Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to posture himself as a peacemaker and potential mediator between Iran and the Gulf States amid the ongoing US-Israeli operation against Iran. Putin spoke with several Gulf State leaders on March 2, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud, Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad al Thani, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan.[1] Putin emphasized in each of these phone conversations Russia’s readiness to contribute to stabilizing the situation surrounding Iran and the Gulf states and the need to urgently resolve the conflict through diplomatic means. Putin noted how Russia has done much in the past to facilitate a peaceful resolution to situations regarding Iran’s nuclear program and finding mutually acceptable compromises. Putin is trying to balance maintaining relationships with partners, including Iran, while conducting outreach to the Gulf States and positioning himself as a mediator in response to rising military escalations in the Middle East. Putin similarly attempted to position himself as a mediator between Iran and Gulf countries following the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[2]
Iranian threats against vessels transiting through the Strait of Hormuz are causing significant spikes in global oil prices, which if sustained, could reverse over a year of declining Russian oil revenues. Brent crude oil futures prices peaked at $82.37 per barrel on March 2 up from $73 at market close on February 27 just prior to joint US-Israeli strikes against Iran.[3] Brent crude oil futures price per barrel was trading at around $78 at time of writing.[4] Reported Iranian strikes against several US- and UK-linked oil tankers and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threats against vessels transiting through the Strait has led vessel traffic in the Persian Gulf to drop by at least 33 percent as of March 1.[5] Oil prices will likely continue to surge in coming days in response to the situation in the Middle East, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $100 per barrel.[6] Russia has historically relied on oil and gas revenues to fund its war in Ukraine, but revenues steadily fell throughout 2025, and Russian authorities are expecting oil and gas revenues to continue to fall in 2026.[7] Russia has had to resort to other means of generating revenue, such as selling gold reserves and raising the value added tax (VAT), to compensate for declining oil and gas revenues.[8] Russian business outlet Kommersant claimed on March 1 that Russia may also increase oil production following easing OPEC+ caps as of March 1 by three percent to 10.9 million barrels per day in 2026 after oil production fell to 9.1 million barrels per day in 2025, likely in part due to the impacts of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure.[9] Sustained high oil prices could keep Russia economically afloat and allow Russia to fund its war in Ukraine in the medium term. It is unlikely, however, that Iran can successfully and indefinitely impose a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz long enough for Russia to reap long-term benefits from the current surge in oil prices.[10]
US allies and partners in the Middle East should learn from Ukraine’s years of experience defending against almost nightly large-scale Russian missile and drone strike packages, including some comprised in large part of Iranian-origin attack drones. United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated on March 1 that Ukrainian and British experts will work together to help UK partners in the Middle East shoot down Iranian drones.[11] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin responded to Starmer on March 2, stating that Ukraine is ready to help and share its experience.[12] Kamyshin noted that over 10 Ukrainian companies are currently producing interceptor systems and that Ukrainian forces have an interception rate of about 90 percent against Russian Shahed drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on March 1 that Gulf states have not been able to down all the Shahed drones and ballistic missiles that Iran has launched against them in recent days even though these countries have superior numbers and types of air defense systems compared to Ukraine’s air defenses.[13] Zelensky stated on March 2 that Ukraine has not received any direct requests from the UK, other partners, or representatives of Middle Eastern states to involve Ukrainian experts in efforts to shoot down Iranian drones, however.[14] Zelensky later suggested to Bloomberg on March 2 that Ukraine could send its best drone interceptor operators to help Middle Eastern states if those states ask Russia to implement a short-term ceasefire in Ukraine.[15] Zelensky specified that the hypothetical ceasefire could range from two weeks to two months.
