Toplines
Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Ukraine with 546 drones and missiles, including 14 ballistic missiles, on the night of May 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; and 524 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four Iskander-K cruise missiles and 503 drones, that 18 missiles and 16 drones struck 34 locations, and that downed debris had fallen on 11 locations as of 08:30 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that the strikes primarily targeted Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes against Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast significantly damaged civilian infrastructure and also targeted energy and residential infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian authorities stated that Russian forces struck Odesa City, including a Chinese-owned ship that was approaching the port.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kherson, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and injured at least 33 civilians, including three children.[4] Russia has been launching larger numbers of ballistic missiles than usual in recent weeks, likely to take advantage of Ukrainian air defense limitations in the face of a global shortage of Patriot interceptors.[5]
Ukraine’s new domestically produced guided glide bomb will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russian forces and assets in the near and operational rear. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on May 18 that a Ukrainian defense company developed and tested Ukraine’s first domestically produced KAB guided glide bomb, which is now ready for combat use.[6] Fedorov reported that the glide bomb has a payload of 250 kilograms and can destroy targets tens of kilometers away from the launch location. Ukraine’s new guided glide bomb capabilities will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their BAI campaign against Russian targets in the near and operational rear, mirroring Russia’s use of guided glide bombs to generate BAI effects by striking Ukrainian logistics.[7] Ukrainian forces have been successfully interdicting Russian logistics at the tactical and operational levels with drones, and the guided glide bomb will allow Ukrainian forces to strike hardened targets with a larger payload.[8] Russian forces have also used glide bombs with extended ranges to keep valuable aviation assets further from the frontline and safe from Ukrainian air defenses — a tactic Ukraine is likely to try to emulate with the guided glide bombs given Ukraine’s limited aircraft stocks.[9]
The Russian economy continues to feel the strain of the compounding effects of over four years of war coupled with Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated in an interview with Russian outlet RBK on May 18 that several factors pushed the Russian government to revise its expectations for GDP growth over the upcoming three-year period, including labor shortages and “external conditions” like ongoing sanctions against Russia and the war in the Middle East.[10] Reshetnikov also credited the changes to the structure of Russia’s planned federal spending and the Russian Central Bank’s key interest rate forecasts. Reshetnikov acknowledged that labor shortages are constraining the Russian economy, in contrast with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing attempts to characterize Russia’s low unemployment rate as a sign of economic health.[11] Reshetnikov claimed that Russia does not expect inflation to accelerate as the economy grows, however, ignoring how labor shortages are fueling inflation.[12] Reshetnikov also failed to acknowledge how Russia’s yearslong military recruitment efforts have removed many individuals from the civilian labor market and worsened the labor shortage. Russia will likely continue to suffer from worsening labor shortages as it prioritizes replacing its losses on the battlefield with new recruits over supporting and growing its domestic economy.
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to exacerbate Russia’s liquidity problems related to unsustainable wartime spending. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) obtained Russian documents that assess that Russia has had to significantly reduce its active oil wells, with one unspecified Russian oil company alone closing 400 wells.[13] Zelensky stated that Russia has reduced oil refining by at least 10 percent thus far in 2026 and that Russia struggles with restarting wells compared to other oil producing states. Zelensky stated that the SZRU data indicates that 11 Russian financial institutions are preparing to liquidate and that another eight banking institutions cannot internally resolve their accumulated problems and have to attract external resources. Zelensky noted that Russia’s federal budget deficit is already almost $80 billion in the first five months of 2026. Russia has increasingly struggled with liquidity problems after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war and resorting to selling its physical gold reserves.[14] The Kremlin has enacted economically sub-optimal policies like increasing the value-added tax (VAT) in January 2026, which is already having cascading effects on the Russian economy by increasing the size of Russia‘s gray (shadow) economy and thereby increasing the costs of goods and services without generating the desired tax revenues.[15] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since March 2026, which have had outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity, undercutting Russia’s ability to profit from increased global oil price spikes.[16] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will likely continue to strain Russian revenues and prevent Russia from reaping any long-term benefits from the current surge in oil prices.
