Toplines
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a response to concerns about its ongoing issues with Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment drive, which has reportedly attempted to fill recruitment quotas using Russian university students. The Russian MoD held a joint meeting with the Russian Ministry of Science, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, and heads of Russian universities and educational associations on April 27 on the “principles and conditions” for recruiting Russian students to the USF and rejected reports that Russian universities have been expelling students en masse in order to then coerce the students into signing USF contracts with the MoD.[1] Russian Deputy Defense Minister and MoD Main Military-Political Directorate Head Army General Viktor Goremykin claimed during the meeting that Russian military service contracts with the MoD are for terms of one to three years at the choice of the signer, and that all Russian students who sign contracts with the USF do so for one-year terms.[2] Goremykin claimed that Russia does not intend to force any students to sign contracts with the MoD and emphasized the importance that all students sign contracts voluntarily. The Russian MoD stated that the MoD regulations forbid transferring USF personnel to units in other services without the servicemember’s permission and that the Russian military command must dismiss servicemembers when their contract terms expire.[3] The MoD stated that Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov will issue guidance by the end of April 2026 to hold Russian military commanders “personally responsible” for ensuring that commanders do not transfer USF personnel to units in other services without the permission of the servicemember. Russian Deputy Science and Higher Education Minister Dmitry Afanasyev claimed during the meeting that the MoD only received six complaints that recruiters had coerced students into signing contracts with the MoD and found each instance unfounded, and Goremykin claimed that 93 percent of surveyed students trust the Russian MoD to comply with the terms of their contracts.[4]
The MoD is likely attempting to mitigate concern around its recruitment campaign of Russian university students that it launched in December 2025-January 2026 to ensure it is still able to recruit military personnel from students.[5] Russia’s overall recruitment rates are stressed by rising casualty rates, and Russian students likely fear signing a contract only for the Russian military command to transfer them from a USF unit to high-casualty assault units. Russian Minister of Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov reportedly directed large universities in early 2026 to ensure that at least two percent of students sign contracts with the MoD.[6] Russian milbloggers criticized the ineffectiveness of the MoD’s recruitment campaign for the USF as of late March 2026 due to the worry that students will be transferred from their USF units to assault units.[7]
Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate Russia’s territorial goals in Ukraine beyond demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on April 27 that Russia must establish a “buffer zone” in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to ensure the security of occupied Velyka Novosilvka Raion, Donetsk Oblast, and to completely seize the remainder of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] ISW has long assessed that Russia maintains its territorial objectives beyond the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, and Pushilin’s statement contradicts the Kremlin’s attempts to portray the only unresolved issue in peace negotiations as Ukraine’s refusal to cede unoccupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia.[9]
An Iranian delegation led by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russian-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.[10] This meeting notably occurs as Iran prepares for a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. Russia has supported Iranian strikes in the Middle East throughout the war, such as by providing Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East.[11]
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a response to concerns about its ongoing issues with Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment drive, which has reportedly attempted to fill recruitment quotas using Russian university students.
- Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate Russia’s territorial goals in Ukraine beyond demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast.
- An Iranian delegation led by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russian-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.
- Neither Russian or Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on the frontline.
