Toplines
Russian forces recently made tactical gains in Kostyantynivka — Russia’s assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 10 that two Russian tactical groups, the “Bakhmut” tactical group and the “Dzerzhinsk” (Toretsk) tactical group have advanced south of and into eastern Kostyantynivka.[1] Mashovets noted that the “Bakhmut” tactical group is mostly composed of the 3rd Army Corps (under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces). Mashovets stated that the “Dzerzhinsk” tactical group is operating in the area of responsibility of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and likely includes elements of the 3rd, 8th, 58th, 51st, and 49th CAAs [all of the SMD]); the 3rd AC; and Russian naval fleets. Mashovets reported that elements of the Bakhmut tactical group advanced from Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) through Novodmytrivka (immediately north of Kostyantynivka) and into northeastern Kostyantynivka and also along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Bakhmut road up to the Kostyantynivka railway station. Mashovets claimed that Russian forces also seized the southern part on Novodmytrivka. Mashovets reported that elements of the ”Dzerzhinsk“ tactical group advanced from Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka) into several areas stretching from northwestern Kostyantynivka to southwestern Kostyantynivka near the Kostyantynivka railway station. Mashovets assessed that the ”Dzerzhinsk” tactical group has likely been successful in achieving tactical breakthrough in western (central) part of Kostyantynivka. Mashovets reported that forward assault elements of the two tactical groups are roughly two kilometers away from each other. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have failed to seize the Kostyantynivka railway station itself and that Ukrainian forces cleared Dovha Blaka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) of Russian infiltrators.
Russian forces began their campaign for Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025 after completing the seizures of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk — settlements northeast and southeast of Kostyantynivka, respectively. The Russian campaign for Kostyantynivka began in August 2025 after Russian forces seized Toretsk and the majority of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces began intensified efforts to seize Kostyantynivka in Winter 2026.[2] Russian forces began setting conditions for a frontal attack on Kostyantynivka in late Summer and early Fall 2025, employing a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults to advance.[3] Russian forces seized Toretsk as of August 2025 after a 14-month campaign and have since advanced roughly nine kilometers toward Kostyantynivka.[4] Russian forces seized the majority of Chasiv Yar as of August 2025 after a 26-month campaign, but Ukrainian counterattacks in March 2026 contested Russian control of the town, and Russian forces have thus far been unable to push Ukrainian forces entirely out of Chasiv Yar.[5] Russian forces also failed to make significant gains in the area west of Toretsk or from Chasiv Yar toward Kostyantynivka in June 2025, after conducting a series of intensified offensive operations and mechanized assaults, while the Russian military command increasingly prioritized the seizure of Pokrovsk in Summer and Fall 2025.[6] Russian forces deprioritized the seizure of Kostyantynivka but maintained interdiction efforts and resumed intensified offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction in Winter 2026.[7] Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka itself in October 2025 and have since then infiltrated into at least 12.69 percent of Kostyantynivka.[8]
Russian forces have failed to seize Kostyantynivka by May 2026 despite committing additional reinforcements and mechanized equipment to the area. Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in March 2026, with Ukrainian officials reporting that the Russian military command set the deadline of seizing Kostyantynivka by May 2026.[9] Russian forces also conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault in Kostyantynivka in March 2026.[10] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi additionally reported on May 2 that Russian forces noticeably increased their activity in the Kostyantynivka direction in April 2026.[11] Russian forces also reportedly redeployed elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) to the Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar area in December 2025, likely in preparation for Spring offensive operations against Kostyantynivka.[12] Russian forces have concentrated at least one CAA and AC to Kostyantynivka and elements of several other armies to support offensive operations against the city.[13] Russian forces also reportedly replenished 80 percent of their units attacking Kostyantynivka as of June 6.[14]
Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but are unlikely to make operational gains against the Fortress Belt writ large. Russian forces will likely continue to infiltrate throughout Kostyantynivka and consolidate positions in certain areas of the city but will likely suffer high casualties in doing so. Russia’s 3rd AC operating northeast of Kostyantynivka appears to be struggling to push Ukrainian forces out of Chasiv Yar, inhibiting their ability to envelop Kostyantynivka from the north. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 9 that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked near Chasiv Yar and maintain control over Podilske and Mykolaivka (both west of Chasiv Yar).[15] Russian forces are also struggling to advance toward Slovyansk on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt. Russian forces launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive with a series of mechanized assaults around Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk), indicating that the Russian military command likely intended to prioritize advancing on Slovyansk from the northeast, but Russian forces failed to subsequently make any significant advances in the area.[16] The Russian military command likely shifted its prioritization to seizing Kostyantynivka after struggling to advance on Slovyansk. Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces’ (GoF) area of responsibility (AoR) ranges from the Kupyansk direction through the Lyman direction and likely does not have the combat capability to make a concerted push against Slovyansk while also balancing offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions. Ukrainian forces also recently conducted counterattacks in the neighboring Borova direction, which likely forced Russian forces to choose between defending positions and attacking north and northwest of Lyman.[17]
Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike overnight on June 9 and 10 against a Russian military plant that produces key components for Shahed drones and missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted FP-5 Flamingo missile strikes against a Russian VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Republic of Chuvashia — over 900 kilometers from the frontline in Ukraine.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the plant is one of Russia’s key manufacturers of navigation equipment for high-precision weapons and produces satellite navigation receivers and Kometa-type antennas used in Shahed drones, Kalibr cruise missiles, Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems, and unified modules for planning and correcting aerial bombs. Geolocated footage and satellite imagery published on June 10 showed smoke rising and fires at the VNIIR plant after the Ukrainian strike.[19] Chuvash Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev acknowledged that a Ukrainian missile strike damaged unspecified infrastructure in Cheboksary.[20] Russian opposition source Astra, citing footage from local outlets, noted on June 10 that Russian officials previously tried to protect the VNIIR-Progress plant with anti-drone nets following Ukrainian strikes against the plant in late 2025.[21] Ukrainian forces conducted an almost identical F-5 Flamingo missile strike against the Russian VNIIR-Progress Plant on May 5, and the missile strike on June 10 demonstrates Ukraine’s increasing ability to sustain and intensify long-range strikes against key Russian military facilities.[22]
Ukrainian forces also continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 9 to June 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck and caused a fire at the Kuibyshevsky (also known as Kuibyshev) Oil Refinery in Samara City, Samara Oblast.[23] The General Staff noted that the refinery is one of the largest oil refineries in Russia, producing gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, and other petroleum products. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) noted that the Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery makes up about 2.5 percent of Russia’s total refining capacity and is located more than 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[24] Russian state oil company Rosneft stated that the oil refinery has the capacity of about 7 million tons of oil per year.[25] Geolocated footage and satellite imagery published on June 9 and 10 show fires and damages to the refinery following the Ukrainian strike.[26] Two unnamed industry sources told Reuters that the Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery halted oil processing on June 10 at the plant’s primary crude distillation units following the strike.[27]
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Vtorovo and Lobkovo oil pumping stations near Maryinka and Lobkovo, Vladimir Oblast, overnight on June 10 at a distance of 700 kilometers from the launch point.[28] The SBU noted that both stations pump diesel fuel to the Moscow Ring Oil Product Pipeline and transport oil products to Russian Baltic Sea ports, primarily through the Primorsk oil loading port. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 10 shows heat anomalies near both pumping stations.[29] Vladimir Oblast Governor Alexander Avdeev acknowledged on June 10 that drone strikes caused fires at two industrial facilities near Kameshkovskyi and Alensandrovskyi raions, Vladimir Oblast.[30] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed on June 10 that an unspecified drone strike caused a fire near an oil depot, and NASA FIRMS data confirmed heat anomalies at a fuel tank near Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[31] Ukrainian forces have been successfully intensifying the scope and scale of their long-range strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in Russia over the last several months, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.[32] Ukrainian strikes against Russian fuel storage tanks will likely intensify the spread of fuel shortages in Russia that have already begun in some Russian regions and parts of occupied Ukraine.[33]
