Toplines
Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest long-range drone strike thus far in the war, striking one of Russia’s largest gas complexes nearly 3,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian General Staff and Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on September 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novy Urengoy Gas Condensate Treatment Plant and the Purovsky Gas Processing Plant in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (roughly 2,840 and 2,780 kilometers from the Ukrainian border respectively) — Ukraine’s farthest strikes thus far in the war.[1] The SSO noted that the Novy Urengoy Gas Condensate Treatment Plant’s annual capacity is 19.5 million tons, and the Purovsky Gas Processing Plant’s annual capacity is 13.4 million tons. Russia has long sought to establish and control the Northern Sea Route to cement Russia’s position in the Arctic Sea and use it as an alternative shipping route amidst Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian port infrastructure in the Black and Baltic seas.[2] The strike against targets in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure throughout all of European Russia and from the Norwegian border to beyond the Urals, exploiting Russia’s lack of air defenses to cover its vast territory.
United Russia Party Chairperson and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev formally articulated United Russia’s commitment to supporting a protracted war in Ukraine and solidified the party’s pro-war stance as part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Medvedev emphasized in a September 10 interview to Russian newspaper Vedomosti Russia’s commitment to the war in Ukraine, to the long-term militarization of Russian society, and to demands for increased economic sacrifices by Russian society.[3] Medvedev outlined the need for Russian society to remain on a permanent war footing even after the war in Ukraine ends. Medvedev indicated that the post-war Russian defense industry should reorient toward stockpiling weapons to repel the supposedly existential threat to Russia posed by NATO and US allies in the Pacific. Medvedev attempted to justify increased tax burdens and obfuscated the Kremlin’s condition setting efforts for the nationalization of private enterprises by claiming that current challenges justify state intervention in the economy. Medvedev also denied that Russia will conduct a mobilization, despite growing indications that the Kremlin is setting conditions for mobilization following the September State Duma elections.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin described the United Russia Party as the war party tasked with executing Putin’s ideological aims on August 22.[5] Medvedev is using his position as the United Russia Chairperson to reaffirm the United Russia Party’s pro-war platform and to position the party as the leader of a pro-war and ultranationalist informal Russian state ideology. The Kremlin has continuously worked to militarize Russian society through youth militarization, militarized education, and Russia’s Time of Heroes program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions throughout Russia and in occupied Ukraine.[6] United Russia’s posturing as the sole executor of Putin’s policies defending Russia against a supposedly hostile global encirclement is similar to one of the roles in which the Communist Party cast itself in the Soviet Union. This posturing supports the Kremlin’s efforts to centralize power, silence dissent, and set conditions to demand greater social sacrifices from the Russian public to support war in Ukraine and beyond.[7]
A Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane was preparing for takeoff at the Chisinau Airport, Moldova on September 9. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store stated on September 9 that a drone “nearly struck” Zelensky’s plane as it prepared to depart the Chisinau Airport, Moldova.[8] A Moldovan government spokesperson stated that Moldovan authorities closed the country’s airspace due to a drone threat, delaying Zelensky’s takeoff.[9] Moldovan authorities allowed Zelensky’s plane to take off after confirming that the drone had crashed roughly 160 kilometers from the airport.[10] The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 10 that Moldovan authorities later identified the downed drone as a Russian Shahed-type strike drone.[11] A source within Zelensky’s administration told Agence France Pressure (AFP) on September 10 that Store “exaggerated” the drone risk.[12]
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 10 that Polish and Ukrainian security services prevented an unspecified direct threat against a Polish-Ukrainian border crossing overnight.[13] Tusk noted that Poland expects further Russian provocations at Polish border crossings with Ukraine. Tusk added that Poland and Europe must prepare for “various scenarios” on Europe’s eastern flank.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest long-range drone strike thus far in the war, striking one of Russia’s largest gas complexes nearly 3,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
- United Russia Party Chairperson and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev formally articulated United Russia’s commitment to supporting a protracted war in Ukraine and solidified the party’s pro-war stance as part of Russia’s informal state ideology.
- A Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane was preparing for takeoff at the Chisinau Airport, Moldova on September 9.
- Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 10 that Polish and Ukrainian security services prevented an unspecified direct threat against a Polish-Ukrainian border crossing overnight.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russian ports along the Black and Caspian Sea coasts on the night of September 9 to 10. Russia launched 149 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 10.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian ports along the Black and Caspian Sea coasts on the night of September 9 to 10. An explosion caused a series of fires at the Port of Sochi, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 310 kilometers from the frontline), following reported Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) strikes against the port based on geolocated footage published on September 9.[14] Russian and local authorities acknowledged on September 10 that Ukrainian USVs struck Sochi, causing a fire at the city’s embankment.[15] The nautical distance between Sochi and the Ukraine-controlled Black Sea coast is approximately 820 kilometers.
Ukrainian officials reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the Makhachkala Sea Trade Port in the Dagestan Republic (roughly 810 kilometers from the international border), which is the only Russian deep, warm-water port on the Caspian Sea coast and an important transport and logistics hub.[16] A fire broke out at the port following the Ukrainian strike according to geolocated footage published on September 10.[17] Acting Dagestan Republic Head Fyodor Shchukin acknowledged on September 10 that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the port.[18]
Open sources provided updated battle damage assessments of recent Ukrainian strikes against Krasnodar Krai and Leningrad Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on September 10 that Ukraine’s September 9 strike against a naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 343 kilometers from the frontline), damaged the Project 11711 Petr Morgunov landing ship, the Zheleznyakov naval minesweeper, and the Project 11356 Admiral Essen frigate.[19] Satellite imagery captured on September 10 shows additional damage to the Project 11356R Admiral Makarov frigate and a Project 21631 Buryan-M corvette that reportedly recently launched a cruise missile strike against Kyiv City.[20] Satellite imagery captured on September 10 indicates that Ukraine’s August 30 strike against the Kirishi Oil Refinery, Leningrad Oblast (roughly 790 kilometers from the international border), damaged ELOU-AT-1 and ELOU-AT-6 primary oil processing units, LCh/24/9 and LCh/24/10 diesel hydrotreating units, and an LG-35/8-300B catalytic reforming unit, reportedly decommissioning 12 million tons (or roughly 60 percent) of the refinery’s processing capacity.[21]
Ukraine continued to intensify its strike campaign against Russia and occupied Ukraine to degrade Russia’s air defense, logistics, and strike capabilities in August 2026. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck 17 pieces of Russian air defense equipment, six bridges, more than 20 material and technical warehouses, and more than 30 drone control, storage, and launch points in Russia and occupied Ukraine in August 2026.[22]
Russian online retailers are primarily storing goods in independent warehouses due to Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign against online marketplace logistics facilities. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on September 10 that the share of Wildberries retailers using their own independent warehouses to store and ship goods nearly doubled to 97.4 percent since July 2026, and increased from 63.3 percent to 73.1 percent for Ozon retailers.[23] Kommersant noted that the proportion of retailers storing their products at marketplace warehouses conversely decreased to 62.8 percent from 94.9 percent at Wildberries and from 73.1 percent to 66.6 percent at Ozon since July 2026. Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries and Ozon logistics and storage facilities in late July and August 2026 have significantly degraded Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and dual-use logistics network while imposing costs on Russian retailers and businesses who face lost and damaged goods.[24]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 9 to 10 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka and Mohrytsia (both northeast of Sumy City).[26]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian radar stations near Pavlin (in an unknown area of Bryansk Oblast) and Kartushin (roughly 22 kilometers from the international border); a Nebo-SV radar near Antonovka (one of two settlements between roughly 72 and 110 kilometers from the international border); and a ground repeater designed to control Geran and Gerbera drones near Trubchevsk (roughly 21 kilometers from the international border).[27]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 9 and 10 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City).[29]
