Toplines
Ukrainian officials announced on August 12 the results of Ukraine’s Oleksandrivka direction counteroffensive, which took place between January and August 2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Ihor Skybyuk, and Airborne Assault Forces Commander Major General Oleh Apostol on August 12 to discuss the results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivka direction, which lasted from January 29 to August 12, 2026.[1] Zelensky reported that the operation aimed to disrupt the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive and push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command reported on August 12 that Ukrainian forces liberated over 745 square kilometers of territory in the Oleksandrivka direction and cleared over 300 square kilometers of Russian infiltrators since January 29, 2026.[2] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have liberated roughly 626.69 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction and northern part of the Hulyaipole direction (where Ukrainian forces also counterattacked) between January 29 and August 12, 2026, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology likely underestimates Ukrainian advances.[3]
The Ukrainian military command reported that Ukrainian forces liberated 26 total settlements in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of the Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations. These settlements include Sichneve, Maliivka, Stepove, Berezove, Ternove, Zaporizke, Novomykolaivka, Kalynivske, Pryvillya, Tsehelne, Zlohoda, and Novoheorhiivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, Myrne, Piddubne, Tovste, Zirka, Yalta, Hrushivske, Novokhatske, and Zeleny Hai (all east or northeast of Oleksandrivka) in Donetsk Oblast; and Novohryhorivka, Rybne, Krasnohirske, and Pryvilne (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) in Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] The Ukrainian Airborne Forces Command noted that Ukrainian forces conducted some of the Ukrainian flag raisings at a “safe distance” from the real Ukrainian positions for operational security reasons, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have likely since advanced beyond at least some of the above-mentioned settlements.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions southeast of Ternuvate and Vozdvyzhivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka) in areas where Russian sources claimed Russian forces had advanced, indicating that much of the Russian claims of advance in the Oleksandrivka direction and near the northern seam with the Hulyaipole direction are likely largely exaggerated.[6]
The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations showcase Ukraine’s ability to make relatively significant tactical advances and reintroduce limited aspects of mechanized maneuver on localized segments of the frontline. The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive was one of the two mutually reinforcing Ukrainian drives in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions that began in late 2025 and early 2026 to push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and undermine Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[7] Ukraine’s tactical successes in the Oleksandrivka direction in the first eight months of 2026 are likely the result of several mutually supporting factors, including the maturation of the Ukrainian command’s operational planning, a coherent suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD / DEAD) campaign, the intensifying intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, Ukraine’s tactical-level drone overmatch, and the surprise February 1 Starlink cutoff for Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[8] The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations have likely had cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction or allocating manpower and materiel to offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline amid a declining Russian recruitment rate.[9] ISW assesses that Russian forces lost about 233.74 square kilometers across the entire frontline when only accounting for advances from January 29 to August 12 and only seized or infiltrated into 382.98 kilometers across the frontline in the same time period, by contrast, further highlighting the significance of Ukrainian tactical successes in the Oleksandrivka direction in the same time period.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to warn that Russia is preparing for large-scale involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections.[10] Zelensky stated on August 11 that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reporting indicates that Russia is planning to mobilize “several hundred thousand” personnel by the end of 2026 and the same number in 2027. Zelensky noted that Russia plans to continue its voluntary recruitment drives during this time. Zelensky recently warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is conducting low-profile preparations to potentially mobilize 500,000 troops as Russia has been struggling to recruit enough personnel to replace its battlefield losses.[11] Zelensky noted that Russia suffers about 30,000 personnel casualties per month, of which about 60 percent are killed in action (KIA). Russia’s recruitment challenges and high casualties will likely force Putin to make a difficult decision about conducting some form of mobilization to augment volunteer recruitment by the end of the year. ISW continues to assess that any form of compulsory military mobilization is a personal decision for Putin, which is contingent on his perception of the battlefield situation and the stability and integrity of the Kremlin.[12]
The Kremlin is likely seeking to deter Japan from adopting a more assertive defensive posture it perceives as unfavorable to Russian interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Liina during the final stage of Pacific Fleet exercises in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalin Oblast on August 12, and Putin and Liina largely used their public remarks to criticize Japan‘s defensive posture.[13] Putin claimed that the “potential for conflict” in the Asia-Pacific region is growing as NATO is “seeping“ into the region, establishing new military-political blocs and deploying new weapons systems. Putin notably criticized Japan’s decision to list Russia as a primary threat in its annual Defense White Paper, which Japan published on August 4.[14] Putin claimed that Russia is “not threatening Japan” and that Japan’s escalating rhetoric and sanctions against Russia for the war in Ukraine are unprovoked. Putin claimed that Russia has no territorial claims against Japan but implied that Japan’s territorial claims over the Kuril Islands are threatening to Russia. Putin also criticized the current Japanese government and called for relations to return to the state they were in under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Liina largely amplified Putin’s main talking points, criticizing Japanese defense policy and spending. Putin’s and Liina’s comments likely aim to undermine Japan’s efforts to improve its defense capabilities and address challenges in its security environment. The Kremlin’s response to Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper is notably more muted than the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) response, which included accusing Japan of “hyping up” the threat of the PRC and using the PRC as an excuse to remilitarize.[15] Putin likely intended to signal that Japan should adjust its defense policy in line with Russian interests while maintaining a degree of rhetorical distance from the PRC’s harsh response to Japan’s 2026 white paper.
