Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) President Xi Jinping failed to reach an agreement on the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline and signed only comparatively minor bilateral agreements during Putin’s official visit to the PRC. Putin and Xi held a joint press conference on May 20 in which the leaders praised deep relations between Russia and the PRC and how Russia and the PRC actively cooperate in energy, noting that Russia is one of the PRC’s largest oil suppliers.[1] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia and China reached agreements on energy projects and “something else very important,” but did not specify what it was, and the parties notably failed to reach an agreement on the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 (PS-2) pipeline.[2] Russia and the PRC have been in disagreement about the PS-2 since at least 2024, as Russia faces a more immediate need for the pipeline to substitute income from exports lost since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the PRC is using its upper hand to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.[3] Putin and Xi signed a joint statement on further strengthening their comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, and on deepening good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, about 40 intergovernmental, interagency, and corporate documents, mainly aimed at deepening economic cooperation, as well as a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations.[4] The agreements signed were relatively small in comparison to the Kremlin’s hopes that Putin’s visit would culminate in a signed deal on the PS-2. Ushakov highlighted on May 18 the PS-2 pipeline as one of the priority items for Putin’s official visit to the PRC, and Putin’s failure to secure a signed agreement demonstrates the current limits of Russo-Sino cooperation.[5]
Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have conducted a series of counterattacks in different areas across the theater in recent months, having made their most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[6] Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured much of Kupyansk starting in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in winter and spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since late April 2026.[7] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine have created cascading operational and strategic effects against Russia’s ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt, which has forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors.[8] Ukraine’s intensified mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early 2026 has also degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations across the theater and has also likely supported recent Ukrainian advances.[9] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on May 15 in an exclusive interview with Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi that precise Ukrainian strikes, the destruction of Russian reserves, and constant pressure on Russian assault units have allowed Ukrainian forces to increasingly seize the tactical initiative and force Russian forces to react to a Ukrainian-defined operational tempo.[10] Syrskyi did not provide absolute figures but noted that the number of Ukrainian offensive actions exceeded those of Russian forces as of May 14, which may indicate Ukraine contesting the initiative at the tactical level and engaging in more active counterattacks.
Ukrainian forces are on track to meet their monthly imposed casualty targets for May 2026. Syrskyi attributed recent Ukrainian battlefield successes to a systematic Ukrainian effort to reduce Russian combat power and Russia’s ability to sustain assault operations by constantly striking Russian manpower.[11] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 20 that Ukrainian drones struck 19,203 Russian personnel in the first 19 days of May, according to data collected in Ukraine’s Delta battlefield management software, of which USF elements struck over 6,000.[12] Brovdi forecasted that Ukrainian drones will inflict over 34,000 Russian casualties by the end of May 2026, excluding casualties from artillery shelling, rear strikes, frontline battle losses, and other unconfirmed losses. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is struggling to recruit enough personnel to compensate for losses, and the Russian recruitment rate has dipped below its replacement rate, concluding only 70,500 military service contracts in the first quarter of 2026, below the monthly quota of 33,500 to 34,600 contracts signed.[13] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces reached their objective of inflicting casualties greater than Russia’s recruitment rate in April 2026 and set a new objective of inflicting around 50,000 Russian casualties per month.[14] Ukrainian forces will likely further expand their mid-range strike campaign and continue counterattacks in vulnerable sectors of the frontline, which will likely further inhibit Russian offensive operations.
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) President Xi Jinping failed to reach an agreement on the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline and signed only comparatively minor bilateral agreements during Putin’s official visit to the PRC.
- Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces advanced in the Sumy and Pokrovsk directions.
- Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and 154 drones toward Ukraine overnight and an additional 84 drones during the day.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and likely a defense industrial base (DIB) facility on the night of May 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the AVT-6 primary oil refining unit at the Lukoil-Nizhegorodorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast overnight, causing fires at the facility.[15] Geolocated imagery published on May 20 shows fires at the refinery, and Nizhny Novgorod Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck two industrial facilities in Kstovskyi Raion.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces’ May 19 strike against the Yaroslavl-3 oil pumping station in Semibratovo, Yaroslavl Oblast, damaged four tanks that can hold up to 140,000 cubic meters of petroleum products.[17] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces likely also struck the Azot chemical plant in Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai, and footage shows fires and plumes of smoke near the plant.[18]
Ukrainian strikes continue to inhibit Russian oil production in the short-term. Reuters reported on May 19, citing two industry sources, that the Moscow Oil Refinery stopped processing petroleum products after Ukrainian strikes on May 17.[19] An industry source told Reuters that the strikes did not cause significant damage to the facility but that the refinery halted operations to mitigate risks and that restarting processing operations will take several days.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 20 and advanced beyond the previously assessed Russian line.[20] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are operating in a forested area northeast of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces likely advanced northeast of Sadky as well as south of Oleshnya and west of Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (both northeast of Sadky) on a previous date.[21]
Ukrainian forces continued frontline strikes against Russian military assets in the Sumy direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Yelizavetovka, Kursk Oblast (north of Sumy City along the international border).[22]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on May 20 but did not advance.[23] Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 20.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces likely cleared most Russian positions within Kupyansk. A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 19 that Ukrainian forces killed or captured the remaining Russian sabotage and reconnaissance elements operating in Kupyansk as of May 18.[24] The Ukrainian company commander noted that Russian forces sometimes infiltrate into Kupyansk in groups of one to three personnel, largely through underground gas pipelines, and still hold some positions on the town’s outskirts. The Ukrainian commander stated that Russian forces do not have nearly the presence in Kupyansk now as in January 2026 and described Kupyansk as largely a contested “gray zone” in which neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces hold firm positions. ISW has adjusted its control of terrain assessment to depict Kupyansk as Ukrainian counterattacks, given several Ukrainian clearing operations in Kupyansk and the absence of sufficiently granular data to map a Russian infiltration zone. ISW will update its assessment, including restoring an active Russian infiltration zone in Kupyansk, as ISW collects and verifies additional information.
Russian infiltrators continue to conduct their cognitive war effort that uses flag raising in the Kupyansk direction in order to achieve informational effects.[25] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 20 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) or the western bank of the Oskil River in particular, to raise Russian flags to create the false impression that Russian forces seized the position.[26] These flag raisings are part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[27]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[28]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Borova on May 20 but did not advance.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking toward Borova itself from Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova) and Zelenyi Hai (east of Borivska Andriivka).[30] Russian forces likely seek to prioritize operations directly against Borova over other areas in this direction in order to belatedly realize the false May 16 claim by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov that Russian forces seized Borova.[31]
A Russian milblogger posted a map acknowledging that Ukrainian forces control Novoplatonivka (north of Bohuslavka), fields east of Novoplatonivka, Shyikivka (east of Borova), and fields north of Shyikivka, all contrary to other Russian claims.[32]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit in occupied Severodonetsk (about 39 kilometers from the frontline).[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 20 but did not advance.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 19 that Russian forces struck the Novokramatorsk Machine-Building Plant near Kramatorsk.[35]
The Russian command is reportedly redeploying forces from the Kupyansk direction to the Lyman direction due to heavy losses. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 20 that the Russian command is transferring elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 26th Tank Regiment, and 153rd Tank Regiment (all of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to the Lyman direction, presumably from the Kupyansk direction, to compensate for heavy losses.[36] These reports, if true, would additionally indicate that the Russian military command may have abandoned its efforts to seize Kupyansk at this time.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Kostyantynivka as Russian forces continued to conduct infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka direction. Geolocated footage posted on May 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced in central Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and ISW has observed data indicating a sustained Ukrainian presence in Illinivka and the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka since April 30.[37] This footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in western Kostyantynivka contrary to Russian claims. Additional geolocated footage published on May 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the fields west and northwest of Illinivka, contrary to Russian claims.[38] Geolocated footage posted on May 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dobropillya direction on May 20 but did not advance.[40]
Russian forces likely maintain consolidated positions in the areas north and northwest of Pokrovsk. The spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on May 20 that Russian forces are operating along the Hryshynka River channel, attempting to advance to Myrne, Hulive, Shylivka, Yurivka, and eventually Krutoyarivka (all northwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces have likely consolidated positions in Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced north from the settlement.[41] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are effectively using drone operators and elevations to provide cover in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces have likely seized all of Pokrovsk and consolidated their positions within the town.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka on May 20 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[42]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 20.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Piddubne (northeast of Oleksandrivka) on May 19 or overnight on May 19 to 20, indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement on a prior date.[44] ISW previously assessed Piddubne to be infiltrated but now assesses it to be Russian-seized.
