Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Updates December 2025 – February 2026

To see other Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Toplines and Key Takeaways, please click here.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2026

Toplines

Russian officials largely condemned the February 28 US and Israeli strikes against Iran, consistent with Russian rhetoric around the June 2025 Israel-Iran war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi following the strikes on Iran on February 28 in which Lavrov condemned the strikes, calling for the United States and Israel to immediately cease all hostilities and resume efforts for a diplomatic solution to resolve the issues among the United States, Iran, and Israel.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a similar condemnation on February 28, calling the strikes unprovoked and a violation of international law.[2] The MFA criticized the United States and Israel for conducting the strikes after recently pursuing efforts to negotiate with Iran and claimed that the strikes violate international law and risk regional and global destabilization. The MFA criticized Israel for allegedly posturing to Russia that Israel had no interest in armed aggression against Iran prior to the strikes. The MFA called for a return to diplomacy and expressed Russia’s willingness to help facilitate renewed talks. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly criticized US President Donald Trump for striking Iran, claiming on his English and Russian language social media channels that the “peacekeeper” has “shown his true colors.”[3] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky and International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa, whose target audience is the Russian population and who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s true diplomatic and military aims, similarly criticized US aims in striking Iran and called for both the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the broader international community to intervene in situation to stop the strikes.[4] Chepa expressed hope that the United States will become preoccupied with the conflict in Iran and “forget” about Ukraine and assessed that the new conflict will likely delay a peace deal in Ukraine.[5]

Russia’s boilerplate condemnations of the strikes against Iran highlight the continued limits of Russia’s ability to support Iran and the asymmetry of the Russian-Iranian relationship. Russia issued similar condemnations of the June 2025 war and was unable to provide Iran with more support in defending against Israeli and later US strikes.[6] Russia’s war in Ukraine is constraining Russia’s ability to provide military support to Iran, also highlighting how Russia has become less reliant on Iran for its war effort in Ukraine over time as Russia has indigenized the production of much of what it previously imported from Iran and has subsequently become much more reliant on North Korea.[7] The Kremlin has to balance competing interests of sustaining its relationship with its allies, including Iran, while also attempting to reset the US-Russia relationship on Russia’s terms, including avoiding additional US sanctions.[8]

Ukrainian authorities implicated soldiers and the commander of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) for using chemical agents in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast from September 2024 to June 2025 in violation of international law. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on February 27 that 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade Commander Colonel Ruslan Nazarenko gave orders to fire K-51 and RG-Vo aerosol grenades containing CS gas (chlorobenzalmalononitrile) and CN gas (Chloroacetophenone) on Ukrainian positions using drone drops at least 14 times from September 2024 to June 2025.[9] The SBU also identified eight Russian soldiers in the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade who used the munitions. CS and CN gases are classified as riot control agents (RCA), the usage of which violates the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory.[10] ISW observed reports that Russian forces significantly increased their usage of RCAs against Ukrainian forces throughout 2024 and 2025 in violation of the CWC.[11]

Key Takeaways

Russian officials largely condemned the February 28 US and Israeli strikes against Iran, consistent with Russian rhetoric around the June 2025 Israel-Iran war.
Russia’s boilerplate condemnations of the strikes against Iran highlight the continued limits of Russia’s ability to support Iran and the asymmetry of the Russian-Iranian relationship.
Ukrainian authorities implicated soldiers and the commander of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) for using chemical agents in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast from September 2024 to June 2025 in violation of international law.
Ukrainian and Russian forces both recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 28 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27, 2026

Toplines

Russian forces have likely begun artillery and drone preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces shelled Bilenke (roughly 14 kilometers from the frontline and immediately northeast of Kramatorsk, the northern tip of the Fortress Belt — a series of fortified cities that have constituted the backbone of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast since 2014) on February 26 and 27 — the first time that Russian forces have hit Kramatorsk or its suburbs with tube artillery.[1] The artillery strikes against Bilenke likely mark the beginning of Russian artillery preparation ahead of the expected Spring-Summer 2026 Russian offensive. Russian forces will likely begin the ground assault phase of this offensive in the near-term following the artillery preparation phase. Russian forces have also been conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the southern tip of the Fortress Belt. BAI is the use of air power to strike targets in the frontline’s operational rear (roughly 20 to 100 kilometers from the line of contact) to impact tactical battlefield operations, and Russia has largely been waging its BAI campaign with drone strikes.[2] Geolocated footage published on February 26 shows Russian drone strikes against a civilian cyclist on the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway northwest of Kostyantynivka and against Ukrainian forces in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, both at the south of the Fortress Belt.[3] The H-20 highway is the main ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting the cities of the Fortress Belt. Russian forces have been using monthslong BAI campaigns as part of a broader campaign design aimed at degrading Ukrainian defensive capabilities and frontline positions ahead of Russian ground offensives.[4] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 26 that the Russian military command is deploying reinforcements to the Slovyansk direction, another indicator that Russia plans to prioritize offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in the near-term.[5] A Russian ground offensive to seize the Fortress Belt will likely be a multi-year operational effort that would cost the Russian military command significant time, manpower, and resources.[6] Russian forces have so far been unable or unwilling to concentrate the resources required for a decisive offensive operation, particularly against the Fortress Belt.[7]

Russia is reportedly expanding recruitment efforts in higher educational institutions to staff the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). The BBC Russian Service reported on February 27 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has expanded its recruitment efforts to at least 95 educational institutions across Russia and pressured students to sign contracts with the MoD during face-to-face meetings at 90 of these institutions.[8] The BBC Russian Service noted that the 95 educational institutions do not include institutions where the Russian MoD is conducting “indirect recruitment,” such as opening unmanned systems centers at Russian universities. The BBC Russian Service noted that Russian universities are publicizing successful recruitment efforts, likely to entice more students to sign contracts with the MoD. Germany-based Russian opposition outlet Echo reported February 26 that the Russian MoD is recruiting students from at least 57 universities and 13 colleges and technical colleges in 24 federal subjects, including occupied Crimea and has expanded its recruitment campaign to include all students, not just those underperforming academically. Echo noted that the Russian MoD is promising to students that they will only serve in USF units (a preferable military occupation that faces lower risk to life and limb than infantry) but that at least some of the contracts contain language that would allow the MoD to send the recruits to any Russian military unit, not just a USF unit.[9] Echo reported that the Russian MoD is utilizing a ”carrot and stick” tactic by offering benefits including large salaries, a guaranteed single year of service, education grants, and student debt forgiveness, and also by coercing and threatening students into signing contracts. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 26 that the Nikolai Lunin Novosibirsk College of Transport Technologies organized a three-day screening of propaganda films about Russians who allegedly “betrayed” Russia because the students had refused to volunteer for military service.[10] The Russian MoD began recruitment efforts targeting underperforming Russian students in December 2025 and began expanding this effort in January 2026.[11] The Russian MoD may staff the conventional Russian military with student recruits. Russian forces are increasingly struggling to hit recruitment targets, with Russia’s casualty rate outpacing the recruitment rate in January 2026, for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion.[12]

The Kremlin is continuing to crack down on pro-war information space figures that it cannot fully co-opt or subordinate to state control as part of wider efforts to consolidate the information space under the Kremlin’s control. Russian law enforcement agencies announced on February 27 that Russian authorities detained Russian news outlet Readovka founder and former editor-in-chief Alexey Kostylev under suspicion of “large-scale fraud.”[13] A spokesperson for the investigation told TASS that Russian authorities suspect Kostylev of embezzling approximately one billion rubles (about $13 million) from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during execution of government contracts.[14] Russian opposition media outlets reported that Readovka previously was a far-right media outlet that did not have close ties to the Russian government until the outbreak of the war in 2022, at which point the outlet began supporting the war.[15] Russian opposition media outlet Astra amplified reports that Russian forces cut funding for Readovka in March of 2025 and that Andrey Tkachenko, who reportedly has ties with the Kremlin, took over the outlet in March 2025.[16] ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin has a long-running campaign to both co-opt and coerce Russian milbloggers in order to eliminate criticism of the Kremlin and consolidate control over the Russian information space.[17] ISW has not collected evidence that the Kremlin succeeded in co-opting Kostylev, as it did with other prominent milbloggers or Telegram administrators.[18] Russian authorities’ detainment of Kostylev is set against the background of other Kremlin crackdowns against the information space such as the throttling of Telegram.[19] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is considering enacting domestically unpopular measures such as rolling involuntary reserve callups, and the Kremlin is likely setting conditions to repress backlash, especially from the highly influential pro-war sphere.[20]

A Russian drone approached the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the Swedish port of Malmo on February 25. The Swedish Armed Forces reported on February 27 that the Russian signals intelligence (SIGINT) ship Zhigulevsk launched a drone illegally while in Swedish territorial waters in the Oresund Strait during the visit of the Charles de Gaulle to Malmo.[21] The Swedish Armed Forces added that a nearby Swedish patrol vessel observed the drone launch and conducted countermeasures to disrupt the drone, after which the Swedish vessel lost contact with the drone.[22] Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson told Swedish outlet SVT on February 26 that the Russian drone approached the Charles de Gaulle while it was docked in Malmo, Sweden on February 25, likely violating Swedish airspace.[23] French General Staff Spokesperson Colonel Guillaume Vernet told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on February 26 that a Swedish system jammed the drone about seven nautical miles (roughly 13 kilometers) from the Charles de Gaulle.[24] Unidentified drones previously overflew a French nuclear submarine base in December 2025.[25] Such drone sightings are part of a pattern of aerial incursions into NATO airspace, possibly with the purpose of reconnoitering known European military bases, equipment, and defense infrastructure.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian and suspected Russian airspace violations are likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that aims to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[27]

Russian forces likely used white phosphorus in Kostyantynivka and may have indiscriminately affected civilian areas in violation of international law. Geolocated footage published on February 27 shows a Russian strike with what appears to be white phosphorus munitions against southwestern Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast.[28] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces used white phosphorus in the strike and immediately after struck the area with a FAB-1500 guided glide bomb.[29] While ISW cannot assess whether the impacted area contained civilians, civilians still remain in Kostyantynivka. The Ukrainian brigade reported that roughly 2,000 civilians remain in Kostyantynivka. Protocol III of the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits the use of incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorus, against civilian targets or in areas with concentrations of civilians.[30] Russian forces notably have used white phosphorous and incendiary munitions allegedly in violation of international law in Ukraine before.[31]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces have likely begun artillery and drone preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
Russia is reportedly expanding recruitment efforts in higher educational institutions to staff the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).
The Kremlin is continuing to crack down on pro-war information space figures that it cannot fully co-opt or subordinate to state control as part of wider efforts to consolidate the information space under the Kremlin’s control.
Russian drone approached the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the Swedish port of Malmo on February 25.
Russian forces likely used white phosphorus in Kostyantynivka and may have indiscriminately affected civilian areas in violation of international law.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 27 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2026

Toplines

Russia launched another massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of February 25 to 26, primarily targeting energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 420 drones and 39 missiles against Ukraine overnight – the fourth Russian strike of over 400 projectiles in February 2026.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles; 24 Kh-101 cruise missiles; two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles; two Kh-69 cruise missiles; and 420 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 280 were Shaheds. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 374 drones and 32 missiles, that five missiles and 46 drones struck 32 locations, and that downed debris fell on 15 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck gas infrastructure in Poltava Oblast, electrical substations in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and caused additional damage in Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, and Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv City.[2] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian overnight strikes targeted a large substation of DTEK subsidiary Odesa Electric Networks, significantly damaging the substation.[3] DTEK noted that Russian strikes have inflicted ”colossal destruction” on 45 percent of DTEK Odesa’s large substations. Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Energy Artem Nekrasov reported that Russian overnight strikes left consumers in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts without electricity.[4]

The appearance of ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missiles in the February 25-26 strike package is reflective of a wider pattern in Russia’s strike campaign. Russia has launched strike packages with 25 or more missiles five additional times in February 2026, most recently on February 22. Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significantly higher quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series to maximize damage by launching several missiles alongside a large quantity of drones to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses.[5] Russian forces have also modified their drones and missiles to inflict more damage, including by equipping Shahed drones with mines and cluster munitions, and such measures have disproportionately affected civilian and energy infrastructure.[6] Russia also launches these larger strike packages to coincide with the days before and after bilateral and trilateral peace negotiations.[7] Russia notably launched this most recent strike package on the eve of bilateral US-Ukrainian talks on February 26 in Geneva. Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other lower-end forms of air defense, for a holistic, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[8]

The US and Ukraine continue bilateral engagements as part of ongoing peace negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump spoke by phone on February 25 to discuss ongoing negotiations and preparation for upcoming bilateral and trilateral talks.[9] US and Ukrainian delegations also met in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 26, led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, respectively.[10] Umerov stated ahead of the talks that parties planned to discuss the proposed prosperity package for Ukraine, mechanisms for economic support and recovery, investment tools, and preparations for the next round of trilateral talks, which will reportedly take place in early March 2026.[11]

Ukraine’s and SpaceX’s efforts to shut off Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals continues to disrupt Russian drone operations across the frontline. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky told the Independent on February 26 that Starlink outages have cut the effectiveness of Russia’s drone campaign by roughly 20 to 40 percent in the last two weeks.[12] The Independent noted that Ukrainian forces in the 3rd Army Corps’ area of responsibility (AoR), which is roughly 12 percent of the 1,300-kilometer-long frontline, have retaken territory near Pokrovsk, north of Lyman, and near Hulyaipole since the Starlink block on February 1.[13] Biletsky stated that Russian forces will likely partially regain communication capabilities within a month or two through other means, such as satellite communication, but that Russian forces will not likely be able to fully restore the level of efficiency they had with Starlink for the next three to five years. Russian forces had been using Starlink terminals both for frontline communication and to extend drone ranges to strike further into the Ukrainian rear and generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects.[14] ISW has observed evidence over the last several weeks that the Starlink block has prevented Russian forces from conducting tactical and mid-range strikes and ground operations at the same tempo and depth as they had been in prior weeks.[15] Ukrainian forces have also exploited recent Starlink blocks to launch localized counterattacks along the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and liberate significant territory in southern Ukraine.[16] Russian forces are finding workarounds to the block, including by resorting to local SIM cards and relay drones, but these mechanisms have thus far not completely compensated for the loss of Starlink.[17]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains a critical enabler of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Industry sources told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti on February 26 that Russia’s sole domestic optic fiber producer, the Optic Fiber Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia, has been offline since Ukrainian drones struck the plant in May 2025.[18] The plant reportedly produced roughly four million kilometers of optic fiber annually and supplied roughly 20 Russian cable manufacturers that used the material to produce fiber-optic cables, which Russian forces use on the battlefield. The CEO of a telecommunications news outlet told Vedomosti that the plant disruption has left Russia entirely dependent on the PRC for optical fiber. The industry sources told Vedomosti that the PRC suppliers have increased the price of one kilometerof optical fiber for Russian buyers from 16 yuan ($2.34) at the start of 2025 to 40 yuan ($5.85) in January 2026, a 150 percent increase in one year. Sources noted to Vedomosti that Russian cable manufacturers will likely have to raise their prices due to the supply issues and that this is the main risk to the industry. ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces are experiencing battlefield fiber optic cable shortages, which may suggest that the PRC’s supply of optical fiber is currently sufficient to meet demand. Russian forces may also be using stockpiled cables predating the May 2025 strike. Russian forces also reportedly use fiber-optics for ground communication.[19] Russian forces have been using fiber-optic cables since Spring 2025 to make drones more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference and to extend the range of tactical drones up to 60 kilometers.[20] ISW continues to assess that the supply of PRC-origin components to Russia has been crucial to the Russian defense industrial base’s ability to adapt, innovate, and continue the war against Ukraine.[21]

A Russian fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone reached the outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time on February 25. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on February 25 that a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone reached Kyivskyi Raion on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time.[22] The Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) published geolocated footage on February 25 showing a Russian fiber-optic drone striking a vehicle traveling along the M-03 highway on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv City, indicating that Russian forces flew another fiber-optic FPV drone as far as roughly 21 kilometers from the international border.[23] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov noted on February 25 that Russian forces would have had to find a suitable and long ground corridor through which to fly the drone, as the area is densely populated and contains obstacles that could sever fiber-optic wires in flight.[24] Russian forces are now able to conduct fiber-optic FPV strikes against Kharkiv City itself, and such strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area could foreshadow a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Such increases in fiber-optic FPV range will also allow Russian forces to harass civilian populations in Kharkiv City, similarly to how Russian forces have been using tactical drones to make life near the frontline untenable for civilians.[25]

Russia is reportedly deploying elements of at least one newly re-formed military unit to the Kupyansk direction. Artillery crews and signalmen of the Russian 68th Separate Command Battalion of the 34th Artillery Division (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly conducting combat operations in the Kupyansk direction.[26] ISW first observed reports that Russia began re-forming the 34th Artillery Division, a Soviet-era formation, in January 2024 and observed indications in January 2026 that it was actively staffing the division.[27] The 34th Artillery Division may be part of then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s military reforms, which started in late 2022 and early 2023 and aimed in part to reconstitute the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD).[28] Russia’s deployment of a new unit to the Kupyansk direction is notable as Russian forces are preparing for an expected Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[29] Russian forces may be setting conditions to prioritize offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction at some point during this offensive, though current indications suggest the primary Russian effort will likely focus on the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[30] Russian forces may also be tapping into operational or strategic reserves to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction, diverting resources from offensive operations or preparations elsewhere.[31] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously noted that all of the reserves of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (responsible for the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman directions, including efforts to advance on Slovyansk from the north) are fighting in the Kupyansk direction and are therefore unable to support Russian offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction.[32] Russia has been unwilling to dedicate sufficient resources to a single, decisive offensive operation, as it would have to redeploy forces from elsewhere on the frontline for such an effort.[33] The Kremlin seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are advancing across all areas of the theater simultaneously – a facade that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction or anywhere that Russian forces are not pursuing offensive operations would actively disprove.[34]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) reportedly issued a warning to Chinese citizens in Russia about a law compelling service in the Russian military. Hong Kong-based media outlet South China Morning Post reported on February 26 that the PRC Consulate in Russia called on Chinese citizens living in Russia to “take note of” a new Russian law requiring male permanent residents under the age of 65 to serve at least one year with the Russian military.[35] The South China Morning Post referenced a Russian November 2025 law that requires foreign citizens and stateless men aged 18 to 65 who are “legally capable” to serve in the Russian military for at least one year to apply for Russian citizenship or a residency permit.[36] The November 2025 Russian law grants exceptions to Belarusian citizens, men who provide proof that they have already fulfilled the service requirement in the Russian military, and men who provide documentation from Russian military enlistment and recruitment centers that they are unfit for military service. Russian state media notably did not publicize these aspects of the decree at the time.[37] The PRC consulate reportedly did not directly warn PRC citizens against serving in the Russian military but called on PRC citizens in Russia to “make prudent decisions” to “ensure lawful residency status in Russia.”[38] The PRC consulate’s warning is an indicator that the PRC may be concerned that Russia will coerce its citizens living in Russia into military service through this law. Russia has conducted raids against migrants with expired permits or who are undocumented and coerced them into military service under threat of criminal charges or deportation.[39] Forcing foreigners to serve in the Russian military as a condition for a residency permit or citizenship is a significant escalation in its recruitment mechanisms. ISW has recently observed indicators that the Kremlin is preparing for rolling call-ups of its involuntary reserve to mitigate manpower shortages from Russia’s slowing recruitment rates.[40] The PRC consulate’s statement may be a supporting indicator that Russia is ready to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups and other coercive force generation mechanisms that could affect its citizens living in Russia.

Key Takeaways

Russia launched another massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of February 25 to 26, primarily targeting energy infrastructure.
The US and Ukraine continue bilateral engagements as part of ongoing peace negotiations.
Ukraine’s and SpaceX’s efforts to shut off Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals continues to disrupt Russian drone operations across the frontline.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains a critical enabler of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
A Russian fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone reached the outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time on February 25.
Russia is reportedly deploying elements of at least one newly re-formed military unit to the Kupyansk direction.
The PRC reportedly issued a warning to Chinese citizens in Russia about a law compelling service in the Russian military.
The PRC consulate’s warning is an indicator that the PRC may be concerned that Russia will coerce its citizens living in Russia into military service through this law.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Feb 26 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2026

Toplines

ISW has not observed evidence of Ukrainian forces operating within Pokrovsk since late January 2026, indicating that Russian forces seized the entire town on a prior date. Russian forces have failed to capitalize on the seizure of Pokrovsk and to make further operationally significant advances, demonstrating that the Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent or inevitable. ISW last observed Ukrainian forces operating on January 28, and therefore assesses that Russian forces likely completed the capture of the settlement sometime in the past few weeks.[1] The Russian campaign for Pokrovsk, a town with a pre-war population of 60,000, has been underway for almost two full years. Russian forces started their drive toward Pokrovsk in February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka (roughly 39 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk) and began setting conditions to take Pokrovsk through direct frontal assaults in March 2024.[2] Russian forces did not seize most of Pokrovsk until December 2025 — 21 months after starting frontal assaults on the town. Russian forces continued to fight to seize most of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) for another month after that, with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claiming on December 28 that Russian forces seized the town.[3] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces fully seized Pokrovsk in early December 2025 and heavily emphasized that Pokrovsk was a critical step in accomplishing Russia’s strategic battlefield objectives.[4] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 9 that the seizure of Pokrovsk was “crucial” for Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast, and Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in his annual Direct Line address on December 19 that the seizure “opened up” multiple directions of advance for the Russian military.[5] Pokrovsk was operationally significant given its use as an important logistics hub, but Russian strikes denied Ukrainian forces the ability to fully leverage the town for logistics as early as July 2025.[6] Pokrovsk had long ceased to be an operationally significant town by the time Russian forces intensified their push to capture the town in Winter 2025.