- Russian forces launched 94 drones toward Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
The Ukrainian General Staff provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on April 27 that the April 20 Ukrainian strikes against the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai destroyed 24 and damaged four fuel tanks.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the April 26 Ukrainian strikes against the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery damaged a vacuum distillation unit.[13]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations north, northeast, and southeast of Sumy City and conducted two KAB airstrikes in Sumy Oblast on April 27.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade seized Taratutyne (southeast of Sumy City).[15] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Taratutyne.[16] Russian sources claimed on April 27 that Russian forces advanced in Kindrativka and Andriivka, Sumy Oblast.[17]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and attempted to infiltrate on April 27 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[18] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on April 27 that Russian forces attempted to infiltrate in small groups in the Budarky-Zemlyanky direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) using motorcycles in unspecified locations but were unsuccessful as Ukrainian forces took prisoner one Russian servicemember.[19]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 27.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continue to use pipelines for infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction while sustaining heavy casualties. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 27 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate toward Kupyansk through a gas pipeline near Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) despite reportedly sustaining up to 70 percent casualties in such assaults.[20] Trehubov stated Russian forces are using these infiltration attempts as part of broader efforts to degrade Ukrainian positions on the left bank of the Oskil River and support a breakthrough toward Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk). ISW previously observed Russian forces conducting similar infiltration missions toward Kupyansk via gas pipes on April 25.[21]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Borova direction on April 27 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[22]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Slovyansk. Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows Russian forces raising a flag west of and in northern Ozerne (northeast of Slovyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 27 that Russian forces seized Ozerne, and a Russian milblogger credited elements of the 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District [CMD]) with the claimed seizure.[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 27 but did not make confirmed advance.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kostyantynivka itself and near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces seized the settlement.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), although three other Russian milblogger posted maps that do not depict Russian forces as controlling the settlement.[28] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novodmytrivka (east of Kostyantynivka), in southern Kostyantynivka, and northeast of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[29]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 27 but did not advance.[30]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction. Footage published on April 24 and geolocated on April 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske, east of Novooleksandrivka, southwest of Hryshyne (both northwest of Pokrovsk), southeast of Serhiivka (west of Pokrovsk), and east of Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized Molodetske (east of Novopidhorodne). [33]
Russian forces are struggling to supply troops as they attempt to advance past Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on April 27 that Russian forces are accumulating heavy equipment, artillery, and tanks in southeastern Pokrovsk, attempting to gain a foothold in western Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and sending small groups to infiltrate to the outskirts of Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) and Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[34] The corps reported that Russian forces are experiencing logistics problems and lack adequate food and medicine.
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Pokrovsk direction on April 26 and overnight on April 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Malynivka (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot as well as a command and observation post near occupied Selydove (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on April 27 but did not advance.[36]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) were reportedly transferred to under the operational control of the 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) at an unspecified time during the week of April 19-26.[37] ISW last observed elements of the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as of March 26.[38]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction while Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole).[40]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strikes against Russian air defense assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on April 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone control points near occupied Hulyaipole, a Russian Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in occupied Melitopol (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline), and a Russian repair unit near occupied Mykolaivka (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline).[41]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 27 but did not advance.[42]
Russian forces are increasing drone strikes against Nikopol Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, including against civilians. Ukrainian 30th Marine Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Pavlo Drohal reported on April 27 that Russian forces conducted roughly 2,000 drone strikes against Nikopol Raion since March 2026, double the number of monthly drone strikes before March 2026.[43] Drohal reported that Russian forces are intentionally targeting civilians.
Russian forces continue to militarize the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 26 that Russian forces continue to store military equipment in the ZNPP, turning it into “an object of [Russia’s] war.”[44] Zelensky noted that Russian forces mined the ZNPP’s perimeter and have completely shut the plant down fourteen times since occupying it. Russian forces have been militarizing the ZNPP since at least April 2023, including using it as a launching point for Russian drones and to store military equipment.[45]
Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Ukrainian drone regiment published geolocated footage on April 26 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) north of occupied Dolynske (roughly 89 kilometers from the frontline).[46]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 27, including toward islands in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[47]
