Toplines
The Russian oil refining industry is failing to meet the rising domestic gasoline demand as the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia’s oil refining capacity. Reuters reported on July 10, citing two industry sources and its own calculations, that Russian gasoline production fell to about 65 percent of the average seasonal consumption and that Russian production is not meeting the seasonal gasoline demand.[1] The two industry sources told Reuters that the seasonal gasoline demand increased by 40,000 and 45,000 metric tons per day (a deficit of around 35 percent) and that Russia’s total gasoline demand typically reaches between 115,000 and 120,000 metric tons per day during the peak summer driving season. Reuters noted that Russian gasoline production fell short of domestic demand by 25 percent in June 2026. Intermediaries told Reuters that Russia is tapping into federal stockpiles and receiving 6,000 metric tons of gasoline per day from Belarus. Reuters noted that Ukrainian combined strikes against Russia’s largest gasoline producers, including the Lukoil- Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez (NORSI) and Omsk oil refineries in Nizhny Novgorod and Omsk oblasts, respectively, forced Russia to temporarily halt production at these facilities.[2] Reuters reported on July 9, citing two sources familiar with the matter, that the Saratov Oil Refinery suspended operations on July 7 after a Ukrainian drone strike damaged the only CDU-6 primary oil refining unit at the facility.[3] It is unclear how long the Saratov Oil Refinery will remain out of commission, as it also reportedly previously halted operations in March and May 2026 following Ukrainian strikes.[4]
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak acknowledged on July 10 that some Russian oil refineries have partially halted production because of Ukrainian drone strikes and noted that Russian authorities will ensure additional gasoline supplies to Russian federal subjects.[5] Regional authorities in Russia and in occupied areas, including Crimea, continue imposing restrictions on gasoline sales and adapting to the worsening gasoline shortages across Russia, and some authorities are even calling on Russians to work remotely and limit travel to reduce gasoline consumption.[6] Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on July 9 that they deployed 59 police posts along its international border and imposed some entry restrictions for foreign cars to combat illegal fuel exports, likely referring to individuals seeking to illegally transport gasoline back to Russia.[7] Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs indicated that the number of individuals caught attempting to smuggle gasoline out of the country illegally sharply rose in June 2026. Ukraine’s successful long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure since March 2026 has decreased Russia’s ability to produce and refine oil, leading to intensifying gasoline and diesel shortages that the Russian government is struggling to mitigate.[8]
A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings continued to fall in early July 2026 after a sharp decline at the end of June 2026. The Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on July 10 the results of a poll indicating that Putin’s approval rating fell by 0.9 percent to 66 percent and that trust in Putin fell by one percent to 72.3 percent between June 29 and July 5.[9] Polling from VTsIOM and other Russian state and independent polling agencies indicated that Putin’s trust and approval ratings sharply fell in late June 2026 after weeks of steady decline since March 2026.[10] It remains notable that a Russian state-owned polling center believes it necessary to acknowledge the growing societal discontent that is likely related to the intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia.[11]
Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski confirmed recent US warnings that Russia might be planning to conduct provocations against unspecified NATO states. Sikorski stated during a press conference with French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot on July 9 that Poland has “credible information” that Russia is planning to conduct provocations against unspecified NATO countries.[12] Sikorski noted that his statement is a public warning aimed at dissuading Russia from carrying out such provocations, and Barrot confirmed that France has similarly observed an increase in Russian provocations.[13] Polish outlet Onet reported on June 30 that the United States reportedly warned Poland that Russia is considering a limited military provocation against Poland, and Sikorski’s statement serves as a confirmation of those reported warnings.[14] Sikorski’s statement and the repeated US and European warnings are consistent with ISW’s long-term assessment that Russian false flag provocations are part of the Russian “Phase Zero” campaign to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[15]
Key Takeaways
- The Russian oil refining industry is failing to meet the rising domestic gasoline demand as the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia’s oil refining capacity.
- A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings continued to fall in early July 2026 after a sharp decline at the end of June 2026.
- Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski confirmed recent US warnings that Russia might be planning to conduct provocations against unspecified NATO states.
- Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of July 9 to 10. Russian forces launched 137 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of July 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 355 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 9 to 10, causing explosions and a fire.[16] The General Staff reported that Ilsky refinery is one of the largest refineries in southern Russia and has a designed refining capacity of up to 6.6 million tons of oil per year. Social media footage published on July 9 shows smoke and fire at the Ilsky Oil Refinery.[17] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed on July 10 that debris from Ukrainian drones caused a fire at the territory of the Ilsky oil refinery.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kurgannefteprodukt oil terminal in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast (roughly 185 kilometers from the frontline), resulting in a fire; and the Azovnefteprodukt oil depot in Azov, Rostov Oblast (roughly 220 kilometers from the frontline), resulting in explosions and smoke.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian forces conducted both strikes on the night of July 9 to 10. The General Staff reported that the Kurgannefteproduct oil terminal provides intake, storage, and transshipment of oil products in the Azov Sea region and that the Azovnefteproduct oil depot supports Rostov Oblast’s fuel infrastructure. Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows smoke rising from the Taganrog port, and additional footage published on July 9 shows smoke rising in Azov.[20] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar acknowledged on July 10 that Ukrainian strikes caused fires at a seaport in Taganrog and at two oil storage facilities in Azov.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novatek Ust-Luga oil terminal in Leningrad Oblast (roughly 855 kilometers from the international border) — one of the largest gas processing and light petroleum production facilities in Russia — on the night of July 9 to 10.[22] Footage and imagery published on July 10 reportedly show smoke rising from the TAIF-NK JSC oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,115 kilometers from the international border), which Ukrainian forces struck on the night of July 7 to 8.[23]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 9 and 10 but did not make confirmed advances.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Russian forces advanced into Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) and in the fields northeast of Stepok (southeast of Sumy City).[25]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on July 10 that Russian forces attempted infiltration missions toward Mala Rybitsa and Velykyi Prykil (both east of Sumy City) but did not consolidate positions.[26]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 9 and 10 but did not advance.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 10 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian temporary deployment point near Zakharivka (northeast of Kharkiv City) with four FAB-500 aerial bombs.[28] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian armored fighting vehicle (AFV) in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 9 and 10 but did not advance.[30] The Russian MoD claimed on July 10 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 aerial bomb strike against a Ukrainian drone control center near Rublene (northeast of Velyky Burluk).[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on July 9 and 10 but did not advance.[32]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces are increasingly using small group infiltration tactics and using drones to supply their positions.[33] The source noted that Russian forces are struggling to supply their positions using drones.
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian gas infrastructure and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Occupied Luhansk Oblast governor Leonid Pasechnik claimed on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a gas station in Novoaidar (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) and are interdicting the P-66 Kreminna-Luhansk City highway.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction as Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack. Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in western Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[36]
Russian forces are struggling to conduct logistics in the Slovyansk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on July 10 that Russian forces frequently abandon their soldiers and have halted supply deliveries to some positions.[37]
Russian forces continue conducting guided glide bomb strikes against river crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River and targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-500 guided bomb strike against a river crossing over the Siverskyi Donets River west of Mayaky (north of Slovyansk).[38] Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Russian forces conducting a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Ukrainian gas station along the T-0509 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway (also called the H-20 highway) in Slovyansk.[39]
Russian sources and geolocated footage indicated that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in locations where Russian forces previously advanced or claimed control. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted a map on July 10 which acknowledges that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and north of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[40] The milblogger’s map further indicates that Russian forces do not maintain positions in the fields north and east of Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka), in Klynove (north of Kostyantynivka), near northern Bezimyane (north of Kostyantynivka), west and in Priyut and Pavlivka (both west of Kostyantynivka) – all areas where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence. The milblogger’s map also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Malocharka (just north of Kostyantynivka) and in northwestern Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 9 and 10 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Markove and in western Malynivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in these areas contrary to Russian claims.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kostyantynivka.[42]
Russian forces are increasing their drone strikes against Kramatorsk. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on July 10 that Russian forces have greatly increased the number and intensity of drone strikes while decreasing offensive ground operations in the Kramatorsk direction in the last week and a half (roughly between June 29 and July 10).[43] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces aim to encircle Kramatorsk rather than assault the city head-on. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian intelligence reports indicate that the Russian military command recently provided Russian forces with 1,000 Molniya drones with orders to intensify strikes on Kramatorsk, and that Russian forces continue to target both Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), military equipment, and civilian vehicles in and near Kramatorsk.
