Toplines
Lithuanian officials continue warning of a possible Russian false-flag operation against NATO’s eastern flank using seized Ukrainian drones. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas stated on August 6 that Russia may use Ukrainian-manufactured drones to conduct a false-flag operation against the Baltic states.[1] Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz issued a similar warning on July 21 that Russia may use seized Ukrainian drones to conduct a sabotage attempt against NATO, along with other recent Western warnings.[2] Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported on August 1, citing images published by former Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, that Russia has potentially begun using seized Ukrainian long-range drones for potential provocations.[3] Latvian Defense Minister Raivis Melnis stated on August 6 that there are no indicators of imminent Russian aggression against any critical infrastructure in Latvia.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia is conducting a “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO and that Russian false flag provocations, along with drone incursions, sabotage, electronic warfare interference, and overflights, are part of this campaign.[5] Russia regularly violates Baltic airspace and may do so with Ukrainian drones as part of an information operation and/or false flag attack to test NATO’s response.[6]
Russia continues to form combat units using Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in direct violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Volunteer Corps announced on August 6 that Russian forces formed the first Ukrainian Volunteer Spetsnaz Brigade comprised of Ukrainian POWs and former Ukrainian servicemembers who allegedly defected to Russia.[7] The Russian military formed this brigade by merging several irregular so-called volunteer units, including the Maxim Krivonos and Alexei Berest battalions and the Alexander Matrosov, Martyn Pushkar, and Slobodskoy detachments (all of which reportedly either are partially comprised of Ukrainian POWs or Ukrainian soldiers who reportedly defected to Russia).[8] At least one Russian military blogger openly discussed how this new brigade is comprised of Ukrainian POWs — a noteworthy statement given the fact that using POWs in combat is a war crime.[9] ISW first observed reports of Russian forces forming combat units using Ukrainian POWs in November 2022, with the most recent Russian “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” battalion with Ukrainian POWs operating under the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry’s “Kaskad” formation in western Donetsk Oblast in December 2023.[10] Russia’s use of Ukrainian POWs in combat formations is likely a violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs, which prohibits the use of POWs in military activities on the side of the power that has captured them and states that “no POW may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.”[11]
Ukrainian Brigadier General Serhiy Sobko has reportedly assumed the post of the acting Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander-in-chief.[12] Sobko previously served as the chief of staff of the 11th Army Corps from January 2024 until now, and as Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces chief of staff between 2022 and 2024.[13]
Key Takeaways
- Lithuanian officials continue warning of a possible Russian false-flag operation against NATO’s eastern flank using seized Ukrainian drones.
- Russia continues to form combat units using Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in direct violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
- Ukrainian Brigadier General Serhiy Sobko has reportedly assumed the post of the acting Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander-in-chief.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 5 to 6.
- Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 101 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 5 to 6. Ukrainian officials reported on August 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 700 kilometers from the international border), causing a large fire.[14] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that the strikes damaged four RVS-2000 tanks containing oil, causing an oil spill, and caused fires at the ELOU-1 and AVT-3 refining units.[15] The SBU noted that the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery is one of the largest oil refining enterprises in Russia with a refining capacity of 15 million tons of oil per year. Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows a large fire at the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery following the Ukrainian strike.[16] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevrayev acknowledged on August 6 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged the storage tanks of an oil refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast.[17] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border), which has a refining capacity of 7.1 to 7.3 million tons of oil per year.[18] Ukrainian forces have struck the Bashneft-Novoil refinery at least three times since August 2.[19]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Wildberries (the closest Russian equivalent of Amazon) warehouses on August 5 as the company appears to be facing mounting costs for damage repair and merchandise loss compensation. Tver Oblast Governor Vitaly Korolyov claimed on August 6 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged the facade of a Wildberries logistics facility in Tver Oblast.[20] A Russian insider source claimed on August 6, citing an unnamed source, that Ukrainian forces have struck at least 21 Wildberries logistics facilities representing up to 22 percent of the company’s total reported facility space between July 18 and August 5, causing up to 400 billion rubles (about $4.82 billion) in losses, significant facility damage, and service disruptions.[21] The insider source claimed that Wildberries had not purchased insurance for any of the struck facilities, which would significantly increase the company’s financial liability for damages.[22] The insider source assessed that Wildberries is unlikely to provide enough compensation to cover its retailers’ total revenue losses, which may prompt retailers to transfer their goods to Wildberries’ competitors — a development that would impose a lasting negative impact on Wildberries’ business.[23]
A Ukrainian source provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) on a recent Ukrainian strike against industrial infrastructure in the Republic of Tatarstan. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel published satellite imagery and reported on August 5 that the July 31 Ukrainian strike against the Nizhnekamskneftekhim Petrochemical Plant near Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,100 kilometers from the international border), destroyed one workshop and likely detonated explosive substances used in polystyrene production.[24]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 6 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Hirky and west of Ryzhivka (both northwest of Sumy City).[26]
A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on August 5 that a Ukrainian drone struck a Russian Yak-40 turbojet passenger aircraft at the Belgorod City Airport.[27]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage published on August 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Lyman and in eastern Vovchansk (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[28]
Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on August 5 that Ukrainian authorities evacuated around 200 civilians from 80 settlements in northern Kharkiv Oblast due to Russian strikes.[29]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 6 that Russian forces advanced south of Bereznyky (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on August 5 and 6 but did not advance.[32]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against fuel infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 3 shows a Ukrainian fiber-optic drone striking a gas station in northern Rubizhne (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 6 that Russian forces advanced into southern Dibrova and southwest of Ozerne (both northeast of Slovyansk).[35]
Ukrainian forces conducted frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Slovyansk direction on August 5 and 6. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows Ukrainian forces using a guided bomb unit (GBU) to strike a Russian command post in Soledar (roughly 13 kilometers from the frontline).[36] Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near Torske (roughly four kilometers from the frontline).[37]
Russian forces recently advanced and conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions south of Krasnyi Kut, in northern Torske, and in northwestern Pryiut (all west of Kostyantynivka), after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[38] Russian forces likely infiltrated north through Sofiivka (also west of Kostyantynivka) towards Krasnyi Kut, Torske, and Pryiut, indicating Russian forces advanced up to the eastern outskirts of Sofiivka and infiltrated throughout Sofiivka.
Russian forces continue to conduct flag-raising missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area published interviews on August 5 with two Russian prisoners of war (POW) who claimed that their commanders gave them orders to infiltrate Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and wave their arms in front of a drone in an effort to provide legitimacy to Russian claims that Russian forces seized Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka.[39] ISW continues to assess that flag-raising tactics are a part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian gains and create a false perception of military strength.[40]
Russian strikes against Ukrainian drone control points and personnel concentrations are reportedly hindering Ukrainian freedom of maneuver in the Druzhkivka direction. A Ukrainian military source reported on August 5 that Russian forces continue to conduct airstrikes against Ukrainian drone control points and personnel concentrations in the Druzhkivka direction to restrict Ukrainian forces’ freedom of maneuver.[41] The Ukrainian military source stated that coordination between the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) in this direction significantly increases the effectiveness of Russian airstrikes.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dobropillya tactical area. Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags in western and central Chernihivka (formerly Krasnoyarske), after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[42] Russian milblogger claimed on August 6 that Russian forces advanced into central Hannivka (northeast of Dobropillya), into eastern and southeastern Dobropillya, and northeast of Chernihivka.[43]
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction but have not made confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 6 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko and Chernihivka and advanced near Chernihivka (both north of Pokrovsk).[44] A Ukrainian military source rejected these claims on August 6, stating that Chernihivka, Shevchenko, and Svitle (north of Pokrovsk) are contested “gray zones” and that Russian forces are infiltrating into eastern Matyasheve (west of Svitle).[45] The source reported that Russian forces are already infiltrating in the Vodyanske area (between Matyasheve and Svitle) by leveraging gaps between Ukrainian positions and concealment provided by windbreaks in the area.