Russian officials and milbloggers continue to baselessly claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, contrary to all available evidence.[30] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces have encircled a large number of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have not encircled any Ukrainian forces in the area, given the lack of evidence of an encirclement.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on September 9 and 10 but did not make confirmed advances.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Zarubynka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 9 and 10 but did not advance.[34]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Borova on September 10, but ISW did not observe evidence of Russian advances.[35]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near Dovzhansk (roughly 215 kilometers from the frontline).[36] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the Luhansk Thermal Power Plant in occupied Shchastya (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline); the 330 kV Mykhailivska electrical substation in occupied Sokolohirsk (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline); the 220 kV Kirovska-220 electrical substation in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline); and unspecified electrical substations in occupied Luhansk City, occupied Butove (roughly 70 kilometers from the front line), and occupied Krasnyi Kut (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline) during the first week of September 2026.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on September 9 and 10 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks around Lyman.[38] Ukrainian forces hold positions south of Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 10.[39]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets provided a limited acknowledgement of Ukrainian counterattacks northeast of Lyman. Mashovets reported on September 9 that Ukrainian forces carried out offensive operations between Stavky and Myrne (north and northeast of Lyman, respectively) until at least September 5 but did not provide further information regarding Ukrainian operations north of Lyman.[40]
Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman. Russian milbloggers continue claiming on September 10 that the situation in the Lyman direction remains difficult for Russian forces as they reported that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks near Lyman, Drobysheve, Shandryholove, (both northwest of Lyman), Ridkodub, and Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman).[41] One milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the Ridkodub-Katerynivka sector and are infiltrating toward Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) which threatens the salient near Shandryholove.[42] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces hold positions in southern Lyman and Maslyakivka (directly east of Lyman), however.
Russian forces will likely prioritize efforts to attack Slovyansk from the east, as Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman will likely prevent Russian forces from reaching Slovyansk from the northeast. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 9 that Russian forces will attempt to seize Slovyansk from the east in the coming months as Russian forces pursue their primary operational objective of seizing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[43] Trehubov added that Russian forces will prioritize advancing in Donetsk Oblast over Kharkiv Oblast and noted that Russian forces will only conduct large-scale offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast if Russian President Vladimir Putin announces mobilization. Russian forces have been prioritizing attacks on the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and east of Slovyansk to create more favorable conditions for an offensive against Slovyansk in their Summer 2026 offensive that bypasses difficult terrain and tough Ukrainian defenses to the northeast.[44]
Russian forces are increasing aerial strikes in the Slovyansk direction, likely in preparation for future offensive operations against the city. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on September 10 that Russian forces have decreased ground attacks but increased aerial strikes using glide bombs, drones, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) in an attempt to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and terrorize the civilian population in the Slovyansk direction.[45] Russian forces have been increasingly relying on glide bomb strikes against Fortress Belt cities in part to create ruins that Russian infiltrators can use for cover and concealment during future offensive operations.[46]
Ukrainian forces reportedly cleared all Russian infiltrations from Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk). Mykolaivka City Military Administration Head Volodymyr Proskunin reported on September 9 that Ukrainian forces eliminated Russian infiltrators from Mykolaivka and Yurkivka (south of Mykolaivka) and noted that there are currently no Russian units in Mykolaivka.[47] Proskunin noted that Russian servicemembers were dressed in civilian clothing to attempt to infiltrate through Ukrainian defenses — an act of perfidy and a war crime under the Geneva Convention. Russian forces likely view Mykolaivka as a primary tactical objective because its potential seizure would facilitate Russian assaults westward towards Slovyansk, bypassing difficult canalizing terrain features like the Siverskyi Donets River that flows north and northeast of Slovyansk.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 9 and 10 but did not advance.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have gained fire control over the outskirts of Druzhkivka.[50]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces likely conducted an infiltration mission west of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya), based on geolocated footage published on September 8 that shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in the area.[51]
Ukrainian drone operations are impeding Russian offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 10 that Ukrainian drone operations are significantly slowing down the rate of Russian advance in the Dobropillya direction.[52] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces managed to infiltrate Dobropillya and continue attacking from the directions of Hannivka (just north of Dobropillya), Chernihivka (just southeast of Dobropillya), and Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), but that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking from the south of Dobropillya.