Ukraine tested its first anti-missile interceptor as an alternative to the US-made PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile amid global Patriot shortages. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 10 that Ukraine tested its new FP-7.x anti-missile interceptor — a cheaper, mass-producible surface-to-air missile alternative to the US-made PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile.[34] Denys Shtilierman, the co-owner and chief designer of Ukraine’s Fire Point defense industrial company, told FT that the first flight test was “pretty successful.” Shtilierman stated the missile’s development timeline will depend on the speed of partner support, and that Ukraine could start mass producing FP-7.x missiles as early as August 2026 but the completed missiles will likely be ready by 2027. A Fire Point representative stated that Ukraine intends to use the FP-7.x to counter Russian ballistic missiles and drones at a much lower cost than existing Western systems. FT reported that Ukraine’s European partners will supply the remaining components for the Ukrainian-made Freyja air defense system, including radars and the command-and-control system. The FP-7.x’s development comes as Ukraine continues to face significant Patriot interceptor missile shortages.[35] The US-made Patriot systems currently remain the only effective option for intercepting ballistic missiles, and Russia continues to exploit the shortages by launching systematic large-scale, long-range ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s volunteer recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses and rising economic costs. Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii, citing Russian federal budget expenses data, reported on June 10 that 71,200 people received one-time enlistment bonuses after signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the first quarter of 2026, down 20 percent from 2025.[36] Vazhnye Istorii reported that 363,900 people signed contracts with the Russian MoD in all of 2025, 10 percent fewer than in 2024. Russia has been increasingly struggling to keep up with recruitment amidst increasing casualties and has had to commit reserves, increase signing bonuses, and expand covert mobilization efforts to combat these recruitment shortfalls.[37] The Kremlin remains committed to defining its main advantage over Ukraine as overwhelming numbers, but Ukraine’s tactical drone superiority throughout the theater and mid-range strike campaign has neutralized this advantage for now, inflicting disproportionately high personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces.[38] The Kremlin has been setting conditions to conduct limited, rolling reserve call-ups to make up for its losses in Ukraine amid declining recruitment rates and rising casualty rates.[39]
The Kremlin continues attempts to nationalize private assets of Russian citizens, likely to support state revenues and the costly war effort in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on June 10 a law permitting Russian authorities to seize the property of Russian citizens accused of offenses against Russia’s interests abroad.[40] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the new amendments to Russia’s administrative offenses code cover abuse of media freedom, incitement of hatred or enmity, public calls for actions violating Russia’s territorial integrity, and discreditation of the Russian military.[41] TASS also reported that the new law allows Russian authorities to seize offenders’ funds from bank deposits and accounts and specifies procedures for conducting these proceedings without their participation. Russia’s new law aligns with the Kremlin’s long-term trajectory towards authoritarianism and nationalization as Putin continues to consolidate his control over Russian society to safeguard his regime.[42] The Kremlin criminalized anti-war speech in 2022, expanded penalties for discrediting Russian forces in 2023, escalated crackdowns on dissent and pursued seizures of private assets in 2024.[43]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces recently made tactical gains in Kostyantynivka — Russia’s assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
- Russian forces began their campaign for Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025 after completing the seizures of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk — settlements northeast and southeast of Kostyantynivka, respectively.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike overnight on June 9 and 10 against a Russian military plant that produces key components for Shahed drones and missiles.
- Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but are unlikely to make operational gains against the Fortress Belt writ large.
- Ukrainian forces also continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 9 to June 10.
- The Kremlin’s volunteer recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses and rising economic costs.