The seizure of Pokrovsk has also not “opened up” major Russian advances to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast as Kremlin officials previously alleged. Russian forces have not significantly advanced northwest or west from Pokrovsk since December 2025 and have yet to even seize Hryshyne (just two kilometers northwest of Pokrovsk). Russian gains past Pokrovsk have not yet set operational conditions to support future offensive efforts towards the Fortress Belt, which ISW assesses will be Russia’s main operational effort in the coming months. Russia’s slow and costly seizure of Pokrovsk does not portend Russian advances elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast — Pokrovsk is a much smaller town both in area and population than Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, which make up the northern tip of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces’ long and costly battle to take Pokrovsk and their subsequent inability to significantly advance beyond the town refute the Kremlin’s repeated claims that Russian forces will be able to easily and swiftly seize the Fortress Belt.

The Kremlin appears to have been successful in enacting a reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing the decision-making of the British- and French-led Coalition of the Willing. Diplomatic and defense sources told The Telegraph on February 24 that some members of the Coalition of the Willing have privately stated that their contributions of troops to guarantee the security of post-war Ukraine are dependent on Russian President Vladimir Putin granting permission for such deployments.[7] A senior diplomatic source stated that Kremlin statements about Russian forces specifically targeting foreign troop deployments in Ukraine mean that the coalition “need[s] to send a different kind of force.” Another diplomatic source assessed that European states have “essentially handed Putin a veto” over the coalition’s plans. Divisions within the Coalition of the Willing are likely the result of a monthslong coordinated Kremlin reflexive control campaign — a method by which Russia attempts to make an opponent freely arrive at a pre-determined decision — that aimed to prevent the West from agreeing on security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected Western security guarantees for Ukraine, stating that foreign troops in Ukraine would be “legitimate targets” for Russian forces.[8] The Kremlin has also been using a baseless Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claim that the United Kingdom (UK) and France were giving Ukraine a “dirty bomb” or nuclear weapon to disrupt the ongoing discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[9] Kremlin officials continued on February 25 to reiterate the SVR’s allegations, claiming that alleged nuclear weapons transfers to Ukraine would threaten Russian security and calling for retaliatory Russian responses that aim to invoke fear in the UK and France.[10] Meaningful security guarantees, including European deterrence forces, will be a vital part of any future agreement that ensures a lasting peace in Ukraine. Security guarantees without significant deterrence measures will not prevent Russia from renewing its aggression against Ukraine at a time of its choosing and are particularly important to justify any territorial concessions Ukraine may be forced to accept. Russia has been explicitly rejecting any meaningful security guarantees as they impede the Kremlin’s ability to achieve its longstanding strategic goal of gaining control over all of Ukraine. Any sort of Russian veto would undermine the foundations upon which the current US-led negotiations are built to ensure a lasting peace.

Insider reports continue to indicate that Russia is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations and is preparing for a protracted war. A source close to the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) told Russian opposition outlet Verstka on February 25 that Russia’s position in negotiations ”has not changed at all” and that Russia “must achieve” its war goals.[11] A source in the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc stated that fundamental differences remain unresolved in negotiations, such as Ukraine’s de jure recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories and prohibitions on NATO troops operating on Ukrainian territory. The source assessed that these issues “cannot be resolved.” Two political strategists close to the United Russia party stated that the party is preparing a “military agenda” for its campaign in the September 2026 State Duma elections. The sources stated that no one in the party “seriously expects” the war to end, so the party is not making any plans to restructure their work should there be a radical shift in the future. ISW has observed similar reports about Kremlin efforts to incorporate the protracted war into its political agenda and its plans for the upcoming elections, including by endorsing candidates who strongly support the war.[12] These insider statements suggest that the Kremlin is planning for the war to continue at a minimum until September, but likely much longer.

The Kremlin is also reportedly purposely delaying negotiations to shape the battlefield to Russia’s benefit. A source in the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc told Verstka that the Kremlin is feigning active negotiations but is in reality trying to drag out the process.[13] The sources stated that the Kremlin views the negotiations process as a “tool” to contain the conflict from escalating in a way that is unfavorable to Moscow. The source gave an example of what this Russian stall tactic has achieved, noting that Ukraine will not obtain Tomahawk missiles from the United States as long as Russia remains at the negotiating table. Verstka’s report indicates that the Kremlin is not only uninterested in meaningful negotiations to end the war but is also actively trying to sabotage ongoing efforts to enable Russia to continue hostilities from a more advantageous battlefield position. This report coheres with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russia is protracting negotiations to make gains on the battlefield and achieve Russia’s goals militarily.[14]

The Kremlin continues to manufacture justifications for a future Telegram ban. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Duma Committee on Information Policy, Information Technology, and Communications Andrei Svintsov stated on February 24 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may propose recognizing Telegram as a “terrorist accomplice” in the next two to three months if Telegram continues to ignore Russian law.[15] Svintsov claimed that the FSB has ”credible information” that Telegram is linked to over 150,000 crimes in Russia, many of which Svintsov claimed had some connection to terrorist threats. Telegram founder Pavel Durov stated on February 24 that Russian authorities opened a criminal case against him for aiding terrorism.[16] The Russian Government’s official newspaper Rossiskaya Gazeta and Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda claimed on February 24, citing FSB materials, that Russian authorities are investigating Durov for assisting terrorist activity.[17] The Kremlin has been setting conditions to justify intensified internet censorship measures, including a possible future ban on Telegram, by claiming that Telegram and other foreign messaging platforms have been violating Russian laws and are not sufficiently protecting Russian citizens.[18] Svintsov’s statements suggest that this condition-setting effort will continue for multiple months before the Kremlin makes a final decision to ban Telegram. The Kremlin is setting conditions now to later deflect blame for a future ban onto Telegram itself, claiming that Telegram failed to take the offered opportunities to adjust its policies to comply with Russian law.

The Kremlin is also increasing its efforts to control the Russian population’s ability to access Western-origin content on the internet. A Russian court fined Google over 22 million rubles (roughly $288,000) on February 25 for distributing virtual private network (VPN) services to Russian citizens on the Google Play app store.[19] The Kremlin has been targeting VPNs, which Russians have widely used to access the foreign platforms the Kremlin has banned in recent years.[20] The Kremlin is not banning VPNs outright but has been disincentivizing their use and making them harder to access.[21] Russia, for example, passed laws in recent months that prohibit advertisements for VPNs and make the use of a VPN an aggravating circumstance in criminal cases.[22] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s intensified internet censorship efforts are aimed at strengthening control over the information space ahead of limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups that are likely to be domestically unpopular and could generate domestic backlash.[23]

Ukraine continues to expand joint production in Europe with its Western partners. The Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry announced that four Ukrainian defense manufacturers signed joint production agreements on February 24 worth up to 800 million euros (about $945 million) to produce unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) with two Finnish companies, a Latvian company, and a Danish company under the Build with Ukraine initiative, which aims to co-produce weapons and military equipment in partner states.[24] Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom (UK) Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported on February 24 that a Ukrainian company opened its first drone production facility in the UK.[25] Ukraine’s defense platform Brave1 and the French Defense Innovation Agency signed a letter of intent on February 25 to create a joint grant program to support Ukrainian and French defense startups.[26] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s partners stand to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) with joint production, as Ukraine’s experience in an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle will allow its partners to bolster their own defenses and domestic DIBs.[27] The establishment of joint Ukrainian-European production facilities outside of Ukraine throughout Europe will also ensure continued Ukrainian defense industrial production in the face of intensified Russian long-range strikes across Ukraine.[28]

Ukraine’s Western partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine on February 24. Lithuanian Minister for National Defense Robertas Kaunas announced that Lithuania will transfer 30 missiles for RBS-70 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Ukraine.[29] Canadian Minister of National Defense David McGuinty announced that Canada will provide two billion Canadian dollars (about $1.4 billion) worth of military assistance to Ukraine in 2026 and 2027.[30] McGuinty also announced that Canada will donate over 400 armored vehicles to Ukraine, including 66 Light Armored Vehicle 6 (LAV 6) armored personnel carriers and 383 Senator armored cars. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced that Estonia will contribute an additional 11 million euros (about $13 million) for Ukrainian air defense and ammunition needs through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[31]

Key Takeaways

ISW has not observed evidence of Ukrainian forces operating within Pokrovsk since late January 2026, indicating that Russian forces seized the entire town on a prior date. Russian forces have failed to capitalize on the seizure of Pokrovsk and to make further operationally significant advances, demonstrating that the Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent or inevitable.
The Kremlin appears to have been successful in enacting a reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing the decision-making of the British- and French-led Coalition of the Willing.
Insider reports continue to indicate that Russia is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations and is preparing for a protracted war.
The Kremlin is also reportedly purposely delaying negotiations to shape the battlefield to Russia’s benefit.
The Kremlin continues to manufacture justifications for a future Telegram ban.
The Kremlin is also increasing its efforts to control the Russian population’s ability to access Western-origin content on the internet.
Ukraine continues to expand joint production in Europe with its Western partners.
Ukraine’s Western partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine on February 24.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, in the Dobropillya tactical area, near Pokrovsk, and near Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 25 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2026

Toplines

The fifth year of Russia’s invasion is not beginning well for Moscow. Recent Ukrainian successes on the battlefield disprove Russian claims that things can only get worse for Ukraine the longer Kyiv delays surrendering to Russian demands. Battlefield realities as of late February 2026 show that continued significant Russian battlefield gains, let alone total victory, are not inevitable. Ukrainian forces have recently made the most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and liberated the most territory in Ukraine itself since the 2023 counteroffensive.[1] Ukrainian forces began a series of counterattacks in the area of Kupyansk in mid-December 2025 that stabilized Ukrainian control over the town of Kupyansk and retook at least 183 square kilometers between December 11 and 25, pushing Russian forces out of several settlements near the town.[2] Ukraine has held its gains in Kupyansk since mid-December despite Russian efforts to reverse them, and current battlefield dynamics do not suggest that Russia will quickly regain land in the area. Ukrainian forces also began limited counterattacks in early February 2026 that liberated multiple settlements in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[3] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated roughly 200 square kilometers in some areas of the Novopavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions, losing 35 square kilometers in other areas of those three directions during the same time frame for a net gain of 165 square kilometers in February.[4] Ukrainian forces continue limited counterattacks in these areas.

Events on the battlefield refute Moscow’s claims that a Russian battlefield victory is inevitable and that Ukraine should surrender to Russia’s demands before its position deteriorates further. Localized Ukrainian counterattacks are unlikely to grow into a large-scale counteroffensive in these areas, and Russian forces will very likely stabilize their positions and even begin advancing again as preparations for Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive approach completion. But Ukrainian counterattacks have reportedly disrupted Russian efforts to set conditions for that Spring-Summer 2026 offensive and will force the Russians first to fight to establish stable defensive positions before starting the fight to regain lost ground. Only then will they be able to move into their planned offensive operations with troops already attrited and worn down rather than fresh. Ukrainian forces have not liberated operationally significant areas, apart from Kupyansk, but the multiple localized Ukrainian counterattacks will likely have lasting effects on the ability of Russian forces to make significant advances in key sectors of the line this spring.

Ukraine’s counterattacks have taken advantage of opportunities presented by Russian vulnerabilities and mistakes. Ukrainian forces were able to conduct counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in part because of problems with Russian command and control (C2) and communications caused by Elon Musk’s efforts, together with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD), to stop Russian forces from illegally using Starlink for their operations in Ukraine.[5] Russian forces’ command, control, and communications also suffered from Moscow’s decision to throttle their access to and use of Telegram, a platform that Russian soldiers use to conduct a variety of essential military communications along the frontline.[6] It appears that the Kremlin was unaware of the degree to which Russian forces continued to rely on that platform for operational military purposes and prioritized securing control of the information space over the conduct of military operations even once they were made aware of that reliance.[7]

Ukraine conducted its successful push to retake land in Kupyansk before Russian forces experienced the series of issues with communications, however, taking advantage of the fact that Russian forces had advanced in Kupyansk on fragile ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that Ukrainian forces were able to sever. Events in Kupyansk show that Ukrainian forces are still able to make noteworthy gains on the battlefield even absent exogenous disruptions to Russian communications and C2. Ukrainian forces on the counterattack are leveraging the sparsity and exhaustion of Russian troops that have advanced in small numbers using infiltration tactics and are being pushed by the Kremlin to move faster than they can consolidate lines of communication and secure reinforcements. The Russians will likely recover and adapt, and the lines will continue to shift in either direction as each side gains a temporary advantage, but one thing should be clear: Russia has not secured a permanent edge that will simply allow Russian forces to continue advancing unchecked the longer the war goes on.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine enters its fifth year with Russia having failed to achieve any of its original war aims and facing setbacks on the battlefield amid mounting casualties. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago with a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City in three days. Russian forces also tried and failed to seize Kharkiv City; all of Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; or Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts, among other initial targets of Russian military operations. Russian forces have still not yet managed to seize the four oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in 2022. Putin launched his invasion with the objective of “de-nazifying” Ukraine — Russian code for replacing Ukraine’s democratically elected government with a pro-Russian puppet state.[8] Ukraine has, on the contrary, remained committed to holding free and fair democratic elections under its own constitution and laws.[9] Putin also intended to ”demilitarize” Ukraine — reducing Ukraine‘s military to such a low level that Ukraine would be unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[10] The Ukrainian Armed Forces are instead now second only to Russia’s as the largest and strongest military in Europe and are sharing four years of combat experience with the West.[11] Putin’s pre-war demands also included that NATO cease expanding and refrain from deploying weapons to new NATO member states.[12] Russia’s invasion prompted both Finland and Sweden to join the alliance instead. Europe has banded together to help Ukraine fight Russian aggression, providing billions in military support and aid alongside the billions the US has provided.[13] Ukraine’s European allies have also established the Coalition of the Willing that will deploy peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.[14] Putin’s pre-war demands included that Ukraine commit to neutrality. Ukraine has not joined NATO, to be sure, but has signed several partnerships and agreements with Western states, including a 100-year agreement with the United Kingdom, and is in negotiations with the EU for accession to that bloc.[15]

Russia’s challenges on and off the battlefield are forcing Kremlin leadership to make difficult decisions to sustain its war effort, as ISW has long forecasted that it would have to do.[16] Russia is facing critical force generation issues that complicate its ability to find manpower for Putin’s war. Russia’s casualty rate surpassed its recruitment rate in January 2026 after years in which Russia’s recruitment rate consistently met its replacement rate targets.[17] Russia is facing issues with financing its current means of recruitment, as the Russian government is struggling to find funds at both the federal and local levels to continue to pay the large cash incentives that it has used to generate the necessary number of volunteers.[18] Russia’s domestic economy is suffering from labor shortages and inflation, and Western sanctions on Russia’s energy exports have forced a sharp decline in Russia’s oil and gas revenues, which form a substantial part of Russia’s budget.[19] Russia’s growing military and economic issues are forcing Putin to consider how he can continue his war at its current tempo. Putin is having to reassess Russia’s force generation mechanisms to determine how Russia can continue to send the number of troops to the front lines needed to sustain the incessant offensive operations he demands. Putin is clearly considering and preparing for domestically unpopular measures such as rolling involuntary reserve callups.[20] Putin has been avoiding these domestically unpopular decisions since the nearly disastrous involuntary callup of 2022, and he must now convince an increasingly tired Russian populace not only to support a fifth year of war but also to accept involuntary mobilization for a war that has already cost Russia well over a million casualties.[21] Putin has been setting conditions to order such a callup, such as tightening control of the information space and increasing censorship efforts.[22] The care and aggressiveness with which Putin is taking such steps indicate the concern with which he contemplates his people’s reaction to the measures he is considering.

The Kremlin is attempting to divert attention on the anniversary away from the Russian military’s inability to achieve Putin’s objectives. Kremlin officials largely avoided acknowledging the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A few Russian officials made boilerplate remarks, including about the war’s alleged “root causes,” the need for Ukraine’s “demilitarization” and “denazification,” and Russia’s unwavering commitment to achieving its original objectives, but Russian officials clearly felt that they had little good news or causes for optimism to share with the Russian people.[23] Kremlin officials focused instead on a baseless claim by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) that the United Kingdom (UK) and France are attempting to transfer a “dirty bomb” or nuclear weapon and delivery systems to Ukraine.[24] Senior Russian officials amplified the SVR’s claim in what ISW assesses was a coordinated information effort designed to elevate nuclear escalation rhetoric and divert attention away from the war anniversary.[25] Senior Russian officials stated that the alleged actions of the UK and France are unacceptable to Russia and escalatory, posing a threat to Russian security. Kremlin officials made explicit nuclear threats, with Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stating that Russia should use nuclear weapons, including “non-strategic” systems, against Ukrainian targets and, “if necessary,” against “supplier states” that are complicit in starting a nuclear conflict with Russia.[26] This nuclear rhetoric fits into a recurring pattern, as the Kremlin has leveraged the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a “dirty bomb” in the past to influence Western discussions about support for Ukraine or to set conditions for Russian false flag attacks.[27] ISW continues to assess that Russian nuclear use remains unlikely.[28]

The Kremlin is using the SVR claims to relitigate its justifications for the war that it initiated, which has now lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s participation in World War II without accomplishing any of the Kremlin’s original aims. Kremlin Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded to the SVR’s allegations on February 24, falsely claiming that Zelensky expressed Ukraine’s willingness to reconsider its non-nuclear status during the February 2022 Munich Conference, just a few days before Russia launched its full-scale invasion.[29] Zelensky did not make any such statements at the conference. Zelensky stated, rather, that Ukraine did not have nuclear weapons and received security guarantees in return for abandoning its nuclear capability — a reference to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which Russia, the UK, and the United States committed to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine’s relinquishment of its nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation.[30] Ukraine abided by that agreement and gave the Russian Federation the Soviet nuclear weapons left on its soil when the USSR collapsed, but Russia has violated that agreement by attacking Ukraine twice and illegally annexing Ukrainian territory. Zakharova and Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko seized on the SVR allegations to claim that Ukraine’s non-nuclear status was a key condition of Russia’s recognition of Ukraine as an independent state — an irrelevance, since Ukraine was in 2022 and remains today a non-nuclear weapons power.[31] Zakharova further made a series of illogical claims about the Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty and alleged that Ukraine has long violated its commitment to remain neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear.[32] Putin has demanded Ukrainian neutrality–by which he actually means pro-Russian — since the onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022 and has justified his war as necessary to eradicate the threat that Ukraine and NATO allegedly pose to Russia. The Kremlin appears to be now using the SVR’s baseless claims about Ukraine’s nuclear aspirations in 2022 to bolster Russia’s ex post facto justifications for a costly and failing war. Russian attempts to fabricate new justifications for its war four years in suggests that the Kremlin is concerned that its messaging is not holding sufficiently within the Russian populace to support the protracted losses and economic damage that continuing to pursue its maximalist objectives will inflict on the Russian people.

Russia is also using the SVR’s claim as an excuse to threaten the UK and France with potential nuclear strikes, likely in order to disrupt ongoing discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine. Russian officials widely used the SVR’s claim to make nuclear threats against Ukraine, the UK, and France.[33] The UK and France have been leading discussions within the Coalition of the Willing about security guarantees for post-war Ukraine — guarantees that the Kremlin has adamantly rejected.[34] Kremlin attempts to veto these guarantees have so far failed, however, with Ukraine’s European partners continuing to make progress on the matter with US support. The Kremlin is likely resorting to renewed nuclear threats, this time explicitly targeting the UK and France, in order to create fear about a possible escalatory conflict between nuclear powers, to deter Europe from providing security guarantees, and to push the United States to block such guarantees.

The Kremlin may additionally be planning to blame Ukraine for a Russian-generated radiological incident in Ukraine, possibly to convince the West to abandon Ukraine or as a further attempt to break Ukrainian will to continue to resist. Russia has been intensely striking Ukrainian nuclear energy infrastructure, repeatedly targeting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the infrastructure that supports the plants.[35] Russian strikes on these targets risk causing a radiological incident. Russia may intentionally or unintentionally cause an incident and then accuse Ukraine of using a nuclear or radiological weapon.

The SVR claim is also part of a wider Kremlin effort to justify future limited involuntary reserve callups, which are likely to be highly unpopular at home. The Kremlin appears to be preparing to conduct limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups in the future and has been intensely setting conditions to justify such callups for the past several months.[36] The SVR claim likely aims to create fear among Russians about the threat Ukraine allegedly poses to Russia and to increase support for Russia’s protracted war. Putin also used a February 24 speech to the Federal Security Service (FSB) Board to justify a future callup.[37] Putin thanked FSB employees who are ensuring Russia’s security in Russia’s “historical lands” in Donbas and Novorossiya (i.e., participating in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and called on Russian authorities to improve security agencies’ management systems in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin noted that the number of Ukrainian strikes against Russian infrastructure increased significantly in the past year and called on the FSB to intensify its efforts to protect this infrastructure. Putin called on the FSB to firmly suppress attempts to promote Russophobia, xenophobia, and religious intolerance to divide Russian society, which Putin claimed is united by patriotism and a “shared responsibility for the fate of the Motherland.”

Putin’s February 24 speech to the FSB, specifically highlighting the need to protect Russian infrastructure, is very likely meant to prepare for decisions to announce limited involuntary reservist callups for the ostensible purpose of protecting such infrastructure. Putin’s statements follow his November 4 signing of a law requiring active reservists to participate in special training to protect critical and other infrastructure in Russia.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) first proposed a version of this law in October 2025 that would have permitted the Russian military to use Russia’s active reserve (“human mobilization reserve”) in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.[39] Senior Russian officials claimed at that time that the law would allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists outside of Russian territory, including to areas in northern Ukraine.[40] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin was using the law permitting the deployment of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure to set conditions to call up active reservists for combat in the future, including in Ukraine.[41] Putin has started to invoke the “responsibility” of not only Russian soldiers but also the Russian people to defend Russia, likely to preemptively garner more support from the population for involuntary service by normalizing the concept of sacrifice and responsibility before he initiates such callups.[42]

Putin additionally continues to set conditions to justify the decisions that he will likely need to make to ensure that he can conduct involuntary reservist callups without significant domestic backlash. Putin paid particular attention in his FSB speech to alleged threats to Russian security on the internet.[43] Putin claimed that Russia is facing a growing number of cybercrimes, including foreign intelligence services’ cyber-sabotage against Russian critical infrastructure. Putin claimed that online recruitment schemes to conduct sabotage against Russian infrastructure are “commonplace.” Putin stated that Russian authorities must secure Russia’s information and digital space. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin is intensifying its internet censorship campaign, including by increasingly restricting Telegram, in order to prepare the information space for future involuntary reserve callups.[44] Putin likely aims to minimize the risk of online criticisms and societal discontent, such as Russia experienced after his September 2022 partial involuntary callup. Putin’s preparation for limited, rolling callups and further internet and censorship restrictions are coming from a place of Russian weakness. Putin’s confidence in his ability to demand more sacrifices from his people without political repercussions is apparently waning, particularly as he protracts the war in Ukraine into its fifth year, yet remains far from achieving the strategic objectives for which he started the war in 2022.