Ukraine has years of experience defending against ever increasing Russian missile and drone strike packages. Russia frequently launches strike packages containing hundreds of Iranian-origin drones against Ukraine and has launched four strike packages containing over 400 drones and missiles in February 2026 alone.[16] Russia launched its largest drone strike series in September 2025 with 810 drones and its largest missile strike series in August 2024 with 127 missiles.[17] Ukraine has also been defending against modernized Shahed drones that Russia has adapted to maximize their range, survivability, and lethality.[18] Ukraine itself has been adapting its multi-layered air defense system, combining traditional air defense systems and mobile fire groups on the ground with aircraft and interceptor drones in the air.[19] Bloomberg reported on March 2 that Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stated that they intercepted a total of 385 Iranian missiles and 881 Iranian drones in the first 48 hours of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran (February 28 and March 1).[20] Bloomberg noted that the UAE intercepted the most missiles and drones in this time period, totaling 165 missiles and 541 drones. These figures only account for the projectiles that these five states have intercepted, however, and do not include missiles and drones that have struck targets. ISW has observed reports of at least 58 Iranian drone hits between February 28 and the afternoon of March 2, but the actual number of hits is likely much higher as the Gulf states vary in their degree of reporting and some hits with multiple drones are conflated as only one strike.[21]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will shift its long-range missile and drone strikes target set to include Ukrainian logistics and water infrastructure going into Spring 2026. Zelensky stated on March 2 that Russian forces are preparing a new wave of strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, including logistics and water supply.[22] Zelensky previously indicated on February 22 that Russia was beginning to shift its target set to include railway logistics and water supply after Russia spent Winter 2025-2026 attempting to break Ukraine’s energy grid and deprive Ukrainians of heat.[23] Ukrainian authorities reported that Russia also targeted Ukrainian railways on the afternoon of March 2, using Shaheds to strike a moving passenger train in Kryvyi Rih Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[24] Ukrainian state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that it is restricting the movement of suburban trains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast due to the damage from the March 2 strike and the risk posed to the trains.[25] Russia is unlikely to de-escalate its strike campaign after intensifying it throughout Winter 2025-2026, and will instead shift to a new target set. Russia’s continued long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, particularly those that disproportionately impact civilians, continue to demonstrate the necessity of partner support for a well-rounded and diverse Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[26]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to posture himself as a peacemaker and potential mediator between Iran and the Gulf States amid the ongoing US-Israeli operation against Iran.
- Iranian threats against vessels transiting through the Strait of Hormuz are causing significant spikes in global oil prices which, if sustained, could reverse over a year of declining Russian oil revenues.
- US allies and partners in the Middle East should learn from Ukraine’s years of experience defending against almost nightly large-scale Russian missile and drone strike packages, including some comprised in large part of Iranian-origin attack drones.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will shift its long-range missile and drone strikes target set to include Ukrainian logistics and water infrastructure going into Spring 2026.
- Russian forces advanced in the Slovyansk and Pokrovsk directions.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and military infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai overnight on March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the Sheskharis oil terminal and the naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire and damaging oil tankers at the terminal and an S-400 air defense system radar.[27] Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the Ukrainian drone strikes struck warships, the guidance radar of an S-300 air defense system, a Pantsir-S2 air defense system, and six of the terminal’s seven oil tankers.[28] Geolocated footage published on March 1 shows a drone striking the Novorossiysk port and a fire at the oil terminal.[29] Russian officials confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the loading dock of the Sheskharis oil terminal.[30]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the February 27 to 28 Ukrainian strikes against the Albashneft Oil Refinery in Novominskaya, Krasnodar Krai destroyed four RVS-5000 tanks and damaged three RVS-2000 tanks, pipelines, and an underground tank.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Mala Korchakivka and northeast of Sumy City toward Myropillya on March 1 and 2.[32]