Russian sources suggested that Colonel General Alexander Lapin may become the next Russian State Duma Defense Committee chairperson. Sources in the Russian State Duma and the ruling United Russia party told Russian business newspaper Kommersant on May 14 that United Russia is considering Lapin as the next Defense Committee chairperson but emphasized that the decision is not final.[17] The sources stated that Lapin may run on the United Party list from the Republic of Tatarstan. Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov currently holds the chairperson position, and Kommersant’s sources claimed that he may not seek reelection. Kommersant reported that a source in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the MoD has often expressed “surprise” at Kartapolov’s statements. Four sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and a source close to United Russia told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti in December 2025 that United Russia will likely not nominate Karapolov for the next Duma election as part of the Moscow Oblast group from which he was elected in 2021, but added that Kartapolov may run in another region.[18] Vedomosti noted that Kartapolov is a close associate of former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.[19] Kartapolov responded on May 18 to the reports of his possible replacement, claiming that he is planning to run for a second term in the Duma elections.[20]
The possible replacement of Kartapolov with Lapin, if confirmed, would be a continuation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s practice of rotating high-ranking commanders into other positions despite their poor battlefield performance. Lapin served as the commander of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; moved to be the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in 2023; and became the commander of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Northern Grouping of Forces in 2024.[21] The Russian MoD confirmed in August 2025 that it replaced Lapin as the LMD and Northern Grouping of Forces commander with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[22] Kommersant reported on May 14 that Lapin became an advisor to Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov after his dismissal.[23] Lapin’s possible move to the Duma Defense Committee would be consistent with Putin’s pattern of rotating commanders with poor performance within the force or sidelining them to government-related positions.[24] Kartapolov’s possible removal would also be consistent with Putin’s campaign to remove personnel loyal to Shoigu and to neutralize his influence within the Russian MoD.[25]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Ukraine with 546 drones and missiles, including 14 ballistic missiles, on the night of May 17 to 18.
- Ukraine’s new domestically produced guided glide bomb will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russian forces and assets in the near and operational rear.
- The Russian economy continues to feel the strain of the compounding effects of over four years of war coupled with Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure.
- Russian sources suggested that Colonel General Alexander Lapin may become the next Russian State Duma Defense Committee chairperson.
- The possible replacement of Kartapolov with Lapin, if confirmed, would be a continuation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s practice of rotating high-ranking commanders into other positions despite their poor battlefield performance.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian warships in the Caspian Sea overnight on May 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 21980 Grachonok-class anti-sabotage boat near Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan (roughly 1,000 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[26] Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) struck a Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship belonging to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service in Kaspiysk on May 16 to 17.[27]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on May 18 that a May 15 Ukrainian strike destroyed a Russian Be-200 multirole amphibious aircraft and Ka-27 ship-based multirole helicopter at the Yeysk Airbase in Krasnodar Krai.[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northwestern Nova Sich (north of Sumy City) and south of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[30]
Ukrainian forces continued their short- and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in Karnatnoye (roughly 12 kilometers from the international border) on the night of May 17 to 18 and an airspace control station in Lesnoye (roughly 71 kilometers from the international border) on May 16.[31]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 18 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[32]
Russian forces have largely abandoned mechanized assault attempts in northern Kharkiv Oblast and have resumed infiltration tactics after suffering heavy losses. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on May 18 that Ukrainian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to destroy Russian infantry remotely — possibly referring to the use of UGVs to remotely mine areas.[33] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces currently possess technical superiority in terms of strike UGVs, but that Russian forces have also begun using UGVs to conduct logistics.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Budarky on May 18.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 18 but did not advance.[35]
Russian forces are increasing the intensity of ground operations due to spring weather conditions that allow better use of reconnaissance and first-person view (FPV) drones. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 18 that the intensity of Russian assaults depends on the weather and that Russian forces increase the intensity of assaults in clear weather because they receive support from reconnaissance and FPV drones.[36] The officer noted that Russian forces only strike Ukrainian positions with mortars and artillery in cloudy weather. The officer also stated that Russian forces continue to leverage small infiltration groups and foliage to conceal their movement from Ukrainian drones and no longer use vehicles to quickly cross the kill zone as they did in the winter.
