[60] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from August 26 shows heat anomalies near the Hvardiivske Airfield near occupied Hvardiivske (roughly 196 kilometers from the frontline).[61] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ferry, reportedly the Maria, near occupied Kerch (roughly 290 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on August 23.[62]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[63]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 162 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones — including jet-powered Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 134 drones; that 18 strike drones hit 19 locations; and that debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, logistics, transportation, and non-residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts.[65]
Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against a shopping center in Kharkiv Oblast. Lozova Mayor Serhiy Zelensky stated on August 26 that a Russian Geran-type drone struck a shopping center near Lozova and that a second drone hit the same shopping center about 40 minutes later, injuring at least 10 people.[66]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus is constructing new railway infrastructure to support military infrastructure near the Belarusian-Ukrainian international border. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Belarusian service reported on August 25 that Belarusian authorities are constructing new railway infrastructure that connects a new Belarusian military training ground in Gomel Oblast with the rest of the Belarusian railway network.[67] RFE/RL reported that the new railway infrastructure includes an access track for up to 60 railcars and a loading platform with a ramp for loading wheeled and tracked vehicles. RFE/RL also reported that authorities completed the new training ground in Gomel Oblast in June 2026 and assessed that the Belarusian 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade will likely deploy there. Belarus was completing the creation of the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade near Gomel City (approximately 40 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine) in early August 2026.[68]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-proviv-bezpekovu-naradu-z-golovnokomanduvachem-zbr-106125; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2092622997806784890 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20608
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3572
[4] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3571
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[10] . https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1387908-okrim-kabiv-i-droniv-vijska-rf-pocali-obstriluvati-slovansk-z-reaktivnoi-artilerii-nacalnik-mva/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72770
[11] https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2092298669571604948; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30740
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[13] https://www dot vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2026/08/26/1223708-v-gosdume-obsuzhdayut-smenu-glavi-komiteta-po-mezhdunarodnim-delam?from=newsline ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/26/vedomosti-leonid-slutskiy-mozhet-poteryat-post-glavy-komiteta-po-mezhdunarodnym-delam-v-gosdume-novogo-sozyva
[14] https://moscow dot er.ru/activity/news/petr-tolstoj-podderzhka-ukrainy-stanet-gibelyu-dlya-evropy ; https://bloknot-kamyshin dot ru/news/pochemu-mosty-ne-razrushili-pochemu-net-udara-po-b-1984343 ; https://tsargrad dot tv/dzen/pjotr-tolstoj-razvejal-illjuzii-o-peregovorah-po-ukraine-lidery-es-zashli-slishkom-daleko-oni-ne-ostanovjatsja_1225154 ; https://ukraina dot ru/20251204/leonid-slutskiy-evrope-pora-ochnutsya-ot-rusofobskogo-durmana-1072597294.html ; https://t.me/slutsky_l/4100
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://ura dot news/news/1052718010
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42026; https://t.me/usf_army/2372; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20602
[19] https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2092441428735468031; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29757
[20] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/9970
[21] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2092440378716606509; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2092531811561644303 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/11114 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/66414 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2092390599416521169?s=20 ; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2092384621019427175?s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2092452575903944781?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2092439606662684746?s=20 ;
[22] https://t.me/PervyshovEA/4774
[23] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2092411797437399527?s=20 ; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2091487506071961775?s=20; https://x.com/carse_n/status/2092346216080146832; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2092421694711267649?s=20 ; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2091487506071961775?s=20
[24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12800 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1070622068762146
[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/66782
[26] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21525 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12798 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3401
[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/26/pysarivka-%e2%80%94-pid-nashym-kontrolem-u-sylah-oborony-sprostuvaly-brehnyu-pro-%c2%abuspihy%c2%bb-rf-na-sumshhyni/
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42023 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42021 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97994 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36454 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9136
[29] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37854; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkBnIxxdcSg
[30] https://t.me/rybar/82672 ; https://t.me/rybar/82674
[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12787
[32] https://t.me/grvZapad/19571
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42027
[34] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2092314135530762466?s=20 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2092317389220159645?s=20 ; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/2000
[35] https://t.me/trozsusumy117/2171 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12797 ; https://t.me/MPBEdelweiss/1500 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12801
[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/26/znajty-skladnishe-nizh-znyshhyty-u-66-j-brygadi-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-rosiyan-na-lymanshhyni/
[37] https://t.me/official24ombr/2579 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12796
[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3571
[39] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2092571618228777150; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15784
[40] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33763
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42023; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42021; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121934
[42] https://t.me/FilimonovGonor/628 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12806
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55505 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55505
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/66784; https://t.me/voin_dv/20848 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12802 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3403 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74429; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2092539353604251786
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42027
[49] https://t.me/istories_media/13356; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29842; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29847;
[50] https://t.me/milinfolive/178235; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74447; https://t.me/PushilinDenis/10206; https://t.me/bazabazon/48587; https://t.me/PushilinDenis/10203;
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42023 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42021 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36454
[52] https://youtu.be/7QzKMv36cOw?t=2694 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/26/%c2%abrozbyrayut-na-molekuly%c2%bb-yak-ukrayinski-drony-znyshhuyut-rosiyan-pid-gulyajpolem/
[53] https://x.com/Volodimyrovich_/status/2092571494073114695; https://t.me/newssdk/7156
[54] https://t.me/rybar/82681
[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026;/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ;
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[57] https://rada dot info/upload/users_files/04353008/docs/b4db71953a2f5a72c13f66c33a070711.pdf; https://bilenke-silrada.gov dot ua/docs/2459023/
[58] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2092295299507060757?s=20 ; https://t.me/Ronins_65/1397 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2092300988182823099?s=20 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2092305408694063440?s=20 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2092300343056945588?s=20
[59] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1387976-rosijska-kab-vdarila-po-hersonskij-tec-naftogaz/; https://www.naftogaz dot com/news/rosiya-atakuvala-kerovanoyu-aviabomboyu-hersonsku-tets
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42027
[61] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.966,45.097,12.994z
[62] https://x.com/DI_Ukraine/status/2091568345388560619; https://x.com/carse_n/status/2092351218194469016
[63] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/74509
[65] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72738; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/26/u-chernigovi-zhinka-ta-dytyna-zagynuly-vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky/; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4294; https://t.me/lomako_oleksandr/3330; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4300; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/4344; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1387400-sered-postrazdalih-6-ricna-ditina-rosijskij-sahed-vpav-na-budinok-u-cernigovi/; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4292; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1387694-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-po-cernigovu-zagorivsa-privatnij-budinok-14-ricnu-divcinku-gospitalizuvali/; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/4348; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1387910-e-travmovani-pid-zavalami-mozut-buti-ludi-rosiani-povtorno-vdarili-po-cernigovu/; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/43003; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31635; https://t.me/astrapress/123279; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31635 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4539; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1387692-reaktivnij-dron-atakuvav-holodnogirskij-rajon-harkova-so-vidomo-pro-nicnij-udar-rf/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1387816-rosijskij-fpv-dron-atakuvav-dergaci-na-harkivsini-poranenij-pracivnik-gazovoi-sluzbi/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30395 ; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14790 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46925 ;
[66] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1388344-rosia-vdarila-po-centru-lozovoi-na-harkivsini-poperedno-10-ludej-poraneni/
[67] https://www.svaboda dot org/a/33839065.html
[68] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