A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on March 2 that the Russian military command is not paying servicemembers of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division for basic leave, hospital stays, or daily allowances.[33] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is also not paying soldiers in the division for attacks, advances, or successful strikes that destroy Ukrainian targets. The milblogger claimed that the VDV headquarters has acknowledged that payments are due but is not retroactively paying the soldiers. ISW last observed reports of the division operating in the Sumy direction on February 25.[34]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces near Pervomaiske (northwest of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kashtan Detachment are reportedly operating near Myropillya.[36] Drone operators of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[37]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya and toward Zybyne and Izbytske and north of Kharkiv City near Neskuchne on March 1 and 2.[38]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 2 that Russian forces seized Kruhle.[39] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 12th Separate Battalion of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the settlement’s claimed seizure.[40] Russian milbloggers previously claimed on January 16 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 1 and 2.[42]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on March 1 and 2 but did not advance.[44]
Russian forces attacked south of Borova near Serednie, Korovii Yar, Oleksandrivka, and Karpivka on March 2 but did not advance.[45]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian air defense assets in rear areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Kasta 2E2 radar system near occupied Lyubyme (along the international border about 146 kilometers from the frontline) and a Yastreb A-V radar station near occupied Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk, about 32 kilometers from the frontline) in the past day.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances and infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 1 shows a Russian soldier operating on the northern outskirts of Lyman, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[47] The geolocated footage also indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Stavky (north of Lyman) and that the Russian FEBA is further than ISW previously assessed near Stavky.[48]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 2 that Russian forces seized Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[49] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov credited elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 237th Tank Regiment (both of the 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with the claimed seizure of Drobysheve and elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure of Riznykivka.[50]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 28 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in southern Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk) – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[51]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve and Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka on March 1 and 2.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[53]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are shelling Ukrainian forces in Nykyforivka.[54] Drone operators of the 9th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (reportedly of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykolaivka and Starodubivka (both east of Slovyansk).[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway in southern Kostyantynivka.[56]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 1 and 2.[57]
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction stated that Russian combat activity has noticeably decreased compared to previous months.[58] The NCO attributed this decrease to the February 1 block on Russian forces’ Starlink terminals, which has decreased their ability to conduct reconnaissance and adjust artillery and drone strikes. Ukrainian officials reported on March 2 that Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against Kramatorsk, killing three civilians.[59] ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are conducting artillery strike against settlements in the immediate vicinity of Kramatorsk in preparation of the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[60]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Stepanivka.[61] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Sofiivka.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas, Shakhove, and Vilne on March 1 and 2.[63]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are focusing on advancing to the Stepy-Novyi Donbas line (east of Dobropillya) and the Krasnopodillya-Svitle area (south of Dobropillya) and that elements of the 2nd and 41st CAAs (both of the CMD) are focusing on advancing to the Matyasheve-Novohryshyne area (south to southwest of Dobropillya).[64] Mashovets stated that Russian forces gained a foothold in the quarries south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and likely reached the southern outskirts of the settlement.[65] Mashovets stated that Russian assault groups periodically enter Novyi Donbas and Vilne but that Ukrainian forces regularly clear the settlements of Russian forces.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported that Russian forces advanced to Shakhtarska Street in southern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces also recently seized Zatyshok and Sukhetske (both southeast of Bilytske) on a prior date.[66] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attacking Bilytske from both the road from Rodynske (south of Bilytske) and from Zapovidne (east of Bilytske) but that attempts to infiltrate the settlement from the east have been unsuccessful.
