The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Note: ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran. Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. Iran is not merely responding to US strikes on Iran, however, but is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives. The revised update structure reflects some of these key objectives.
Key Takeaways
- Iran is adapting its tactics based on lessons from recent conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine War. Iran deployed a swarm of drones into an area that US fighter jets had entered before downing the US F-15E with MANPADS in April 2026. The drones reportedly transmitted the jet’s GPS location, speed, and direction to Iranian commanders, which helped them successfully target the aircraft.
- The Houthis are attempting to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military campaign against the Houthis by threatening to attack Saudi oil infrastructure unless Saudi Arabia negotiates a settlement. The Houthis also seek to coerce Saudi Arabia into accepting negotiations, likely because the group sees diplomatic engagement as a means to halt Saudi kinetic activity in Yemen and codify a Saudi surrender to Houthi demands.
Toplines
Iran is adapting its tactics based on lessons from recent conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine War. A senior US military official described to the New York Times the conditions under which Iran downed a US F-15E in April 2026.[1] The official said that Iran deployed a swarm of drones into an area that US fighter jets had entered before downing the US F-15E with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS).[2] US military officials added that the drones transmitted the jet’s GPS location, speed, and direction to Iranian commanders, which helped them successfully target the aircraft.[3] This account aligns with the US fighter pilot’s report that he saw multiple Iranian drones hovering nearby before Iran shot down the aircraft.[4] Iran reportedly adopted this tactic from the Russia-Ukraine war.[5] Iran has sought to learn and implement important lessons about the modern battlefield since Russia invaded Ukraine, and Russia has directly assisted Iranian attacks on US forces and bases in this war by providing advanced drone tactics.[6] Reports about Iran’s tactical adaptations are also likely part of a broader Iranian effort to improve targeting by incorporating lessons from its own wars in June 2025 and Spring 2026. US officials have warned that Iran has fired advanced, maneuverable missiles to target US bases in recent weeks, for example.[7]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
US intelligence services identified an unknown individual armed with a MANPADS near the NATO summit in Ankara on July 8 before US President Donald Trump switched to a more secure aircraft for his return flight.[8] Sources briefed on the matter previously told the New York Times that a “credible threat” from “Iranian proxy forces” prompted Trump to change planes.[9]
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline section.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Lebanon
The implementation of “pilot zones” to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon under the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement remains delayed. The agreement stipulates that the LAF will be responsible for disarming Hezbollah in the “pilot zones” after the IDF withdraws from these areas.[10] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) complained to Military Coordination Group for Lebanon Head Lieutenant General Joseph Clearfield (USMC) that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is obstructing LAF deployments in southern Lebanon on August 12.[11] The agreement’s security annex stipulates that Clearfield’s coordination group will deconflict between IDF and LAF units in southern Lebanon and verify that both militaries implement the agreement’s terms.[12] Neither the IDF nor the United States publicly responded to reports about the LAF’s claims. The two sides appear to be making limited diplomatic progress in ongoing talks. Reuters reported that Israel and Lebanon agreed on a monitoring mechanism comprised of military officials from third countries to verify Hezbollah disarmament in the “pilot zones” on August 12, which negotiators reportedly failed to agree on during talks in Rome between August 4 and 6.[13] An unspecified US State Department official told UK-based, Saudi-owned media on August 11 that US, Israeli, and Lebanese delegations are expected to resume direct negotiations in Rome in September 2026.[14]
Iraq
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s reported plan to send security forces into Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, reportedly prompted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s recent visit to Baghdad.[15] Shia Coordination Framework sources told US-funded regional media on August 11 that unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders previously told Ghaani that the Iraqi government was preparing to enter Jurf al Sakhr at “any moment,” which prompted Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on August 10.[16] Informed sources told Iraqi media on August 11 that Ghaani warned Iraqi militia leaders against armed confrontation with the Iraqi government during his August 10 visit. Ghaani also told militia leaders to reach a settlement to avoid handing over militia weapons to the state.[17] Zaydi’s reported plan to retake militia strongholds is consistent with an earlier Saudi media report that Zaydi is considering two approaches to disarm the militias as part of the federal government’s efforts to restrict arms to the state. One of these reported plans would entail deploying Iraqi security forces to take control of Jurf al Sakhr.[18] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah has refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April.[19]
An Iraqi security delegation will visit Saudi Arabia on August 13 to discuss measures to prevent future Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi territory, according to a senior Iraqi government source speaking to Iraqi media on August 12.[20] Iraqi National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al Shatri and Iraqi Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Office Director Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al Shammari will lead the delegation.[21] The source stated that the delegation will discuss strengthening security and intelligence coordination with Saudi Arabia to prevent repeated attacks.[22] This visit comes after the Iraqi government recently took several security precautions on August 7 to thwart Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi Arabia.[23]
Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis are attempting to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military campaign against the Houthis by threatening to attack Saudi oil infrastructure unless Saudi Arabia negotiates a settlement with the Houthis. Houthi media warned on August 11 that the Houthis will expand their attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts and mobilize for further kinetic activity against the Houthis.[24] The Houthi-affiliated threats come amid Saudi Arabia’s current efforts to organize a multinational maritime coalition to ensure safe passage through the Red Sea and reports that Saudi Arabia is concentrating forces for a possible combined ground and maritime offensive against the Houthis.[25] The Houthis have attacked Saudi Aramco facilities since July 24, including terminals and storage units at the Red Sea ports of Yanbu and Jizan, to force Saudi Arabia to abandon its blockade on Houthi ports and airports.[26] ISW-CTP has assessed that Houthi attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure since July 24 primarily seek to raise Saudi political and economic costs to an untenable level and force Saudi leaders to terminate the military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.[27]
The Houthis also seek to coerce Saudi Arabia into accepting negotiations, likely because the group sees diplomatic engagement as a means to halt Saudi kinetic activity in Yemen and codify a Saudi surrender to Houthi demands. Houthi media urged Saudi leaders on August 10 to accept diplomacy and emphasized that the Houthis are prepared to negotiate an end to the current Houthi-Saudi conflict.[28] Houthi officials argued on August 11 and 12 that Saudi capitulation to Houthi demands under a negotiated settlement would ”not be costly” to Saudi Arabia.[29] Such messaging could also be aimed at Saudi partners, such as the United States, to inflame ongoing concerns about global energy disruptions and increase pressure on Saudi Arabia to abandon its campaign in Yemen.[30]
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/us/politics/iran-military-base-attacks-us-munitions.html
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/us/politics/iran-military-base-attacks-us-munitions.html
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/us/politics/iran-military-base-attacks-us-munitions.html
[4] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/06/23/politics/iran-drones-f-15-pilot-intelligence
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/us/politics/iran-military-base-attacks-us-munitions.html
[6] https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/middleeast/russia-iran-advice-drone-tactics-intl; https://www.understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The20Russia-Iran20Coalition20Deepens20013025.pdf
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/us/politics/iran-military-base-attacks-us-munitions.htmll ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-kheibar-shekan-missile-5776a6e4
[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/us/politics/trump-iran-threat-air-force-one.html
[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/24/us/politics/trump-plane-iran-threat.html?smid=url-share
[10] https://www.axios.com/2026/07/21/lebanon-israel-trump-aoun-hezbollah ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/
[11] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2087471997286519121
[12] https://x.com/HibaNasr/status/2071617895331746115
[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/uk-italy-among-states-considered-verify-hezbollah-disarmament-sources-say-2026-08-12/ ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5304124-مفاوضات-روما-2-بلا-نتائج-الأسرى-والمناطق-النموذجية-يتصدران
[14] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5305891-السفير-الأميركي-متفائل-بأن-تسهم-المفاوضات-اللبنانية-الإسرائيلية
[15] https://alhurra dot com/32845
[16] https://alhurra dot com/32845
[17] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-قا-ني-يرسم-خطا-حمر-في-بغداد-لا-حصر-لسلاح-الفصا-ل-ولا-صدام-مع-الدولة ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-قا-ني-في-بغداد-لبحث-سلاح-الفصا-ل-ومسار-تصدير-النفط-عبر-هرمز
[18] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2026/08/11/العراق-الزيدي-يتمسك-بحصر-السلاح-ويبحث-السيطرة-على-جرف-الصخر
[19] https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/
[20] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/غدا-وفد-مني-عراقي-رفيع-لى-السعودية-لبحث-هجمات-المسي-رات-حصري
[21] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/غدا-وفد-مني-عراقي-رفيع-لى-السعودية-لبحث-هجمات-المسي-رات-حصري
[22] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/غدا-وفد-مني-عراقي-رفيع-لى-السعودية-لبحث-هجمات-المسي-رات-حصري
[23] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/572444/تفاصيل-حول-سبب-الانتشار-الامني-وسحب-افواج-من-ثلاث-محافظات-الى-بغداد ; https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2026/08/07/intelligence-indicates-iran-proxies-preparing-attacks-on-saudi-arabia-senior-source; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/ليلة-عصيبة-في-العراق-إنذار-عسكري-واتصالات-لتخفيف-حدة-التوتر ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-7-2026/
[24] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2087249860986917046?s=20
[25] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/30/saudi-forces-planning-major-offensive-against-houthis-central-yemen
[26] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2086341452062245037 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2080948398375453128?s=20 ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-hormuz-strait-war-25-july-2026-df3790320c595f3e599fb1dd69423e77 ; https://x.com/john_marquee/status/2080890037558984957?s=20
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-27-2026/ ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2080948398375453128?s=20
[28] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2087249860986917046?s=20
[29] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3763073.htm?cid=1 ; https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/2087113259996401789?s=20
[30] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/23/business/oil-price-100-dollars.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-21-2026/
