Toplines
A Russian Geran-2 drone struck a multi-story apartment complex in Galati, Romania, on the evening of May 28-29. The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported on May 29 that Russian forces struck civilian and infrastructure close to the Ukrainian-Romanian international border along the Danube River on the night of May 28 to 29, during which a drone entered Romanian airspace and struck a residential apartment building in Galati (approximately seven kilometers from the Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[1] The strike injured at least two civilians.[2] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that two Romanian F-16 fighters and an IAR 330 SOCAT helicopter scrambled at 0119 local time on the morning of May 29 after the drone entered Romanian airspace.[3] Romanian authorities reported that the drone was a Russian Geran-2 (the Russian-produced version of an Iranian Shahed-136) and that its entire payload detonated upon impact.[4] Footage of the debris is also consistent with that of a Shahed-type drone.[5] Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated that 43 Russian drones were flying toward Romania from the east, one of which Ukrainian air defenses likely intercepted above Reni, Odesa Oblast (east of Galati along the international border with Romania and Moldova), altering its trajectory.[6] Dan stated that Russia bears the full responsibility for the drone strike, as Russia’s behavior disregards international law and the safety of the citizens of a NATO member state.[7] Romanian Acting Foreign Minister Oana Toiu stated that Romania is engaging in discussions about possibly activating NATO’s Article 4 provision, a consultation between NATO member states, in response to the Russian drone strike.[8] Romania shut down the Russian consulate in Constanta and declared the Russian consul persona non grata in response to the strike.[9]
Russian drones have violated Romanian airspace at least 28 times (and drone fragments have entered Romania, reportedly as many as 47 times) since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but this is the first incursion that injured civilians in Romania or in any NATO member state.[10] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense noted in September 2025 — during a period of intense Russian drone incursions into NATO states bordering Ukraine, including intentionally at times — that Russian drones had conducted about 50 drone strikes near the Ukrainian-Romanian border since February 2022, including 30 strikes in which debris fell on Romanian territory.[11] Russia notably violated Polish airspace with at least 19 drones on the night of September 9 to 10 in intentional Russian incursions.[12] Increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering NATO airspace as an acceptable consequence of its strikes in Ukraine. Putin now appears to accept the risk of inflicting civilian casualties in NATO states as an acceptable consequence of Russia’s strike campaign.
Romanian Armed Forces Joint Staff Acting Commander, Brigadier General Gheorghe Maxim, spoke about constraints on Romania’s air defense abilities on May 29. Maxim stated that Romanian law prohibits Romanian air defenses from operating in such a way that would affect the airspace of a neighboring country, including firing a projectile that could enter Ukrainian airspace.[13] Maxim stated that four minutes passed between when Romania detected the Russian drone in Romanian airspace and when the drone struck the apartment in Galati, noting that four minutes was not enough time to detect, identify, and intercept the drone. Maxim also stated that Romanian forces need to consider the risk of debris from air defense operations inflicting more damage than the drone could inflict itself, noting that Romanian forces had no opportunities to intercept the drone safely. Maxim stated that these strikes are the consequence of a conflict occurring near Romania’s border that is directly affecting Romanian residents. Given the restrictions on Romania’s air defense operations, NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine and Moldova as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.
Senior Kremlin officials are leaning into two separate responses to the drone strike in Romania that together aim to deflect Russia’s responsibility for the drone incident, falsely blame Ukraine, and test NATO’s response to Russian drone incursions. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 29 in response to the drone strike in Romania that European states are “direct participants” in the war against Russia and that “[European countries] have not seen anything yet… so they’d better get used to it. This won’t be the last time.”[14] Medvedev’s response effectively threatens Romania and other European states with further drone strikes should these states continue to support Ukraine. Putin criticized European assertions that the drone was Russian and claimed that no one can say for sure the origin of the drone until authorities examine the wreckage.[15] Putin insinuated that the drone was Ukrainian and offered to examine the drone’s wreckage to determine its origin if Romanian authorities give the wreckage to Russia. Medvedev frequently makes more radical and outlandish statements than other Kremlin officials make, but his statements still reflect threats that the Kremlin wants to – and Putin himself in the past has delivered to the West.[16] Russian State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s rhetorical lines, also deflected Russian responsibility for the strike and falsely accused the West of escalating against Russia.[17] The Kremlin has observed NATO’s responses to prior Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace, particularly during their height in Fall 2025, and will likely use the May 29 strike in Romania to test NATO’s response to both the drone incursion itself and the Kremlin’s rhetoric, regardless of whether the May 29 incursion was accidental or intentional. Such incursions and strikes will likely continue so long as Russian forces continue operating drones in the vicinity of NATO’s borders. NATO may need to adjust its air defense policies and frameworks to protect its own people against Russian recklessness.