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske and toward Shevchenko; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on March 1 and 2.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serhiivka (west of Pokrovsk).[68]
The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have temporarily decreased their assault activity, likely due to improved weather conditions that are complicating Russian concealment efforts by improving drone visibility.[69] The chief of staff noted that Ukrainian reconnaissance is better able to detect approaching Russian assault groups in clear weather. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command is regularly amassing 51st CAA (SMD) infantry near the Krasnolymanska coal mine (north of Chervonyi Lyman), in northern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), and near Rodynske.[70]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking between Bilytske and Myrnohrad and that elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are attacking in the Hryshyne direction.[71] Elements of the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA and likely comprised of mobilized personnel) and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) are reportedly operating within Pokrovsk.[72]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself on March 2 but did not advance.[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 2 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Stepove, and Vorone on March 1 and 2.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vidradne and Hai (both south of Oleksandrivka).[75]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces have liberated nine settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction and are clearingthree additional settlements.[76] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces launched counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction to take advantage of Russian forces’ loss of Starlink, which complicated Russian command and control (C2) during the initial phase of the Ukrainian counterattacks. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have inflicted 6,537 Russian casualties and destroyed 419 pieces of Russian weapons and equipment since the beginning of Ukrainian counterattacks on January 29, 2026.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Vremivka (Oleksandrivka) direction.[77]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[78]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole toward Zlahoda; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, Rizdvyanka, Tsvitkove, and Varvarivka and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne on March 1 and 2.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Verkhnya Tersa toward Pryluky.[80]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 2 that there are no Russian forces in Zaliznychne and that Ukrainian forces control Hirke, contrary to Russian claims that Russian forces seized both settlements.[81] Voloshyn stated that fighting is ongoing a few kilometers from both of these settlements.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 1 that Ukrainian forces are only two kilometers from the Hulyaipole-Velyka Novosilka road.[82]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine on the night of March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two concentrations of a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies electronic intelligence unit near occupied Kinski Rozdory, Zaporizhia Oblast (southeast of Hulyaipole and roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Kremenchyk, Donetsk Oblast (southeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 36 kilometers from the frontline).[83]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 2 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 1 shows Russian forces operating in northern Prymorske (west of Orikhiv) in what ISW assessed was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[84]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; east of Orikhiv near Myrne; west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Lukyanivske, Mahdalynivka, and Zapasne on March 1 and 2.[85]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on March 2 that Russian forces struck Komyshuvakha (northwest of Orikhiv along the H-08 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway, roughly 13 kilometers from the frontline) with guided glide bombs.[86]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are conducting reconnaissance operations south of Orikhiv.[87] Signalmen of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[88]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and medium-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on March 1 to 2. Geolocated footage posted on March 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system northwest of Prymorske, reportedly with a Bulava loitering munition.[89] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Kasta-2E2 radar station in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast that previously prevented Ukrainian drones from operating at tactical and operational depths.[90]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 2 but did not advance.[91]
Order of Battle: The Ognemetka unit of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) is reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novotyahynka (northeast of Kherson City).[92] SKAT 350M drone operators of the 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[93]Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea overnight on March 1 to March 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian long-distance space communication center near occupied Vityne (roughly 160 kilometers from the frontline) and a Podlet K1 radar station near occupied Vynohradne (roughly 245 kilometers from the frontline).[94]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 70 were Shaheds, from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[95] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 84 drones, that 10 drones struck four locations, and that downed debris fell on two locations as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[96] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in several oblasts, causing power outages in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Sumy oblasts.[97] The Mykolaiv Oblast Administration reported that a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile hit an open area in Voznesensky Raion, Mykolaiv Oblast on the evening of March 1.[98]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79245 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79244; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74942 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79242 ;https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4733; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74935 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79243; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74938