Putin is also attempting to deter European Union (EU) seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels. Putin also used his meeting with Liina to criticize the EU’s “recent decisions” related to Russia’s shadow fleet vessels, likely referring to the EU’s adoption of legal mechanisms that expand powers of European authorities to inspect Russian shadow fleet vessels and the 21st package of EU sanctions announced on July 23, 2026 that target Russian shadow fleet tankers and oil refineries.[16] Putin criticized the EU’s legal mechanisms to seize shadow fleet vessels and sell their cargo, as well as threatening that Russia may “respond in kind” to Western vessels sailing through the Pacific Fleet’s area of responsibility. Liina responded that the Pacific Fleet has the capacity to inspect and detain vessels of “unfriendly states.” European states have been taking increasingly concerted steps to counter Russia’s shadow fleet in 2026.[17] Putin likely feels additional pressure to protect these vessels as Ukraine’s strike campaigns against Russia’s oil refining infrastructure and vessels transporting oil in the Black and Azov seas further constrain Russian energy revenues that fund the war effort.[18]
Russia will likely continue to rely on its use of a relatively small number of jet-powered Geran drones in its nightly strikes against Ukraine until Ukraine can develop sufficient countermeasures and the technological offense-defense race resets. Ukraine’s GUR told Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi on August 12 that Russia produces about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered strike drones per month at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and at other Russian defense industrial enterprises.[19] The GUR added that Russia seeks to expand its production capacity at the Alabuga SEZ, with Militaryi noting that satellite imagery captured in early July 2026 showed ongoing construction at the enterprises that began in May 2026.[20] The GUR stated that Russia halted its production of Geran-3 drones, a jet-powered adaptation of the Geran-2 equipped with a Kometa-M12 anti-jamming navigation system, in line with recent statements from GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi that Russia is focusing production on Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones.[21] The GUR noted that Russian forces are increasing their use of Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones in their strike packages due to the drones’ technical abilities that allow them to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. The GUR stated that Russia has stockpiled about 6,200 Geran-type drones for future strikes against Ukraine as of August 2026.[22] The GUR added that Russia’s limited production capacity does not permit Russia to sustain repeated strike packages with very large numbers of drones, noting that Russian forces now typically launch 150 to 300 Geran drones per strike package as Russia builds up its stockpiles — as opposed to very large salvoes of 600 to 1,000 drones that have characterized Russian strike packages in early 2026.
Russia may be able to reduce the number of drones it launches nightly as it shifts towards using more powerful jet-powered drones that Ukraine struggles to intercept. Russia is also currently focusing on its use of ballistic missiles to take advantage of Ukraine’s lack of anti-ballistic interceptors, and Russia does not require large numbers of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses to allow the ballistic missiles to penetrate and strike their targets.[23] Russia may transition to larger drone packages in the future, however, in an attempt to again overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses once Ukraine develops sufficient countermeasures to intercept the jet-powered drones at a high rate. The dynamic between Russian drone production and Ukrainian interception innovations is exemplary of the offense-defense cycle of innovation and adaptation that has characterized the technical dimension of the war thus far.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian officials announced on August 12 the results of Ukraine’s Oleksandrivka direction counteroffensive, which took place between January and August 2026.
- The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations showcase Ukraine’s ability to make relatively significant tactical advances and reintroduce limited aspects of mechanized maneuver on localized segments of the frontline.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to warn that Russia is preparing for large-scale involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections.