Russia is reportedly allowing private businesses to purchase air defense and counter-drone systems as Russia seeks to offset the cost of its increased air defense needs on Russian federal subjects and entities outside of the federal government. Russian outlet RBK reported on May 28, citing sources in and close to the Russian MoD, that the Russian MoD approved a mechanism that allows private companies and enterprises to purchase large-caliber weapons, turrets, anti-aircraft artillery systems, radars, and mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems to equip mobile fire groups defending their facilities from drone threats.[18] A source familiar with the organization of Russian air defenses for civilian infrastructure claimed that the mechanism includes both anti-aircraft missile systems within the broader Russian air defense umbrella and the mobile fire teams made up of reservists, volunteers from regional Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) units, and employees of private enterprises. A source told RBK that the increasing frequency of Ukrainian strikes deep in Russia necessitates more mobile fire teams, which the source claimed are “highly effective” at intercepting Ukrainian fixed-wing drones. A source in the Russian MoD reportedly told RBK that Russian private companies have long been able to purchase “passive” defense equipment, including EW, on the open market, and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) controls the distribution of small arms and light weapons to security personnel. Russia is increasingly shifting the funding of air defenses to individual enterprises and regional governments and is turning to private military companies (PMCs) to defend Russian critical infrastructure against Ukrainian long-range drone strikes.[19] Russia’s requirements for air defense and mobile fire group personnel are increasing both at the long-range within Russia and at the mid-range in occupied Ukraine, as Ukrainian forces are increasing the frequency and range of their drone strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and oil and military-industrial facilities in Russia.[20]
A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings fell again following a slight increase that interrupted weeks of falling approval ratings. The Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on May 29 the results of a poll indicating that Putin’s approval rating fell by 1.9 percent to 67.5 percent from May 18 to 24 and that trust in Putin fell by 0.1 percent to 73.7 percent in the same time period.[21] VTsIOM’s prior polling indicated that Putin’s trust and approval ratings fell for several weeks starting in March 2026, before VTsIOM changed its methodology to include in-person polling rather than just phone calls, which likely contributed to a slight increase in Putin’s approval ratings in early May 2026.[22] This slight increase in early May now appears to be temporary. VTsIOM’s numbers are likely not reliable in any event, but it remains notable that a Russian state-owned institution has been acknowledging decreases in Putin’s approval ratings as the Russian population increasingly bears the brunt of Putin’s war effort. The Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), another Russian state-owned polling agency that reported a decline in Putin’s approval ratings in recent weeks, claimed that on May 29, Putin’s trust and approval levels increased from the prior week, contrary to the VTsIOM’s polling.[23] The Kremlin has recently pushed for Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets to limit reporting on some news that contributes to domestic discontent against Putin and the Russian Government, such as state censorship initiatives.[24] The discrepancy in the VTsIOM’s and FOM’s reporting on May 29 may be a reflection of the tension between the obvious societal discontent within Russia and the Kremlin’s efforts to manipulate media coverage in order to temper this discontent.
Key Takeaways
- A Russian Geran-2 drone struck a multi-story apartment complex in Galati, Romania, on the evening of May 28-29.
- Senior Kremlin officials are leaning into two separate responses to the drone strike in Romania that together aim to deflect Russia’s responsibility for the drone incident, falsely blame Ukraine, and test NATO’s response to Russian drone incursions.
- Russia is reportedly allowing private businesses to purchase air defense and counter-drone systems as Russia seeks to offset the cost of its increased air defense needs on Russian federal subjects and entities outside of the federal government.