The high density of Ukrainian drones is preventing Russian forces from deploying high-value equipment into assaults in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 9 that Russian forces maintain a high intensity of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction but refrain from deploying high-value equipment due to the high number of Ukrainian drones in the sky.[53] The spokesperson added that the high drone density forces both Russian and Ukrainian artillery to constantly move and employ camouflage to conceal firing positions and prevent counter-battery fire.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Novopavlivka direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northwest of Bilyakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 9.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 9 and 10 but did not advance.[55] Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northwestern Perebudova (east of Oleksandrivka) in areas where Russian forces had previously infiltrated according to geolocated footage published on September 9.[56]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian preparation and launch site for Geran and Gerbera-type drones near Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline); Russian drone command posts near Yasnohorivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline), Komyshuvate (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline), and Ocheretyne (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline); and Russian command posts near Zaitsevo (one of two settlements between 17 and 25 kilometers from the frontline) and Luhanske (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline.[57] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck 10 electrical substations in occupied Donetsk Oblast during the first week of September 2026.[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 10 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 9 and 10 but did not advance. Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated based on geolocated footage published on September 9.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Orikhiv.[61]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone command posts in Osypenko (approximately 91 kilometers from the frontline) and Tokmak (approximately 27 kilometers from the frontline) on September 9 and on the night of September 9 to 10.[62] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck two electrical substations in Mala Bilozerka (approximately 34 kilometers from the frontline) and Rozivka (approximately 65 kilometers from the frontline) during the first week of September 2026.[63]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 10.
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Russian forces dropped a grenade on a civilian in Kherson City according to geolocated footage published on September 9.[64] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike mainly civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear, especially in Kherson City, is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[65]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast. Brovdi reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the Henicheska electrical substation in occupied Henichesk (roughly 118 kilometers from the frontline) twice, the Morska electrical substation near occupied Skadovsk (roughly 61 kilometers from the frontline), and the Pershokostyantynivka electrical substation in an unspecified part of occupied Kherson Oblast during the first week of September 2026.[66]
Ukrainian forces conducted 10 strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea during the first week of September 2026. Brovdi reported on September 10 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure facilities in Nyzhnohirskyi (approximately 180 kilometers from the frontline), Natashyne (approximately 143 kilometers from the frontline), Yevpatoriia (approximately 166 kilometers from the frontline), Veresaieve (approximately 162 kilometers from the frontline), Dibrivske (approximately 165 kilometers from the frontline), Chervone (approximately 186 kilometers from the frontline), Uporne (approximately 126 kilometers from the frontline), Kolosky (either 121 or 158 kilometers from the frontline), Maiske (approximately 159 kilometers from the frontline), and Nyzhnohirsk in the first week of September 2026.[67]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[68]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 149 Shahed-type (half of which were jet-powered), Gerbera, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 128 drones; that an unspecified number of drones struck 13 locations; and that debris fell at 9 locations.[70] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, communications, transport, fuel, and port infrastructure in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts.[71] Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian double-tap drone strike injured five first responders in Khmelnytskyi City.[72]
Russian forces continued strikes against Ukrainian civilian shopping centers and food warehouses overnight on September 9 and 10. Russian forces struck shopping malls in Sumy City and Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and commercial sites in Mykolaiv and Dnipro cities overnight and into the day when businesses were open.[73] Russian strike packages since late Summer 2026 have been increasingly targeting shopping centers, food warehouses, and other private civilian facilities.[74] Russia’s continued use of these tactics likely aims to increase civilian damage and force Ukrainians to seek shelter more often, resulting in significant disruptions in daily life and the Ukrainian economy, likely to demoralize Ukraine’s population.[75]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) provided details of Russia’s new RM-48U surface-to-air interceptor missile repurposed for ground attack. The GUR stated that the RM-48U is made of modernized components from the S-400 and S-300 air defense missile systems and electronic components from foreign manufacturers.[76] The RM-48U has a speed of between Mach four and Mach six and an operational range of up to 400 kilometers when equipped with a 199 Kilogram warhead. Operators can control the missile via satellite or radio guidance, and Russia has created special units to strike ground targets with the surface-to-air missile.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1]https://t.me/ukr_sof/3365 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42181