Russian forces continued to use fixed-wing reconnaissance drones to conduct counter-battery target acquisition. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on May 18 that Russian forces are using Supercam and ZALA reconnaissance drones to constantly search for Ukrainian artillery positions, restricting Ukrainian artillery operations.[37]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Kupyansk direction on the night of May 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control point in Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[38]
Ukrainian officials and open-source reporting refute Russian claims that Russian forces seized Borova. A Russian source published footage on May 18 purportedly taken in Borova, but geolocations show that the footage was actually taken in Kolomyichykha, Luhansk Oblast, (northeast of Borova and approximately 9 kilometers from the frontline) on May 18.[39] Ukrainian officials also refuted recent Russian MoD claims from May 16 that Russian forces had seized Borova.[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 18 but did not advance.[41]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Hermes unit of Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) are striking Ukrainian forces north of Lyman.[42] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 18 that Ukrainian forces liberated Stavky (northeast of Slovyansk).[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on May 18 but did not advance.[44]
Russian forces continue to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian targets in the operational and near rear of the Kostyantynivka direction. A commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems platoon operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on May 18 that Russian forces have extended the “kill zone” — an area of elevated drone strike risk — to approximately 30 kilometers behind the frontline.[45] The commander reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones can now reach Kharkiv Oblast via Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 18 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[47]
Russian forces are attempting to increase artillery and drone activity in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on May 18 that Russian forces are deploying artillery near Pokrovsk and attempting to create a network of drone launch sites to support offensive operations in the Hryshyne direction (northwest of Pokrovsk).[48]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Novopavlivka direction on May 18 but did not advance.[49]
Ukrainian forces continue to hold Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) as Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 18 that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Ternove, that a Russian infiltration mission reached 1.8 kilometers south of Stepove (southeast of Oleksandrivka), and that Russian forces previously infiltrated to a pond south of Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[50]
Russian forces have failed to recapture positions they lost during Spring 2026 Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction. Mashovets reported on May 18 that Russian forces are attempting to recapture positions that Russian forces lost during Ukrainian forces’ Spring 2026 counterattacks.[51] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are deploying additional servicemembers from the 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) (newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) to support the 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD])’s effort to advance to the Vovcha River and secure Russian forces’ vital ground line of communication (GLOC) along the Hulyaipole-Velyka Novosilka road (southeast of Oleksandrivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to outflank Sichneve (southeast of Oleksandrivka) from the north and the south and have also failed to force Ukrainian troops in Novomykolaivka and Kalynivske (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) to retreat. Mashovets reported that the 36th CAA may commit an additional one or two battalions to its effort to remove Ukrainian forces from Novomykolaivka and Kalynivske in the near future. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to push Ukrainian forces north from Uspenivka (south of Oleksandrivka) on the western bank of the Yanchur River at the junction of the Russian 5th and 36th CAAs (both EMD) and that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Nove Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Oleksandrivka) to cut off the Ukrainian GLOC to Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole). Mashovets noted that small Russian infantry groups have been conducting meeting engagements along the frontline in the Oleksandrivka direction and are achieving the most promising results in the stretches from Novoheorhiivka to Berezove (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) and west of the Yanchur River from Zlahoda to Rivnopillya (both southeast of Oleksandrivka), where Russian forces may commit additional forces and assets in the future.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on May 18 but did not advance.[53]
Russian infiltration missions are failing to make significant gains in the Hulyaipole direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 18 that elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) that are attacking west and southwest of Hulyaipole are advancing at a pace of three to four kilometers in two to three weeks.[54] Mashovets noted that Russian forces took 1.5 months to infiltrate roughly 7.5 kilometers from Myrne toward Novoselivka (both southwest of Hulyaipole) and two months to infiltrate roughly 12 kilometers from Hulyaipole to Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole). Mashovets reported that Russian infiltrations do not secure control of terrain and that Ukrainian forces are capable of clearing Russian infiltrators from these unconsolidated positions. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian small groups near Verkhnya Tersa, Svyatopetrivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), and Krynychne (west of Hulyaipole) during the past week (roughly from May 11 to 18).