Key Takeaways

The fifth year of Russia’s invasion is not beginning well for Moscow. Recent Ukrainian successes on the battlefield disprove Russian claims that things can only get worse for Ukraine the longer Kyiv delays surrendering to Russian demands.
Events on the battlefield refute Moscow’s claims that a Russian battlefield victory is inevitable and that Ukraine should surrender to Russia’s demands before its position deteriorates further.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine enters its fifth year with Russia having failed to achieve any of its original war aims and facing setbacks on the battlefield amid mounting casualties.
Russia’s challenges on and off the battlefield are forcing Kremlin leadership to make difficult decisions to sustain its war effort, as ISW has long forecasted that it would have to do.
The Kremlin is attempting to divert attention on the anniversary away from the Russian military’s inability to achieve Putin’s objectives.
The Kremlin is using the SVR claims to relitigate its justifications for the war that it initiated, which has now lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s participation in World War II without accomplishing any of the Kremlin’s original aims.
Russia is also using the SVR’s claim as an excuse to threaten the UK and France with potential nuclear strikes, likely in order to disrupt ongoing discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine.
The Kremlin may additionally be planning to blame Ukraine for a Russian-generated radiological incident in Ukraine, possibly to convince the West to abandon Ukraine or as a further attempt to break Ukrainian will to continue to resist.
The SVR claim is also part of a wider Kremlin effort to justify future limited involuntary reserve callups, which are likely to be highly unpopular at home.
Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 24 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2026

Toplines

Kremlin officials used the February 23 Defender of the Fatherland Day holiday to set conditions to mitigate any domestic backlash that may result from limited rolling reserve involuntary callups in the future. Defender of the Fatherland Day is a holiday on the day of the creation of the Red Army in 1918 that honors the contemporary Russian military. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed at an awards ceremony in honor of Defenders of the Fatherland Day that Russian soldiers have on their shoulders an “enormous responsibility” for the Russian people and Russia’s “common cause.[1] Putin also claimed that a “sense of patriotism and responsibility for the fate of the Motherland” unifies all Russian soldiers despite their different nationalities and faiths.[2]

Putin’s persistent invocation of “responsibility” in his February 23 speech appears to be a narrative condition-setting effort aimed at demanding that Russian society make additional sacrifices for his war effort, including by providing more troops through future involuntary reserve callups. ISW continues to assess that Putin is preparing to conduct limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups in the future to fulfill Russia’s force generation needs.[3] Putin’s focus on responsibility in his speeches – not only the responsibility of Russian soldiers but also that of all Russians – is likely an attempt to instill a sense of civic duty in the Russian people to lessen possible blowback to potential involuntary mobilization measures. Putin is likely aware of the domestic discontent such involuntary reserve callups could generate and is trying to preemptively garner more support from the population by normalizing the concept of sacrifice and responsibility before he initiates such call-ups.

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev appeared to use his February 23 public appearance to support this wider condition-setting effort. Medvedev met with Russian military personnel on February 23 and notably wore a military uniform, despite the fact that he is not a member of the military and is no longer the commander-in-chief.[4] Medvedev claimed that Russia “needs” victory but that the “price of victory matters” and urged Russian soldiers to “take care of themselves…[and] their loved ones.” Kremlin officials often publicly state that Russia is prepared to keep fighting in order to achieve its original war aims in Ukraine, and Medvedev’s explicit statement about the “price” of such a victory is a notable inflection in that it represents an acceptance of social cost.[5] Medvedev is implying that Russian authorities will “take care” of any involuntarily mobilized personnel and will not simply send them to die – likely in an effort to subdue any societal concern resulting from future involuntary reserve callups. Russian forces, however, have long been reliant on highly attritional tactics on the battlefield, securing advances with disproportionately high losses.[6] The Russian military has furthermore become heavily optimized for such slow, infantry-led positional warfare, suggesting that the Russian military command does not foresee any major shift in tactics that would significantly reduce the casualty rate.[7] Medvedev’s February 23 appearance seeks to socialize the concept of loss and sacrifice amongst the entire Russian population.

Putin is setting conditions to offset the significant financial issues that any future limited involuntary reserve callup would cause. Putin held a meeting with the widows of Russian servicemembers who died in Ukraine, in which he claimed that the “Motherland” for which their husbands died will always be with the widows.[8] Putin expressed his support for the women and their children as they “get back on their feet” and stated that he would continue to demand that all levels of government pay “constant attention” to supporting veterans’ families. The wide-ranging social benefits that the Russian government has been offering soldiers and their families in order to boost voluntary recruitment are significantly straining the Russian budget.[9] Future limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups would significantly increase the financial burden on the Russian government, and Putin may be preparing to curtail these benefits and compensations as he starts callups in order to grant the Russian economy some breathing room. Putin will likely also need to more evenly balance the compensations and benefits that contract soldiers and involuntary mobilized personnel receive to avoid discontent about any inequities within the Russian force. Putin is likely aware that such changes could spark domestic backlash, having witnessed online criticisms toward his previous policies that reduced the Kremlin’s payouts to Russian soldiers.[10] Putin’s February 23 meeting with the widows is an effort to persuade Russian society that the Russian government is not going to completely abandon soldiers, even if the Kremlin calls up more troops and reduces their benefits and payouts. Putin’s outreach to widows specifically is noteworthy, as disgruntled groups of veterans’ wives and mothers historically were able to lead large Soviet and Russian social movements, including by protesting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Russian wars in Chechnya.[11] The Kremlin has also recently intensified its internet censorship campaign, likely in order to prevent domestic backlash to future policy decisions that are likely to be unpopular at home, such as the start of limited, rolling reserve callups and the reduction of benefits and payouts to soldiers.[12]

Ukrainian forces continue to liberate territory in southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[13] Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows a Ukrainian servicemember operating in northwestern Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement, contrary to Russian sources’ claims that Russian forces maintain control over the settlement.[14] ISW has not observed visual evidence to suggest that Russian forces maintain positions in Ternuvate since February 6, 2026. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on February 23 that Russian claims that Russian forces control Ternuvate are untrue.[15] Voloshyn stated that a Russian group infiltrated the settlement two weeks ago (roughly around February 9) but that Ukrainian forces “destroyed” the group. Voloshyn noted that some limited Russian soldiers may remain in Ternuvate but that Russian forces do not control the settlement–likely in reference to the doctrinal definition of control, which is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.

ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Andriivka, Ostapivske, Pishchane, Nechaivka (all northwest of Ternuvate), Radisne, Nove Zaporizhzhia (both west of Ternuvate) due to the fact that ISW has not observed visual evidence indicating a Russian presence in any of these settlements in over two weeks (since at least February 9). ISW has not observed significant evidence indicating a Russian presence in Pishchane, Nechaivka, Radisne, and Nove Zaporizhzhia since February 8. Voloshyn stated that Ternuvate is located 10 to 12 kilometers from the front, supporting ISW’s assessment that Ukrainian forces also recently liberated the area east and northeast of Ternuvate.[16] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces are leveraging Russian forces’ communications challenges following the February 1 SpaceX block of Russian Starlink terminals in order to advance in this area.[17] Voloshyn noted on February 17 that changing weather conditions and successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics are also contributing to Ukrainian successes.[18]

Ukrainian officials have offered differing assessments of control of terrain in southern Ukraine, in large part reflecting the tactical intricacies of the current frontline situation. Ukrainian Commander in Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi and Voloshyn stated on February 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400 square kilometers and eight settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction since the end of January 2025.[19] Voloshyn added that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border and in the Hulyaipole direction.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 20 that Ukrainian forces liberated 300 square kilometers in unspecified areas in southern Ukraine in an unspecified time frame.[21] The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces stated on February 22 that Ukrainian forces liberated over 300 square kilometers and have cleared eight settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction since Ukrainian forces began more significant tactical counterattacks in the area (since roughly February 9).[22] It is unclear at this time why Ukrainian officials are giving different figures, but some variation may be due to differences in the geographic and temporal bounds.

ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated 200 square kilometers in some areas of the Novopavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions between February 1 and 23, but lost 35 square kilometers in other areas of those three directions during the same time frame. ISW’s mapping methodology may underestimate Ukrainian advances. ISW’s mapping methodology depicts the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances until open-source evidence emerges that allows ISW to confidently assess that Russian forces no longer hold those positions. Available footage and reports that meet ISW’s threshold for changing its maps are often limited, and ISW’s maps can continue to depict areas where an earlier Russian presence has significantly decreased or even disappeared as still within the “Assessed Russian advances” until a preponderance of reporting and footage indicates otherwise. The frontline in Ukraine, especially near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, has become porous with a lack of contiguous lines over time, resulting in Ukrainian and Russian positions intermingling in a way that adds additional complexity to assessing the true control of terrain (COT). ISW will continue to monitor reports and footage about Ukrainian counterattacks and COT in southern Ukraine and will refine its maps from assessments based on these pieces of evidence.

Russia is strengthening its ability to collect intelligence and disrupt enemy satellite communications, which may bolster its strategic capabilities in the event of a future potential confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 4, citing European security officials and other unspecified sources, that the Russian Luch-1 and Luch-2 space vehicles intercepted communications of at least a dozen key satellites carrying government and military communications over Europe at an unspecified time.[23] FT reported that Russian space vehicles have shadowed European satellites for weeks at a time more intensively over the last three years and that Luch-2 in particular has approached European satellites 17 times since its launch in 2023. A senior European intelligence official assessed that the Luch vehicles are likely positioning themselves within the narrow cone of data beams transmitting from Earth-based stations to the satellites, which were launched years ago without advanced technology, and are unable to encrypt their sensitive information. FT reported that the European intelligence official stated that the Luch vehicles are unlikely to be able to jam or destroy the European satellites, but likely provided Russia with data on how to disrupt the satellites from the ground or in orbit. FT reported that Russia may be able to beam false commands to the satellites in order to manipulate their thrusters to knock other satellites out of alignment. Russia is likely strengthening its ability to gather data from space satellites and to disrupt Western communications as part of its “Phase Zero” campaign to prepare for a possible future war with NATO.[24]

Key Takeaways

Kremlin officials used the February 23 Defender of the Fatherland Day holiday to set conditions to mitigate any domestic backlash that may result from limited rolling reserve involuntary callups in the future.
Putin is setting conditions to offset the significant financial issues that any future limited involuntary reserve callup would cause.
Ukrainian forces continue to liberate territory in southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials have offered differing assessments of control of terrain in southern Ukraine, in large part reflecting the tactical intricacies of the current frontline situation.
Russia is strengthening its ability to collect intelligence and disrupt enemy satellite communications, which may bolster its strategic capabilities in the event of a future potential confrontation with NATO.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Feb 23 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 22, 2026

Toplines

Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package overnight on February 21 to 22 and appear to be shifting their target set from primarily energy infrastructure to include Ukrainian water and railway infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 347 drones and missiles against Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 297 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drone types – of which roughly 200 were Shaheds – from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 50 missiles, including four Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 22 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts and occupied Donetsk Oblast; 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Volgograd Oblast; and two Iskander-K and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 274 drones and 33 missiles, including all the Iskander-K and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and all but one of the Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 14 missiles and 23 strike drones struck 14 locations and that falling debris hit five locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Kyiv, Odesa, Kirovohrad, and Poltava oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian logistics, including railway infrastructure, and water supply infrastructure in cities, rather than focusing on energy infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, damaging two locomotives.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian, commercial, medical, residential, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts, and injured at least 19 civilians and killed one in Mykolaiv and Kyiv oblasts.[4] Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaliy Kim reported that Russian strikes overnight caused power outages for at least 16,000 customers in Mykolaiv City.[5] The shifting Russian target set comes after Russian strikes intended to break Ukraine’s energy grid in the dead of winter, though Russian forces will likely continue efforts to further degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure using long-range strikes.[6]

Ukrainian officials accused Russian intelligence services of coordinating an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a shopping center in Lviv City on February 22 that killed one and injured at least 25. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 22 that Russia coordinated the attack in Lviv City and recruited the perpetrators via Telegram.[7] The Lviv Oblast National Police reported on February 22 that Russian special services recruited a woman from Rivne Oblast to make and plant IEDs at predetermined locations.[8] The Lviv Oblast National Police reported that the law enforcement arrived at a retail store to investigate a break-in just after midnight and that the first explosive detonated after law enforcement arrived on scene. The Lviv Oblast National Police reported that a second device detonated after additional law enforcement arrived at the scene of the explosions, killing one law enforcement officer and severely wounding at least six other law enforcement personnel. It is currently unclear how many others of the 25 total wounded are members of Ukrainian law enforcement.

Russia is likely escalating a sabotage campaign intended to degrade Ukrainians’ trust in their security and destabilize Ukrainian society. Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated on February 22 that Russia wants to destabilize the situation in Ukraine and noted that Russia deliberately chose to conduct the attack in Lviv City because many tourists and military personnel were in the city at the time of the attack.[9] Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities recently prevented a Russian plot to assassinate several prominent political and defense figures, and Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) warned at the time that Russia intends to use these high-profile assassinations to spread panic and destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine.[10] Russian agents assassinated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in August 2025.[11] Zelensky warned after the Lviv City attack that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russia will likely continue such attacks.[12] Russia will likely continue such attacks and assassination attempts to further its goal of destabilizing Ukraine, and may also seize on reports of attacks or arrests connected with foiled plots to promote narratives aimed at spreading panic and distrust within Ukrainian society.

Russia is reportedly selling man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran, likely to repair its reputation among Iran and Russia’s other allies. The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 22 citing leaked internal documents and several people familiar with the matter that Russia and Iran concluded a 500 million euro (about $589 million) deal for Iran’s purchase of 500 Verba MANPADS, 2,500 9M336 surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and 500 Mowgli-2 night vision sights to be delivered from Russia in three tranches from 2027 to 2029.[13] One person familiar with the deal told FT that it is possible that Russia could deliver a small number of the deliveries early. FT noted that Iran requested Verbas from Russia in July 2025, just weeks after the June 2025 Israel-Iran war obliterated Iran’s air defense capabilities. FT noted that there have been several cargo flights from Russia to Iran in December 2025 and January 2026, and Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali confirmed that recent flights from Russia contained military cargo. Russia has relied heavily on its allies, especially members of the Adversary Entente, for military and economic support since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 but has not been able to reciprocate this support.[14] Russia has failed to support its allies in their own conflicts in recent years due to the needs of its war effort in Ukraine, and these allies have suffered, with some even distancing themselves from Russia as a result.[15] The Kremlin likely seeks to repair relations with Iran in the near-term by delivering weapons and equipment on such a timeline that the Kremlin believes will not impact its war effort. Russia reportedly delivered attack helicopters and Spartak armored vehicles to Iran in mid-January 2026, including at least one Mi-28 helicopter that was part of a November 2023 deal.[16] The Kremlin may also assess that it can delay any weapons deliveries beyond their contracted dates, as it has with other allies since its full-scale invasion.[17]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package overnight on February 21 to 22 and appear to be shifting their target set from primarily energy infrastructure to include Ukrainian water and railway infrastructure.
Ukrainian officials accused Russian intelligence services of coordinating an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a shopping center in Lviv City on February 22 that killed one and injured at least 25.
Russia is likely escalating a sabotage campaign intended to degrade Ukrainians’ trust in their security and destabilize Ukrainian society.
Russia is reportedly selling man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran, likely to repair its reputation among Iran and Russia’s other allies.
Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 22 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2026

Toplines

Ukrainian forces continue to hold defensive lines and push back Russian advances in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told AFP in an interview published on February 20 that Ukrainian forces have liberated 300 square kilometers of territory in an unspecified area of southern Ukraine.[1] Zelensky did not specify the timeframe or the exact locations of these recent Ukrainian advances, but AFP characterized Zelensky as suggesting that Ukrainian forces are “taking advantage” of the situation, following the recent SpaceX block on Russian forces’ usage of Starlink terminals, which supported such Ukrainian advances.

Available open source evidence indicates that Ukrainian forces have liberated multiple settlements around Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border in recent weeks.[2] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated at least 168.9 square kilometers of territory in southern Ukraine since January 1, 2026. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger published a map on February 20 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka.[3] ISW has not observed visual evidence in 2026 to assess that Russian forces maintain positions in northern Novopavlivka, and geolocated footage published on February 20 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Novopavlivka.[4] Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[5] A Ukrainian military source reported on February 18 that Ukrainian forces advanced to northwestern Verbove, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Orestopil, Vovche, Novooleksandrivka, and Hai (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) on recent prior dates.[6] ISW will continue to refine its control of terrain assessment as more information becomes available.

The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to restrict Internet usage and set informational conditions to block Telegram in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on February 20, requiring Russian cell operators to disconnect communications at the request of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in cases “established by regulatory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation.”[7] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted on February 20 that the law allows the FSB to block communications in all of Russia or specific federal subjects without explanation.[8] Meduza reported that the initial version of the bill specified that the FSB would only be granted these powers in cases of “emerging security threats,” but that legislators removed this language that could restrain the scope of Russian censorship by the bill’s second reading. Russian authorities have previously disconnected large swaths of Russia from the internet to suppress dissent under the pretext of national security.[9] The Kremlin has been intensifying its efforts in recent weeks to restrict access to Telegram, WhatsApp, and other Western social media platforms, news sites, and internet services as part of broader efforts to regain control over the Russian information space and dismantle the open internet in Russia.[10] The Kremlin has been manufacturing justifications to ban Telegram in order to coerce Russian citizens to abandon other messaging apps for the state-controlled messenger app Max.[11] The Kremlin may use its expanded powers to create an information blackout in the event of a possible mobilization or to further tighten state control over the Russian information space.

Russian authorities are likely setting information conditions to block Telegram in Russia by accusing the platform of being compromised by Ukrainian intelligence or endangering Russian operational security. The FSB additionally claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on February 21 that it possesses information showing that Ukrainian forces and intelligence are capable of rapidly obtaining data posted in Telegram and using this information “for military purposes,” and that Russian forces’ usage of Telegram has threatened the lives of Russian servicemembers within the past three months.[12] The FSB’s statement comes against the backdrop of Russian authorities’ recent throttling of Telegram despite Russian forces’ widespread usage of the platform.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and prominent Kremlin television propagandist Vladimir Solovyov published footage on February 21 of Russian servicemembers claiming that Russian forces use their own encrypted “military messenger” rather than Telegram for communications.[14] A Russian servicemember also claimed that Russian forces do not use Telegram as it is dangerous and threatens the lives of Russian forces. A Russian milblogger claimed, however, that Russian forces only possess a military messenger “locally” and expressed skepticism of Russian authorities’ claims about the military messenger’s supposed capabilities — consistent with other recent milblogger claims that Telegram outages are having negative effects on Russian command and control (C2).[15] The milblogger noted that the FSB’s statement indicates that Russian authorities have already made a decision, presumably to block Telegram, and are leveraging Russian state media to shape public opinion against the messenger.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the blocking of Telegram is an attempt by the Russian ruling class to suppress Telegram as it is a communications platform that the Russian authorities cannot control.[17] The milblogger also noted that a division is emerging in Russia between internet users who use the Russian-controlled internet and internet users who use VPNs and platforms that Russian authorities do not fully control for now. Russian milbloggers’ skeptical reaction to Russian officials’ statements denouncing Telegram demonstrates the extent to which Russian authorities have lost credibility regarding the blocking of Telegram among the milblogger community.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets on the night of February 20 to 21, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo missile strike against the Russian state-owned Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic (roughly 1230 kilometers from the international border).[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Votkinsk Plant produces Yars-series intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched Bulava ballistic missiles (SLBM), 9M723-1 type Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and 9-S-7760 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence project reported that the plant also produces Topol-M missile systems and Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM).[19] Geolocated footage published on February 20 shows smoke rising from the Votkinsk Plant.[20] Udmurtia Republic Governor Aleksandr Brechalov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck and damaged an unspecified facility in Udmurtia.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Neftegorsk gas processing plant in Samara Oblast (roughly 850 kilometers from the international border), causing fires.[22] Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported that the Neftegorsk gas processing plant processes associated petroleum gas and has an annual processing capacity of 0.7-0.75 billion cubic meters.[23] Heat anomalies detected by the NASA FIRMS/VIIRS sensors indicate that there were fires at the Neftegorsk gas processing plant on February 21.[24] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck two unspecified industrial sites in Samara Oblast.[25] Geolocated footage published on February 21 shows fires and smoke plumes at the Elektrovypriamitel-ZSP plant in Saransk, Mordovia Republic, after a reported explosion.[26] It is unclear if the reported explosion was the result of a Ukrainian strike.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-to-long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine on the night of February 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Project 22460 Okhotnik border patrol vessels near occupied Inkerman, Crimea (roughly 237 kilometers from the frontline) and two Be-12 amphibious aircraft at the Yevpatoria aircraft repair plant in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea (165 kilometers from the frontline).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Tornado multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) system near occupied Astrakhanka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 61 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian materiel and technical depot in occupied Polohy, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly ten kilometers from the frontline); a fuel and lubricants warehouse in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian production and maintenance workshop near occupied Nova Karakuba, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[28] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) posted geolocated footage on February 21 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division drone operators’ concentration point in occupied Selydove, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline).[29] ISW has observed a notable increase in Ukrainian mid-range strikes against Russian military assets inoccupied Ukraine since December 2025, as Ukrainian forces undertake their own battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to parallel Russia’s BAI campaign that enabled Russian advances in Fall 2025.[30]

Russia has been using Belarusian infrastructure to support Russian drone operations against Ukraine and incursions into NATO airspace. Pro-Ukrainian hacker groups announced on February 20 that the hackers conducted a six-month cyber operation using dozens of hacked Russian military personnel accounts to gain access to Russian drone monitoring systems.[31] The hacker groups reported that Russian forces used civilian infrastructure in Belarus, including cellular towers, to lay out routes and provide stable signals for Russian drone strikes against targets in northern and western Ukraine, including energy and railway infrastructure. The hacker groups reported that Russian strikes overnight on September 9 to 10, 2025, during which Russian drones crossed into NATO airspace in Poland through Belarus, were actually a test of Belarusian civilian and cellular infrastructure for Russian drone strikes.[32] The hacker groups noted that Russian forces used incursions into NATO airspace to plan strikes against logistics routes in both Ukraine and Poland to cut flows of Western military assistance to Ukraine. These operations are likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign, which it has been intensifying destabilize Europe and undermine NATO cohesion in preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Belarus is a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine.[34]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces continue to hold defensive lines and push back Russian advances in southern Ukraine.
The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to restrict Internet usage and set informational conditions to block Telegram in Russia.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets on the night of February 20 to 21, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-to-long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine on the night of February 20 to 21.
Russia has been using Belarusian infrastructure to support Russian drone operations against Ukraine and incursions into NATO airspace.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka.

read the full Feb 21 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2026

Toplines

The Kremlin continues cognitive warfare efforts to attempt to convince the West to abandon Ukraine by projecting the false narrative that Russian battlefield victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that Russian forces are making widespread battlefield gains. Russian Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy claimed on February 20 that Russian forces have seized approximately 900 square kilometers and 42 settlements since the beginning of 2026.[1] Rudskoy claimed that Russian forces seized over 6,700 square kilometers of territory and over 300 settlements in 2025. Rudskoy claimed that elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces have seized 26 settlements in Sumy Oblast and 15 settlements and the town of Vovchansk in northern Kharkiv Oblast as of February 20 and that Russian forces are “establishing a security zone” along the Ukraine-Russia international border. Rudskoy claimed that elements of the Western Grouping of Forces seized “over 50” settlements in 2025, including Kupyansk — an oft-repeated Kremlin claim that Russian milbloggers have widely refuted.[2] Rudskoy claimed that Russian forces seized 49 settlements in 2025 and control “more than half” of Kostyantynivka. Rudskoy claimed that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces seized 86 settlements in 2025, including major cities such as Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Myrnohrad. Rudskoy claimed that elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces seized Hulyaipole in 2025 and seized 160 square kilometers and 11 settlements in eastern Zaporizhia and southern Dnipropetrovsk oblasts in January and February 2026. Rudskoy did, however, acknowledge recent Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[3] Rudskoy claimed that elements of the Dnepr Grouping of Forces have seized 12 settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2025 and that Russian forces have advanced within 12 kilometers of the southern and southeastern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City.

ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces have only seized 19 settlements and 572 square kilometers of total territory since the beginning of 2026 — a difference of 23 settlements and 328 square kilometers. ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces only seized 252 settlements in 2025 — roughly 50 fewer settlements than Rudskoy claimed — and that Russian forces seized nine settlements in Sumy Oblast and seven settlements in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 17 settlements in the Western Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility (AoR) (roughly from Kupyansk to Lyman). ISW collected evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 50 settlements in the Southern Grouping of Forces’ AoR, roughly consistent with Rudskoy’s claim. ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced or conducted infiltration missions in only seven percent of Kostyantynivka. ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 38 settlements in the Central Grouping of Forces’ AoR (roughly near Pokrovsk). ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized 99 square kilometers and only three new settlements, including Hulyaipole, in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026 while losing full or partial control of 18 settlements in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as Ukrainian forces have retaken 86 square kilometers in these areas. ISW assesses that Russian forces have only seized two settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2025 and that Russian forces have advanced within 20 kilometers of the southern administrative boundary of Zaporizhzhia City.

Russia is seizing small, rural settlements that lie along the Russia-Ukraine international border and presenting these seizures as alleged evidence of the prowess of the Russian military to further the false narrative that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[4] Russian forces have repeatedly claimed that Russian forces are expanding the “buffer zone” in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are conducting limited cross-border attacks in previously dormant areas of northern Sumy Oblast to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing and that Ukraine should concede to all of Russia’s demands.[6] In reality, Russian forces continue to make marginal gains at very high costs. Russian forces in 2025 advanced between 13-15 square kilometers per day at a cost of 83 casualties per square kilometer gained.[7]

The Kremlin continues to crack down on former pro-Russian proxy forces and separatist leaders who criticized the Kremlin to consolidate control over the Russian information space. Kremlin newswire TASS stated on February 18, citing a Russian law enforcement source, that Russian authorities filed an administrative case against former pro-Russian separatist leader and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev for “discrediting the Russian Armed Forces,” reportedly facing a fine of 30,000 to 50,000 rubles ($391 to $651).[8] Gubarev told Russian outlet RBK on February 18 that ”someone may have not liked [his] writing,” presumably referring to Gubarev’s posts in his Telegram channel that counts almost 35,000 subscribers.[9] Gubarev stated on his Telegram channel on February 18 that he suspected that an affiliate of Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov filed the case on Alaudinov’s behalf.[10] Gubarev recently criticized Alaudinov as a “TikTok general” and ineffective battlefield commander for his failures in Kursk Oblast.[11] Gubarev also criticized the Kremlin-endorsed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin for profiteering off the water supply crisis in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[12]

The case against Gubarev is part of the Kremlin’s long-running effort to censor and silence prominent former pro-Russian Ukrainian separatist leaders with platforms in the ultranationalist information space who criticize the Kremlin’s handling of its war in Ukraine. Gubarev was a prominent leader of pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk Oblast during the 2014 “Russian Spring” — the Kremlin-fomented insurgency movement in eastern and southern Ukraine in 2014 — and is a known associate of ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin. Gubarev cofounded the Angry Patriots Club — an ultranationalist pro-war social movement that aims to correct perceived issues in the war effort in Ukraine so that Russian forces can achieve victory — with Girkin in 2023, and has chaired the club since.[13] The Kremlin has imprisoned Girkin since 2023.[14] The Kremlin’s repression of former separatist leaders is an effort to shield itself from backlash from veterans disgruntled with Putin’s failure to live up to the aims of the Russian Spring and larger Novorossiya project and thus to eliminate witnesses of the Kremlin’s lies about its original invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. The case also comes against the backdrop of Russian authorities’ throttling of Telegram, indicating that the case may be part of Russian authorities’ larger efforts to control the Russian ultranationalist information space.[15]

Russia’s war in Ukraine is increasingly impacting the Russian people, forcing the Russian Presidential Administration and the ruling United Russia Party to invest in mitigating strategies ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Sources in a major Russian news outlet told Russian opposition outlet Meduza on February 20 that the Russian Presidential Administration political bloc has instructed news outlets to write more frequently about United Russia ahead of the September 2026 elections.[16] The Presidential Administration reportedly strongly encouraged journalists to promote articles about United Russia, primarily focused on the party’s social initiatives supporting families and legislation on housing and medical benefits for Russian war veterans. Meduza noted that United Russia is very concerned that rising food and utility prices are threatening the party’s popularity, with a source in United Russia’s Presidential Representative’s Office in the Northwestern Federal Okrug stating that United Russia’s polling numbers dropped by an average of 10 percent in recent months and as much as 13 to 15 percent in St. Petersburg. Russia’s domestic populace has been increasingly bearing the economic costs of Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine, with ongoing price spikes in food and utilities, as Russian civilians also struggle to afford homes.[17] United Russia reportedly also instructed media outlets to cover the party’s purchase and delivery of military equipment for the frontline.[18] United Russia’s emphasis on the war effort in Ukraine reflects ongoing Kremlin efforts to popularize the war effort as a marker of national unity.[19] The Russian Presidential Administration and United Russia Party are spending resources to retain popularity and maintain control of the domestic situation, although the outcomes of Russia’s 2026 State Duma elections are predetermined.

Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities prevented a Russian attempt to assassinate prominent Ukrainians and destabilize Ukraine. Prosecutor General of Ukraine Ruslan Kravchenko reported on February 20 that Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities detained ten people in connection with a Russian plot to assassinate prominent Ukrainians.[20] Kravchenko and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that Russian intelligence promised the individuals up to $100,000 to assassinate Ukrainian journalists, public figures, the head of a strategically important company, and personnel of the Ukrainian Foreign Legion and Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), including Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) Deputy Head Andriy Yusov.[21] Kravchenko noted that the plot’s organizers intended for these murders to provoke public outrage in Ukraine, generate negative media coverage of the Ukrainian security situation, and incite further subversive acts.[22] This plot is likely a continuation of Russia’s campaign to conduct sabotage operations within Ukraine that include assassinations of Ukrainian public figures. Russian agents assassinated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in August 2025, for example.[23]

Leaked messages from a senior Russian general support ISW’s assessment that the Russian military command itself condones and encourages war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs). Radio Svoboda’s Skhemi project published on February 19 leaked Telegram messages from Russian Major General Roman Demurchiev, deputy commander of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), indicating that Demurchiev discussed the torture and killing of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) as routine practice.[24] Demurchiev’s discussion of these crimes with Russian 49th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) commander Lieutenant General Mikhail Kosobokov, 20th CAA (Moscow Military District [MMD]) commander Lieutenant General Oleg Mityayev, 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) First Deputy Commander Major General Igor Timofeev, and favored counterintelligence officer Colonel Alexei Shvedov, highlights the extent of senior Russian commanders’ normalization and complicity in such atrocities. Demurchiev’s statements are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Russian military command is sanctioning the torture and execution of Ukrainian POWs.[25] Skhemi noted that the leaked messages also contained December 2024 infrared drone footage showing Russian forces murdering Ukrainian POWs near Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast. The far-right Russian paramilitary unit Rusich Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group also explicitly trumpeted imagery of executions of Ukrainian POWs and offered cash rewards for imagery of such executions in November 2025.[26] Russian forces’ circulation and amplification of execution footage on social media further legitimizes violence within the Russian military narrative, degrades the dignity of victims, and reinforces conditions that enable continued war crimes on the battlefield.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin continues cognitive warfare efforts to attempt to convince the West to abandon Ukraine by projecting the false narrative that Russian battlefield victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that Russian forces are making widespread battlefield gains.
The Kremlin continues to crack down on former pro-Russian proxy forces and separatist leaders who criticized the Kremlin to consolidate control over the Russian information space.
Russia’s war in Ukraine is increasingly impacting the Russian people, forcing the Russian Presidential Administration and the ruling United Russia Party to invest in mitigating strategies ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections.
Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities prevented a Russian attempt to assassinate prominent Ukrainians and destabilize Ukraine.
Leaked messages from a senior Russian general support ISW’s assessment that the Russian military command itself condones and encourages war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 20 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2026

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Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements. Five anonymous European intelligence agency heads told Reuters in an article published on February 19 that Putin does not want to end the war in Ukraine quickly.[1] The head of one European intelligence agency stated that the Kremlin’s strategic goals remain unchanged and include the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the imposition of Ukrainian neutrality. Reuters’ intelligence sources added that Ukraine’s cession of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would not satisfy Putin’s desire to overthrow Ukraine’s democratically-elected government and would not in and of itself lead to a final peace agreement, as Putin would then make further demands. The European intelligence heads’ statements are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Putin is committed to achieving his original war aims.[2] Putin has repeatedly indicated that his war aims extend beyond territory in eastern Ukraine and include changes to the NATO alliance that amount to a total restructuring of the European security architecture, Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations, severe limitations on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, and the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government.[3]

Senior Kremlin officials continued on February 18 to reject any resolution to Russia’s war that does not capitulate to all of Putin’s maximalist demands, supporting ISW’s assessment and the assessments laid out to Reuters by senior European intelligence officials. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Saudi Arabian state-owned television channel Al-Arabiya — the latest in a string of interviews Lavrov has given to media sources targeting international audiences.[4] Lavrov claimed that Russian and US delegations discussed their alleged “Alaska understanding” during recent talks in Geneva, alluding to alleged agreements that the Kremlin claims the United States and Russia reached at the August 2025 Alaska Summit based on Putin’s public demands for Ukrainian and NATO capitulation.[5] Lavrov claimed that this “understanding” addresses the alleged “root causes” of Russia‘s war in Ukraine, which Lavrov again claimed include Ukraine’s NATO aspirations and the Ukrainian government‘s alleged discrimination of ethnic Russians and the Kremlin-backed Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). Lavrov called for recognition of Russia’s illegal 2022 annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Lavrov further claimed that Ukraine has been the “main obstacle” to peace since 2014 and blamed the European Union (EU) for the failure of the Minsk Agreements, obfuscating Russia‘s own role in violating the Minsk Agreements and delaying ongoing peace talks.[6] Lavrov further denounced Western security guarantees for Ukraine as posing a threat to Russia.

Kremlin officials continue to indicate that Russia’s aims extend beyond simply removing Zelensky to the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in postwar Ukraine, further undermining the Russian narrative the demands are only tied to questions of territorial control. Lavrov claimed that former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Zelensky both discriminated against ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine.[7] Lavrov recently explicitly demanded that any future Ukrainian government be “friendly” toward Russia and “benevolent,” demonstrating that the Kremlin’s demands extend beyond the removal of Zelensky.[8] The Kremlin will not be satisfied with another democratically elected Ukrainian government that rejects Kremlin rule even if Ukraine gives in to Russia’s demand that it hold elections.

Western sources tied Putin’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s theory of victory. Reuters reported that one intelligence chief assessed that the “main issue” is that Putin neither wants nor needs a quick peace as the Russian economy is not on the verge of collapse.[9] Another Reuters source stated that Russia will face “very high” financial risks in the second half of 2026, however, as Western sanctions and Russia’s high borrowing costs have limited Russia’s access to capital markets. Putin has grossly mismanaged Russia’s economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[10] Russian oil and gas industries continue to suffer, with Bloomberg reporting on February 18 that Russian oil producers drilled 3.4 percent fewer production wells in 2025 compared to 2024 as Western sanctions and a strong ruble have reduced revenue.[11] Russian oil and gas revenues dropped in 2025 to a five-year low, and Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in September 2025 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[12] The Kremlin appears to currently believe that it can absorb and deal with these economic friction points in the immediate term. ISW assessed in February 2025, however, that Putin’s ability to manage these friction points is not indefinite. Putin will have to balance his theory of victory, which posits that the Russian economy can continue to support Russian battlefield advances longer than Ukraine is able to defend itself and the West is willing to support Ukraine, with the need to reckon with the increasingly difficult economic situation in Russia in 2026.[13] Putin is likely pushing for Ukraine and the West to capitulate now to Russia’s demands in negotiations before Putin must face these difficult economic decisions.[14]

The Kremlin is attempting to distract the United States with bilateral economic deals in order to secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine. Reuters reported that four of its European intelligence chief sources assessed that the Kremlin has been using talks with the United States over the past year to push for sanctions relief and bilateral business deals.[15] Two of the sources noted that Russia is trying to separate ongoing talks between those focused on the war in Ukraine and those focused on bilateral US-Russian deals. ISW has assessed since the Trump administration took office in early 2025 that the Kremlin has been trying to entice the United States with carrots unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral economic deals, to push the United States to agree to Russia’s demands related to the war.[16]

Kremlin officials continued on February 18 to try to push the United States to focus on improving US-Russian economic relations. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that US sanctions on Russia are costly for US businesses and that a US decision to lift its sanctions against Russia would therefore be in the United States’ best interest.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that “illegal” US sanctions are hindering the development of US-Russian trade and economic cooperation.[18] Peskov called on Russia and the United States to “revive” their relations in order to benefit from such cooperation. Lavrov noted to Al-Arabiya that Russia and the United States are engaging in bilateral economic working groups in addition to the ongoing trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks that aim to resolve the war in Ukraine.[19]

The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor. Advisor to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Gvozdiar reported on February 19 that the Ukrainian DIB has increased production fiftyfold since the start of the full-scale invasion, reaching an estimated $50 billion worth of production.[20] Gvozdiar stated that the Ukrainian DIB provides over 50 percent of the Ukrainian military’s needs and is expanding its joint production facilities with European states. Sweden announced on February 19 a new military aid package worth almost 12.9 billion Swedish kronor (about $1.4 billion), which includes short-range air defense systems and ammunition.[21] The package will also support projects expanding cooperation projects with Ukraine to procure and develop long-range drones and provide Ukraine with unmanned surface vehicles. Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB, and Western security and financial aid has helped Ukraine in past work towards this goal.[22] Ukraine’s partners stands to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian DIB in this endeavor, as Western states can use Ukraine’s experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle to bolster their defenses and domestic DIBs. The provision of air defenses to Ukraine is particularly necessary to not only defend Ukrainian cities in the rear and on the front but to defend Ukraine’s own defense industrial enterprises. The establishment of joint Ukrainian-European production facilities outside of Ukraine throughout Europe will also ensure Ukraine‘s continued production in the face of intensified Rusisan long-range strikes across the country.

Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 17 allegedly showing a Russian Geran-2 mothership drone releasing an FPV drone while flying over Sumy Oblast.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using Geran drones as signal repeaters for FPV drones, which separate from the mothership drone as they near the intended target. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces’ use of Geran-2 drones as aerial relays is particularly important after they lost access to Starlink terminals.[24] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov previously reported on February 3 that Russian forces began using Gerbera drones (which are the much cheaper decoy version of Russia’s Shahed/Geran drone) as mothership drones to carry strike or reconnaissance FPV drones, and Russian forces have used Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones in a similar capacity.[25] Geran motherships drones are likely able to continue toward their own targets after releasing their FPV drones to conduct significant strikes. Gerbera drones, in contrast, carry either very small or no explosive payloads so would either crash or result in a small explosion. Geran mothership drones carrying reconnaissance FPV drones would also be able to use the FPV drones to confirm or adjust the Geran’s own strike.

Key Takeaways

Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements.
Western sources tied Putin’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s theory of victory.
The Kremlin is attempting to distract the United States with bilateral economic deals in order to secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine.
The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor.
Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 19 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2026

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Ukrainian, US, and Russian representatives concluded trilateral and multilateral negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 18.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated that Ukrainian, US, and Russian representatives met in two groups focusing on military and political issues, respectively, on February 17 and 18.[2] Zelensky and Umerov noted that Ukrainian and US representatives also met with British, French, German, Italian, and Swiss representatives on February 17. Zelensky and Umerov stated that meetings on February 18 concerned security parameters and implementation mechanisms as well as humanitarian steps, such as prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges and the release of imprisoned civilians. Zelensky stated that the US representatives called on Russia and Ukraine to refrain from strikes, likely referring to long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, and reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to do so.[3] Reuters reported on February 18 that the talks lasted two hours.[4] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation to the February 17 to February 18 Geneva talks, stated that the negotiations were difficult but “businesslike.”[5]

Medinsky leading the Russian delegation to Geneva is notable as the Kremlin is likely using him to stall negotiations. Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov led the Russian delegation to the first two rounds of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late January and early February 2026, but Zelensky expressed concern on February 17 that the change in the delegation’s leadership suggests that Russia would use the Geneva talks to buy more time for its war effort.[6] Zelensky noted that Medinsky tends to discuss the so-called “historical roots” of the war, which Ukrainian and US officials have previously noted that Kremlin officials bring up during negotiations to stall discussions of a serious peace deal.[7]

Ukraine continues to offer significant concessions to advance the peace negotiations process, including compromising on territorial concessions. Zelensky told Axios on February 17 that Ukraine is prepared to discuss a troop withdrawal in Donbas but called on Russia to pull back Russian troops an equivalent distance.[8] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and the United States agree that the Ukrainian people would have to vote on any agreement to end the war, but noted that the Ukrainian people would reject a peace deal that involved Ukraine unilaterally withdrawing from eastern Donbas. Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to hold elections in line with Russia’s demands but noted that Ukraine needs a ceasefire to safely hold the elections. Zelensky reiterated the need for a bilateral meeting with Putin to negotiate territorial issues directly — a meeting that Putin has repeatedly refused.[9] US President Donald Trump notably stated after the August 2025 Alaska summit that Putin had agreed to meet with Zelensky, but Putin has not yet done so.[10]

Russian officials signaled that Russia would not be satisfied with just territorial concessions and reiterated commitment to Russia’s original war goals, which include dismantling the NATO alliance. The Russian Embassy in Belgium told Russian state Izvestia newspaper on February 17 that Russia will demand that NATO legally enshrine a non-expansion clause in accordance with a “draft treaty” that Russia created in December 2021 — referring to Russia’s December 2021 pre-war ultimatums of the United States and NATO.[11] These ultimatums amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance by calling for NATO to halt deployment of forces or weapons systems to member states that joined NATO after 1997.[12] These ultimatums also aimed to force the West to reverse its “open door” policy, rule out eastward enlargement, and abandon partnerships on NATO’s eastern flank, including Ukraine.[13] These demands of Ukraine and NATO are part of Russia’s original war demands, and a Russian embassy reiterating these demands amid ongoing negotiations continues to signal that Russia would not be satisfied with a deal that does not concede to all these demands of Ukraine, NATO, and the United States — even if the deal meets some of Russia’s territorial demands. through its demands of NATO[14]

Russian officials, including Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, invoked on February 17 and 18 the so-called “spirit” or “understandings” that the US and Russian delegations allegedly reached during the August 2025 Alaska summit.[15] Kremlin officials often attempt to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the Alaska summit to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine, and present the agreement in ways that benefit Russia — including by obfuscating Russia’s own efforts to impede the peace process.[16] This “understanding” remains ambiguous as there have been no formal agreements as a result of the meeting, with Trump noting after the summit that the US and Russian delegations reached “no deal.”[17] Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated their commitment to achieving their original war aims militarily or diplomatically and have demonstrated no willingness to compromise from these aims to achieve a peace in Ukraine.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting informational conditions to restart limited, rolling involuntary reserve call-ups as Russia appears to be struggling to replace its losses in Ukraine with existing force generation mechanisms. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on February 18 that would strengthen preventative measures against the “distortion of historical truth” and “evasion of the duty to defend the Fatherland.”[19] The bill likely aims to provide Russia with a legal justification to prosecute Russians who criticize involuntary reserve call-ups. Russian State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption Deputy Chairperson Anatoly Vyborny stated that the bill’s primary objective is to shape the Russian public consciousness to think of evading service to the Russian “Motherland” as “socially unacceptable.”[20] The Kremlin has also throttled Telegram in recent days, likely in an attempt to consolidate control over the information space and limit criticisms of the Russian government or war effort.[21] Putin likely seeks to normalize limited, rolling call-ups in an effort to sustain the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine, rather than conduct another partial call-up as in September 2022 or declare general mobilization. Putin likely aims to use these limited call-ups to maintain Russia’s loss rates and the current tempo of offensive operations — not to significantly build up the Russian force grouping fighting in Ukraine and flood the front with more forces.