- A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings fell again following a slight increase that interrupted weeks of falling approval ratings.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
- Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile/S-400 air defense missile, and 232 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure and Federal Security Service (FSB) facilities overnight on May 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Yaroslavl-3 pumping station in Yaroslavl Oblast and the Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd Oblast, causing a fire at two of the Yaroslavl-3’s oil tanks and damaging the AVT-1, AVT-3, AVT-5, and AVT-6 primary crude distillation units and secondary processing units at the Volgograd Oil Refinery.[25] Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows smoke rising from the Yaroslavl-3 pumping station.[26] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes hit a synthetic fiber plant and a chemical plant in Volzhsky, Volgograd Oblast, and damaged fuel and energy facilities in the southern part of the oblast.[27] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian FSB’s 16th Center in Temryutsky Raion, Krasnodar Krai.[28] The SBU noted that the FSB’s 16th Center handles electronic intelligence and that the strike disabled key facilities of the center.
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to hinder Russian oil production. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck 17 Russian oil facilities from May 1 to 29, including in Krasnodar and Perm krais and in Leningrad, Samara, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Moscow oblasts.[29] Brovdi stated that over half of these oil facilities halted operations or cannot operate following the Ukrainian strikes.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 29 but did not advance.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (along the international border).[31]
Russian forces continue reporting exaggerated claims that do not reflect the realities of the battlefield. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on May 29 that Russian forces are creating a “fictional reality” and reporting false claims of advance, and refuted recent Russian claims that Russian forces seized Zapsillia (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 29 but did not make confirmed advances.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Budarky (northeast of Kharkiv City) and elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], LMD) seized Karaichne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[34]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 29 but did not advance.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 29 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[36]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Kupyansk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk and roughly five kilometers from the frontline).[37]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka on May 29 but did not advance.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of May 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse near occupied Aidar (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline).[39]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces continued to conduct infiltration missions in the area. Geolocated footage posted on May 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember west of Dibrova (southeast of Lyman) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40] Geolocated footage posted on May 18 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in the southern outskirts of Ozerne (east of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[41] Geolocated footage posted on May 27 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in the fields east of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[42]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions. Geolocated footage published on May 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Kostyantynivka and in southern Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[43] Geolocated footage posted on May 27 and 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and north of Illinivka in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[44] Geolocated footage published on May 25, 26, and 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in eastern and western Kostyantynivka, in Illinivka, and northeast of Stepanivka after what ISW assesses were all Russian infiltration missions.[45]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 29 but did not advance.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 29 but did not make confirmed advances.[47] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[48]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[49]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near and northeast of Novopavlivka on May 29 but did not advance.[50]
Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Sichneve (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[51] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 29 that elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Lisne (east of Oleksandrivka), but geolocated footage posted on May 28 and reporting from a Russian milblogger indicate that the Russian frontline is much farther southeast of Lisne.[52]
Ukrainian forces continue their tactical strike campaign against Russian military assets in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations near Sichneve and Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) and a drone control point near Komar (east of Oleksandrivka and approximately five kilometers from the frontline).[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian unit command post near Paraskoviivka (approximately 14 kilometers from the frontline) on May 27, injuring 18 and destroying the facility.[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid and long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near occupied Kalynove (approximately 32 kilometers from the frontline) and Novohrodivka (approximately 22 kilometers from the frontline); material and technical warehouses near Mariupol (approximately 110kilometers from the frontline), Novoselivka Druha (approximately 105kilometers from the frontline), and Buhas (approximately 76 kilometers from the frontline); and an ammunition depot near occupied Hrabove (approximately 72kilometers from the frontline).[55] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) published footage on May 28 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Uragan multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in an unspecified rear area of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[56] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 29 that Ukrainian USF interdicted Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast and struck railway tanks with fuel and lubricants near occupied Makiivka (approximately 48 kilometers from the frontline).[57] Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian fuel tank near occupied Kuteinykove (approximately 98 kilometers from the frontline).