Order of Battle: The Garuda detachment of the Russian 7th Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Volunteer Corps) reportedly struck a Ukrainian gas station in Kramatorsk.[44] ISW last observed elements of the 7th Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade operating near Bohdanivka (northeast of presently occupied Bakhmut) on April 7, 2024.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on July 9 and 10 but did not make a confirmed advance.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 10 that Russian forces advanced northeast and east of Hannivka and northwest of Toretske (both east of Dobropillya).[47]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[48] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows destroyed Russian vehicles after reported Ukrainian strikes near Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk and roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline) after what was likely a Ukrainian drone strike.[49]
Ukrainian forces continue to interdict Russian logistics in Pokrovsk as Russian forces are attempting to use their forward positions in the Pokrovsk direction to advance toward Dobropillya. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi reported on July 10 that elements of the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) as well as the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces deployed significant reserves to the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR).[50] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to advance through Hryshyne (northeast of Pokrovsk) towards Dobropillya from the south. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian logistics and striking Russian personnel concentrations, command posts, and other control centers in Pokrovsk itself.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 10 but did not advance.[51]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission. Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions east of Novokhatske (northeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[52] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in Andriivka-Klevtsove (east of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Ukrainian small groups operating in the Oleksandrivka direction are preventing Russian forces from effectively clearing areas in the Oleksandrivka direction.[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy, manufacturing, and logistics infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military targets on the outskirts of occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline), including a drone assembly facility, an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) warehouse, and Russian servicemembers.[55] Footage published on July 10 shows smoke rising from an electrical substation in occupied Shakhtarsk (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[56] Footage published on July 9 shows a Ukrainian strike against a Russian truck in occupied Horlivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[57] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on July 9 that Ukrainian drones struck a manufacturing facility in occupied Novoazovsk (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline).[58]
Ukrainian forces reportedly reduced the rate of Russian advance and are continuing to inflict steep casualties on Russian forces. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have reduced the rate of Russian advances by more than half during the first six months of 2026 and that the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian assaults is roughly 40 to 60.[59] Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces inflicted 32,000 casualties onto Russian forces during the first six months of 2026.
The Ukrainian 1st Separate Assault Regiment Commander Dmitry “Perun” Filatov reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces increased the number of intermediate-range strikes against occupied Ukraine by a factor of three over the last two months.[60]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 9 and 10 but did not advance.[61]
Russian forces are increasingly relying on light vehicles to maneuver between positions due to armored vehicle shortages. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on July 10 that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other light equipment to maneuver between positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast due to the shortages of armored vehicles and the need to reduce exposure to Ukrainian strikes.[62]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricant depot near occupied Rozivka (possibly referring to one of several settlements between roughly 40 and 120 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on July 9 to 10.[63] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows two burning Russian fuel tankers along the M-14 Melitopol-Berdyansk highway south of occupied Inzivka (roughly 87 kilometers from the frontline).[64]
Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure are causing power outages in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on July 9 that Ukrainian strikes against key energy facilities left a significant portion of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast without power.[65]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 10.
Russian occupation officials reported power outages in occupied Kherson Oblast following Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure. Kherson Oblast Russian occupation officials, including Kherson Occupation Governor Vladimir Saldo, claimed on July 9 and 10 that all the districts of occupied Kherson Oblast are partially or completely without power since the evening of July 9.[66]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea, causing continued power outages. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the 110 kV Berehove substation in occupied Molochne (possibly referring to one of several settlements between roughly 115 and 215 kilometers from the frontline), the 110 kV Mainaki electrical substation near occupied Yevpatoria (roughly 160 kilometers from the frontline), the 110 kV Saky electrical substation in Saky (roughly 185 kilometers from the frontline), and the 110 kV Novoozerna and 35 kV Medvedeve substations in occupied Medvedeve (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).[67] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on July 9 that the Ukrainian strike against the 110 kV Mainaki electrical substation near occupied Yevpatoria caused the substation to catch fire and resulted in power outages in nearby settlements.[68] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev stated on July 10 that the Chornomorsk Regional Dispatch Office imposed a temporary power supply restriction in occupied Sevastopol to prevent a breakdown of the overloaded power system in occupied Crimea following Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure.[69]