- The Kremlin continues attempts to nationalize private assets of Russian citizens, likely to support state revenues and the costly war effort in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russian forces launched 207 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian sources and satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) and additional information about recent Ukrainian strikes in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that a Ukrainian strike on the Grushovaya transshipment oil terminal (just east of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai and roughly 350 kilometers from the frontline) on June 8 caused a fire at two oil tanks and oil quality evaluation infrastructure.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes on the Krasnoarmeysk oil pumping station in Saratov Oblast on June 8 caused a fire in two oil tanks of 50 thousand cubic meter volume and that the Ukrainian strike against the Krasny Yar linear production and dispatch station in Volgograd Oblast on June 8 caused a fire in a 50 thousand cubic meter volume oil tank.[45] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) published satellite imagery on June 10 indicating that Ukrainian strikes in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on June 8 damaged or damaged between four and five fuel tanks at the Grushovaya industrial site.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that the Ukrainian strike on a weapons, ammunition, and vehicle arsenal of the Russian 1060th Material-Technical Support Center (Leningrad Military District) in Bolshaya Izhora (northwest of Lomonosov on the Neva Bay, St. Petersburg) caused secondary detonations and destroyed 18 underground storage areas and three open storage areas.[47]
Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaliy Khotsenko claimed on June 10 that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) declared a drone threat in Omsk Oblast (roughly 2,300 kilometers from the front line at the furthest extent) for the first time.[48]
See topline text for additional details on Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Ukrainian forces maintain positions northeast of Sumy City, contrary to Russian claims. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows Ukrainian forces operating south of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 10 that Russian advanced southeast of Myropillya.[50]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 10 but did not advance.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on June 10 that Russian forces are attempting to consolidate positions on the northern and northeastern outskirts of Kupyansk, and that the Zaoskillya-Kupyansk Vuzlovyi line (east and southeast of Kupyansk) remains unstable because small Ukrainian groups are still operating in the area.[53] The source claimed that Russian forces are continuing to infiltrate in the Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi area, but that Ukrainian drones are slowing down Russian advances.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 10 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Karpivka (south of Borova).[55]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in northwestern Lyman after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Lyman.[57]
Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian infiltrators in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces advanced. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from Dovha Balha (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[58] Mashovets’ report indicates that Russian forces advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka and southwest of Kostyantynivka and infiltrated in northeastern Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian trench in the fields east of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[59] Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Russian forces striking Russian servicemembers east of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern and western Kostyantynivka.[61]
Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction. The commander of a Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on June 10 that Russian forces have stopped using heavy armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction and are relying on light transport to supply positions and rotate personnel.[62] The commander reported that Ukrainian forces have expanded the kill zone – an area of increased drone risk – through Horlivka (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) forcing Russian infantry to cover large distances on foot and slowly to reach positions. The commander reported that both sides are striking each other’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and that Russian forces are increasingly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and heavy bomber drones to supply forward positions. The commander stated that Russian forces are also actively remotely mining Ukrainian GLOCs with first-person view (FPV) drones.
See topline text for additional reports on Russian operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 10 but did not advance.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on June 10 but did not advance.[64]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows a Russian servicemember operating in central and eastern Tovste (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[65]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian regiment posted footage on June 10 and reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck and destroyed the headquarters of the Russian 91st Separate Rifle Regiment (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Mykilske (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline).[66] Ukraine’s Azov Corps reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the Mariupol Commercial Port, striking electrical substations, radar equipment, repair facilities, a control tower, and fuel tanks at the port.[67] The Azov Corps reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Lady Augusta cargo ship, which is part of Russia’s shadow fleet. The Azov Corps reported that the strikes completely de-energized the port and significantly reduced Russian forces’ ability to use the port for military logistics. Geolocated footage published on June 10 confirms the strikes against the port in Mariupol.[68]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 9 and 10 but did not advance.[69]
Ukrainian forces advanced in the western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Lobkove (southwest of Orikhiv).[70]
Russian forces attacked near southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on June 10 but did not advance.[71]
Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is disrupting traffic on bridges connecting occupied Kherson and Crimea as Russian forces attempt to adapt to bridge closures. A Ukrainian brigade commander reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the bridge between occupied Henichesk (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline) and the Arabat Spit.[72] The commander added that Russian forces can only reach occupied Crimea from Kherson Oblast through one route near Armyansk (on the northwestern edge of Crimea off the Perekop Bay) as a result of the strike. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo acknowledged the missile strike and claimed temporarily blocking traffic across the bridge.[73] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) published satellite imagery June 10, indicating that Russian forces constructed a pontoon bridge next to the Chonhar bridge, which Ukrainian forces have struck twice since June 7.[74]
Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov announced June 10 that Russian occupation published a new summer passenger train schedule ending nighttime passenger train travel in Crimea and requiring all passengers on nighttime trains traveling into Crimea to switch to buses in Kerch, likely in response to Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics through occupied Crimea.[75]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 207 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol-type loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 181 drones, that 21 drones struck 14 locations, and that debris fell on 13 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, administrative, industrial, civilian, and railway infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[77] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts.[78]
Ukrainian forces achieved a high interception rate of Russian drones and missiles in May 2026. The Ukrainian Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Andryi Hnatov stated on June 10 that Ukrainian forces intercepted 90 percent of Russian drones and missiles in May 2026, but that Ukraine still needs additional funds for air defense systems.[79]
Russian forces are increasing the lethality of domestically produced drones and missiles. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on June 9 that Russian forces started using Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones on frequencies that most electronic detection equipment cannot detect.[80] The Ukrainian MoD press service reported on June 9 that Russian forces innovated Kalibr missiles to use cluster warheads and imported electronics following an unsuccessful attempt to adopt Russian domestic electronics in 2023 and 2024.[81] The Ukrainian MoD noted that Russian forces returned to imported components in 2025 as Russian domestic guidance technological accuracy declined.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3452 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3453
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/
[6] https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/ukrainian-defenders-repel-russian-assault-in-kostiantynivka-donbas-50523537.html
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2025/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2026/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1266984-rf-narosue-sturmi-bila-nikiforivki-ta-minkivki-ponad-100-obstriliv-sodna-na-slovanskomu-ta-kramatorskomu-napramkah/
[10] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1273732-ataka-rosian-z-cotiroh-napramkiv-na-kostantinivku-provalilasa-vijskovi/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1980773066208945
[11] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%8E%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B2-%D1%83-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%96-%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%96-11-%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D1%82%D0%B0-19-%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BC%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%85-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%81%D1%96%D0%B2-%D1%8F%D0%BA%D1%96-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD/1344703907825091/
[12] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3197
[13] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3403
[14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1324075-u-nas-prosuvanna-protivnika-nemae-101-brigada-pro-kramatorskij-napramok/
[15] https://t.me/rybar/80934
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/ ;
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2026/
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39770
[19] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2064545627225129451; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2064570442354917841; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2064565463028248797; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101424; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/10/raketa-flamingo-urazyla-vnyyr-progress-u-cheboksarah-sprovokuvavshy-paniku-sered-rosiyan/; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13163; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/10/ukraina-nanesla-raketnyy-udar-po-oboronnomu-zavodu-v-cheboksarah-v-samare-iz-za-ataki-dronov-zagorelsya-neftepererabatyvayuschiy-zavod; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1095095; https://t.me/astrapress/115216 ; https://x.com/sternenko/status/2064563503155789884; https://x.com/sternenko/status/2064733051129561369 ; https://t.me/astrapress/115216; https://t.me/astrapress/115220; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2064540360236220472;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064559839481930186;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064569627041275905;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064569752983613453;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22399;
https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7661;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064750975878152478; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22442; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2064706621193007498; https://t.co/IjkmzLJUNw; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2064707517075403095; https://t.me/idelrealii/45319
[20] https://t.me/oanikolaev/11428; https://t.me/oanikolaev/11427
[21] https://t.me/astrapress/115278
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39770
[24] https://t.me/usf_army/2051 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/8671
[25] https://rosneft dot com/business/Downstream/Neftepererabotka/OilRefineries/KuibyshevRefinery/
[26] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064543135062188445;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064553590174425242;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064566611823255752;
https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2064536795023622360;
https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2064543355674190297;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22354;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22356; https://t.me/idelrealii/45326; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2064675548186464484; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2064595834486804515; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2064599311451906392;
[27] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/rosnefts-kuibyshev-oil-refinery-halted-processing-june-10-after-drone-attack-2026-06-10/
[28] https://t.me/SBUkr/17770 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/10/sbu-vdaryla-po-naftoperekachuvalnyh-stancziyah-yaki-zabezpechuyut-palnym-moskvu/
[29] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@40.960,56.184,14.076z
[30] https://t.me/avdeev_o_vazhnom/9963; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2064553863466652039; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/10/ukraina-nanesla-raketnyy-udar-po-oboronnomu-zavodu-v-cheboksarah-v-samare-iz-za-ataki-dronov-zagorelsya-neftepererabatyvayuschiy-zavod
[31] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/6073; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2064543913797443890; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2064608997618118901;
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-template-020426/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/
[34] https://www.ft.com/content/c5839dd4-c4e9-4503-a605-67dcef053845
[35] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19445 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19434
[36] https://t.me/istories_media/12474 ; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2026/06/09/v-pervom-kvartale-2026-goda-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-podpisali-712-tis-chelovek/index.html