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 5 and 6 but did not advance.[46]
Ukrainian forces are striking Russian tube and rocket artillery in the Russian near rear in the Novopavlivka direction. Geolocated footage published on August 5 and 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian D-30 howitzer in Preobrazhenka, a BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in southern Sribne, and a 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer in southern Novoyelzavetivka (all east of Novopavlivka and about six to nine kilometers from the frontline).[47]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 6.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Hulyaipole direction as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian vehicle in northern Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced or maintained positions in the area despite Russian claims.[48] Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag east of Zirnytsya (northwest of Hulyaipole), after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49] A Ukrainian military source reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces control Zirnytsya and refuted the Russian claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[50] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 5 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[51]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northwestern Mali Shcherbaky (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City and west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced or maintained positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[52]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 6.
Ukrainian forces recently conducted a series of strikes on Russian military drone infrastructure and patrol boats in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 6 that recent Ukrainian strikes damaged two Russian ground repeater antennas for controlling Geran and Gerbera fixed-wing strike drones in occupied Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast (approximately 47 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Olenivka, Crimea (likely one of three settlements between approximately 130 to 230 kilometers from the frontline, likely the settlement on the western coast of Crimea 130 kilometers from the frontline).[53] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on August 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the ”Balaklava“ and ”Kerch“ project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol boats of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the port of occupied Kerch, Crimea (approximately 240 kilometers from the frontline).[54]
Ukraine’s strike campaign against Crimea is reportedly degrading Russia’s ability to supply electricity to consumers in the Peninsula. Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on August 6 that some parts of occupied Feodosia (approximately 243 kilometers from the frontline) have been without power since July 28 as a result of Ukrainian drone strikes.[55]
Ukrainian forces claim to have established fire control over a key Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting occupied Crimea to mainland Russia. A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) unit reported on August 6 that it established fire control over portions of the M-14 and M-18 highways between occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast and Chonhar, Kherson Oblast and is conducting constant strikes against Russian logistics.[56]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 6 that Russian forces launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles from occupied Crimea, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea, and 101 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[57] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 66 drones, that 29 drones and one Onyx missile hit 18 locations, and that drone and missile debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, residential, transportation, and agricultural infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[58] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[59]
Russian forces continue to strike foreign-flagged merchant vessels travelling to and from Ukrainian ports. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on August 6 that Russian forces struck the Guinea-Bissau-flagged merchant vessel Mera Queen carrying Ukrainian wheat off the coast of Odesa City on the evening of August 5 to 6, killing at least one and injuring at least three.[60]
The Russian campaign against Ukrainian commercial logistics warehouses is beginning to cause significant financial losses for Ukrainian retail companies. The co-founder of Ukrainian online marketplace Rozetka, Vladyslav Chechetkin, stated on August 6 that Russian strikes against Rozetka facilities have caused billions of hryvnias worth of direct losses so far.[61] Forbes Ukraine reported on August 6 that Russian strikes since July 2026 have destroyed over 400,000 square meters of warehouse and logistics facility space belonging to Ukrainian postal and retailing entities including Nova Poshta, Fozzy Group, Rozetka, Epicenter, and hundreds of small businesses which store their goods in the warehouses of major companies.[62] Russian milbloggers continue to accuse Ukrainian forces of storing military assets or dual-use goods in commercial warehouses and logistics facilities.[63