Russian forces are reportedly struggling to protect gasoline tankers as Ukrainian forces continue to strike seaborne shipments to further isolate occupied Crimea’s gasoline market. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces struck 13 vessels, including ten tankers, one dry cargo ship, one ferry, and one tugboat near occupied Crimea on the night of July 9 and 10.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces struck 13 tankers, three dry cargo ships, one ferry, and one Russian military auxiliary vessel on the night of July 9 and 10 in an unspecified area.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff’s numbers may refer to some of the same Ukrainian strikes against Russian vessels that Brovdi reported. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the Sea of Azov north of the Kerch Strait on July 8 and 10 following Ukrainian strikes on Russian tankers in the Sea of Azov between July 5 and 10.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that the Russian commercial fleet is employing isolated and poorly armed mobile fire teams to intercept Ukrainian drones that target fuel logistics and tankers in the Sea of Azov.[73] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on July 10 that occupied Crimea residents are increasingly traveling to Russia to purchase gasoline and transport it back to occupied Crimea amid persistent fuel shortages on the peninsula.[74] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline transports represent a new phase in Ukrainian efforts to isolate occupied Crimea from the Russian logistics network.[75]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 137 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol-type loitering munitions from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 drones, that 18 drones struck 16 locations, and that debris struck four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck medical, fuel, civilian, water, transport, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[77] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported on July 10 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[78]
Russian forces continue their strike campaign targeting gas stations in Ukraine. The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on July 9 that a Russian drone struck a gas station in Zaporizhzhia City, causing a fire and injuring five civilians.[79] Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported on July 10 that Russian forces struck gas stations in Kholmy and Koryukivka, Chernihiv Oblast, using Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) and Gerbera drones during the day on July 9.[80] Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin stated on July 10 that Russian forces struck a gas station in Slovyansk and two gas stations in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast.[81] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials stated on July 10 that Russian forces damaged two gas stations in Pishchanska Hromada, Samarivskyi Raion and in Pavlohrad Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. [82] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 10 that Russian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Belyary, Odesa Oblast, a fuel and lubricants depot near the port of Mykolaiv City, and an oil depot near Pereyaslavske, Kyiv Oblast.[83]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged on July 9 that a Russian strike near Vyshneve, Kyiv Oblast on the night of July 5 to 6 hit a Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise, Ukroboronprom’s ammunition depot.[84]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarus and Russia are simplifying the procedure for obtaining resident permits as part of the Union State integration process. Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree on July 9 approving the draft protocol that simplifies the procedure for Belarusian and Russian citizens to obtain a residence permit in the other country and reduces the processing time from three to two months.[85]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-gasoline-output-covers-65-demand-after-ukrainian-strikes-sources-say-2026-07-10/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-largest-oil-refinery-halts-processing-after-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-07-07/; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-gasoline-output-covers-65-demand-after-ukrainian-strikes-sources-say-2026-07-10/; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-norsi-refinery-halted-after-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-06-25/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-saratov-oil-refinery-halt-since-wednesdays-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-07-09/
[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-saratov-oil-refinery-halt-since-wednesdays-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-07-09/
[5] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/10/v-pravitelstve-priznali-npz-vyhodyat-iz-stroya-iz-za-udarov-ukrainy; https://t.me/tass_agency/384685; https://t.me/tass_agency/384687
[6] https://www.nso dot ru/npa/78030; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/10/zhitelyam-novosibirskoy-oblasti-predlozhili-ne-ezdit-na-avtomobilyah-mestnym-kompaniyam-rekomendovali-pereyti-na-udalenku; https://t.me/astrapress/118229; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/118860 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/115691; https://www.riatomsk dot ru/article/20260709/tomskie-vlasti-sovetuyut-chinovnikam-berech-benzin-i-soveschatsya-onlain; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/10/zhitelyam-novosibirskoy-oblasti-predlozhili-ne-ezdit-na-avtomobilyah-mestnym-kompaniyam-rekomendovali-pereyti-na-udalenku; https://t.me/astrapress/118216; https://t.me/sotaproject/115695; https://t.me/kobzevii/16315; https://t.me/astrapress/118230; https://t.me/bazabazon/47440; https://vk dot com/wall-37680642_247577; https://t.me/astrapress/118256; https://t.me/sotaproject/115714; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104366; https://t.me/istories_media/12847 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/22119;
[7] https://polisia dot kz/ru/mvd-presekayutsya-fakty-nezakonnogo-vyvoza-goryuche-smazochnyh-materialov/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/09/kazahstan-vystavil-59-politseyskih-postov-na-granitse-tak-vlasti-boryutsya-s-nezakonnym-vyvozom-topliva
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[9] https://wciom dot ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-prezidenta-pravitelstva-i-politicheskikh-partii-10072026
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[12] https://www.rmf24 dot pl/fakty/polska/news-sikorski-mamy-wiarygodne-informacje-ze-rosjanie-znowu-cos-pl,nIdn,1009392
[13] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/09/8043294/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40974
[17] https://x.com/BrennpunktUA/status/2075379095567761863; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24930?single
[18] https://t.me/opershtab23/16724
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40974
[20] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24971; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24970; https://t.me/astrapress/118190; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2075436809304318225?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2075429438079308195?s=20
[21] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/6363
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40974
[23] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/25014?single; https://t.me/supernova_plus/55449; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40948v ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40946; https://t.me/wargonzo/35426; https://t.me/dva_majors/95886;
[25] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33525
[26] https://suspilne dot media/1351594-u-visnevomu-buv-sklad-ukroboronpromu-zatrimali-pidozruvanogo-u-suticci-z-tck-u-lvovi-1598-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1783683913&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40948; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40946; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40973; https://t.me/dva_majors/95886; https://t.me/severnnyi/8646; https://t.me/severnnyi/8653; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73418