- The Kremlin is likely seeking to deter Japan from adopting a more assertive defensive posture it perceives as unfavorable to Russian interests.
- Putin is also attempting to deter European Union (EU) seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels.
- Russia will likely continue to rely on its use of a relatively small number of jet-powered Geran drones in its nightly strikes against Ukraine until Ukraine can develop sufficient countermeasures and the technological offense-defense race resets.
- Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, an unspecified number of Kh-35 cruise missiles, and 138 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian naval and grain infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on the night of August 11 to 12.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian naval and grain infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on the night of August 11 to 12. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces used Palyanytsya jet-powered drones, Neptune missiles, and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to strike the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, which houses elements of the Black Sea Fleet.[24] Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian air defense positions, berths, and seaport infrastructure at Novorossiysk. Ukrainian sources who frequently report on successful Ukrainian strikes reported that Ukrainian drones struck the Sheskharis oil terminal, Novorossiysk grain terminal, and naval base infrastructure and published footage of fires at the oil terminal and naval base.[25] Reuters reported on August 12, citing four industry sources, that two of Russia’s largest grain terminals in the port of Novorossiysk suspended operations due to the Ukrainian strikes.[26] The sources reportedly stated that the Novorossiysk grain terminal and the Novorossiysk Grain Products Plant (NKHP) suspended operations. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev acknowledged Ukrainian strikes against Novorossiysk on August 12 and claimed that Ukrainian drones also damaged civilian objects in Novorossiysk, Anapa, Gelendzhik, and Temryuk.[27]
Additional battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian military, naval, and oil refining assets continue to emerge in the open source. Satellite imagery published on August 11 reportedly shows a destroyed hangar at the base of the Russian 10th Special Purpose Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, following a July 31 Ukrainian strike.[28] A Ukrainian Telegram source that frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes published satellite imagery collected on August 7 showing a ship sinking in the Black Sea near Novorossiysk, and additional imagery shows a mostly sunken vessel in the water.[29] Reuters reported on August 12, citing two industry sources, that the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast, ceased operations after Ukrainian strikes on the night of August 10 to 11 caused a fire at the facility.[30]
Russian officials continue attempts to counter Ukrainian drone strikes while failing to address the cause of the strikes. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov held a meeting on August 11 about protecting Russian infrastructure from Ukrainian “terrorist threats,” referring in part to Ukrainian long-range strikes.[31] Bortnikov claimed that Russia is conducting “significant work” to counter Ukrainian operations but did not specify such measures. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported that commercial demand for counter-drone systems in Russia increased more than sixfold to about 441.3 million rubles (about $5.3 million) from January to June 2026 compared to January to June 2025, notably aligning with Ukraine’s escalation of its long-range strike campaign against Russia in March 2026.[32] A Russian aviation-focused milblogger criticized on August 12 Russia officials’ shirking of responsibility for air defense failures and insufficient measures to dedicate resources to strengthen air defenses.[33]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 11 and 12 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 12 that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack near Mohrytsia (northeast of Sumy City).[35]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that Russian activity in northern Kharkiv Oblast aims to pin Ukrainian forces to facilitate Russian advances elsewhere on the front.[36] The milblogger claimed that Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Sumy City) is a contested “gray zone.” The milblogger acknowledged that Russian advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast are mostly local and that Russian troops have not conducted any large-scale border crossings. The milblogger claimed that further Russian advances in the Kharkiv direction will allow Russian forces to saturate border areas with electronic warfare (EW) assets and mobile fire groups to reduce the number of Ukrainian strikes against Russia but acknowledged that this will not be an easy task to implement.