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 18 but did not advance.[55]
Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in central Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv) and southwest of the settlement. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted geolocated footage on May 18 showing Ukrainian forces operating in central Stepnohirsk and at the M-18 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway junction southwest of Stepnohirsk and southeast of Prymorske.[56] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from southern Stepnohirsk.[57] The geolocated footage further confirms recent Ukrainian and Russian reporting that Ukrainian forces retook positions near the M-18 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway junction and pushed back Russian forces in central Stepnohirsk.[58]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Kamyanske (roughly three kilometers from the frontline southwest of Orikhiv) on the night of May 17 to 18.[59]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 18 but did not advance.[60]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in the Kherson direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian troop concentration in occupied Olhyne (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 17 to 18.[61]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian and Russian forces commenced joint military exercises on May 18 to practice the use of nuclear weapons. The Belarusian MoD reported on May 18 that Russian and Belarusian forces began a joint exercise on the use of nuclear weapons, including practicing delivering nuclear munitions and preparing for combat use in coordination with Russian forces.[62]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/62173
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19101
[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19101 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1GndV8m12t/?mibextid=wwXIfr; https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/20485
[4] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29168; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/64121; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/2056232197309247540; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29497; https://t.me/synegubov/22039; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EDWnCJhy1/; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/57031; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/13016; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2180;
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/
[6] https://t.me/zedigital/6800
[7] understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[10] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/18/05/2026/6a0abe829a79471017c1e69a; https://t.me/tass_agency/376286; https://t.me/tass_agency/376288; https://t.me/tass_agency/376290
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/
[12] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/18/05/2026/6a0abe829a79471017c1e69a
[13] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19111
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[17] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8656038
[18] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/12/04/1160372-andrei-kartapolov-mozhet-ne-poiti-na-vibori
[19] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8656038
[20] https://dailystorm dot ru/news/kartapolov-zaveril-chto-poydet-na-vybory-v-gosdumu-na-fone-sluhov-o-ego-smenshchike-generale-lapine
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25-24/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-7/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/
[23] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8656038
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-18/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-10/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_24-6/
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38812; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-rajoni-kaspijska-urazyly-rosijskyj-kater-proyektu-grachonok/;
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38812; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780; https://t.me/severnnyi/8049; https://t.me/rybar/80365; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72355; https://t.me/dva_majors/93126; https://t.me/wargonzo/34263
[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72355
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38812
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780;
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_-e1L724OU; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/18/ukrayinecz-prydumav-a-my-vkraly-fabryka-z-vynyshhennya-utylizuye-rosijskyj-bruht-na-harkivshhyni/
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/93126
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780; https://t.me/wargonzo/34263
[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/18/mayemo-zbilshennya-vsogo-rosijskogo-v-povitri-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-shhodenni-shturmy/
[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/18/pidyizhdzhayut-po-odnij-dvi-lyudyny-skydayut-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zakydayut-lyudskym-resursom/
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38812
[39] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2056079658647699753; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/205607966092103693; https://t.me/operationall_space/11521; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2056105548458951032
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://t.me/borova_gromada/12926
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780; https://t.me/dva_majors/93126; https://t.me/wargonzo/34263
[42] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2056057949488079202
https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2056058309199995283
https://t.me/vbs_hermes/6
[43] https://t.me/gvZapad/18587
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780; https://t.me/dva_majors/93126
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/18/vse-bude-kil-zona-u-holodnomu-yaru-rozpovily-yak-drony-styrayut-ponyattya-tylu/
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72351 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34263
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34263 ;
[48] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1455
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3410
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3410
[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3411
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14008; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780; https://t.me/wargonzo/34263; https://t.me/voin_dv/19561
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3412
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14008; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780
[56] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2056344696696246304; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11946; https://t.me/artan_gur/3931;
[57] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8464
[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38812
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38813; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38782 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14008; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38780
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38812
[62] https://t.me/modmilby/55909