[58] Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a Russian fuel tanker along the T-05-07 road near occupied Tretyaky (approximately 67 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian truck along the H-21 road near occupied Zuhres (approximately 60 kilometers from the frontline).[59]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on May 29 but did not advance.[60]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 29 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv).[62]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Tor-M2 air defense system near occupied Berdyansk (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration near an unspecified occupied Novopetrivka (either roughly 105 or 25 kilometers from the frontline).[63] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 29 that Ukrainian drone operators continue striking Russian equipment in the deep rear and blocking the land corridor between occupied Crimea and occupied Donetsk Oblast by striking sections of the highway between occupied Berdyansk, Melitopol, and Dzhankoy.[64]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 29 but did not advance.[65]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 29, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ST-68 radar station in occupied Feodosia, Crimea, overnight.[66] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on May 29 and reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system near occupied Novofedorivka, Crimea.[67]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 28 to May 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile/S-400 air defense missile from Kursk Oblast, and 232 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and Parodiya-type drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 217 drones, that the ballistic missile and 14 drones struck one location, and that debris fell on seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Odesa oblasts.[69]
Russian forces struck three foreign merchant vessels in the Black Sea between May 28 and 29. Ukrainian officials reported on May 28 and 29 that Russian drones, including Shaheds, struck three foreign ships, including a Vanuatu-flagged (Turkish-owned), a Comoros-flagged, and a Panama-flagged ship travelling through the Baltic Sea corridor.[70]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Ukrainian intelligence continues monitoring the possible threat of Russian military action from Belarusian territory. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on May 29 that Ukraine is recording activity near Belarus that may pose a threat to Ukraine or European states in the future, but that Ukrainian intelligence has not observed indications of Belarusian readiness to attack Ukraine in the near term.[71] Beskrestnov added that Ukrainian forces could destroy all Belarusian equipment within a few hours and that Russian forces may aim to draw Ukrainian forces away from other frontline sectors by opening a new front from Belarus or using Belarus as a springboard for launching missiles and drones against Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia may be setting conditions to justify the launch of drone strikes at Ukraine from Belarus, including to strike strategically important GLOCs in the rear of western Ukraine, but that Russian forces remain unlikely to launch any ground attacks from Belarus in the short-term.[72]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://english.mapn dot ro/cpresa/6785_press-release
[2] https://www.rfi dot fr/ro/rom%C3%A2nia/20260529-drona-c%C4%83zut%C4%83-la-gala%C8%9Bi-nicu%C8%99or-dan-i-a-vizitat-la-spital-pe-cei-doi-r%C4%83ni%C8%9Bi-%C3%AEn-urma-incidentului
[3] https://english.mapn dot ro/cpresa/6785_press-release
[4] https://www.mapn dot ro/cpresa/19272_informa%C8%9Bie-de-presa; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-romania-drone-aa90986c237b8fa1d9116685c8c32f95
[5] https://x.com/MVC_Dimamir/status/2060154600720675070
https://t.me/supernova_plus/52427; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52433
[6] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c93x4nxlkjeo
[7] https://x.com/NicusorDanRO/status/2060265206899491142
[8] https://www.digi24 dot ro/stiri/actualitate/oana-toiu-despre-drona-care-a-lovit-un-bloc-din-galati-incidentul-justifica-invocarea-articolului-4-din-nato-3790931
[9] https://www.romaniajournal dot ro/politics/romania-closes-russian-consulate-in-constanta-expels-consul/; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-polytics/4128614-romania-shuts-russian-consulate-in-constanta-declares-consul-persona-non-grata-after-drone-strike.html
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/28/europe/romania-ukraine-russia-drone-intl-hnk; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/29/world/europe/romania-drone-strike-what-to-know.html
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/
[13] https://suspilne dot media/1318261-rumunski-vijskovi-ne-mali-dostatno-casu-dla-perehoplenna-drona-u-galaci-ale-situacia-pid-kontrolem-general-maksim/
[14] https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/145
[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79910
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/
[17] https://lenta dot ru/news/2026/05/29/v-rossii-otvetili-na-obvineniya-rumynii-iz-za-padeniya-drona-na-zhiloy-dom/ ; https://rtvi dot com/news/general-gurulev-otvetil-na-obvineniya-rumynii-v-adres-rf-iz-za-upavshego-drona/
[18] https://www.rbc dot ru/business/28/05/2026/6a1850ad9a79477349237757
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[21] https://wciom dot ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reitingi-prezidenta-pravitelstva-i-politicheskikh-partii-29052026; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/05/29/reyting-putina-prodolzhaet-padat-vtsiom-izmenil-metodiku-oprosov-no-eto-ne-pomoglo
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/
[23] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/05/29/reyting-putina-prodolzhaet-padat-vtsiom-izmenil-metodiku-oprosov-no-eto-ne-pomoglo
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[26] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2060338972296131029
[27] https://t.me/rgn_34/11542
[28] https://t.me/SBUkr/17694; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/29/navodyly-rakety-j-drony-po-ukrayini-sbu-urazyla-czentr-radioelektronnoyi-rozvidky-fsb/
[29] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2417
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235; https://t.me/uvkkursk/398 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93682; https://t.me/wargonzo/34490; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43620; https://t.me/severnnyi/8196
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gbHHEILrDs&t=2884s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/29/navit-ne-flagovtyk-a-rozbudova-virtualnoyi-realnosti-na-sumshhyni-rosiyany-systematychno-vygaduyut-peremogy/