The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation responded on August 12 to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) August 11 claim that Russian forces seized Shcherbakivka — a village that Ukraine administratively liquidated in 1997.[37] The Center assessed that the MoD claim is part of wider Kremlin efforts to create the illusion of constant successful Russian offensive operations in all directions of the front — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment.[38]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember east of Chorne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39] The Russian MoD claimed on August 12 that Russian forces seized Vodyane (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction as Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the area. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces acknowledged on August 12 that Ukrainian forces advanced into northern Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[41] Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northwestern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[42]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 12 that Russian forces likely control most of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[43] Trehubov added that Russian forces are most active in the Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Kivsharivka directions (west of Pishchane). Trehubov reported that Russian forces have brought in forces to pressure Kupyansk’s northern flank near Radkivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control northern, eastern, and central Kupyansk.[44]
A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 11 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[45] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continue attacks near Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka (just south of Bohuslavka) but have not consolidated positions in the area.[46] The source added that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over the approaches to Russian positions in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub (southeast of Borova).[47]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian unmanned systems personnel concentration near Marivka (either about 115 or 130 kilometers from the front) on the night of August 11 to 12.[48]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Yurkivka (southeast of Slovyansk) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[49]
Russian forces continue using drone and glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield in the Lyman and Slovyansk direction. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported that Russian forces are using various strike drones, including Molniya and fiber optic drones, to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that military vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) use.[50] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones to reconnoiter Kramatorsk in search of military vehicles during both the day and night. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are not accumulating heavy equipment in the area as Russian forces continue to rely on small group infiltration tactics. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated that the Russian command is placing a significant emphasis on the Lyman direction and is deploying new drone crews to the area.[51] The battalion reported that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian drone crews’ shelters, antennas, and technical facilities. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces again struck a crossing over the Siverskyi Donets River near Mayaky (southwest of Lyman) after striking it with glide bombs in June and July 2026.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian glide bomb strikes have practically destroyed the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk), leaving the plant unable to generate electricity.[53] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that more heavily relies on glide bomb strikes to set conditions for future offensive operations against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[54]
Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike against Ukrainian rescuers in Kramatorsk on the night of August 11 to 12. The Donetsk Oblast State Emergency Services reported that Russian forces struck firefighters responding to a fire that earlier Russian shelling caused in Kramatorsk, damaging a fire truck.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows a Russian servicemember in civilian clothing (an act of perfidy and a war crime under the Geneva Convention) attempting to throw an anti-tank mine into a Ukrainian-occupied building in western Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[56] A source affiliated with the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) posted, and then deleted, the footage.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 12 that Russian forces seized Petrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[58]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged Russian difficulties in seizing Chasiv Yar and surrounding areas. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have intensified their efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket near Chasiv Yar but that the town’s Shevchenko and Yuzhnyy microraions are contested “gray zones.”[59] The milblogger added that Russian forces are struggling to seize the area quickly due to the intensity of Ukrainian drone strikes and difficulties traversing open terrain. The milblogger claimed that the Russian seizure of Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka) is a “distant prospect,” particularly as there are few positions that offer cover in the area and because Ukrainian forces maintain significant positions near Vyrolyubivka (north of Stinky). The milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Klynove (west of Vyrolyubivka), which the Russian MoD claimed Russian forces seized in December 2025.[60]
Russian forces continue to strike religious infrastructure in Ukraine.[61] The Donetsk Oblast State Emergency Service reported on August 11, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Russian forces struck a church in Kramatorsk, starting a fire.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 11 and 12 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 11 and 12 but did not advance.[64] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that some Russian brigades in the area have received reinforcements but are attacking without body armor or assault rifles.[65] The Ukrainian servicemember reported that Russian military authorities are instructing the attackers to take body armor and weapons from the bodies of KIA Russian soldiers they encounter along their attack routes. The servicemember added that Russian forces are dropping water from drones 10-20 kilometers from Russian positions in order to incentivize Russian forces to attack and advance to the drop point.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Novopavlivka on August 11 and 12 but did not make confirmed advances.[66]
See topline text for reports of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka on August 11 and 12 but did not make confirmed advances.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Khrystoforivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka and about 7.5 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian infiltrations) and advanced north of the settlement.[68] Khrystoforivka was roughly eight kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian infiltrations as of July 27, when the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement and when Russian sources published likely AI-altered footage to bolster the MoD’s false claim.[69] Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Maliivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against occupied southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit near Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the front) on the night of August 11 to 12.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are dropping first-person view (FPV) drones from small balloons near the M-14 Melitopol-Mariupol highway near Melitopol but noted that Russian forces cannot detect the balloons.[72] The milblogger stated that the FPVs are appearing without warning along the highway.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 11 and 12 but did not make confirmed advances.[73]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions between Mali Shcherbaky and Stepove (both west of Orikhiv) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[74]
Russian milbloggers continue to claim Russian presence in western Zaporizhia Oblast in areas where ISW has not observed evidence of Russian positions. A Russian milblogger claimed that the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast runs south of Lukyanivske and near Pavlivka (both west of Orikhiv).[75] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pavlivka.[76]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in Kherson Oblast on August 12.
Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against Russian military and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea continue to cause electricity and water shortages. The leading electric grid company of occupied Sevastopol, Sevastopolenergo, reported on August 12 that there is an unstable electricity supply in occupied Crimea due to damage to energy infrastructure and transmission networks.[77] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind, citing an occupied Crimea news source, reported that Kirovsky Raion in eastern Crimea is without water due to issues within Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo’s network.[78] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ground repeater for controlling Geran- and Gerbera-type drones near occupied Olenivka (likely one of three settlements approximately 130 to 230 kilometers from the frontline).[79]
The Russian MoD claimed on August 11 that Russian forces struck Ukrainian naval vessels in the Black Sea.[80]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, and an unspecified number of Kh-35 cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast and the Black Sea and 138 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[81] Russian forces reportedly primarily targeted Sumy and Odesa oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian Forces downed 112 drones, that Russian air targets hit 16 locations, and that debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, logistics, and critical infrastructure in Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force recently stopped reporting exactly how many missiles Russian forces launched and how many Ukrainian forces downed — such that no reporting on downed missiles does not necessarily mean Ukrainian forces failed to intercept any.[83]
North Korea is also reportedly deploying KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia alongside KN-23 missiles. The Ukrainian Strategic Communications Center reported on August 12 that Russian forces again launched an unspecified number of North Korean-provided KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles as part of their August 10 to 11 strike package against Ukraine.[84] The KN-23 ballistic missile reportedly has a range of 450 kilometers, while the KN-24 missile has a range of 300 to 400 kilometers.[85] Both missiles reportedly have a warhead of up to 400 kilograms. ISW continues to assess that the addition of North Korean-provided missiles to Russia’s arsenal will allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zircon missile stocks.[86]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian forces arrived in the PRC to participate in a joint Belarusian-PRC tactical exercise. The Belarusian MoD claimed on August 12 that Belarusian Special Operations Forces personnel arrived in the PRC and traveled to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Airborne Corps training ground in Hubei Province to participate in the Swift Eagle 2026 tactical exercise until late August.[87] ISW continues to assess that Belarusian forces will be able to share lessons learned from Russian forces fighting in Ukraine with the PRC during the exercise.[88]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ukrayinski-voyini-vidnovili-kontrol-nad-26-naselenimi-punkta-105789; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1344456424436405
[2] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1344456424436405 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/08/12/ugrupovannya-dshv-vidnovylo-kontrol-nad-26-naselenymy-punktamy-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/analysis/russia-ukraine/mapping-methodology-ukraine-product-line/
[4] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1344456424436405 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/08/12/ugrupovannya-dshv-vidnovylo-kontrol-nad-26-naselenymy-punktamy-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41856
[5] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1344456424436405 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/08/12/ugrupovannya-dshv-vidnovylo-kontrol-nad-26-naselenymy-punktamy-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/
[6] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12673; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37576; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2087239912030450062; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2087235951001018524; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/37559
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/;
[10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20367
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/
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[20] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/na-terytoriyi-alabugy-buduyut-majdanchyky/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/3-tysyachi-droniv-geran-4-5-na-misyats/
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[41] https://t.me/grvZapad/19411
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[43] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1377114-tregubov-rosiani-prosunulisa-na-kupanskomu-napramku-so-vidomo/
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55257
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55187
[46] https://t.me/grvZapad/19412
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/36176
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41853
[49] https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/545; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2087294461495701936
[50] https://youtu.be/h8gn5UGF3HM; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/08/12/vnochi-kramatorsk-napovnenyj-gudinnyam-fpv-droniv-okupanty-namagayutsya-pererizaty-logistyku/
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[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41843;
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/12/hochesh-vodychky-idy-v-ataku-dijdesh-my-tobi-skynemo-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-motyvuyut-u-speku/
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[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/97367; https://t.me/rybar/8237
[69] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/
[70] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2087243644008825013; https://t.me/swallow_31ombr/301
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41853
[72] https://t.me/arx_spn/30624
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41843; https://t.me/wargonzo/36176
[74] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2087276223810421159; https://t.me/Russki_Medved/2646; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12675
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46383
[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/36176
[77] https://t.me/sev_energo/4135
[78] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106975 ; https://vk dot ru/wall-210270034_42115
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41853
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/66434
[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/72484
[82]https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14454 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2640 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71462 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7216 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7226 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18418 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65897 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45994
[83] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[84] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2087447396330471490 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
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[87] https://t.me/modmilby/57957
[88] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