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-12/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-11/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/ ;
[3] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/characters/2026/09/10/1227677-dmitrii-medvedev-ili-velikaya-derzhava-ili-nikakaya
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80570
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-12/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-12-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[8] https://www.nrk dot no/artikkel/zelenskyjs-fly-ble-forsinket-av-dronetrussel-1527509
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiys-plane-almost-hit-by-drone-tuesday-norway-pm-says-2026-09-09/
[10] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c86x49e379vo
[11] https://suspilne dot media/1400454-dron-cerez-akij-u-moldovi-zatrimali-litak-zelenskogo-viznacili-ak-shahed/
[12] https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/international/article/2026/09/09/norway-pm-says-zelensky-s-plane-almost-hit-by-drone-en-route-to-oslo_6757358_4.html
[13] https://www.teraz dot sk/zahranicie/tusk-polske-a-ukrajinske-tajne-slu/991405-clanok.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-says-it-expects-russia-will-target-its-border-crossings-with-ukraine-2026-09-10/
[14] https://x.com/LayBay_ish/status/2097765462545183056?s=20; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30600; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/33058
[15] https://t.me/opershtab23/17170 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394711 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394712 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394713 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394714
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42187 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2437 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2097941102393229485 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2097941105677393970 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20795 ;
[17] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2098015163366490406 ; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2097952077850804275
[18] https://t.me/Glava_RD/488
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42187 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/33079 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/
[20] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30675 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30668
[21] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/73
[22] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/urazheno-17-odynyts-ppo-ta-30-punktiv-upravlinnia-pidsumky-middle-strike-u-serpni
[23] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8940323?from=top_main_4
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184; https://t.me/wargonzo/36827;
[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/98786; https://t.me/severnnyi/9279;
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42188
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9279 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47411
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/67193
[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/394726 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/394731 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9279
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/67194
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19720 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36827 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47448
[35] https://t.me/grvZapad/19720
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42188
[37] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2805
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36827 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19720
[39] https://x.com/meowqai/status/209782hold 10.6352418496518; https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/590
[40] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02GeH3ZuL3yHavHoeUgdWMZqKfVVaakhUSJTTSb6FGYsaJeoK4marLzAhRqaEBES5Dl
[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/36827 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/98786
[43] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1399702-masstabnih-atak-okupantiv-na-harkivsini-ne-ocikuut-ale-harakter-bojovih-dij-moze-zminitisa-komentari-vijskovih/
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/10/shturmiv-menshe-udariv-z-povitrya-%e2%80%94-bilshe-rosiyany-zminyly-taktyku-pid-slov%e2%80%99yanskom/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[47] https://www.youtube.com/live/6mgkTjcdl9I; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1399574-perevdaglisa-u-civilnij-odag-ta-pronikli-u-mikolaivku-na-doneccini-ocilnik-mva-pro-rosian-u-misti/
[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36827 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/29009
[50] https://t.me/epoddubny/29009
[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12920; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DdA0fEgMDTl
[52] https://t.me/arx_spn/31015