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/65443
[29] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2075563118218887386; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvkKjz5xtt4
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40948; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40946; https://t.me/dva_majors/95886
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/65443
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40948; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40946; https://t.me/wargonzo/35426; https://t.me/dva_majors/95886; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45150; https://t.me/severnnyi/8646; https://t.me/grvZapad/19106
[33] https://t.me/grvZapad/19109
[34] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/5268
[35] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2075325750157201706 ; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/769
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/95886
[37] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1730053195086688; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/10/pokynuti-svoyimy-final-rosijskyh-maroderiv-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/
[38] https://t.me/Osintpen/3103; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29928;
[39] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2075476344503161178?s=20 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2075476350379377064?s=20 ; https://x.com/RedHibana/status/2075550818330173846?s=20 ; https://t.me/bakhmut_life/130641
[40] https://t.me/rybar/81641
[41] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2075549410193252366 ; https://t.me/DobroKor/3334 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2075333180677112168; https://t.me/shock3OA/8024
[42] https://t.me/divgen/82288?single
[43] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3VpXqHI6xI ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/10/navit-vidnosno-tyhoyi-godyny-vzhe-nemaye-yak-rf-koshmaryt-kramatorsk/
[44] https://t.me/DobroKor/3320
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-8/
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40948; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40946; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40973; https://t.me/wargonzo/35426; https://t.me/dva_majors/95886
[47] https://t.me/divgen/82272; https://t.me/rybar/81641
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12436 ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Daj9bvmq5if ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2075230666216595926 ; https://www.instagram.com/38_recruiting/reel/Daj9bvmq5if/
[49] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2075544995705057633 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2075545153888981222
[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/10/komandni-punkty-perestayut-buty-dlya-nas-tayemnyczeyu-yak-zsu-posylyuyut-tysk-na-okupantiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3VpXqHI6xI
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40973
[52] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2075251494027206902 ; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2075251536997855480 ; https://t.me/btr80/39509
[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12446 ; https://t.me/craftoriz/677
[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/20156
[55] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DAF7MS9wr/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/10/fire-point-vypalyuye-tyl-voroga-dshv-nyshhyt-logistyku-okupantiv-pid-doneczkom/ ; https://t.me/airborne1126/36899
[56] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24988
[57] https://t.me/andriyshTime/62598
[58] https://t.me/PushilinDenis/10004
[59] https://t.me/osirskiy/1753
[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/10/zrosly-na-300-za-dva-misyaczi-komandyr-1-oshp-pro-naroshhuvannya-midlstrajkiv-po-vorozhij-logistyczi/
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40946; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40948; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40973; https://t.me/wargonzo/35426; https://t.me/voin_dv/20156
[62] https://t.me/usf_army/2178; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/10/motoczykletnyj-shturm-ne-vdavsya-sbs-likviduvaly-rosijskyh-okupantiv-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku/
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40974
[64] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2075491309431689453?s=20; https://t.me/supernova_plus/55444; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104379; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2075560501371633856; https://t.me/informnapalm/28088 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2075482999768916347 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/62649
[65] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/8580
[66] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/39468; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/16397; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/16422
[67] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2580
[68] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104329 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104333
[69] https://t.me/razvozhaev/22126
[70] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2580 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2180
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40974
[72] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@36.649,45.480,11.465z ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/62616 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/
[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/95893
[74] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104366
[75] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/
[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/67924
[77] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30411; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4054; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30716 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27518; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30717; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1351632-poraneni-dvoe-ludej-armia-rf-bila-po-transportnij-infrastrukturi-i-medzakladu-na-mikolaivsini/; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02zJjZD3tyA9VKv6wPLBpfYqY22ynUMPvvP8jDkErNxhCnLr8fZB3pdmZjLwdAvBkal; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17435
[78] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7399; https://suspilne dot media/1351788-cerez-negodu-ta-obstrili-e-znestrumlenna-u-cotiroh-oblastah-minenergo/
[79] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/68352; https://t.me/astrapress/118180; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43716;
[80] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30411
[81] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/16711
[82] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30716 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27518
[83] https://t.me/milinfolive/175811; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73411 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/28126
[84] https://hromadske dot ua/viyna/267356-u-vyshnevomu-buv-sklad-boyeprypasiv-ukroboronpromu-budut-zvilnennia-zelenskyy; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/09/zelenskiy-zayavil-chto-vzryv-v-vishnevom-pod-kievom-proizoshel-v-rezultate-rossiyskogo-udara-po-skladu-ukroboronproma;
[85] https://t.me/pul_1/21880; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/385042