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39278 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20786 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34490 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8196 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93682 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/29769
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/64083 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64087
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20786 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39278 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20786 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34490 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/18707
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39278
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12039; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/800
[41] https://x.com/OSINTRoshen/status/2060161340648374300; https://t.me/vbs_krechet/10
[42] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2060335589036364081; https://t.me/shock3OA/7220
[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060313817276416156; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060313805347856682; https://t.me/BOBR_SEVER/89 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060040097274155034; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060040140995588595; https://t.me/shock3OA/7225
[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060049004117762351; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060049058203381841; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/33458 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060313808468340782; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060313805347856682; https://t.me/BOBR_SEVER/89
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060323995816276180; https://www.instagram.com/fenix__dpsu/reel/DYzKjCgjcwl/ ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037591437598967; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037603718512771; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037607245922526; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037610844614968; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2060303268799193417; https://t.me/seekservice/6690 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037614149705807; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037617312289052; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060037588358926346; https://t.me/ariantobbps39/28
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39278; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235; https://t.me/wargonzo/34490; https://t.me/dva_majors/93682; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115953
[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/64083; https://t.me/mod_russia/64086
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235
[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12041; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1516795219859380
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/64083; https://t.me/mod_russia/64088; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/ ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12031; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2059892364022526242 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52226
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2884
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/3923
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/3923
[56] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2024883211799914 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/29/spalyly-uragan-na-donechchyni-vdaryly-po-rosijskij-arti-ta-logistyczi/
[57] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2416
[58] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060106292119650426; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52400 ; https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/21565 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2060329059268145213?s=20
[59]
https://x.com/moklasen/status/2060094802121609236 ; https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/21565; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2060099470847513065; https://t.me/DonbassYasinovatayanaliniiOgnia/66263
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39278 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14097 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34490 ;
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39278 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14097 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34490 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93682
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39271
[64] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8568
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39238 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14097; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39235
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39237; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2060290269539418558;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2060294861178216721;
https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2060284791132426482;
https://t.me/robert_magyar/2416; https://t.me/andriyshTime/59104;
[67] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060292322219208706;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2060294866488213653;
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2060291765735723058; https://t.me/usf_army/1993; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2416
[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/63176
[69] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29464; https://t.me/synegubov/22338; https://t.me/synegubov/22347; https://t.me/synegubov/22351; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4021; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16398; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1318141-v-izmailskomu-rajoni-dron-rf-zaplutavsa-v-liniah-elektroperedac-pat-sil-bez-svitla/
[70] https://www.facebook.com/navy.mil.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02WTAZ1pHGmm7meB1R9sT3DnfBickebPPAoz89RRtnhBUDSyV8S8xRcwqAApsDYA8Ul ; https://t.me/romanov_92/53488 ; https://t.me/astrapress/114064; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1318157-rf-atakuvala-turecke-sudno-ake-pramuvalo-z-portu-odesini-poraneni-dvoe-cleniv-ekipazu/; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8837 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/29/vorog-czilespryamovano-atakuvav-torgovelni-sudna-v-chornomu-mori-vynykla-pozhezha/; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/536; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/29/keruvalysya-cherez-telemetriyu-v-realnomu-chasi-u-vms-rozkryly-detali-nichnoyi-ataky-voroga-na-mori/
[71] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7441 ; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid0bXAEzcvjNiyiLpio9J4m7Uo4qEZrg6kzaRvymDTGWzgwgM8sgrD2vyCrNVrrpphAl
[72] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/