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025/
[3] https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/brn00?countrycode=uk&gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqe3mcxSj89eCA2dIBIVuYimGekbwx8TAjeXkZzJHl77ue8uUnfUu1E5&gaa_ts=69a5edca&gaa_sig=guaU_wsJ4yrQw5rQUH4GycsFyEv8_zCQsXamaoDcvE18NWTaPvyUqThJvy4BHPUh9j7OgW139jV30lQYOfE49A%3D%3D
[4] https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/brn00?countrycode=uk&gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqe3mcxSj89eCA2dIBIVuYimGekbwx8TAjeXkZzJHl77ue8uUnfUu1E5&gaa_ts=69a5edca&gaa_sig=guaU_wsJ4yrQw5rQUH4GycsFyEv8_zCQsXamaoDcvE18NWTaPvyUqThJvy4BHPUh9j7OgW139jV30lQYOfE49A%3D%3D
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/28/world/middleeast/strait-of-hormuz-ship-traffic.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-february-28-2026/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-jumps-10-iran-conflict-could-spike-100-barrel-analysts-say-2026-03-01/ ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/01/business/oil-prices-us-attack-iran-vis
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/
[9] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8477501?tg ; https://t.me/istories_media/11537 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/
[11] https://x.com/Keir_Starmer/status/2028213832380826047
[12] https://x.com/AKamyshin/status/2028387335855821215
[13] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/rosiyani-hotili-peretvoriti-cyu-zimu-na-znishennya-ukrayini-103173
[14] https://suspilne dot media/1253290-zelenskij-ukraina-gotova-dilitisa-dosvidom-u-sferi-ppo-ale-zapitiv-pro-zalucenna-fahivciv-vid-partneriv-ne-bulo/
[15] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-02/zelenskiy-offers-help-to-stop-iranian-drones-in-return-for-truce
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26-3/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2026/02/26/learning-at-war-speed-how-ukraines-air-defence-evolves/; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/4033062-ukraine-building-layered-defense-system-to-counter-russian-drones.html
[20] https://x.com/becca_wasser/status/2028423457717755974
[21] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2028533809290047858?s=20; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/israel-us-launch-strikes-iran-2026-02-28;
https://x.com/Faytuks/status/2027785747466465531;
https://x.com/FIammen1543/status/2027793317480542548?s=20 ;
https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2027903893825310989 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/glitzy-dubai-gets-a-taste-of-middle-east-war-9d941f20?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2;
https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2028142565560660467;
https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2027763934258721121?s=20; https://x.com/SStapczynski/status/2028425393875960019/photo/1; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2028026806259900781 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-aramco-shuts-ras-tanura-refinery-after-drone-strike-source-says-2026-03-02/; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A; https://x.com/posted_news/status/2028443470709350633?s=20; https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2028442959973109875
[22] https://suspilne dot media/1253238-rosia-gotue-novu-hvilu-masovanih-atak-po-ukraini-zokrema-na-obekti-vodopostacanna-zelenskij/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2026/
[24] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8248; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/02/na-dniprovshhyni-vorog-atakuvav-potyag-ukrzaliznyczi-ye-zagyblyj-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/astrapress/106080 https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-kryvorizkomu-rajoni-rosijskyj-dron-vdaryv-u-tsyvilnyj-poyizd/; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1253346-rf-atakuvala-sahedami-elektricku-z-pasazirami-na-krivorizzi-e-zertvi-sered-nih-diti/
[25] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1253628-na-dnipropetrovsini-cerez-obstrili-ta-poskodzenna-infrastrukturi-obmezeno-ruh-primiskih-potagiv-ukrzaliznica/; https://t.me/UZprymisky/2707
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35579
[28] https://suspilne dot media/1252720-dsv-prorvali-oboronu-rosian-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku-fico-zaproponuvali-dati-dla-vizitu-v-ukrainu-1468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1772447850&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[29] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7221 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7226 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33990; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2028287275017408595; https://t.me/supernova_plus/48924; https://x.com/MackjackMaier/status/2028408224001724850; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2028220831512350784; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2028383684747771909; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/16965
[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/363773; https://t.me/opershtab23/15224; https://t.me/opershtab23/15217
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35579
[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/32631; https://t.me/severnnyi/6976
[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/6977
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/
[35] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2028171363031347353; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15784
[36] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6389
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/32645; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40370
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20165; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549; https://t.me/severnnyi/6976; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15238; https://t.me/dva_majors/89018; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40377
[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/61654;
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/89027; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15813 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/200391;
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/
[42] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15238; https://t.me/dva_majors/89018
[43] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15238