[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/10/cze-shozhe-na-zhertvoprynoshennya-shho-vidbuvayetsya-z-rosijskoyu-pihotoyu-poblyzu-pokrovska/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1399622-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-intensivnist-sturmiv-protivnika-dosit-velika-komunikacijnik-155-ombr/; https://youtu.be/EcKcqJSvzDM?t=2844
[54] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2097792373166383282; https://t.me/armyUA59/364
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184
[56] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2097805431112442157; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12921; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/38290
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42188
[58] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2805
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42182; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42184; https://t.me/mod_russia/67189; https://t.me/dva_majors/98786
[60] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2097752957785624726; https://t.me/gv71msp/597
[61] https://t.me/divgen/83816
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42188
[63] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2805
[64] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2097682581407899669; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/37726
[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[66] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2805
[67] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2805
[68] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/77565
[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/77565
[71] https://www.facebook.com/chernigiv.dei/posts/pfbid02k1KR3qVqCRBjnrmHaNK7SqrmreqSmwEg5ExFo48MwFAGRNCgu9zUj3ceqmmHWW4ql?cft[0]=AZj5qpcDWJISMg1xfUvBSZnoOafyCCGSM_AE62RuSLdLqfUnYqSjVRa1ShrdqsVy0ycWxSCdTrdUsgFmkhUit_2WBvPk_BkA2X4Tiu0WEHsyRIOY8DWPfnqG7EIhUbv-ASg513ZKwQo_nxGNU5eSyfzew0wqLqDA&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1399856-u-seli-dobranskoi-gromadi-na-cernigivsini-gori; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31697; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/22559 ; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1399002-na-cerkasini-znisili-tri-bpla-so-vidomo-pro-dronovu-ataku; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31922; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31949; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31948;https://t.me/synegubov/25584; ; damaging the house and injuring one. https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30539 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1399786-kharkiv-slobidskyi-raion-udar-dron/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1399800-derhachi-udar-drona-avto-poraneni-9-veresnya/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1400090-na-izumsini-rosiani-urazili-pidstanciu-cerez-so-skasuvali-elektricki-tokar/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74252; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/10/vorog-atakuvav-rynok-u-hmelnyczkomu-vnaslidok-povtornoyi-detonacziyi-postrazhdaly-chetvero-ryatuvalnykiv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1399684-cotiroh-ratuvalnikiv-i-odnogo-policejskogo-travmovano-unaslidok-rosijskoi-ataki-na-hmelnickij-9-veresna/ ; https://www.facebook.com/policia.Khmelnytskoi.oblasti/posts/pfbid02FuuP3GVVmHANKqQdZ7veQkCZfBW3DSeS5ZmZFEy3RGkrnLDJB4BJboTR3LTgSrWql?cft[0]=AZgUvbxSX2ypFoBCoXYYfTsY97cr7R5x2fEmHFVyEnUzUulIqaGyASjcC5AV9WtJurge19sLUlJmnyPmFebYUP9AhE-PqUy2Kn6QDHVUwa6hxtzz2NOYfTHwnw-bfWAZ_wi8QK4_71h4BKa27hbDnZKEKDwnQ32t&tn=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74252; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/10/vorog-atakuvav-rynok-u-hmelnyczkomu-vnaslidok-povtornoyi-detonacziyi-postrazhdaly-chetvero-ryatuvalnykiv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/khmelnytskiy/1399684-cotiroh-ratuvalnikiv-i-odnogo-policejskogo-travmovano-unaslidok-rosijskoi-ataki-na-hmelnickij-9-veresna/ ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02sDV3F61ymBhEvJ5oqhiX4vncZrkNEteKQixAt6STFPjrtzzvugufEsFdmrd12Kvvl?cft[0]=AZjZL7Z9EAwfGcjG8YpE36xzwGdWkKUkoncIMZhw5QsZomKd86zv6wuCOlrEqsqWfjq2CVlHL8I-abQcj2SxfzohguRNOmHfEMNXonpJroy-iPe72bfAK6OB9Bcr9LKloQN6wpsxI9f5BMzknrRfIrtCj21MjvPr&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1399756-mikolaiv-pid-masovanoi-atakou-zaginuli-4-ludej-poraneni-19/; https://t.me/volynskaODA/10907 ; https://t.me/dsns_sumy/28656 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1399898-armia-rf-atakuvala-sostkinsku-gromadu-z-aviacii-zaginuv-colovik/ ; https://www.facebook.com/noha.mykola.petrovych/posts/pfbid02tnM4JUKNKwNTA6QMPZfsSfNxTYE2ZpkLPfzezPdb5SUJBdsf7EeEsgcw2DL18gVnl?cft[0]=AZjLT0MxZBQSPUWNqwjjuYvipCa0lj8LbLROkpBKw8qQCc94f-oiFOXHGN0K3J3ix-WgAImpy369GjwcAz0hE-zn6CAhyiS1tuylcKghmp0Fu6TpW06JpXYC0UIP46ep16tJ6_8Ie4coc2UZO94apCU7rWTDHWT0kkG49sX9foBF7eTln5eIZaSC&tn=%2CO%2CP-R
[72] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74252
[73] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2097753125767520401 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2097753129353895937 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20783; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74324 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1400024-rosijska-armia-atakuvala-dnipro-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-podii/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/74298; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31927; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31926
[74] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[75] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[76] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9432 ; https://united24media dot com/defense-tech/russia-builds-ballistic-frankenstein-from-s-400-missiles-and-packs-it-with-us-tech-22435
