Toplines
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the second day of the May 9–11 ceasefire. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials issued competing accusations that the other side violated the ceasefire on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces continued assaults in key directions and conducted artillery and drone strikes.[1] Zelensky stated that Russian forces conducted more than 150 ground assaults, 100 artillery strikes, and almost 10,000 drone strikes between May 9 and 10. Zelensky noted that Russian forces did not conduct any large missile packages, however, and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched only 27 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya drones between 0000 and 0800 local time on May 10, all of which Ukrainian forces downed.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) similarly accused Ukraine on May 10 of violating the ceasefire by conducting eight ground assaults; 676 artillery, MLRS, and mortar strikes; and 6,331 drone strikes.[3] Observed National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) signatures from May 10 indicate that hostilities further decreased on May 10, but that activity did not cease. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that the overall operational tempo across certain areas of the frontline continued to decrease on May 10 despite persistent tactical combat missions that violated the ceasefire.[4] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized activity throughout the second day of the ceasefire highlights the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.
Russian President Vladimir Putin vaguely suggested that the war in Ukraine could end soon, despite offering no indication that Russia intends to end the war. Putin responded to a question during a press conference on May 9 about claimed Western involvement in recent Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia, claiming that this “matter is coming to an end” after reiterating the Kremlin’s false justifications for its war in Ukraine.[5] Russian state media presented Putin’s statement as if he had stated that the war in Ukraine “is nearing an end,” despite Putin providing no indication that he intends to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[6] Putin notably claimed during the press conference that he intended to allow Russian forces to “focus on the final defeat of Ukraine” by excluding Russian military equipment from the Victory Day Parade, signaling that Russia remains committed to its maximalist goals for the Ukrainian government’s capitulation. Putin reiterated his previous demand that any bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky take place in Moscow City and implied that he would not meet with Zelensky abroad for peace negotiations. The Kremlin has routinely signaled its unwillingness to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Zelensky to end the war in Ukraine.[7] The Kremlin is likely playing to its domestic audience, who are increasingly feeling the effects of over four years of war and Russia’s inability to repel Ukrainian long-range strikes.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted Russian claims that Ukraine is sabotaging the planned prisoner of war (POW) exchange as part of the three-day Victory Day ceasefire. Putin accused Ukraine on May 9 of sabotaging the 1,000 for 1,000 POW exchanges as part of the Victory Day ceasefire, claiming that Russia had not heard anything from Ukraine on the topic.[8] Zelensky stated on May 10 that Ukraine is fully committed to the POW exchange and had already given Russia its lists detailing the 1,000 POWs that Ukraine would return to Russia in the exchange and added that the United States is acting as a guarantor in the exchange.[9]
Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts. ISW has increasingly observed footage created using artificial intelligence purportedly showing Russian forces raising flags in several sectors of the frontline in recent days.[10] Russian forces shifted to infiltration tactics in Summer 2025 and have since then increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raising to claim advances in areas where Russian forces had conducted small group infiltrations but did not establish enduring positions.[11] Russia has been increasing the sophistication of these videos over the last several months, beginning to produce more complex, higher-production edited montages throughout numerous locations in Winter 2025 compared to previous shorter one-off videos.[12] The increased sophistication and use of artificial intelligence in these videos suggest that the Kremlin is engaging in a coordinated campaign to support the higher Russian military command’s informational efforts. Russian sources notably released much of the AI footage in the days leading up to Victory Day on May 9, possibly to compensate for Russian forces failing to meet deadlines for advances ahead of May 9. The Kremlin continues to engage in a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and flag raising infiltration missions in an attempt to portray them as a sweeping, broad-front advance to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[13]