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Russia continues to rely on Belarusian fuel imports to compensate for fuel shortages as a result of Ukraine’s strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and logistics. Reuters reported on August 5, citing two industry sources and its own calculations, that Russian imports of gasoline and diesel from Belarus reached record highs in July 2026, with gasoline imports increasing by 13 percent to 212,000 metric tons and diesel imports doubling to 162,000 tons.[64] Reuters noted that Russia’s gasoline output fell to 65 percent of its seasonal average consumption while diesel production fell to about half of the seasonal average as of early July 2026. Ukraine’s strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and logistics have significantly degraded Russia’s refining capacity, inflicting gasoline and diesel shortages during a busy summer tourist season and requiring Russia to import increasing amounts of gasoline and diesel from Belarus since May 2026.[65]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.15min dot lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/karine-zvalgyba-rusija-svarsto-smugius-baltijos-regione-ukrainos-gamybos-dronais-56-2736860; https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/3013140/kaunas-apie-galimas-rusijos-provokacijas-stebime-planavima-bet-tikslios-datos-nea; https://www.lsm dot lv/raksts/zinas/arzemes/06.08.2026-lietuvas-izlukdienesti-bridina-par-iespejamiem-krievijas-uzbrukumiem-infrastrukturai-baltija.a657748/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/2991345/merzas-rusija-rengiasi-agresijai-uz-ukrainos-ribu; https://www.reuters.com/world/lithuania-says-russia-is-planning-attacks-infrastructure-2026-07-15/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/information-nato-member-states-shows-russia-attempted-sabotage-latvias-president-2026-07-15/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[3] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-jmovirno-pochala-vykorystovuvaty/; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AzhmQJMCE/ ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7642
[4] https://www.lsm dot lv/raksts/zinas/arzemes/06.08.2026-lietuvas-izlukdienesti-bridina-par-iespejamiem-krievijas-uzbrukumiem-infrastrukturai-baltija.a657748/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/
[7] https://dobrocor dot ru/v-sostave-dobrovolcheskogo-korpusa-sformirovana-novaya-brigada/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-20-2025/ ; https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/4060002-u-rf-ukrainskih-polonenih-verbuut-na-vijnu-u-cotiri-sformovani-pidrozdili-koordstab.html ; https://insta.news/cluster/1297363/details
[9] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120826
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25-19/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-11/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-11/ ; https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_24-22/
[12] https://suspilne dot media/1372848-sergij-sobko-stav-timcasovim-zastupnikom-golovnokomanduvaca-zsu-dzerela/ ; https://www dot pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/05/8047473/
[13] https://hromadske dot ua/viyskovi/268953-nachshtabu-11-ho-korpusu-serhiy-sobko-vykonuvatyme-oboviazky-zastupnyka-drapatoho ; https://suspilne dot media/1372848-sergij-sobko-stav-timcasovim-zastupnikom-golovnokomanduvaca-zsu-dzerela/ ; https://espreso dot tv/viyskovi-novyny-noviy-zastupnik-drapatogo-khto-takiy-general-sergiy-sobko-geroy-ukraini-i-prikhilnik-reform-u-zsu#goog_rewarded
[14] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2085266040154452422 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20307 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9036 ; https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-spilno-iz-inshymy-skladovymy-syl-oborony-urazyla-yaroslavskyi-npz-ta-korabli-berehovoi-okhorony-fsb-u-kerchi
[15] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-spilno-iz-inshymy-skladovymy-syl-oborony-urazyla-yaroslavskyi-npz-ta-korabli-berehovoi-okhorony-fsb-u-kerchi
[16] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2085283056785510728 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2085264566292775227 ; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2085261735385035098
[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/388974
[18] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2085266040154452422 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20307 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2293
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/388948
[21] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2111
[22] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2113
[23] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2112
[24] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8013
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41775; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41773; https://t.me/wargonzo/36052; https://t.me/severnnyi/8936
[26] https://t.me/divgen/82969; https://t.me/divgen/82976
[27] https://t.me/in_factum/46690
[28] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6777; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2085266925928743128; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2085279826579976462
[29] https://t.me/synegubov/24540
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41775; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41773
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33648
[32]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41775 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41773 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36052 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19358
[33] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2085282874115154059 ; https://t.me/umftteam/1066