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20165; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20165; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35578
[47] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1484; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11391
[48] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1484; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11391
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/61654
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/61658; https://t.me/mod_russia/61659
[51] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2028189475075993704; https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2027793523731534323; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2027796858500714715; https://t.me/shock3OA/5441
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20165; https://t.me/gvZapad/17882; https://t.me/dva_majors/89018; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40389
[54] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2028189475075993704; https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2027793523731534323; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2027796858500714715;
[55] https://t.me/red_war_machine/304; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27194
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49164
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631
[58] https://suspilne dot media/1252720-dsv-prorvali-oboronu-rosian-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku-fico-zaproponuvali-dati-dla-vizitu-v-ukrainu-1468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1772459575&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1252916-rosijski-vijska-vranci-2-berezna-obstrilali-kramatorsk-e-zagibli/; https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0Guty5VDXUQuNsm75jSQ6kBtjt73cmxQub6vVowjJbSnS76fPtxNtF7wErKTr6ePVl; https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid0jCuX8JhKPTYjTrA8daAgFpprPXLprPksFUMu4r4YTTsz9KsyQQDTdUZA3rdif6prl; https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid09wP7ja3CxDdKzJiViSpM1s8sZBdABuCSNr7SWyYkWPSHWGdW9TEJBVEeL41C92Qml; https://www.facebook.com/don.gunp/posts/pfbid02rMo2w22xqHKiVEYZXLccwgX5jQ9rjdX8twkh9z2KRCxZSsFYVrwqZwyoHM5WDk3bl
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49164
[62] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15087
[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3272; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551
[64] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3271
[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3272
[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3272
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40394 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3272
[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40394
[69] https://suspilne dot media/1252720-dsv-prorvali-oboronu-rosian-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku-fico-zaproponuvali-dati-dla-vizitu-v-ukrainu-1468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1772443717&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3272
[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3272
[72] https://t.me/sashakots/60124
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13573 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/18826
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35580
[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/18825
[78] https://t.me/rusich_army/28576
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13573 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/89018 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/18831
[80] https://t.me/rusich_army/28576
[81] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/02/girke-perebuvaye-pid-nashym-kontrolem-syly-oborony-pivdnya/
[82] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3269
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35578
[84] https://t.me/Zaporizkalava/3542; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11392
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35581; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13573; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35549; https://t.me/dva_majors/89018; https://t.me/wargonzo/32631
[86] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/35527; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1252786-rosijski-vijska-zavdali-aviaudaru-po-komisuvasi-zaporizkogo-rajonu-poraneni-dvoe-ditej/
[87] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2028468191002054718; https://t.me/zapravdu_1429/1897
[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40364; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40376 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40387 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40370 ;
[89] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2028442813868789872; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2028189749630976452; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/771
[90] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/02/na-pivdni-urazyly-vazhlyvu-rosijsku-antydronovu-rls/; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2033; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2028397528610144502
[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35551
[92] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/200360;
[93] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40370 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33012
[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35578; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27181
[95] https://t.me/kpszsu/56880
[96] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/59059; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/02/vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-na-chernigivshhyni-zagynula-zhinka/ ; https://t.me/koryukivka_rva/4384; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1252870-vnaslidok-rosijskoi-ataki-na-sela-velikij-simel-na-cernigivsini-zaginula-zinka/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3543; https://t.me/astrapress/105958 ; https://t.me/synegubov/20276 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/1393; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1252886-uranci-rf-zavdala-udaru-po-odesi-e-vlucanna-v-budinok/
[97] https://t.me/energyofukraine/6368; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4723; https://suspilne dot media/1252896-u-troh-oblastah-ukraini-castkovo-znestrumleni-spozivaci-cerez-nicnu-ataku-rf-na-energoinfrastrukturu-minenergo/
[98] https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid037rV42mkNPPpfDFHdrS8KeESy2PcEKFSsoBu2whcrh4wVmg6Y9Q5xeNAKkbyorEtql; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1252822-vdarili-balistikou-armia-rf-atakuvala-mikolaivsinu-iskanderom-m/