The Kremlin has been setting conditions to allow it to conduct a rolling, involuntary reserve call-up since at least October 2025.[22] The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved a bill in October 2025 that would allow Russia to deploy reservists from its active reserve in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.[23] The bill also allows the Kremlin to mobilize active reservists to perform special tasks in armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on November 4, 2025, allowing the Russian military to conduct conscription processes year-round rather than only twice a year, which may improve Russia’s military registration and enlistment offices’ administrative capacity to process the rolling involuntary reserve call-ups amidst the semi-annual conscription cycles.[24] Putin signed another decree on December 8, 2025, authorizing the compulsory call-up of an unspecified number of Russian inactive reservists who will undergo compulsory “military assemblies” in the Russian Armed Forces, National Guard (Rosgvardia), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Emergency Situations military rescue units, and other state security agencies in 2026.[25] ISW assessed that that decree would likely allow the Kremlin to covertly call up members of its strategic inactive reserve.[26]

Putin is resorting to preparations for further involuntary reserve call-ups from a place of weakness, as Russia is likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near exhaustion of its expensive voluntary recruitment system in 2026. Putin has long been trying to balance “butter and guns” – the need to prevent societal discontent about another large-scale partial involuntary reserve call-up, the need to maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the battlefield, and the need to maintain the workforce in both the civilian and defense industrial sectors of the already strained Russian economy. The September 2022 partial call-up of 300,000 reservists led to widescale domestic backlash and the exodus of an estimated 700,000 to 900,000 economically mobile Russians from the country.[27] Putin must balance the workforce needs of the Russian economy, which Russian officials have stated will require at least 2.4 million additional workers by 2030.[28] Russia is already suffering from labor shortages, and the Kremlin has claimed that Russian manufacturing industries have a shortage of about 800,000 workers, while trade, construction, and service industries have a shortage of about 1.5 million workers — all due to Russia’s war effort.[29] A large-scale call-up would potentially take thousands of workers away from not only the civilian sectors of the economy, but the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), affecting Russia’s ability to produce enough materiel to maintain its battlefield tempo.

The Russian military must simultaneously maintain its force generation mechanisms to, at a minimum, replace Russia’s battlefield losses. Russian officials have indicated that Russia’s recruitment rate has been barely able to replace its monthly loss rates for much of the war, but Russia’s ability to recruit volunteers to fight in Ukraine appears to be slowing.[30] Bloomberg reported on February 11, citing Western officials, that Russia sustained about 9,000 more battlefield casualties than it was able to replace in January 2026 after years of Russia’s recruitment rate meeting its replacement rate.[31] The Russian military’s ability to replace its losses is crucial for Putin’s theory of victory, which rests on the assumption that the Russian military can maintain its current advances, albeit slow and grinding, long enough to outlast Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and the West’s willingness to support Ukraine.[32]

Putin has refused to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call-up since September 2022, despite the slowing tempo of Russian advances in recent years and the Russian military’s consistent inability to achieve Putin’s strategic objectives on the battlefield. Putin likely fears more domestic backlash like that the Kremlin experienced in the aftermath of the September 2022 call-up, and Kremlin officials have repeatedly attempted to quell any fears of another call-up in recent years by claiming that Russia’s ongoing force generation recruitment mechanisms are sufficient and Russia does not need another call-up.[33] The Kremlin is also facing social pressure to conduct rotations and relieve mobilized servicemen who had fought in Ukraine since Fall 2022. Russian society, including ultranationalist milbloggers, has consistently complained about Russia’s poor conduct of the September 2022 partial involuntary reserve call-up and the need for Russia to provide some relief to mobilized personnel still fighting on the frontline.[34] A Russian source suggested that about 78,000 Russian personnel mobilized in September 2022 were fighting against Ukraine as of May 2025.[35]

ISW assessed in February 2025 that the high personnel, economic, and societal costs of Russia’s war would force the Kremlin to make difficult choices about.[36] The Kremlin’s efforts to prepare Russian society for more partial reserve callups suggest that Putin is now grappling with these difficult choices in February 2026, four years into the war, as ISW previously forecasted. The Kremlin is likely pushing for Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s long-held demands in ongoing peace negotiations imminently to secure its war aims without having to make uncomfortable sacrifices to do so.

Russian officials’ messaging about the recent throttling of Telegram remains disjointed as the Kremlin attempts to navigate the repeated backlash the restrictions have generated among Russian milbloggers. Kremlin officials, including Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov, recently denied that Russian forces were significantly using Telegram on the frontline or even using the platform at all.[37] Peskov’s and Kartapolov’s claims sparked significant milblogger backlash, and Kremlin officials appear now to be backtracking on these previous claims. Russian Minister of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Maksut Shadayev acknowledged on February 18 that Russian forces began using Telegram at the start of the full-scale invasion, but claimed that Russian authorities have not made a decision to restrict Telegram in the war zone in Ukraine at this time.[38] Shadayev stated that he hopes Russian forces will adapt and switch to using Russian platforms “within some time.” Chief of the Main Communications Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces Lieutenant General Valery Tishkov also acknowledged on February 17 that Russian forces were using Starlink terminals on the frontline but claimed that only “individual” Russian units were using the terminals and “primarily to mislead Ukrainian forces.”[39] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov claimed on February 18 that Russian troops at command posts use chats on both Telegram and Russian state messaging platform Max and that “everything is functioning properly.”[40] Solovyov claimed that Russian authorities are not slowing down or blocking Telegram, so any Russian units experiencing communications issues with Telegram should submit a request to their superiors directly to resolve the problem.

Kremlin officials’ and affiliates’ February 17 and 18 statements acknowledged that Russian forces have been using Telegram but still attempted to downplay the consequences of the recent SpaceX block on Russian forces’ usage of Starlinks, likely to address the continued backlash within the information space about the Telegram restrictions. Some Russian milbloggers, however, continued on February 18 to criticize Kremlin officials, particularly Shadayev, for dismissing the negative effects of the latest Telegram restrictions.[41] The varying Kremlin claims about whether or not Russian forces use Telegram on the battlefield continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin is sensitive to Russian milblogger complaints, a key pro-war community that the Kremlin has long sought to coopt and control.[42]

The Kremlin is looking for new excuses to justify its intensified Telegram censorship campaign. Shadayev also attempted on February 18 to justify the decision to throttle Telegram, claiming that foreign intelligence agencies are now “systematically” accessing Russian troops’ Telegram correspondence in order to gain information to use against Russian forces.[43] Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor initially stated on February 10 that it throttled Telegram in order to force it to comply with Russian laws and called for Telegram to protect Russian citizens from fraud and to combat extremism and terrorism.[44] The Kremlin appears to be trying to find new ways to justify the decision to significantly restrict Telegram, likely in response to the widespread backlash. The Kremlin may hope that claims that foreign intelligence services were exploiting Telegram to harm Russian forces on the battlefield will appeal to the pro-war, ultranationalist milblogger community.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian, US, and Russian representatives concluded trilateral and multilateral negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 18.
Ukraine continues to offer significant concessions to advance the peace negotiations process, including compromising on territorial concessions.
Russian officials signaled that Russia would not be satisfied with just territorial concessions and reiterated commitment to Russia’s original war goals, which include dismantling the NATO alliance.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting informational conditions to restart limited, rolling involuntary reserve call-ups as Russia appears to be struggling to replace its losses in Ukraine with existing force generation mechanisms.
Putin likely aims to use these limited call-ups to maintain Russia’s loss rates and the current tempo of offensive operations — not to significantly build up the Russian force grouping fighting in Ukraine and flood the front with more forces.
The Kremlin has been setting conditions to allow it to conduct a rolling, involuntary reserve call-up since at least October 2025.
Putin is resorting to preparations for further involuntary reserve call-ups from a place of weakness, as Russia is likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near exhaustion of its expensive voluntary recruitment system in 2026.
The Kremlin is likely pushing for Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s long-held demands in ongoing peace negotiations imminently to secure its war aims without having to make uncomfortable sacrifices to do so.
Russian officials’ messaging about the recent throttling of Telegram remains disjointed as the Kremlin attempts to navigate the repeated backlash the restrictions have generated among Russian milbloggers.
The Kremlin is looking for new excuses to justify its intensified Telegram censorship campaign.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Velykyi Burluk.

read the full Feb 18 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2026

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Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 16 to 17 — the eve of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Geneva. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 425 drones and missiles against Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Russian forces launched 396 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drone types — of which roughly 250 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 29 missiles, including four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea; 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea; four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast; and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile from the airspace over occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 367 drones and 25 missiles, including all of the Iskander-K, Kh-101, and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the four ballistic missiles and 18 strike drones struck 13 locations and that falling debris fell at eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and transport infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[2] Russian strikes caused power outages for at least 28,000 consumers in Kharkiv Oblast and tens of thousands of people in Odesa City.[3]

Russian forces have been launching large strike packages in recent months in the days before and after bilateral and trilateral negotiations but are likely refraining from fully maximizing Russia’s strike capabilities in order to avoid upsettin US President Donald Trump. Russian forces have consistently launched large strike packages of roughly 400 to 700 drones and missiles in the days right before and after major negotiations in recent months, such as the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska summit, the November 2025 US-Ukraine talks in Geneva, the November 2025 US-Russian talks in Moscow, US-Ukrainian-European and US-Russian talks in December 2025, and two rounds of US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi in late January and early February 2026.[4] The largest Russian strike package of the war thus far consisted of 823 drones and missiles in early September 2025, and all the strike packages Russian forces have launched around these bilateral and trilateral talks are far below this record.[5] Ukrainian officials warned in Summer 2025 that Russia intended to increase its strike packages to include over 1,000 drones per day by Fall 2025, and Russia may be deliberately curtailing the size of these strike packages to maintain the facade that the Kremlin is interested in meaningful negotiations and to avoid Trump’s ire.[6]

The ongoing talks in Geneva will reportedly discuss another possible short-term moratorium on energy strikes.[7] Russia used similar moratoriums in March-April 2025 and in January-February 2026 to claim it was interested in peace while stockpiling drones and missiles for subsequent devastating strikes after the moratorium lifted.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on the evening of February 16, citing Ukrainian intelligence, that Russian forces were preparing another large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[9] The Kremlin may seek to portray its compliance with another moratorium on energy strikes as a major Russian concession while preparing to launch another devastating strike against Ukraine in the near future.[10]

Russian strike packages against Ukraine are dangerous regardless of their size. Russian strike packages — even those below 500 drones and missiles — have inflicted devastating damage on Ukraine’s energy and civilian infrastructure.[11] Russian forces have been altering their strike tactics, warheads, and the composition of their strike packages in order to maximize damage and disproportionately impact civilians, especially as Russia has intensified its efforts in recent months to collapse the Ukrainian energy grid.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces launched 96 ballistic missiles in January 2026 — the largest number of ballistic missiles that Russian forces have launched during a single month of the war thus far.[13] Ukraine has adapted its air defense to down many but not all the Russian drones and missiles in a strike package, and Russian forces have concentrated their fire on targets for devastating effects. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukrainian forces downed all the cruise missiles that Russia launched on February 16 to 17, mostly with Ukrainian F-16 and Mirage fighter jets.[14] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces did not down any of the ballistic missiles overnight. Ukraine requires advanced Western-provided air defense systems to down ballistic missiles, forcing Ukraine to husband Western-provided systems and missiles, which remain in very short supply.[15]

Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated media sources reaffirmed Russia’s unwillingness to compromise as trilateral talks started in Geneva on February 17. US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations began trilateral talks in Geneva on February 17 and will continue on February 18.[16] A source told Kremlin newswire TASS that the talks will cover at least five tracks — territorial, military, political, economic, and security issues.[17] ISW will continue to monitor reports about the trilateral talks in the coming days.

Russian State Duma deputies and Federation Council senators, whose target audience is the Russian population and who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s true diplomatic and military aims, continue to advance the Kremlin’s boilerplate rhetorical lines about Russia’s original war demands that go beyond territory in eastern Ukraine. Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that Ukraine will only be able to “win” when it joins the Russian Federation — reiterating Russia’s long-term goal of destroying an independent Ukraine.[18] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Yuri Shvytkin claimed that Russia’s military achievements and technological superiority create a “favorable backdrop” for a future diplomatic settlement — furthering the Kremlin’s false narrative that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia’s demands now at the negotiating table out of fear of future Russian actions on the battlefield.[19] Deputies and senators continued to claim that Russia should only negotiate with the United States, and that Russia and the United States together should act in the “spirit of Anchorage” — a reference to the Kremlin’s insistence that the United States and Russia came to an alleged agreement during the August 2025 Alaska Summit to end the war based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public demands for Ukrainian and NATO capitulation.[20]

Russian ultranationalist television network Tsargrad published an op-ed by a Russian journalist that claimed that Russia is trying to use ongoing negotiations to “create the impression” that Russia seriously desires to resolve the most complex issues in the war.[21] The journalist claimed that Russia will only be able to achieve peace on its terms when the Ukrainian frontlines collapse, which the article claimed is “still a long way off.” The journalist claimed that the Russian delegation must not give Ukraine and the West any reason to blame Russia for the lack of progress in the negotiations. Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev founded Tsargrad, which serves an informational role of conditioning the Russian nationalist community to support the Kremlin’s war effort.[22] Malofeev often appeals to Russian nationalists to convince them that Russia has no other choice but to fight against Ukraine and NATO. The op-ed in Tsargrad likely aims to condition Russian ultranationalists — a key constituency of Putin — to believe that Russia has no intention of abandoning its original war aims or of compromising to end Russia’s war. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has not prepared Russian society for the idea of possible Russian concessions and compromises to end the war.[23]

Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev used escalatory language to try to push the West to stop the seizures of Russian shadow fleet tankers. Patrushev responded in an interview with Russian state newspaper Argumenty i Fakty (AiF) published on February 17 to recent Western seizures of Russian shadow fleet oil tankers.[24] Patrushev claimed that Russia must give a “firm rebuff” to alleged British, French, and Baltic attempts to block Russia’s access to the Atlantic Basin. Patrushev stated that Russia must have a permanent naval presence in the “main maritime directions” around the world in order to deter ”Western pirates.” Patrushev accused European countries of pursuing military escalation and NATO of planning to blockade Kaliningrad Oblast. Patrushev warned that the Russian Navy would forcibly break any future blockade if the parties cannot resolve the situation peacefully. Patrushev claimed that the Russian Navy, which he described as the “most powerful and flexible geopolitical instrument” of the Russian armed forces, can counter alleged Western attempts to paralyze Russia’s foreign trade. Patrushev called for BRICS to take on a “full-fledged strategic maritime dimension.” Patrushev implicitly accused the United States and Europe of trying to impose a blockade on Russia — an exaggerated response to the seizures of a few Russian tankers, including those as far from Russia as the Indian Ocean and Caribbean Sea.[25] Patrushev is trying to claim that Russia would view any Western interference with Russia’s illegal shadow fleet as a blockade on Russia that would justify an aggressive Russian response. These efforts aim to intimidate the Trump administration and push the United States and Europe to stop their tank seizures. The Russian Navy cannot credibly back up such escalatory threats, however.Patrushev baselessly criticized Finland for preparing to attack Russia. Patrushev particularly highlighted Finland in his wider criticisms of NATO’s alleged preparation for offensive action against Russia.[26] Patrushev complained that Finland, which is Russia’s direct northwestern neighbor and shares a land and maritime border, is acquiring corvettes with weapons that can easily reach northwestern Russia. Patrushev’s complaints are meaningless, as Finnish vessels docked within Finnish waters would inherently be able to strike northwestern Russia given their geographic proximity. Patrushev’s February 17 complaints about Finland are only the latest in a string of Kremlin threats against Finland that aim to set conditions to justify any possible future Russian aggression against NATO.[27]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 16 to 17 — the eve of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Geneva.
Russian forces have been launching large strike packages in recent months in the days before and after bilateral and trilateral negotiations but are likely refraining from fully maximizing Russia’s strike capabilities in order to avoid upsetting US President Donald Trump.
Russian strike packages against Ukraine are dangerous regardless of their size.
Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated media sources reaffirmed Russia’s unwillingness to compromise as trilateral talks started in Geneva on February 17.
Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev used escalatory language to try to push the West to stop the seizures of Russian shadow fleet tankers.
·Patrushev baselessly criticized Finland for preparing to attack Russia.
Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.

read the full Feb 17 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2026

Toplines

Russian officials are unlikely to deviate from their original war demands during the upcoming February 17 to 18 trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Geneva, Switzerland. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 16 that Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky will head the Russian delegation at the upcoming trilateral meetings.[1] Peskov noted that the Russian delegation will also include Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin and Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Kostyukov.[2] Peskov stated that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev will be in Geneva but will be attending a working group on economic cooperation, likely referring to the US-Russian bilateral economic group.[3]

Peskov stated that the Geneva talks would discuss a “broader” range of issues than previous talks in Abu Dhabi and would particularly discuss territorial issues.[4] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that the Kremlin has instructed the Russian delegation to act within the framework that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump allegedly agreed to during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[5] Kremlin officials have previously claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin insisted on capitulation to Russia’s demands of both Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[6] The Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated its full commitment to achieving its original war aims, including those not related to territory in eastern Ukraine.[7]

Russia may try to exploit another temporary moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure to falsely claim that Russia is making a concession. Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated on February 14 that Ukraine will raise the issue of another temporary energy strikes ceasefire in the Geneva meetings.[8] Russia has previously used temporary moratoriums on energy strikes in March-April 2025 and in January-February 2026 to stockpile drones and missiles for subsequent devastating strikes.[9] The Kremlin agreed to the January-February 2026 moratorium on strikes against some Ukrainian energy infrastructure only after inflicting severe damage to Ukraine’s national energy grid. The Kremlin will likely again try to portray its adherence to any future short-term moratorium as a significant concession, even though the Kremlin will likely use those days to stockpile weapons for larger strike packages. Russian forces have also already degraded Ukraine’s energy grid such that Ukraine faces major power issues even when Russia temporarily stops its strikes. Ukraine’s energy grid suffered significant shutdowns during the January-February 2025 strikes moratorium due to the months and years worth of damage the grid had already sustained.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 14 that Russian strikes have damaged every power plant in Ukraine, and Ukraine may again face major power issues during a future moratorium.[11]

Russia appears to be investing in centralized incubators for drone technology and is setting up bespoke roles and units to support specific drone capability development efforts. These drone capability development efforts include supporting drone units’ ability to conduct tactical tasks that support Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, as well as drone-based air defense. Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated on February 16 that the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment), which Rogozin oversees, is expanding its roster of specialized roles, expanding combat units, and conducting additional recruitment.[12] The BARS-Sarmat Center is a key research and development (R&D) organization for Russian drone capabilities and develops and tests hardware and operational concepts before proliferating new technologies and drone tactics more broadly across Russian drone units.[13] The official Telegram channel of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center stated that the center is not just a group of drone operators but a comprehensive structure that integrates reconnaissance, strike capabilities, electronic warfare (EW), engineering development, production, and training under one organization.[14] The BARS-Sarmat Center stated that it also includes two specialized detachments — the ”Dnepr” and ”Stalingrad” detachments — which specialize in operating drones at operational depths of up to 30 to 35 kilometers and a separate “Bagration” air defense detachment, which specializes in intercepting Ukrainian drones using unmanned systems. The BARS-Sarmat Center stated that it is developing a “new” military specialty role called the “soldier technologist” — a role likely designed to facilitate the development and integration of drone capabilities across Russian combat forces writ large. The BARS-Sarmat Center also includes a specialized detachment — the Ustinov Scientific and Technical Detachment — which manufactures and modernizes equipment considering combat experience from the front. Each of these new units notably focuses on different elements of Russia’s BAI campaign, including enabling mid-range strikes, interceptor drones, and technological adaptations. Russia’s BAI campaigns have been largely responsible for facilitating Russian advances on the battlefield in Fall and Winter 2025. Russia’s investment in specialized units meant to develop, refine, and proliferate Russian drone capabilities is noteworthy. ISW previously observed reports that Russian plans to reorganize the BARS-Sarmat Center and at least five separate Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) regiments into six USF brigades, and the further development and expansion of the center may allow Russia to more quickly disseminate successful drone developments across the Russian military.[15]

The Kremlin appears to be adapting its tactics to conduct sabotage attacks in Europe. Western intelligence officials stated to the Financial Times (FT) on February 15 that former Wagner Group recruiters, who previously recruited Russians to fight in Ukraine, are now organizing Kremlin-sponsored sabotage attacks in Europe.[16] Sources told FT that the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) is leveraging Wagner’s recruitment network in Europe while attempting to maintain at least two degrees of separation from the agents to maintain plausible deniability. The Wagner Group recruiters are reportedly trying to attract Europeans, particularly those who are “economically vulnerable” or lack purpose or direction in their lives, to conduct arson attacks or to pose as putative Nazi propagandists in Europe. FT‘s February 15 report follows earlier reports that Russia’s sabotage campaign deintensified in 2025, likely as the Kremlin reassessed its tactics.[17] US and European officials told Bloomberg in August 2025 that the decline may have been due to Kremlin efforts to regain control over the unreliable local criminals it often used for these attacks.[18] The officials noted at the time that many potential recruits were likely less willing to participate in Russia’s attacks, given that several agents were arrested and prosecuted. The GRU also reportedly was redirecting resources away from the European sabotage campaign and towards the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin began a campaign to reassert control over the Wagner Group and other irregular forces and integrate them into Russian state services starting in late 2022 and intensified this campaign following the Wagner Group’s mutiny in June 2023.[19] The GRU appears to be leveraging former Wagner Group elements to fulfill the GRU’s needs in Europe, potentially allowing the GRU to focus more of its organic resources on Ukraine. Russia may reintensify its sabotage campaign in 2026 by shifting from using unreliable organized crime networks to financially motivated individual agents.