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41775; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41773; https://t.me/wargonzo/36052
[35] https://t.me/divgen/82972
[36] https://t.me/soniah_hub/17525; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2085099619587940837; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37430
[37] https://t.me/ombr_63/1776; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2085267206036758942
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12625; https://t.me/nichnavarta/319
[39] https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/4457; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/05/my-ne-zrozumily-shho-stalosya-morpihy-zirvaly-rosijsku-ipso-ta-vzyaly-polonenyh-na-kostyantynivskomu-napryamku/
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[41] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14076
[42] https://t.me/Osintpen/3301; https://t.me/VESTIDONETSK/21929
[43] https://t.me/divgen/82982; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33644
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54822 ; https://t.me/divgen/82982
[45] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14078 ; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14079
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41775; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41773
[47] https://x.com/55brigade/status/2085286963418931386; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2085315512288846318; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2085316391779909846 https://x.com/ayzin_illya/status/2085031921256395022; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2085111592480371029
[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/20542; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2085069906790465845
[49] https://t.me/Osintpen/3300; https://t.me/voin_dv/20537
[50] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14075
[51] https://t.me/rybar/82236
[52] https://t.me/Russki_Medved/2454; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2085309697221869915; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2085313192725508418
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41778
[54] https://ssu dot gov.ua/novyny/sbu-spilno-iz-inshymy-skladovymy-syl-oborony-urazyla-yaroslavskyi-npz-ta-korabli-berehovoi-okhorony-fsb-u-kerchi
[55] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106531
[56] https://t.me/umftteam/1068
[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/71719
[58] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30925; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42957; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31229; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31232; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31230; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31224; https://t.me/synegubov/24541; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1372574-troe-ludej-zaginuli-v-balaklii-na-harkivsini-rf-atakuvala-zitlovi-budinki/; https://t.me/synegubov/24543; https://t.me/synegubov/24544; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1372628-fpv-dron-na-optovolokni-vdariv-po-masini-na-harkivsini-poranenij-colovik/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70848; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1372594-vorog-voue-navit-z-korovami-rosiani-atakuvali-molocnu-fermu-na-harkivsini-e-poraneni-tvarini/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18360; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18368; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/70851; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1373012-kerovanou-aviabombou-rosijska-armia-nanesla-udar-po-seredmistu-sum-so-kazut-ocevidci/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45545; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65576; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65580; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65583; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45560; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65584; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65591; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65595; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65599; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45576; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65601;
[59] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7562
[60] https://t.me/odeskaODA/18369; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/594; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1372650-rf-atakuvala-sudno-mera-queen-u-portu-odesini-zaginuv-morak-e-travmovani/; https://t.me/astrapress/121421
[61] https://epravda dot com.ua/rus/biznes/ubytki-rozetka-ot-rossiyskih-atak-ischislyayutsya-milliardami-824372/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/06/pryamye-ubytki-milliardy-griven-ukrainskiy-marketpleys-rozetka-zayavil-chto-iz-za-udara-rossii-pones-samye-bolshie-poteri-v-istorii-kompanii ; https://t.me/astrapress/121434 ; https://suspilne dot media/1372524-udar-po-skladu-rozetka-kompania-zaznala-milardnih-zbitkiv-i-poperedzae-pro-mozlive-pogirsenna-servisu/
[62] https://forbes dot ua/ru/company/vzaemne-znishchennya-ekonomik-fozzy-group-rozetka-epitsentr-nova-poshta-pid-rosiyskimi-obstrilami-yak-kompanii-planuyut-zakhistiti-tovari-partneriv-i-spozhivachiv-06082026-41020
[63] https://t.me/sashakots/63581; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29046
[64] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gasoline-diesel-exports-belarus-russia-hit-new-record-high-july-sources-say-2026-08-05/
[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/;