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of Donetsk Oblast on the night of May 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in occupied Soledar (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline); a command and observation post near occupied Ivanivske (roughly six kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian drone control point near Perebudova (three kilometers from the frontline).[45]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 19 shows Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions east of Vozdvyzhivka and west of Olenokostyantynivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[46] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are penetrating through Ukrainian positions in fields north of Luhivske toward Charivne and Hulyaipilske (all southwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces are likely infiltrating further into fields between Zaliznychne, Zahirne, and Myrne (all west to southwest of Hulyaipole) than ISW previously assessed.[47] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on May 19 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Hulyaipilske and north of Charivne (both southwest of Hulyaipole).[48]
Geolocated footage posted on May 19 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position southeast of Charivne in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[49]
Ukrainian forces continue to advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces liberated Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya (both southeast of Orikhiv); pushed Russian forces from the southern tip of the Uspenivka Balka in the area south of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhv) and from southern Prymorske (west of Orikhiv); and advanced to the east of Plavni (west of Orikhiv) along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway.[50] Mashovets stated that several sources informed him that Ukrainian forces liberated Mali Shcherbaky and Shcherbaky (both west of Orikhiv) but expressed doubt about the veracity of these reports.[51] Ukrainian forces began counterattacking in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late April 2026 and have retaken several settlements in the area in recent weeks.[52] These Ukrainian counterattacks have effectively halted Russian advances toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City.[53]
Mashovets reported that Russian forces hold positions in a music school south of Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv).[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Military Base (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 166th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[55]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southeast of Kherson City toward Bilohrudyi Island on May 20.[56]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Lyubimivka (northeast of Kherson City on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River).[57]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a missile strike and a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 19 to 20 and during the day on May 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 154 Shahed (including jet-propelled), Gerbera, and Italmas-type strike drones, Parodiya decoy drones, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast overnight.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 131 drones, that the Iskander-M missile and 23 drones struck 20 locations, and that downed debris fell on six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 20 that Russian forces also launched 84 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type drones, Parodiya decoy drones, and other drones during the day.[59] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 75 drones, and that six drones struck an unspecified number of locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged energy and residential infrastructure in Odesa and Sumy oblasts.[60] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck food warehouses and residential areas in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely with an Iskander-M ballistic missile, killing at least two civilians and injuring at least six.[61] ISW previously reported that Russian forces have begun launching daytime strike packages, in addition to overnight strikes, in what ISW assesses is an effort to maximize visibility for long-range strikes and disrupt civilian and commercial activity.[62]
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 20 that authorities detected depleted Uranium-235 and Uranium-238 elements in the wreckage of a Russian Geran-2 (Shahed-type) drone armed with an R-60 air-to-air missile that Ukrainian forces shot down in Chernihiv Oblast on April 7.[63]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79787
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/376664 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/27467459
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-6/
[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79787; http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6486; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79787
[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/376390 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27447667
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/;
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/
[10] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syrskyj-kilkist-nastupalnyh-dij-syl-oborony-pochala-perevyshhuvaty-rosijski/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9ZMEMKBWl0&t=1s
[11] vii https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syrskyj-kilkist-nastupalnyh-dij-syl-oborony-pochala-perevyshhuvaty-rosijski/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9ZMEMKBWl0&t=1s
[12] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2378
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/
[14] https://t.me/zedigital/6784; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/myhajlo-fedorov-pyatyj-misyacz-pospil-rosiya-vtrachaye-bilshe-nizh-zdatna-mobilizuvaty/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/rekordni-pokaznyky-droniv-perehoplyuvachiv-194-pidrozdily-mayut-pidtverdzheni-zbyttya-shahediv/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/shtaby-ppo-ta-logistyka-voroga-kilkist-midlstrajkiv-zrosla-vdvichi-za-misyacz/