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-the-kremlin-is-preparing-to-mobilize-reservists-on-a-rolling-basis-to-fight-in-ukraine-for-the-first-time/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/
[40] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202606100028?index=13
[41] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27721835;
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_2-23/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_22-9/;
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2023/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_22-9/;
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39771 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39771; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/
[46] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-rosia-naftobaza-udar/33776988.html; https://suspilne dot media/1327247-na-naftobazi-v-novorosijsku-pisla-ataki-ukrainskih-droniv-poskodzeno-do-15-rezervuariv/; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/99146 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udar-droniv-8-chervnya-po-naftobazi-grushova-znyshhyv-4-5-rezervuariv/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39770
[48] https://t.me/HocenkoVP/8244
[49] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2064696564589662581; https://t.me/bear007/94345
[50] https://t.me/divgen/81406
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39778; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39750; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39748; https://t.me/rybar/80936; https://t.me/severnnyi/8364; https://t.me/dva_majors/94305; https://t.me/wargonzo/34725;
[52] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2064487077027233926;
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2063884696392507880;
https://t.me/ombr43/3552
[53] https://t.me/grvZapad/18811
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44060; https://t.me/grvZapad/18811; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39750; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39748
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/34725
[56] https://t.me/kraken_ab3/1388; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12138
[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72800
[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3453
[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2064603722030756302; https://t [dot] me/official24ombr/2316; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12142
[60] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2064603605710123468; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/2013
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52560
[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/10/kilzonu-roztyagnuly-do-gorlivky-u-28-j-brygadi-poyasnyly-yak-vysnazhuyut-rosijskyj-nastup-na-kostyantynivku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGOOrXFDLTQ
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39778 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39750 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39748
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39778 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39750 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39748; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116818 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/94305 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19768
[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/19772 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2064711833198747795
[66] https://t.me/raid_413/1432 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/10/rejd-feyerychno-rozvalyv-shtab-na-vidstani-ponad-50-kilometriv-urazheno-ligvo-okupantiv-na-donechchyni/
[67] https://t.me/azov_media/8461 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/10/korpus-azov-okupanty-vtratyly-mozhlyvist-vykorystovuvaty-port-mariupolya/; https://t.me/usf_army/2050
[68] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2064654832238035339;
https://x.com/azov_media/status/2064609256133767495;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2064654836956610959;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2064648784076828922; https://x.com/RedHibana/status/2064638215483506767; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064617150304690675
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39778; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39750 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39748; https://t.me/wargonzo/34725
[70] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2064707331804557326 ; https://t.me/War4RSO/252
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39778
[72] https://t.me/channel5UA/160368
[73] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/15857
[74] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/99167; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/
[75] https://t.me/Aksenov82/9678
[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/64700
[77] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29755; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30044; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/26933; https://t.me/vilkul/16693; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1327137-kharkiv-kholodnohirskyi-raion-shahed-vlughannya-budynok/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4116; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4117; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4118; https://t.me/synegubov/22734; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4130; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4129; https://t.me/synegubov/22729; https://t.me/synegubov/22737; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4134; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064431660204986456 ; https://t.me/truexakharkiv/93359 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oH3H1Rt3JtU ; https://t.me/place_kharkiv/126489 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2064638775032979599 ; https://t.me/synegubov/22737 ; https://t.me/tipichnoe_xtz/134479 ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/29307; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65757 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/10/vnochi-rosiyany-atakuvaly-odesu-ye-postrazhdali-poshkodzheni-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1327183-rf-atakuvala-dronami-zitlovi-budinki-v-odesi/; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2445; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16713; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/58449; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/58456; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2446; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2452;
[78] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7183; https://suspilne dot media/1327346-castina-ukraini-10-cervna-zalisilas-bez-svitla-cerez-obstrili-energetiki/; https://t.me/bbcrussian/95901;
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39777
[80] https://www.facebook dot com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02Hc2mfYKW6meA3o1LKNdMEWYqRD7gP8XoTZBkE56jr26e197RnALtsjNttArVKxSXl; https://suspilne dot media/1327129-rf-zastosovue-droni-molnia-na-novih-castotah-aki-ne-bacat-bilsist-detektoriv-radnik-ministra-oboroni/ ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7469
[81] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/kasetna-chastyna-ta-importni-elementy-yak-zminylysia-vorozhi-rakety-kalibr-vid-pochatku-vtorhnennia; HYPERLINK https://suspilne/https://suspilne dot media/1327115-importni-detali-ta-kasetna-bojova-castina-rf-doopracuvala-kalibri/