The Kremlin and the Russian military command continue to coerce and punish pro-war information space figures critical of Russian political and military leadership as part of a wider effort to consolidate control over the information space. The Russian milblogger Telegram channel Thirteenth claimed on May 8 that the command of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) sent its main administrator Yegor Guzenko, who served with the unit in lieu of jail time, to an unspecified assault unit on the frontlines on or around April 27 and that Guzenko has not made contact since.[14] Thirteenth noted that Guzenko suffered a double leg fracture on March 1 from which he had not recovered and that Guzenko would very likely die on this combat mission.[15] Guzenko and the Thirteenth channel have been critical of the Kremlin throughout the war, and notably criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, particularly for his conduct of the war in Ukraine, and Russian internet restrictions in a series of Telegram posts on April 24, three days before Guzenko’s assignment to the assault unit.[16] Russian authorities arrested Guzenko on October 5, 2024, on felony charges for assaulting a police officer, following his continuous heavy criticism of the Russian MoD and the Kremlin.[17] The Russian ultranationalist Telegram channel Voevoda Veshaet claimed on May 8 that Russian officials arrested its administrator and former Russian combat helicopter pilot, Alexey Zemtsov and that Zemtsov is in pre-trial detention on charges unrelated to his military service.[18] Voevoda Veshaet noted that Zemstov is ready to go fight in Ukraine as part of a Storm V assault company. Zemtsov published on April 15 video alleging that he faced censorship from the Russian military command and accusations of discrediting the Russian military for complaining about the kit he received after transferring to an assault unit.[19] The Kremlin has recently intensified efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the second day of the May 9–11 ceasefire.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin vaguely suggested that the war in Ukraine could end soon, despite offering no indication that Russia intends to end the war.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted Russian claims that Ukraine is sabotaging the planned prisoner of war (POW) exchange as part of the three-day Victory Day ceasefire.
- Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts.
- The Kremlin and the Russian military command continue to coerce and punish pro-war information space figures critical of Russian political and military leadership as part of a wider effort to consolidate control over the information space.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova and Slovyansk directions, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 10 but did not advance.[21]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 10 but did not advance.[22]
Russian forces are reportedly launching Banderol cruise missiles from helicopters and using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics in the Kharkiv direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 10 that Russian forces are launching Banderol cruise missiles based on Orion drones from Mi-28 helicopters in Kharkiv Oblast, noting that the range of the Banderol allows Mi-28 helicopters to launch them without entering Ukrainian air defense range.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have introduced UGVs that can carry up to 20 kilograms for logistics. The milblogger claimed that the usage of small group infiltration tactics has expanded the offensive zone of a company to 1.5 kilometers and that of a battalion to three to four kilometers.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 10.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 10 but did not advance.[24] Ukrainian 10th Army Corps Spokesperson Yevhen Artelemeychuk reported that Russian forces did not conduct any ground assaults in the Kupyansk and Borova sectors on May 9.[25] Artelemeychuk stated that Russian forces continued to conduct first-person view (FPV) and Molniya fixed-wing FPV drone strikes, but at a reduced pace. Artelemeychuk added that Russian forces are using the ceasefire to accumulate forces and improve logistics. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 10 that the ceasefire did not hold in the Kupyansk direction, however, and that both sides had resumed activity.[26]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on May 9 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian-occupied trench in a forested area southwest of Serhiivka, indicating that there are likely no Russian positions near the Ukrainian positions in the area.[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[28] The footage, recent reports from Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, and claims from a Russian milblogger indicate that Ukrainian forces are likely fighting for Nykyforivka and have likely cleared Lypivka (northwest of Nykyforivka and southeast of Slovyansk) from Russian infiltrators.[29]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Sosnove (northwest of Lyman) and east of Lyman.[30]
Russian forces continued shelling, drone strikes, and limited ground assaults in the Slovyansk direction and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on May 10 amidst the truce but did not advance.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continued shelling and flying Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones during the truce.[32] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continued to deliver ammunition and supplies using cars, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The spokesperson added that Russian forces are also using the truce to accumulate troops and bring infantry closer to the frontline. Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces reduced airstrikes in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions during the truce but continued ground assaults, aerial reconnaissance via drones, and drone strikes.[33] Zaporozhets added that Russian forces also exploited the truce to accumulate infantry and conduct logistics in the Kramatorsk direction.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[34] Geolocated footage published on April 28 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in eastern Kostyantynivka, indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area, contrary to Russian claims.[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and in the Pokrovsk direction on May 10 but did not advance.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are actively striking Russian logistics west of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and that Russian forces are not rapidly advancing in the Pokrovsk direction.[37]