At least one Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile did not cause damage to Russia’s Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast in January 2025. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) outlet published on February 16 satellite imagery collected on an unspecified date showing a six-meter crater near the fence of a preparation area at Kapustin Yar.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike series that included Flamingo missiles against Kapustin Yar in January 2025 and later stated that the strikes damaged a technical facility that serviced missiles, an assembly building, and a logistics warehouse.[21] This recent satellite imagery suggests that at least one of the Flamingo missiles reached Kapustin Yar but that it either missed its intended target or that Russian forces intercepted the missile. The available satellite imagery is limited in scope, and other Ukrainian missiles may have struck other areas of Kapustin Yar. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 16 that Ukrainian forces launched four total Flamingo missiles in the strike package.[22]

Key Takeaways

Russian officials are unlikely to deviate from their original war demands during the upcoming February 17 to 18 trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Geneva, Switzerland.
Russia may try to exploit another temporary moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure to falsely claim that Russia is making a concession.
Russia appears to be investing in centralized incubators for drone technology and is setting up bespoke roles and units to support specific drone capability development efforts. These drone capability development efforts include supporting drone units’ ability to conduct tactical tasks that support Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, as well as drone-based air defense.
The Kremlin appears to be adapting its tactics to conduct sabotage attacks in Europe.
At least one Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile did not cause damage to Russia’s Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast in January 2025.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.

read the full Feb 16 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 15, 2026

Toplines

The Kremlin continues to discuss future elections in Ukraine to advance its false claim that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and insists on means of controlling Ukraine’s politics. In an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on February 15, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin repeated the debunked claim that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is “illegitimate” and said that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 2025 proposal for the United Nations (UN) to create a temporary external administration in Ukraine is still an option.[1] Galuzin claimed that UN governance would allow for “democratic” elections and the establishment of a government with which Russia can sign a peace treaty and “legitimate” documents on future bilateral cooperation – implying that Russia cannot sign binding agreements with the current Ukrainian government and that any future elections that the current government would oversee would be undemocratic. The Kremlin’s calls for UN governance over Ukraine are a rejection of Ukraine’s sovereignty and legitimacy. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and White House National Security Council Spokesperson James Hewitt rejected such proposals when Putin first presented them in March 2025, stating that UN governance would be a violation of the legitimate Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian Constitution, and the Ukrainian people’s right of choice.[2] The Kremlin’s proposal for UN election oversight is an attempt to give Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, veto power over any resolution that does not establish a UN governance system that will produce Russia’s desired outcome of a pro-Kremlin political arrangement in Kyiv.

The Kremlin continues to signal that it will reject any election result that does not produce such a pro-Russia government in Ukraine. Galuzin claimed that Ukraine will try to prevent “Ukrainian citizens” living in Russia from voting in a future Ukrainian election.[3] The Kremlin is setting conditions to claim that any future Ukrainian election that does not “sufficiently” allow “Ukrainians” under Russian control to vote is not free and fair. It is far from clear how the Kremlin would determine who is a Ukrainian for purposes of voting, considering the intensive, forced passportization efforts Russia has undertaken to coerce Ukrainians in territories under Russian control to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship in favor of Russian citizenship.[4] The Kremlin’s pressure on Ukraine to hold an election before a final peace agreement comes into effect ensures that Ukrainian authorities would be completely unable to oversee electoral processes within the Russian Federation, always granting that the Kremlin would give any Ukrainian government it does not already control the right to do so. The Kremlin likely further aims to use “Ukrainians,” or at least those whom the Russians decide are Ukrainians for purposes of the election, voting in Russia to enable massive Russian election interference. Galuzin trumpeted the 2024 Russian presidential election as alleged evidence of the viability of wartime elections. Kremlin officials have similarly claimed that Russia’s illegal sham referendums in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022 show that Ukraine does not need an extended ceasefire to hold elections.[5] Russian elections and referendums in 2022 and 2024 were neither free nor fair; they were autocratic and rigged.[6] The Russian legal regime in place during those events, moreover, did not explicitly ban elections, whereas the Ukrainian Constitution and martial law legislation do. Zelensky has repeatedly indicated his intent to hold free, fair, and democratic elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and law as soon as possible.[7]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently claimed that any postwar Ukraine must be ”friendly“ and ”benevolent” to Russia, explicitly rejecting any future Ukrainian government that is not pro-Kremlin.[8] Russian insistence on elections in Ukraine as somehow tied to the legitimacy of any peace agreement is disingenuous, as the Kremlin has made it clear that it will deny the legitimacy of any Ukrainian government that does not allow Russian control over its composition and political orientation. ISW will outline Russia’s efforts to use calls for Ukrainian elections to manipulate the Ukrainian political process and establish the narrative basis for violating any peace agreements made with the current Ukrainian government in a forthcoming special report.

Long-term, meaningful US security guarantees for Ukraine must precede a war termination agreement to prevent the Kremlin from following through on its stated intent to reject such guarantees after Ukraine has committed to ceding territory. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 14 that he met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and had a telephone conversation with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner.[9] Zelensky stated that the United States is proposing security guarantees for post-war Ukraine that would last 15 years but called for guarantees for at least 20 years, if not longer.[10] Zelensky also called on the United States to provide security guarantees “first” – echoing Zelensky’s February 14 statement that any security guarantees agreement must precede any war termination agreement.[11] Zelensky stated that Russia is looking to control the whole of Ukraine – in line with ISW’s long-running assessments.[12] Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected any meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[13] Any future Ukrainian territorial concessions made before a US-Ukrainian security guarantees agreement would commit Ukraine to the withdrawals before security guarantees are in place and without reason to expect that Russia would even accept such guarantees.[14] Russian officials also repeatedly rejected US President Donald Trump’s and Zelensky’s proposal for a ceasefire that would allow for a sustainable peace agreement to be concluded and implemented.[15] ISW continues to assess that accepting the Kremlin’s demanded sequencing of agreements runs the high risk of leaving Ukraine open to rapidly renewed Russian attack with no assurance of US or other partner military support to deter or respond to such an attack and therefore of producing a “peace agreement” likely to fail rapidly.

Russia’s long-term goal is to occupy all of Ukraine, and Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to justify Russia’s territorial expansion in the face of pressure to negotiate a peace settlement. Kremlin rhetoric and Russia’s efforts on the battlefield indicate that Russia’s objectives extend beyond simply controlling territory in Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations across the entire frontline, rather than focusing their efforts on seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. ISW observed a report that the Russian military command is also preparing for a possible summer 2026 offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] Kremlin officials often claim that all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts are part of the Russian Federation and that Russia intends for areas of occupied Kharkiv Oblast to act as a “buffer zone” to protect occupied Luhansk Oblast.[17] The Kremlin has also demonstrated its commitment to its original war aims, including the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government that would grant Russia political control over Ukraine even if Russia does not physically control all of its territory.[18] Consistent Kremlin rhetoric about Russia’s commitment to its original war aims, particularly statements aimed at domestic audiences in Russia, demonstrates that the Kremlin is not preparing Russian society to give up on these original goals.[19] The Kremlin’s repeated rejections of meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine aim to set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression in the future at a time of its choosing in pursuit of these wider, long-term goals.

General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to aggrandize Russian seizures of small villages and fields to influence ongoing negotiations and push the West and Ukraine to give in to Russian territorial demands. Gerasimov claimed on February 15 that Russian forces seized 12 settlements and 200 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in the first half of February 2026.[20] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized roughly 203 square kilometers between February 1 and 14. Gerasimov made a big deal out of Russian gains in tiny villages throughout the frontline in an effort to frame these advances as significant. Gerasimov’s report obscures the fact that the seizures of these small villages and open fields do not require the same resources and effort as large, well-defended cities like those that Russian forces will have to take to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russian aggrandizement of the seizures of tiny villages also takes advantage of the fact that most people have no idea where or how large the named locations are.

Gerasimov attempted to downplay Ukrainian successes in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. Gerasimov acknowledged recent Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole direction but claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces are repelling the attacks. Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces continue to expand the “buffer zone” in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and highlighted the claimed seizures of Sydorivka and Popivka (both northwest of Sumy City). ISW previously assessed that Russian forces were conducting limited cross-border attacks in previously dormant areas of northern Sumy Oblast to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing and that Ukraine should concede to all of Russia’s demands.[21]

Russian gains continue to move at a footpace and do not portend the collapse of the Ukrainian lines. Russia’s weekly advances between late November 2025 and mid-February 2026 have fluctuated widely. At their height, Russian forces seized 141 square kilometers the week of January 25-31, but Russian gains subsequently fell to 74 square kilometers in the past week (February 8 to 14). Ukrainian forces liberated territory in November and December 2025, decreasing Russian gains during some weeks. Ukrainian forces liberated territory in the Kharkiv, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions in late November and early December, such that Russian forces lost control over 106 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian forces also liberated much of Kupyansk and its surroundings in late December, and Russian forces lost control over 305 square kilometers.

Recent Ukrainian tactical counterattacks have reportedly liberated multiple small settlements along the Yanchur and Haichur rivers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 15 that the tempo of Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions began to slow about one week ago (starting roughly February 8) and has since largely stopped.[22] Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces have been able to significantly reduce Russian advances in a few narrow sectors of the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions, pushing Russian forces back nine to 9.5 kilometers in some areas. Mashovets, noted, however, that Ukrainian forces are not conducting a “counteroffensive” – in line with recent Ukrainian official statements denying Russian milblogger claims that Ukrainian forces launched a “counteroffensive” in the area.[23] ISW uses the term “counteroffensive” to refer to a large-scale operational-level undertaking such as those that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast and western Kherson Oblast in 2022. It uses the term “counterattack” to refer to the smaller, tactical actions Ukrainian forces have been conducting recently in Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from Oleksiivka and Orestopil and advanced to Berezove and Ternove (all southeast of Oleksandrivka). Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces also pushed Russian forces from Danylivka; liberated Vyshneve, Yehorivka, Zlahoda, and Rybne (all southeast of Oleksandrivka along the Yanchur River); and are fighting for Pryvilne (just southeast of Rybne along the Yanchur River).

Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from Ternuvate and Kosivtseve (both northwest of Hulyaipole), crossed the Haichur River, liberated Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole and east of the Haichur River), and are currently operating east of Dobropillya. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from Pryluky and Olenokostyantynivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), crossed the Haichur River, and have begun fighting for Varvarivka (just south of Pryluky and east of the Haichur River). Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks along the Tsvitkove-Zaliznychne line (northwest to west of Hulyaipole) stopped Russian advances but that Russian forces still advanced up to 1.2 kilometers south of Zaliznynche.

These Ukrainian counterattacks are likely leveraging the recent block on Russian forces’ access to Starlink, which Russian milbloggers have claimed is causing communications and command and control (C2) issues on the battlefield.[24] Mashovets reported on February 5 that the Russian military command is preparing for the summer 2026 offensive in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction and/or the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City direction but that Russian forces are struggling to seize the necessary starting positions to launch the offensive on the command’s intended timeline.[25] Recent tactical Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions have likely further hindered Russian forces’ ability to properly prepare for a summer offensive toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City from the east.

Russia is reportedly testing a stratospheric communications system as an alternative to Starlink, which some Russian milbloggers have already dismissed as an inadequate replacement. The Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects, a Kremlin-established advanced military research agency, claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on February 12 that Russia conducted the maiden flight of the Barrage-1 unmanned stratospheric platform, which could carry 5G Non-Terrestrial Network (NTN) off-ground communications equipment.[26] The research agency claimed that the platform can carry up to 100 kilograms and fly at an altitude of 20 kilometers. Russian milbloggers framed the test of the Barrage-1 as part of efforts to find an alternative to Starlink after Russian forces in Ukraine recently lost access to the SpaceX system.[27] Russian milbloggers cautioned, however, that Barrage is not a full replacement for Starlink, with one Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stating that a single launched aerostat cannot replace a low-orbit constellation of several thousand satellites but may play a role in a layered communications system.[28] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov called on Ukrainian forces to use S-300 air defense systems to strike objects like the Barrage-1 system at altitudes of 20-30 kilometers.[29]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin continues to discuss future elections in Ukraine to advance its false claim that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and insists on means of controlling Ukraine’s politics.
The Kremlin continues to signal that it will reject any election result that does not produce such a pro-Russia government in Ukraine.
Long-term, meaningful US security guarantees for Ukraine must precede a war termination agreement to prevent the Kremlin from following through on its stated intent to reject such guarantees after Ukraine has committed to ceding territory.
General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to aggrandize Russian seizures of small villages and fields to influence ongoing negotiations and push the West and Ukraine to give in to Russian territorial demands.
Russian gains continue to move at a footpace and do not portend the collapse of the Ukrainian lines.
Recent Ukrainian tactical counterattacks have reportedly liberated multiple small settlements along the Yanchur and Haichur rivers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.
Russia is reportedly testing a stratospheric communications system as an alternative to Starlink, which some Russian milbloggers have already dismissed as an inadequate replacement.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.

read the full Feb 15 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2026

Toplines

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to compromise ahead of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 17 to 18. Zelensky stated on February 14 that Ukraine is ready to hold elections as quickly as possible, provided a sustained ceasefire, and called for a two-month ceasefire and security guarantees in order to do so.[1] Zelensky noted that if a two-month ceasefire is not possible, then Ukraine at least needs “many days” to prepare for elections.[2] Zelensky stated that any security guarantees agreement must precede any war termination agreement.[3] Meaningful security guarantees are crucial to any future peace agreement that allows Russia to occupy parts of Ukraine. Concluding peace agreements ahead of security guarantees entails Ukrainian surrender of critical territory with no assurance of Ukraine receiving necessary guarantees against future Russian aggression.[4]

Russian officials continue to insist that the issues and terms impeding a peace agreement go beyond Russia’s territorial demands. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov, who often acts as a bullhorn for the Kremlin’s true diplomatic and military aims, reiterated on February 14 that Russia “will not be satisfied” with only Ukraine’s surrender of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and that Russia must additionally achieve regime change in Kyiv to remove any allegedly “Russophobic” and neo-Nazi government.[5] Senior Kremlin officials have similarly recently claimed that post-war Ukraine must be “friendly” to Russia, implying that Russia will only be satisfied with a Ukraine led by a pro-Russian government that implements pro-Russian policies.[6] Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine and demonstrated their commitment to achieving Russia’s war goals militarily if it cannot do so diplomatically.[7] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio notably stated on February 14 that negotiations to end the war have “narrowed” to the “hardest questions to answer,” but that the United States is unsure if Russia is serious about ending the war.[8] Rubio stated that the United States does not know under what terms Russia is willing to end the war or whether the United States can find terms that are acceptable to Ukraine and to which Russia will also agree.

Russian forces continue to suffer disproportionately high casualties in return for marginal territorial gains. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte stated on February 13 that Russian forces are advancing at the “stilted speed of a garden snail,” yet suffered 35,000 deaths in December 2025 and 30,000 deaths in January 2026.[9] Rutte’s numbers largely cohere with data from the Ukrainian General Staff, which maintains that Russian forces suffered about 35,100 casualties in December and 31,680 casualties in January. ISW continues to assess that the Russian rate of advance, even at its relatively quicker tempo in late 2025, has been constrained to a footpace and comes at disproportionately high infantry casualty costs.[10] ISW has observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced in or infiltrated through an estimated 462 square kilometers in December 2025 and roughly 364 square kilometers in January 2026 – suggesting that Russian forces suffered roughly 76 casualties per square kilometer seized or infiltrated through in December 2025 and 87 casualties per square kilometer seized or infiltrated through in January 2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on February 13 that Russian forces have recently suffered 170 casualties for every kilometer of territory gained.[11] ISW’s calculations are based only on evidence observable in the open source, and it is unclear if Zelensky is referring only to territory that Russian forces control or is also including areas in which Russian forces have infiltrated but do not control. True Russian losses are very likely higher than what is confirmable from open sources. Russian forces have long suffered such a disproportionately high casualty rate, having suffered an average of 83 casualties per square kilometer gained in all of 2025.[12] The Russian rate of advance slowed in late December 2025 and January 2026, but Russian losses did not significantly decrease, showing how these slowing advances have come at an even greater cost.[13]

Ukraine’s and SpaceX’s efforts to shut off Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals in Ukraine are reportedly disrupting Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies’ short- and mid-range drone strikes in the immediate term, as ISW recently forecasted. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade told BBC Ukrainian Service that Russian forces will likely spend about six months trying to find an alternative to Starlink.[14] The commander noted that Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), unlike the Russian Rubikon Center, cannot focus exclusively on strikes against Russian logistics and the Russian operational rear, as the Ukrainian USF must also spend time and resources helping Ukrainian infantry hold the frontline and repel Russian infantry attacks.[15] Russian forces, particularly from the Rubikon Center, were using Starlink terminals to extend the ranges of their drones in order to strike further into the Ukrainian rear to generate effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[16] Rubikon often publishes footage on its Telegram channel highlighting strikes against specific frontline or rear settlements, but has not offered this level of geographic detail about any of the strikes since February 4 — just days after SpaceX blocked unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine.[17] Rubikon has continued to post about its strikes across the frontline since February 4 but has not provided specific locational details, suggesting that SpaceX’s decision to restrict Russian forces’ access to Starlink on February 1 has been negatively impacting Rubikon’s strike campaign.[18] ISW assessed on February 5 that Ukraine’s efforts to shut down Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals would likely impact Russian BAI efforts, preventing Russian forces from conducting these strikes at the same tempo and depth as in prior weeks.[19]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to compromise ahead of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Geneva, Switzerland on February 17 to 18.
Russian officials continue to insist that the issues and terms impeding a peace agreement go beyond Russia’s territorial demands.
Russian forces continue to suffer disproportionately high casualties in return for marginal territorial gains.
Ukraine’s and SpaceX’s efforts to shut off Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals in Ukraine are reportedly disrupting Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies’ short- and mid-range drone strikes in the immediate term, as ISW recently forecasted.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, in the Borova and Slovyansk directions, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Feb 14 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2026

Toplines

Western reporting suggests that the United States has accepted Russia’s demanded sequence of having Ukraine cede territory to Russia before receiving formal US or European security guarantee commitments. Western reporting suggests that the United States will not finalize a security agreement with Ukraine until after Ukraine and Russia reach a peace agreement and that the United States is pushing Ukraine to make concessions in order to conclude a peace agreement by Summer 2026.[1] The Kremlin has continuously attempted to convince the Trump administration that territory is the only significant issue left unresolved in peace negotiations, particularly Russia’s claim to the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and in southern Ukraine, and has attempted to portray Ukraine as the intransigent negotiating party for refusing to cede strategically important territory that Russian forces have been unable to capture through force.[2] Ukraine, however, has indicated multiple times that it is willing to consider withdrawing its forces from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast (although not to recognize Russian control over the parts of the oblast it does not currently occupy) in exchange for meaningful Western security guarantees — a significant Ukrainian concession.[3] Russia has refused to compromise on its demands for additional territory beyond the current line of control in Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin has been publicly focusing on territory in part to distract from its own rejection of any meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine — a refusal that senior Kremlin officials have constantly reiterated around the recent trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE).[4] Kremlin officials have consistently objected to Western security guarantees for Ukraine, particularly the deployment of any Western troops or military assets to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping contingent or ceasefire monitoring mechanism — continuing to demonstrate that territorial discussions are not the only significant issue left unresolved in negotiations and that Russia, not Ukraine, remains inflexible in its demands.[5] Russia is rejecting the guarantees Ukraine requires to be able to safely conclude the war and make any territorial concessions, should Ukraine choose to do so. Russia is unlikely to accept any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine even if the United States and Ukraine concede to Russia’s territorial demands, however. The sequence of agreements that Russia is insisting on and that the United States has reportedly accepted thus entails Ukrainian surrender of critical territory with no assurance of receiving necessary guarantees against future Russian aggression.