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887
[16] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13043; https://t.me/worldmilitares/42989; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7577 ; https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/9219
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/
[18] https://t.me/astrapress/113148
[19] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-moscow-oil-refinery-halted-output-after-may-17-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-05-19/
[20] https://t.me/uvkkursk/379 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/381 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38893 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93216 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8073 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34304 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43295
[21] https://t.me/severnnyi/8075
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20707 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38893 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8073 ; https://t.me/rybar/80405 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93216
[24] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1312646-ugrupovan-rosian-u-kupansku-nemae-rozmova-pro-situaciu-u-misti-z-komandnogo-punktu-hartii/
[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/20/mayut-zavdannya-zajmatysya-flagovtykom-rosijski-generaly-zvituyut-pro-fejkovi-peremogy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/
[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/20/misiya-prorvatysya-iz-soboyu-dayut-akvafresh-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vidbyly-vorozhi-shturmy/;
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43328
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43318
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43318; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43295
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20707 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38893; https://t.me/wargonzo/34304;
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43294
[36] https://t.me/gvZapad/18608
[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057016745882271906 ; https://t.me/red_army1/10629; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2056372002974216353; https://t.me/MSP1465/488; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2054942439635337703; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33145
[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057008497603014989 ;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057008533183287500; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33213
[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057024871696040098?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057024875810664763?s=20; https://t.me/OMBR156/2750
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876; https://t.me/wargonzo/34304
[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/20/ohopyty-pokrovsk-abo-pidrizaty-vystup-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-syly-oborony-zbilshuyut-kilzonu/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115401 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14017 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38893 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14024
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887
[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11960; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1640600506992601/
[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3415
[48] https://t.me/rybar/80402
[49] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2056803323605565679; https://t.me/mod_russia/63773
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3414; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3415
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3415
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3414
[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3413; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3414; https://t.me/DIUkraine/8488
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38876 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14017
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38887
[58] https://t.me/kpszsu/62285
[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/62328
[60] https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid02PZ1oCRFq9gmi6UGMqrZAwSGFWWaedBs46vPaihfZKe6gRciqgfCDJbYsksFP3bzDl ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1313241-rf-zavdala-udaru-po-energoobektu-dtek-v-odesi/; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2194 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16209; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16205 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/57402 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/57390 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2057022191548457274 ; https://t.me/suspilnesumy/44488 ; https://t.me/suspilnesumy/44483
[61] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29563 ; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/2056997094557127016 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29557
[62] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026
[63] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-vyiavyla-pidvyshchenyi-radiatsiinyi-fon-na-ulamkakh-rosiiskoho-udarnoho-drona-yakym-voroh-atakuvav-chernihivshchynu-u-kvitni-2026-roku ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/pidvyshhenyj-radiatsijnyj-fon-ulamkiv-geran-2-cherez-raketu-r-60-zafiksuvala-sbu/; https://www.facebook.com/ssu.chernihiv/posts/pfbid02D5oioavuRBTsqKZM3E37no4EzwWSVZWjgMBXiHhx8ocSVAsGBxPQsXGVPeiGoX7Jl?rdid=JUlkLerxb2JThC2k# ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1313205-na-cernigivsini-v-ulamkah-rosijskoi-raketi-viavili-pidvisenij-radiacijnij-fon/
CORRECTION: On May 21, 2026, ISW added a missing sentence about Russian positions in a music school under Russian Supporting Effort. We apologize for this mistake.