A Ukrainian drone strike on the night of April 25 to 26 damaged two Russian large landing ships. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source posted satellite imagery indicating that Russian forces relocated the Yamal Ropucha-class project 775 and Filchenkov Tapir-class project 117 large landing ships (both of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) to Korabelna Bay in occupied Sevastopol, possibly due to damage from a Ukrainian strike on Russia’s Sevastopol Naval Base on the night of April 25 to 26.[48]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 26 to 27 and caused a sunflower oil spill. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones — of which roughly 60 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[49] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones, that 20 drones struck 15 locations, and that downed debris fell on 11 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck port, energy, transport, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[50] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on April 27 that Russian drone strikes against Odesa City injured 14 civilians, including two children.[51] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure in Zaporizhia Oblast left 4,400 customers without power.[52] The Southwester Okrug State Environmental Inspectorate of Ukraine reported on April 27 that Russian strikes against port infrastructure in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast, destroyed a sunflower oil tank and caused sunflower oil to spill into the port’s water area.[53] The Ukrainian Sea Ports Administration reported on April 27 that Russian forces struck the Nauru-flagged vessel RAMCO while it was transiting the Ukrainian Maritime Corridor, causing minor damage and starting a fire.[54]
Ukraine continues to improve its air defenses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 27 that Russian forces launched roughly 1,900 strike drones against Ukraine in the past week, and that Ukrainian forces intercepted over 90 percent of the Russian strike drones. [55] Ukrainian drone manufacturer General Chereshnya reported that Ukrainian forces used its drones in 11,473 interceptions in March 2026, 5,800 more than in February 2026.[56] General Chereshnya reported that Ukrainian forces used its drones to intercept three times as many Molniya drones compared to February 2026.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met People’s Republic of China (PRC) Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministerial summit on April 27.[57]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/62960
[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/62960; https://t.me/mod_russia/62961
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/62962
[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/62963
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/;
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/
[8] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27227517
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-6/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025/
[10] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/313263/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79633
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-29-2026/ ; https://www.ft.com/content/d5d7291b-8a53-42cd-b10a-4e02fbcf9047?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37861; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113938; https://t.me/dva_majors/92033; https://t.me/severnnyi/7748; https://t.me/wargonzo/33805; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42400
[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/62982
[16] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113938; https://t.me/dva_majors/92049; https://t.me/tass_agency/373129
[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208482; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42400
[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/92033; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/27/na-toj-svit-na-motoczyklah-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-vidbyly-sprobu-rosijskogo-shturmu/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37854; https://t.me/severnnyi/7748; https://t.me/wargonzo/33805
[19] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2501
[20] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1299369-trubi-rozdovbani-prosto-v-hlam-akih-vtrat-zaznae-rf-namagaucis-prolizti-do-kupanska-cerez-gazovi-trubi/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42402
[23] https://t.me/Osintpen/2810; https://t.me/operationall_space/11150
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/62978; https://t.me/operationall_space/11150
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37854; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208482; https://t.me/dva_majors/92033; https://t.me/rybar/79805; https://t.me/motopatriot78/51144; https://t.me/wargonzo/33805
[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/92033
[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72017; https://t.me/motopatriot78/51144
[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208482; https://t.me/rybar/79805; https://t.me/motopatriot78/51144; https://t.me/wargonzo/33805
[29] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72017; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72017; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208482
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824
[31] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2048494154888736846?s=20 ; https://t.me/krulaomegu/1293
[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/92033
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/92033
[34] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1378; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/27/u-pokrovsku-syly-oborony-utrymuyut-pozycziyi-na-pivnichnyh-okolyczyah-mista-7-j-korpus/
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37856
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37854; https://t.me/dva_majors/92033; https://t.me/voin_dv/19359
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/7749
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/33805 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/27/kudys-zahodyat-ale-utrymatysya-ne-mozhut-bilya-gulyajpolya-tryvayut-i-shturmy-voroga-i-kontrataky-syl-oborony/ ; http://t.me/rybar/79807 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19362 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19359 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/92033; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37854 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822
[40] https://t.me/rybar/79807
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37856
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824
[43] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1298561-ne-vijna-a-vbivstvo-civilnogo-naselenna-rf-zavdae-po-nikopolsini-blizko-2000-dronovih-atak-na-misac-drogal/
[44] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-uchasnikiv-mizhnarodnoyi-chornobils-104129; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/krayini-partneri-mayut-obmezhiti-bezvidpovidalnu-silu-rosiyi-104133
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Russian20Operations20Assessments20December2013.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-12/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-assessment-july-8-2023/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-19/
[46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2048424312961425919; https://x.com/markito0171/status/2048417835647463840; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/885
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37822; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37854
[48] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12868
[49] https://t.me/kpszsu/60825
[50] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28785 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/1959 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/56201 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15694 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15702 ; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/515 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38909 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/59664
[51] https://t.me/odeskaODA/15694 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15702
[52] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38909 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/59664
[53] https://t.me/derzhecoinspekciya_pivdenno_zah/8709
[54] https://t.me/ampu_uspa/515
[55] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18804 ;
[56] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/generalchereshnya-lidery-perehoplennya-bpla/
[57] https://t.me/modmilby/55310
CORRECTION: On May 21, 2026, ISW added a missing sentence about Molodetske under Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3. We apologize for this error.