Meaningful security guarantees are crucial to any peace agreement that allows Russia to occupy parts of Ukraine, especially if Ukraine withdraws from territory it currently holds. Ukraine has repeatedly offered to freeze the frontline as a basis for territorial negotiations, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand additional territory that Russian forces have been unable to occupy in over 10 years of conflict and nearly four years of full-scale war.[6] A Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast would have Ukraine cede its Fortress Belt, the fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that has served as the backbone of Ukraine’s defenses in the oblast since 2014.[7] Russia has spent years attempting to seize the Fortress Belt militarily, and Russian forces could take at least two to three more years to seize the Fortress Belt based on their rate of advance as of November 2025, which has slowed in the first month of 2026.[8] A Ukrainian concession of its most valuable defense line to the Kremlin would provide Russia with more advantageous positions to renew aggression against southwestern and central Ukraine in the future while depriving Ukraine of extensive fortified positions it would need to defend against this aggression.[9] A peace agreement acceptable to Russia would certainly include territorial stipulations given the current Russian demands, and the reported US refusal to conclude a security agreement with Ukraine before Ukraine agrees to such stipulations means that the territorial stipulations and any Ukrainian withdrawals would come into effect before US-Ukrainian security guarantees are in place and without any guarantee that Russia would accept meaningful guarantees. Ukraine would therefore likely have to conduct a withdrawal without these protections amid the threat of a renewed Russian effort. This sequencing of agreements runs the high risk of leaving Ukraine open to rapidly renewed Russian attack with no assurance of US or other partner military support to deter or respond to such an attack.[10]

Putin’s rejection of meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine is a greater impediment to a prospective peace deal than Ukraine’s position on ceding its territories. The Kremlin has continuously attempted to portray Ukraine as the main impediment to a peace in Ukraine to disguise Russia’s own refusal to make concessions and participate in good-faith negotiations.[11] The Kremlin has continuously stalled and delayed peace negotiations and doubled down on accomplishing Putin’s original war aims. These aims include Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations and commitment to neutrality; Ukraine’s demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), Ukraine’s denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government), international recognition of Russia’s illegal annexations of the four Ukrainian oblasts and Crimea in international agreements; and the lifting of all Western sanctions against Russia.[12] Ukraine has offered significant concessions to some Russian demands in pursuit of peace, including ceding territory, changing Ukrainian law, and holding elections in wartime, as long as Ukraine receives the security guarantees it needs to cede territories and hold elections safely. The Kremlin is attempting to distract from the fact that its refusal to compromise is the main impediment to peace by falsely insisting that Ukraine’s refusal to make territorial concessions without security guarantees is the one and only impediment to peace, therefore deflecting US pressure from Russia to Ukraine.[13]

The Kremlin likely sees an opportunity to manipulate the US-led negotiations process into another means through which Russia can achieve its unchanging military and political objectives, which it has failed to achieve in nearly four years of war. Russia’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast without preconditions and the Kremlin’s rejection of a ceasefire to conduct negotiations are further evidence that Russia will accept nothing short of its full war demands.[14] The Kremlin has continuously doubled down on its pre-war demands, which extend beyond Ukraine and include demands of NATO, and has indicated that it will seek to achieve these goals militarily if it cannot achieve them diplomatically.[15] The Kremlin has been pursuing a balancing act between posturing strength to its populace and allies while engaging the United States in negotiations enough to avoid additional US pressure while continuing to achieve its military and political objectives in Ukraine.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwavering determination to conquer more Ukrainian territory and gain full political control over Ukraine is severely degrading Russia’s military and economy at the cost of the Russian population, and Russia will increasingly have to reckon with this degradation in the coming year. Putin and other Kremlin officials are engaged in a cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Ukrainian defenses as on the brink of imminent collapse and a Russian victory as inevitable in an attempt to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia’s demands now before Ukraine’s battlefield situation worsens.[17] Russia is feeling the effects of four years of attritional war, however, suffering significant material, manpower, and economic challenges that Putin’s commitment to the war is only exacerbating.[18] The Russian rate of advance is constrained to a footpace at its fastest, and costs disproportionately high infantry casualties relative to Russia’s marginal rate of advance.[19] The Kremlin’s force generation apparatus has also shown signs of strain as it has had to meet Russia’s replacement rate, struggling to sustain high payments to recruits and to recruit from its existing manpower pools, forcing the Kremlin to target new demographics, including students.[20] Putin’s commitment to his war aims is causing and exacerbating high losses on the battlefield, labor shortages, and economic problems that will likely only grow and have disproportionate effects on the civilian populace. ISW has long assessed that Russia would begin suffering more severe economic and military issues in 2026-2027, and these stress points in the war effort are beginning to show.[21] These stressors in combination with increased Western military support to Ukraine and harsher economic pressure could force Putin to change his calculus and consider making actual negotiations.

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time in 2026 and fifth time in the last 12 months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and maintain the facade of domestic economic stability.[22] The Russian Central Bank announced on February 13 that it lowered its key interest rate from 16 to 15.5 percent.[23] The Russian Central Bank claimed that Russian unemployment is at a historical low and that wage growth is outpacing productivity growth. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages, however, and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation.[24] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged on February 13 that inflation accelerated in January 2026 but claimed that this was a “one-off” and that Russia passed the peak of inflationary pressure in December 2025 and January 2026.[25] The Russian government has struggled to finance its DIB amidst heavy Western sanctions and restrictions and has introduced a series of measures to increase the capital available to the Russian DIB, including through the Industrial Development Fund, off-budget subsidies, and policies strongarming banks into providing preferential lending to defense industrial enterprises.[26] The Central Bank lowered its key interest rate four times between June and October 2025 from an initial rate of 21 percent and likely lowered it again on February 13, 2026 to make more capital available to the Russian DIB and to lower the price of borrowing money for DIB producers, as Russia struggles with liquidity problems due to its unsustainable wartime spending.[27] The Russian Central Bank stated on February 13 that it intends to lower the key rate to between 13.5 and 14.5 percent in 2026, likely in order to maintain the facade of economic stability.[28]

Russia is incurring high levels of external debt and has gradually depleted its liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine, ignoring the long-term economic implications of the Kremlin’s economic policies. The Russian Ministry of Finance claimed on February 13 that the Russian government’s external debt (debt owed to nonresident debtors) exceeded $60 billion for the first time since 2006.[29] Russian outlet RBK reported that the Russian Central Bank estimates that Russia’s total external debt, including government and private debt, is roughly $319.8 billion as of January 1, 2026, a $30 billion (10 percent) increase from January 1, 2025.[30] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war and has had to resort to selling its physical gold reserves in November 2025 due to unsustainable spending.[31] Russia also raised its value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026, in an attempt to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, placing the burden of Putin’s costly war in Ukraine directly on the Russian population.[32] Putin’s economic policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as the Kremlin is attempting to project and is therefore vulnerable to increased Western pressure.[33]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine through the Ramstein format, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced on February 13 that Ukraine’s Western partners will provide Ukraine with a series of aid packages totaling $38 billion that will fund drones, air defense, artillery, and other military assistance in 2026.[34] Fedorov reported that over $6 billion is earmarked for specific military assistance, including over $2.5 billion for Ukrainian drones, nearly $2 billion for air defense, and more than $500 million for the purchase of US weapons through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative that funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 13 that Norway and France signed a new agreement to provide Ukraine with surveillance, situational awareness, and air-to ground capabilities, the first stage of which includes a Norwegian loan of about 365 million euros (about $433 million) and a French loan of 260 million euros (about $309 million) for procuring French-made guided aerial bombs for Ukraine.[35] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson stated on February 13 that the EU is providing Ukraine with a loan of 90 billion euros (roughly $106.8 billion) to purchase Swedish Gripen fighter jets and unspecified air defenses.[36] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on February 12 that Germany will supply Ukraine with five additional PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missiles if other partner countries agree to supply 30 PAC-3 interceptors.[37] Fedorov’s $38 billion figure includes aid packages from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands that were reported on February 12.[38]

Key Takeaways

Western reporting suggests that the United States has accepted Russia’s demanded sequence of having Ukraine cede territory to Russia before receiving formal US or European security guarantee commitments.
Meaningful security guarantees are crucial to any peace agreement that allows Russia to occupy parts of Ukraine, especially if Ukraine withdraws from territory it currently holds.
Putin’s rejection of meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine is a greater impediment to a prospective peace deal than Ukraine’s position on ceding its territories.
The Kremlin likely sees an opportunity to manipulate the US-led negotiations process into another means through which Russia can achieve its unchanging military and political objectives, which it has failed to achieve in nearly four years of war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwavering determination to conquer more Ukrainian territory and gain full political control over Ukraine is severely degrading Russia’s military and economy at the cost of the Russian population, and Russia will increasingly have to reckon with this degradation in the coming year.
The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time in 2026 and fifth time in the last 12 months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and maintain the facade of domestic economic stability.
Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine through the Ramstein format, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 13 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2026

Toplines

Russia is blocking WhatsApp and other Western social media platforms, media outlets, and means of bypassing internet restrictions as part of an intensification of the Kremlin’s campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space and prevent access to the global internet.[1] Meta-owned messaging application WhatsApp reported on the evening of February 11 that the Russian government attempted to fully block access to WhatsApp and isolate over 100 million users.[2]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on February 12 that Russia began restricting WhatsApp due to Meta’s alleged unwillingness to comply with Russian laws, likely referring to Russia’s heavy censorship laws.[3] Peskov stated that Russia would only remove the restrictions on WhatsApp if Meta is willing to comply with Russian laws and engage with Russian authorities.

Russian opposition outlets reported on February 11 that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor blocked WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, the Tor browser, the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL’s Systema investigative project, Deutsche Welle, the Moscow Times, virtual private network (VPN) service Windscribe, and a site for installing applications onto Android smartphones to bypass application stores.[4] The opposition outlets reported that Roskomnadzor removed these sites from Russia’s National Domain Name System (NSDS), part of Russia’s sovereign “RuNet” internet system that uses state-controlled domain name servers (DNS) to match IP addresses with domain addresses and connect users with websites. Russian telecommunications providers are legally required to use the NSDS, therefore routing internet traffic through the RuNet-controlled DNS and prevent users from accessing websites not on the NSDS.[5] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii noted that it is unclear when Roskomnadzor removed these websites from the NSDS and that users can manually bypass these blocks by changing the DNS server their devices use to browse the internet.[6] Vazhnye Istorii reported that Roskomnadzor only blocked the WhatsApp web browser and that many users are still able to send messages through the WhatsApp application on their devices. Vazhnye Istorii reported that Roskomnadzor began throttling WhatsApp in December 2025 and that while there have been spikes in reports of issues with WhatsApp and YouTube in recent days, these spikes are still relatively small and do not suggest widespread issues accessing the services.

The Kremlin’s restrictions against WhatsApp and other Western social media platforms, news outlets, and online services follow Russian throttling of Telegram on February 9 and 10.[7] The Kremlin is likely intensifying efforts to restrict access to Telegram, WhatsApp, and other Western social media platforms, news sites, and internet services in order to incentivize Russians to switch to state-controlled messenger app Max, as previous Russian efforts to do so have been largely ineffective.[8] ISW will outline the Kremlin’s intensified efforts to regain control over the Russian information space and dismantle the open internet in Russia in a forthcoming special edition.

Ukrainian forces are conducting localized and opportunistic counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, likely to take advantage of recent blocks on Starlink terminals and Telegram. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows Russian strikes against static Ukrainian positions east of the Haichur River, including east of and in southern Dobropillya and north of Varvarivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[9] This footage indicates that Ukrainian forces likely maintained control of these positions prior to February 12 and are likely using localized counterattacks to reconnect these frontline positions to each other. Russian forces likely bypassed these Ukrainian positions during infiltration missions to exaggerate the extent of Russian gains in the area. ISW began observing reports of limited and localized Ukrainian counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on February 9.[10] Russian milbloggers initially portrayed these counterattacks as a broader Ukrainian “counteroffensive,” but Ukrainian military sources and some Russian milbloggers have since indicated that the Ukrainian counterattacks are limited in scale and span.[11] Russian milbloggers have continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks north and northwest of Hulyaipole, but noted that the situation on the ground is unclear due to degraded Russian communications on the frontline.[12]

Ukrainian tactical counterattacks in this area are likely an opportunistic response to favorable battlefield conditions. A senior NATO official told the BBC’s Russia service on February 11 that at least some of the Ukrainian battlefield successes in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast are due to SpaceX’s efforts to prevent Russian forces from using Starlink terminals in early February 2026.[13] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are “new complicating factors” to Russian communication issues from restrictions on Russian Starlink access.[14] The milblogger is likely alluding to Russia’s restrictions on the use of Telegram since February 9, which Russian forces on the frontline have also used for communications. Russian milbloggers have been warning that the Kremlin’s decision to block Telegram at the same time as SpaceX’s restrictions on Russian Starlink usage will severely impact Russian communications in the near-term.[15] Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area likely seek to exploit these recent Russian communication and command-and-control (C2) challenges.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure on the night of February 11 to 12, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo strike on an arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 320 kilometers from the international border).[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the GRAU arsenal near Kotluban is one of Russia’s largest storehouses for ammunition, missiles, and other explosives and that the strike caused secondary detonations. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows fires and secondary detonations near the Kotluban GRAU arsenal.[17] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) facility near Kotluban, likely in reference to the GRAU arsenal.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ukhta Oil Refinery in Komi Republic (roughly 1,750 kilometers from the international border), causing fires near the AVT crude processing units and the visbreaker processing units.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukhta Oil Refinery can process up to 4.2 million tons of oil per year and supplies the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows smoke plumes at the Ukhta Oil Refinery.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Michurinsk Progress Plant, which produces advanced equipment for aviation and missile control systems, in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, causing fires.[21] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian drones striking the Michurinsk Progress Plant.[22] Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike hit a Magnit store immediately next to the Progress plant in Michurinsk and caused a fire.[23]

Available independent reporting continues to indicate that 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian citizens since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The open-source project Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported on February 9 that the Russians caused conflict-related violence in Ukraine, including in occupied areas, killed at least 2,919 civilians, and injured 17,775 in 2025 — increases of 12 percent and 25 percent, respectively, from 2024.[24] The CIT reported that drone strikes killed at least 1,376 civilians and injured at least 10,089 — more casualties than all other types of weapons combined and almost three times higher than the civilian casualty rates resulting from drone strikes in 2024. These numbers are consistent with findings from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) and a reported European government assessment of 2025 civilian casualties from January 12.[25] The UN HRMMU noted that Russian strikes against Ukrainian-controlled areas caused 97 percent of the total civilian casualties in 2025. The CIT noted that Russian strikes inflicted the highest civilian casualties in Kherson Oblast, killing 359 civilians and injuring 2,903 in 2025 — an increase of 24 percent and 35 percent from 2024, respectively. This increase in civilian casualties is notable despite the lack of large-scale combat activity in the Kherson direction. Russian forces pervasively employ “human safari” tactics in Kherson Oblast using tactical drones, especially first-person view (FPV) drones, to strike civilians and civilian infrastructure.[26] Russian forces have also integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template, indicating that the Russian military is using FPV drones to weaponize civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[27]

The United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands announced new military aid, particularly to support Ukrainian air defense. UK Defense Secretary John Healey announced on February 11 and 12 that the UK is providing Ukraine with a new aid package worth about £540 million (about $735.5 million).[28] Healey stated that the UK is joining the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine, and that the UK is allocating £150 million (about $204 million) to this effort.[29] Healey announced that the other £390 million (about $531 million) of this package is funding 1,000 UK-manufactured Lightweight Multirole Missiles to help Ukraine counter Russian drone and missile strikes.[30] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on February 12 that the Netherlands will transfer F-16 flight simulators to Ukraine to accelerate pilot training and expand Ukraine’s ability to generate qualified F-16 aircrews.[31] Ukraine continues to require a well-provisioned and holistic air defense umbrella, comprised of both high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems and fighter jets, as well as lower-cost interceptor drones and missiles, in order to defend against increasingly intense and diverse Russian strike packages.[32]

Key Takeaways

Russia is blocking WhatsApp and other Western social media platforms, media outlets, and means of bypassing internet restrictions as part of an intensification of the Kremlin’s campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space and prevent access to the global internet.
Ukrainian forces are conducting localized and opportunistic counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, likely to take advantage of recent blocks on Starlink terminals and Telegram.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure on the night of February 11 to 12, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
Available independent reporting continues to indicate that 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian citizens since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands announced new military aid, particularly to support Ukrainian air defense.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 12 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2026

Toplines

Kremlin officials recently have been repeating the same messages about Russia’s commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine to various media sources that reach international and domestic audiences. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has given interviews to three different media sources in the past three days, repeating the same Kremlin lines in each.[1] Lavrov gave an interview on February 9 to TV BRICS, a Russian newswire service covering BRICS states and candidate states; an interview on February 10 to Russian state channel NTV, which also broadcasts in the United States, Canada, and Belarus; and an interview on February 11 to “Empathy Manuchi,” a popular Russian podcast channel from Russian propagandist Vyacheslav Manucharov on RuTube (Russia’s analogue of YouTube).[2] “Empathy Manuchi” RuTube channel caters to a younger Russian audience and promotes Russian state propaganda, including interviews with Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan.[3] Lavrov’s three interviews were likely intended to reach audiences in the West and Russia’s allied and partner states, as well as younger audiences within Russia. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly held a three-way interview on February 1 with Reuters, Kremlin newswire TASS, and pro-war Russian milblogger and head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov that was likely intended to simultaneously influence Russian and Western audiences.[4] These interviews likely aim to shape the public perception in various countries about ongoing negotiations and to garner domestic and international support for Russia’s position.

Kremlin messaging in these various interviews is consistent, with Kremlin officials repeating Russia’s unwavering commitment to its demands. Lavrov and Medvedev both referenced the agreements to end the war that the United States and Russia allegedly made at the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[5] Lavrov and Medvedev directly pointed to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), wherein Putin demanded that Ukraine and NATO capitulate to Russia’s original war demands and cede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including unoccupied areas of these regions. Lavrov and Medvedev also repeated the Kremlin’s rejection of Western security guarantees for post-war Ukraine — reinforcing how the Kremlin does not view the territorial issue as the only significant issue left unresolved in negotiations.

Lavrov explicitly reiterated Russia’s 2021 and 2022 demands of NATO and Ukraine in his February 11 interview with a Russian propagandist channel. Lavrov used his February 11 interview with “Empathy Manuchi” to reiterate Russia’s 2021 demands that NATO halt its expansion and not deploy forces to any states that joined after 1997, asserting that “security is non-negotiable” for Russia.[6] Lavrov stated that Ukraine “is obligated” to repeal its laws about the use of the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and that Russia “will not change these positions.” Lavrov’s reiteration of Russia’s commitment to its original war aims to a propaganda channel demonstrates how the Kremlin is not socializing Russians, particularly the pro-war segments of Russian society, to the possibility of Russian compromises in order to end the war.

The United States, Ukraine, and Russia may hold another round of trilateral talks on February 17 to 18. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told Bloomberg on February 11 that Ukraine accepted the US offer to host another round of talks in the United States on February 17 to 18.[7] Zelensky stated that it is unclear, however, if Russia would agree to participate in the talks. Zelensky also told journalists on February 11 that Russian officials have not confirmed their participation in a trilateral meeting in Miami and will likely demand that the parties meet again in Abu Dhabi.[8] Zelensky stated that the next round of meetings may discuss Ukraine’s postwar economy and the US-Ukrainian prosperity plan.[9] Zelensky called on Ukraine, the United States, and Russia to use future trilateral talks to further discuss the US proposal to establish a “free economic zone” as a buffer zone in Donbas. The Kremlin, however, explicitly rejected in December 2025 the proposal to establish a demilitarized zone in Donetsk Oblast.[10] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine has not received an answer from Russia about a US proposal to renew the moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes.[11]

Russian milbloggers issued new complaints about the Kremlin’s handling of the recent throttling of Telegram, continuing domestic backlash against further Kremlin censorship efforts. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 11 that he cannot imagine that Russian forces are using Telegram or other messenger platforms for frontline communications.[18] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov similarly claimed that Russian forces ”minimally” use Telegram during combat operations.[19] Russian sources accused Peskov and Kartapolov of lying or not understanding how Russian forces use the platform, with one milblogger questioning if Kartapolov receives “distorted” reports about the situation on the ground.[20] Russian milbloggers first complained about Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor’s throttling of Telegram on February 9 and 10, claiming that it would have serious implications on Russian command and control (C2).[21] The Kremlin appears to have deemed it necessary to respond to the milbloggers’ February 9-10 complaints, which only triggered further criticism. The milbloggers’ widespread criticisms highlight how the Kremlin is trying to balance its longer-term censorship objectives, including a possible full block on Telegram in the future, with the need to avoid domestic backlash.

US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker highlighted the success of the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-manufactured weapons for Ukraine. Whitaker stated on February 11 that 21 NATO member states, Australia, and New Zealand have contributed $4.5 billion to PURL since the program’s launch in Summer 2025.[22] Whitaker stated that Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany have especially provided significant contributions to PURL. Whitaker noted that unspecified states would announce new commitments to PURL at a NATO ministerial meeting on February 12.

Key Takeaways

Kremlin officials recently have been repeating the same messages about Russia’s commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine to various media sources that reach international and domestic audiences.
Lavrov explicitly reiterated Russia’s 2021 and 2022 demands of NATO and Ukraine in his February 11 interview with a Russian propagandist channel.
The United States, Ukraine, and Russia may hold another round of trilateral talks on February 17 to 18.
Russian milbloggers issued new complaints about the Kremlin’s handling of the recent throttling of Telegram, continuing domestic backlash against further Kremlin censorship efforts.
US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker highlighted the success of the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-manufactured weapons for Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, and near Velykyi Burluk, Borova, and Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 11 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2026

Toplines

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to explicitly blame the United States on February 10 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and reinvoked the Spring 2022 Istanbul talks to justify Russia’s rejection of Ukraine receiving meaningful security guarantees. Lavrov used a February 10 interview with Russian state outlet NTV to accuse the United States of acting in bad faith during peace negotiations by imposing new sanctions on Russia and placing secondary tariffs on importers of Russian oil, reiterating his February 9 criticism that the United States is to blame for the lack of progress to end the war.[1] Lavrov claimed that US policies toward Russia under US President Donald Trump are “moving in the wrong direction.” Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa echoed Lavrov’s criticism of US policies toward Russia, noting that US “actions rather than words” demonstrate that the United States remains an “adversary” to Russia.[2] Lavrov also explicitly referred to Russia’s position codified in the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, to which the Kremlin periodically refers to as the appropriate basis for a peace agreement, to justify Russia’s continued rejection of meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Lavrov specifically called for the composition and decision-making framework of the guarantees proposed in the 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document. The 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document stipulated that Russia – the aggressor in the war in Ukraine – would be treated as a neutral ”guarantor state” of Ukraine; that Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would have veto power over a mechanism to respond to future aggression in Ukraine; and that Ukraine commit to neutrality, severe restrictions on military size and composition, and never accepting military assistance from its allies.[4] The Kremlin has been attempting to push the United States to abandon the recent US-led negotiations with Ukraine and Europe in favor of a US-Russian settlement based almost entirely on Russia’s demands, which have not changed over the course of the war.[5]

The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10 – a significant intensification of Russia’s three-year campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space. Website and online services monitoring platforms registered a significant rise in complaints about access and usage of Telegram in Russia on the morning of February 9, declining on the evening, and rising again on the morning of February 10.[6] Russian outlet RBK claimed on February 10 that a source in the Russian IT industry and two sources in unspecified “relevant” Russian agencies stated that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor decided to start throttling Telegram on February 10.[7] Roskomnadzor confirmed to Russian business outlet Kommersant that it is restricting Telegram’s operations in order to force it to comply with Russian laws.[8] Roskomnadzor claimed that Telegram needs to protect Russian citizens from fraud and create conditions to combat extremism and terrorism. Russian authorities began to restrict calls on Telegram in August 2025, but the February 9-10 throttling marks a more significant Kremlin effort to block access to the platform. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the recent throttling of Telegram is a “test” and that Russian authorities may completely block Telegram ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections, as the Kremlin fears a negative domestic reaction to the United Russia Party winning 70 percent of the vote.[9] A Verstka source stated that the Kremlin may completely block Telegram due to worries about society’s mood about the upcoming Duma elections and attitudes toward the war in Ukraine, but a source claimed to Verstka that the Kremlin has not yet decided to fully block Telegram.