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 10 shows Russian servicemembers dressed as Red Cross personnel operating in Pokrovsk, which is an act of perfidy and a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[38] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces around Pokrovsk have been wearing white, Red Cross armbands for several days in a row.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 10 but did not advance.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 10 and recently conducted an infiltration mission in the area.[41] Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian servicemembers in northern Zlahoda (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not occur within the last 24 hours.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 10 that Russian forces have been attempting to retake positions in the Rybne-Zlahoda direction (southeast of Oleksandrivka) that Russian forces previously lost due to Ukrainian counterattacks.[43] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have only achieved small tactical penetrations, the largest of which was the infiltration of Russian assault groups north of Novohryhorivka toward Verbove (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on May 10 but did not advance.[44]
The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces’ efforts west and southwest of Hulyaipole have effectively come to a standstill due to Russian forces’ reliance on small group infiltration tactics. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 10 that Ukrainian forces have effectively halted the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces’ advance in the Hulyaipole-Omelnyk (west of Hulyaipole direction). Mashovets argued that Ukrainian drone strikes caused Russian forces to rely on small group infiltration tactics, effectively preventing Russian forces from concentrating forces necessary to make tactical gains and rapid advances.[45] Mashovets assessed that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) is unable to achieve even its near-term objective of reaching the Verkhnya Tersa-Hulyaipilske line (southwest of Hulyaipole) because it cannot accumulate sufficient forces beyond small groups in the area, despite the Eastern Grouping of Forces committing operational reserves to the sector.[46][47]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly pushing back Russian infiltrators in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 10 that Ukrainian forces reduced the size of the Russian infiltration area south of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and pushed back Russian forces in central Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv).[48] Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces eliminated most Russian assault groups southeast of Stepnohirsk. A Russian milblogger similarly claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in central Stepnohirsk and that Russian forces are unable to stabilize the situation.[49] Mashovets’ statements on April 29 and May 10 indicate that Russian forces are confined to the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk.[50] Mashovets also reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the Yanchekrak River northwest of Stepove (west of Orikhiv) and north of Lobkove (southwest of Orikhiv), indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated around these Ukrainian positions rather than seizing them as previously assessed. The Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Ukrainian forces seized four settlements northwest of Orikhiv, including Lukyanivske, and operate in most parts of Prymorske. Ukrainian forces have been advancing in western Zaporizhia Oblast since late April 2025 and recently liberated several settlements in the area.[51] These advances follow Ukrainian advances that began in February 2026, and cumulatively have eliminated Russian gains made in the area since roughly mid-2025.[52]
Russian forces recently infiltrated western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets reported that several small Russian infantry groups infiltrated up to a kilometer north of Shcherbaky and into northwestern Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv). Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied warehouses in the northwestern outskirts of Mali Shcherbaky in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[53] Mashovets also reported that Russian assault groups infiltrated south of and in the southern outskirts of Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), rather than seizing the area as ISW previously assessed. Mashovets added that small groups of no more than five to six Russian servicemembers maintain positions west of Novoandriivka and east of Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) in what ISW assesses are Russian infiltration attempts.
The Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) has likely shifted its main efforts from attempts to advance toward Zaporizhzhia City to focus on seizing Orikhiv. Mashovets reported that the Russian 58th CAA is gradually shifting its operational reserves from supporting its left flank toward Zaporizhzhia City within the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) to the right flank toward Orikhiv within the AoR of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA), signaling a change in its main effort.[54] Mashovets noted that the Russian command likely changed its main effort in this frontline sector after assessing that a further operational-level offensive towards Zaporizhzhia City without eliminating Orikhiv as a Ukrainian defensive hub would be futile. Mashovets assessed that the Russian Dnepr and Eastern groupings of forces (GoFs) will only be able to seriously attempt to seize Orikhiv after they finish regroupings, receive substantial reinforcements, seize favorable positions to flank Orikhiv, and interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 9 by a Ukrainian drone unit shows Ukrainian drone operators striking two Russian military trucks west of occupied Chernihovo-Tokmachansk (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline).[56]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 10.
The Russian military command may have redeployed Russian airborne (VDV) elements to support assaults in the Zaporizhia direction. Mashovets assessed on May 10 that the Russian military command’s redeployment of elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division from the Sumy direction to the Kherson direction may be an attempt to free up the 104th VDV Division from operations in the Kherson direction.[57] Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command may commit elements of the 104th VDV Division to the Zaporizhia direction. ISW observed reports of 106th VDV Division elements operating in the Kherson direction as of May 6.[58]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text for Russian long-range strikes.
Russian forces have reportedly introduced new BM-70 drones to the battlefield. A Russian milblogger posted footage on May 10 reportedly showing elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces conducting strikes with BM-70 reconnaissance and strike drones.[59] The milblogger claimed that the drone has a speed of 150 to 200 kilometers per hour.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/yaksho-rosiyani-virishat-povernutis-do-povnoformatnoyi-vijni-104325
[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/61612
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/63518; https://t.me/tass_agency/375270; https://t.me/tass_agency/375271
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU; https://suspilne dot media/1309641-robota-nad-obminom-trivae-vijska-rf-vdarili-bezpilotnikami-po-harkovu-1537-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1778417265&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://youtu.be/G_-e1L724OU; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1309591-rosijski-vijska-namagautsa-vikoristovuvati-pripinenna-vognu-recnik-66-ombr-pro-limanskij-napramok/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1309589-kupanskij-napramok-pid-cas-peremira-9-travna-vidmicaemo-nakopicenna-rosian-na-pevnih-dilankah/ ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19496 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15508 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/63519
[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79718
[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/27365593
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79718
[9] https://www.president.gov dotua/news/yaksho-rosiyani-virishat-povernutis-do-povnoformatnoyi-vijni-104325
[10] https://t.me/okovsevidyashee/2915 ; https://t.me/sloaembr_81/399; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/651; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/yakshho-pabyedy-nemaye-yiyi-treba-vygadaty-rosiyany-zrobyly-fejk-pro-perehid-na-yih-bik-nashyh-desantnykiv/ ; https://t.me/prolivstalina/23600
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[14] https://t.me/Z13_Separ/50706
[15] https://t.me/Z13_Separ/50710
[16] https://t.me/Z13_Separ/50323; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/50324; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/50325
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024/
[18] https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/44109
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436; https://t.me/uvkkursk/364
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20629; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15508
[23] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15508
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20629 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436
[25] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1309589-kupanskij-napramok-pid-cas-peremira-9-travna-vidmicaemo-nakopicenna-rosian-na-pevnih-dilankah/
[26] https://t.me/gvzapad/34368
[27] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2053223882757439968; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14743
[28] https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/80716; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2053181979793785034
[29] https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/80716; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2053181979793785034; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3360; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72169; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71921
[30] https://t.me/rybar/80162
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20629; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436
[32] https://youtu.be/G_-e1L724OU; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1309591-rosijski-vijska-namagautsa-vikoristovuvati-pripinenna-vognu-recnik-66-ombr-pro-limanskij-napramok/
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU; https://suspilne dot media/1309641-robota-nad-obminom-trivae-vijska-rf-vdarili-bezpilotnikami-po-harkovu-1537-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1778417265&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[34] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2053240428728573990; https://t.me/BOBR_SEVER/84
[35] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2053459632450940979; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/79903
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/51634
[37] https://t.me/rusich_army/29523
[38] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2053482416790966727; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1407
[39] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1407
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436
[42] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2053237086606516234; https://t.me/ombr_110/2504
[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3397
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38462; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38436;
[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3396
[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3393
[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3393
[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3394
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51613
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3375
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025/
[53] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2053163947579023493; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/895
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3393
[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3398
[56] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35556; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/898; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2053151680296841668
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3399
[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/
[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/114827