Russian milbloggers complained about the Telegram restrictions on February 10 and expressed concern about possible implications on Russian command and control (C2).[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Telegram slowdowns will have a “profound” negative impact on Russian military communications.[11] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities began to slow down Telegram “some time ago” and that the decision is “clumsy” as Telegram serves as a “lifeline” for Russian military communications.[12] The milblogger claimed that the throttling of Telegram will negatively impact interoperability among air defense units and maneuver groups that need to be able to cooperate in the face of Ukrainian drone strikes. Telegram slowdowns could exacerbate C2 issues Russian forces are reportedly facing after SpaceX shut down Russian Starlink terminals operating in Ukraine as of February 1.[13] Russian strikes and assaults have not stopped entirely since the shutdown of Starlink and throttling of Telegram, however, and Russian forces likely maintain alternative C2 networks, such as mesh networks, that they can use in the meantime.

The Kremlin has been engaged in a widespread censorship campaign to regain control over the Russian information space since late 2022, when the Kremlin began to censor, arrest, and coopt Russian milbloggers who criticized the Kremlin and its methods of waging war in Ukraine.[14] Russian authorities justified their initial efforts to deliberately restrict Telegram by blaming the platform for enabling scammers to commit fraud against Russian citizens.[15] The Kremlin introduced the state-controlled messenger app Max in March 2025 and has been attempting to entice and coerce Russian citizens to abandon other messaging platforms for Max.[16] The Max platform has remained largely unpopular among Russians, however.[17] The Kremlin is likely more significantly restricting Telegram now in order to incentivize Russians to switch to Max, as previous Russian efforts to do so have been largely ineffective. Telegram founder Pavel Durov assessed on February 10 that Russia is restricting access to Telegram to force Russian citizens to switch to Max.[18] ISW will outline the Kremlin’s intensified efforts to regain control over the Russian information space and dismantle the open internet in Russia in a forthcoming special edition.

Russia’s ability to acquire foreign machine tools despite Western sanctions is reportedly allowing Russia to increase its production of tank and artillery barrels- a key constraining factor on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian open source intelligence outlet Frontelligence Insight reported on February 9, citing internal Russian procurement documents that Russia is modernizing the Uralmash Plant No. 9, which manufactures barrels for the Koalitsiya and Msta self-propelled howitzers and for various Russian tanks, including the T-14 Armata, T-90, and modernized T-62 and T-72.[19] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russia has been modernizing the Uralmash Plant No. 9 since 2016 and that the plant has acquired at least 22 of machine tools manufactured by companies in Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy for its production efforts. Frontelligence Insight noted that Russia determined it cannot compensate for its dependency on foreign machine tools for its defense industrial base (DIB) and that the planning documents indicate that Russia feels confident about its ability to acquire these machine tools despite Western sanctions.

Russia’s struggles to acquire foreign-produced machine tools have historically limited its DIB production, including tank and artillery barrels. Russia was reportedly able to produce about 50 artillery barrels per year as of October 2024 – a major bottleneck to Russia’s ability to produce new and maintain existing artillery systems.[20] Russia has not been able to produce tanks and artillery systems to match its losses of these systems in Ukraine, but successful sanctions evasion schemes may allow Russia to scale up its rate of production and refurbishment of artillery systems in particular.[21] Russia’s production of the precision machine tools it needs for its DIB has atrophied in the past 30 years, and Russia has been increasingly relying on the PRC to obtain these machine tools.[22] Russia will likely continue to intensify its sanctions evasion efforts to acquire foreign-made machine tools for both its near- and long-term armament efforts, highlighting the critical importance of Western sanctions in countering these efforts and inhibiting Russia’s war machine.

Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Japan may fund non-lethal military aid to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative. Japanese outlet NHK reported on February 10, citing anonymous NATO officials, that Japan plans to join the PURL initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-manufactured weapons for Ukraine, and plans to announce this publicly in the coming days.[23] The anonymous NATO officials reportedly stated that Japan would only fund non-lethal defense equipment, including radar systems and body armor. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara denied media reports about Japan joining PURL, noting that Japan will still continue to provide economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine.[24] It is unclear how Japan would be able to join the PURL initiative. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan renounce war and the “threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” which has historically precluded the Japanese government from providing military support to any country.[25]

NATO jets intercepted another Russian fighter jet close to NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea in late January 2026. The Spanish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 28 that Spanish EF-18M Hornet jets intercepted a Russian Su-30SM2 fighter jet flying over the Baltic Sea close to NATO airspace as a part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its ”Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO cohesion in preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[27]

Key Takeaways

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to explicitly blame the United States on February 10 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and reinvoked the Spring 2022 Istanbul talks to justify Russia’s rejection of Ukraine receiving meaningful security guarantees.
The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10 – a significant intensification of Russia’s three-year campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space.
Russia’s ability to acquire foreign machine tools despite Western sanctions is reportedly allowing Russia to increase its production of tank and artillery barrels- a key constraining factor on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Japan may fund non-lethal military aid to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.
NATO jets intercepted another Russian fighter jet close to NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea in late January 2026.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Hulyaipole, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Feb 10 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2026

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly blamed the United States on February 9 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. Lavrov used a February 9 interview with TV BRICS, a Russian outlet covering BRICS states and candidate states, to accuse the United States of reneging on the peace proposals the United States itself allegedly proposed at the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit by imposing new sanctions on Russia, seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers, and placing secondary tariffs on importers of Russian oil.[1] Lavrov claimed that the United States and Russia “seemingly…resolv[ed]” the war at the Alaska Summit and moved toward “broad and mutually beneficial collaboration,” but the United States has since “creat[ed] artificial barriers” to cooperation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 9 that the United States and Russia reached a “number of understandings” in Alaska, which Peskov claimed could lead to a “breakthrough” in peace negotiations.[2] The Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of publicly available documents from the Alaska Summit to claim that Russia and the United States came to an understanding to end the war during the meeting.[3] Kremlin officials have claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin insisted on capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[4] Kremlin officials have been trying to push the United States to abandon the recent US-led negotiations with Ukraine and Europe in favor of a US-Russian settlement based almost entirely on Russia’s demands.[5]

Lavrov reiterated Russia’s demand for effective control over Ukraine’s post-war government and the size and composition of its military. Lavrov stated that he has “no doubt” that Russia will prevent the deployment of “any weapons that threaten [Russia] on Ukrainian territory” in order to ensure Russia’s security.[6] The Kremlin has long demanded Ukraine’s “demilitarization” to prevent Ukraine from being able to defend itself.[7] Lavrov’s February 9 statement demonstrates that Russia wants to dictate not only the number of troops in Ukraine’s post-war military but also the weapons and equipment in Ukraine’s arsenal, a position codified in the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, to which the Kremlin periodically refers as the appropriate basis for a peace agreement.[8] The limitations in the Istanbul Protocols would have left Ukraine helpless against future Russian aggression. Lavrov’s demand about Western weapons would likely prohibit any meaningful Western military assistance to post-war Ukraine in the future, rejecting US-backed efforts to stand up a strong Ukrainian military to guarantee Ukraine’s security after a peace settlement. Lavrov further claimed that a peace settlement must eliminate Ukraine’s “Nazi roots” in order to ensure Russia’s security and the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in “Crimea, Donbas, and Novorossiya.”[9] The Kremlin has called for the “denazification” of Ukraine since 2022 in order to demand the removal of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with a pro-Russian puppet government. Lavrov’s reference to “Novorossiya” — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that extends beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed – continues to demonstrate that Russia’s territorial demands go beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[10] Lavrov also stated that Russia must ensure its security in the face of an alleged European threat to “unleash a war” against Russia.[11] Russia issued ultimatums to NATO in 2021, demanding “security guarantees” from the United States and NATO that amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance, with demands that NATO reverse the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member-states that joined NATO after 1997.[12] Lavrov’s February 9 statements are all implicit reiterations of Putin’s original war aims from 2021 and 2022 that amount to complete Ukrainian and NATO capitulation, effectively signaling that any peace deal that does not address Russian demands of not only Ukraine but also of NATO and the West will not satisfy Russia. The Kremlin’s insistence on these demands are calls for the United States to discard the negotiations process that the United States has conducted with Ukraine and Europe since the publication of the US-proposed 28-point plan.

Russian State Duma deputies are explicitly demanding that the United States concede to all Russian demands. Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Chairperson Svetlana Zhurova stated on February 9 that a draft peace deal could be ready by March 2025, but only if Ukraine and the West agree to Russia’s terms.[13] Kremlin officials, including Lavrov, have repeatedly made demands that amount to nothing less than complete Ukrainian capitulation. Zhurova, however, is explicitly stating what Lavrov has been implying – that the Kremlin will not agree to any peace settlement that does not concede to all of its 2021 and 2022 war demands. The Kremlin is trying to deflect blame for the lack of progress away from Russia and onto Ukraine, Europe, and now the United States.

Russian forces are likely falsely claiming that Ukrainian forces are conducting a “counteroffensive” near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border to rectify earlier false reports about alleged Russian advances in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather and the recent block on Russian forces’ use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine to conduct a “counteroffensive” near Sosnivka, Novooleksandrivka (both southeast of Oleksandrivka), and Nechaivka (north of Hulyaipole).[14] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced toTernuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a “local counteroffensive” in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast for the first time in a long time.[15] Other milbloggers similarly claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking, including with armored vehicles, near Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka), Orestopil (southeast of Oleksandrivka), Ternuvate, Pryluky, Zarichne, Pishchane, and Dobropillya (all north of Hulyaipole) during foggy weather and reduced Russian communications capabilities.[16] The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces out of positions west of Pryluky and in Prydorozhnie (northwest of Hulyaipole).[17] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Ternuvate after Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to conduct a flag-raising in the settlement to provide alleged evidence of its seizure.[18] Voloshyn stated that the frontline is currently at least 10-15 kilometers from Ternuvate. Voloshyn denied, however, Russian milbloggers’ claims about an alleged Ukrainian “counteroffensive” at the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[19] Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces in the area are conducting reconnaissance and search missions to identify Russian infiltration and sabotage groups, but noted that these Ukrainian actions do not constitute a counteroffensive. Voloshyn noted that Russian forces have been inflating their advances in the area and assessed that they are now trying to use claims of a Ukrainian counteroffensive to manage their lies. ISW has observed widespread complaints from Russian milbloggers themselves about the systematic practice of Russian commanders sending false reports to their superiors about alleged advances.[20] Russian forces – and subsequently some Russian milbloggers — likely overstated recent Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions and are now trying to use the guise of a Ukrainian “counteroffensive” to justify recessing Russian advances back to the forward positions that Russian forces have likely maintained for some time.

Russian and Ukrainian sources recently reported that Russian forces have increased the range of their guided glide bombs to 200 kilometers, but this is not a new Russian innovation. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 6, and a Ukrainian OSINT source stated on February 8, that Russian forces are employing UMPB-5R guided glide bombs with a range of up to 200 kilometers.[21] Reports of Russian forces using glide bombs with such ranges are not new, however. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported in October 2025 that Russian forces introduced the UMPB-5R bombs with an extended range of 100 to 180 kilometers.[22] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi also stated in November 2025 that Russia planned in 2025 to produce 500 of the longer-range glide bomb variants that can fly up to 200 kilometers.[23]

India will reportedly dramatically decrease or halt its direct and indirect purchases of Russian oil. Refining and trade sources told Reuters on February 8 that Indian refiners are not buying Russian oil for delivery in April 2026 and will likely continue to avoid such purchases beyond this time frame.[24] A trader reported that Indian oil refiners Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum, and Reliance Industries have already scheduled some deliveries for March but are no longer accepting offers to load Russian oil in March and April. Sources noted that most other Indian refiners have stopped buying Russian crude. Sources indicated that Russian-backed private refiner Nayara, which relies solely on Russian oil, may be allowed to keep buying Russian oil since other crude sellers pulled back after the EU sanctioned Nayara in July 2025. Sources noted, however, that Nayara does not plan to import Russian crude in April 2026 due to a maintenance shutdown at the facility. Sources assessed that Indian refiners may order Russian oil but only if the Indian government were to advise such a move. An Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson stated that India is attempting to diversify its energy sources. US President Donald Trump stated on February 2 that Indian Prime Minister Modi agreed to stop buying Russian oil and to increase purchases of US and possibly Venezuelan oil as part of US efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[25] ISW has previously assessed that a curb in India’s purchase of Russian oil would likely further strain the Russian budget and hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war effort in Ukraine without suffering more economic consequences.[26]

The United States seized another Russian shadow fleet oil tanker. The US Department of Defense (DoD) reported on February 9 that the United States conducted a right-of-visit, maritime interdiction, and boarded the Aquila II on the night of February 8 to 9 in the area of responsibility of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).[27] The DoD stated that the vessel was violating the US quarantine of sanctioned vessels in the Caribbean Sea and noted that the DoD tracked the vessel from the Caribbean Sea to the Indian Ocean. Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Aquila II sailed under the Panamanian flag and briefly transmitted its automatic identification systems (AIS) signal in the Indian Ocean on February 8. Starboard data indicates that the ship’s last AIS transmission before that was near the Strait of Hormuz on March 10, 2025. The United States sanctioned Sunne Co Limited, which owns the Aquilla II, in 2025 for its involvement in illegally transporting Russian oil above the G7 price cap.[28]

Likely Belarusian balloons violated Polish airspace on the night of February 8 to 9. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Polish radar detected balloon-like objects violating Polish airspace overnight.[29] The command did not explicitly state from which direction the balloons entered Polish airspace, but balloons have violated Polish airspace from Belarus five times since January 27.[30] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Russia is likely using airspace incursions into NATO states like Lithuania and Poland from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[31]

Key Takeaways

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly blamed the United States on February 9 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Lavrov reiterated Russia’s demand for effective control over Ukraine’s post-war government and the size and composition of its military.
Russian State Duma deputies are explicitly demanding that the United States concede to all Russian demands.
Russian forces are likely falsely claiming that Ukrainian forces are conducting a “counteroffensive” near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border to rectify earlier false reports about alleged Russian advances in the area.
Russian and Ukrainian sources recently reported that Russian forces have increased the range of their guided glide bombs to 200 kilometers, but this is not a new Russian innovation.
India will reportedly dramatically decrease or halt its direct and indirect purchases of Russian oil.
The United States seized another Russian shadow fleet oil tanker.
Likely Belarusian balloons violated Polish airspace on the night of February 8 to 9.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Slovyansk, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Feb 9 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2026

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Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 8 that Russian forces seized Sydorivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that the seizure is part of efforts to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Sumy Oblast and credited elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with allegedly seizing the settlement.[2] ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm the Russian MoD’s claim. Sydorivka is just east of Komarivka, a previously dormant area of the front where Russian forces launched cross-border attacks in December 2025.[3] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command plans to create more than 20 assault groups from elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to attack deeper into Sumy Oblast from Bila Bereza (northwest of Sydorivka on the international border) and Komarivka.[4] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) will follow the RVSN troops to consolidate positions. ISW has previously observed reports that the Russian military command is misusing specialist RVSN personnel as assault troops in the Sumy direction.[5]

The Kremlin began in late December 2025 a cognitive warfare campaign using cross-border attacks in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to try to generate informational effects and influence ongoing negotiations to end the war.[6] The Russian seizure of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City); alleged seizures of Komarivka, Bila Bereza, and Popivka (north of Hrabovske); and advances into Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City) are likely part of this effort.[7] ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Russian forces have made significant advances toward any operationally significant objective since the alleged seizures of these small border villages or indicators of Russian preparations for a significant offensive into Ukraine from the north.[8] Russian forces have not conducted a sustained and intense battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to degrade Ukrainian logistics to defensive positions and to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults along the international border in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, as Russian forces did in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[9] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely aims to portray these limited cross-border attacks as a broad new Russian offensive that reinforces the Kremlin’s narrative that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable in order to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands now out of fear of intensified Russian offensive operations in the future.[10]

Russian milbloggers continue to claim that SpaceX’s recent block of unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine is hindering Russian combat operations in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Russian units at various, unspecified sectors of the front are experiencing communication issues after the block and need radio and satellite equipment donations.[11] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the block was “extremely unfortunate.”[12] The milblogger claimed that “wise” commanders long ago understood the dangers of Russian forces’ reliance on Starlinks and created alternative communication means, but that the block is still negatively impacting combat operations, as Russian forces so far have no equivalent to fully replace Starlink. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting all communications “on the ground.” Russian milbloggers have been complaining about issues with Russian ground operations and tactical strikes since SpaceX worked with Ukrainian officials to shut down Russian troops’ access to Starlink within Ukraine on February 5.[13] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will struggle to maintain their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign at the previously high intensity levels in the near-term unless Russian forces are able to find workarounds to the blocks or adapt new technological solutions to replace Starlink.[14]

Russian forces continue to integrate air-to-air capabilities onto their Shahed-type drones to ensure the drones evade Ukrainian air defenders and to undermine Ukraine’s air defense. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported on February 8 that a Ukrainian interceptor drone shot down a Russian Shahed-type drone equipped with R-60 air-to-air missiles that were facing backwards.[15] Russian forces previously equipped Shaheds with forward-facing R-60 missiles in order to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds.[16] The shift from forward- to backward-facing R-60s suggests that the intended purpose of the modified drone may have shifted. Russian forces were likely first using the drones with forward-facing R-60 missiles specifically to search for and then strike Ukrainian aircraft. Russian forces now appear to be using backward-facing missiles in order to defend the drone if it encounters a Ukrainian aircraft, but then allow the drone to threaten Ukrainian aircraft involved in air defense operations and to continue toward its original target.

Parts of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) have achieved self-sufficiency such that Ukraine can start exports to the West. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 8 that Ukraine is opening its military exports and will open 10 export centers in northern European states and the Baltic states in 2026.[17] Zelensky did not specify which weapons Ukraine will export, but stated that Ukraine will start to jointly produce Ukrainian drones in Germany in mid-February 2025 and that Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) have opened joint production lines in the UK. Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB such that Ukraine could be less reliant on foreign military provisions in the future.[18] Western security and financial aid to Ukraine in the past years helped the Ukrainian DIB in these endeavors, and ISW assessed in early 2024 that Ukraine would require considerable Western military assistance for several years before Ukraine achieved self-sufficiency. Ukrainian exports, as well as joint European-Ukrainian and US-Ukrainian production, are mutually beneficial, as the West can use Ukraine’s experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle to bolster its defenses and own DIBs.

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian missile strikes in January 2026 damaged parts of Russia’s Kapustin Yar launch site. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 8 that previous Ukrainian strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast damaged a technical facility that serviced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, an assembly building, and a logistics warehouse.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against the Kapustin Yar site with Ukrainian-produced long-range weapons, including FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, in January 2026.[20] Russian forces launched their November 2024 and January 2026 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine from Kapustin Yar.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.
Russian milbloggers continue to claim that SpaceX’s recent block of unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine is hindering Russian combat operations in Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to integrate air-to-air capabilities onto their Shahed-type drones to ensure the drones evade Ukrainian air defenders and to undermine Ukraine’s air defense.
Parts of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) have achieved self-sufficiency such that Ukraine can start exports to the West.
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian missile strikes in January 2026 damaged parts of Russia’s Kapustin Yar launch site.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 8 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2026

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Russia launched another massive strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 6 to 7 and specifically targeted substations that support Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 408 drones and 39 missiles against Ukraine overnight – the second Russian strike of over 400 projectiles since the brief moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes between about January 29 and February 1.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 21 Kh-101 cruise missiles; two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles; 16 Kalibr cruise missiles; and 408 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 250 were Shaheds. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 382 drones and 24 missiles, that 13 missiles and 21 drones struck 19 locations, and that downed debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that drones and missiles struck energy infrastructure, including thermal power plants (TPPs) and substations, in Volyn, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, and Vinnytsia oblasts.[2] Ukrainian Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal reported that Russian forces struck the 750 kV and 330 kV substations that form the backbone of Ukraine’s energy grid, the Burshtyn TPP in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, and the Dobrotvir TPP in Lviv Oblast.[3] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian forces struck key high-voltage substations that support the reactors at NPPs, forcing Ukraine to reduce its energy output and increasing the duration of emergency power outages across the country.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also left 600,000 subscribers without power in Lviv Oblast, completely cutting heating and water supply to Burshtyn, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[5]

Russia used the temporary moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for devastating strikes on the nights of February 2 to 3 and February 6 to 7. The February 2 to 3 strike used 71 missiles and 450 drones during some of the coldest temperatures Ukraine has endured all winter.[6] The Kremlin has attempted to portray Russia’s adherence to the short energy infrastructure strikes moratorium as an indicator of Russia’s interest in good-faith negotiations.[7] The fact that Russia conducted two sets of strikes with over 400 projectiles within six days of the lapse of the energy strikes moratorium demonstrates the Kremlin’s determination to maximize the suffering of Ukrainian civilians and unwillingness to de-escalate the war or seriously advance the US-initiated peace negotiations. Russia instead used the moratorium to its advantage, maximizing damage against Ukraine’s collapsing energy grid in the dead of winter. Russian forces have also modified their drones and missiles to inflict more damage, including by equipping Shahed drones with mines and cluster munitions, and such measures have disproportionately affected civilian and energy infrastructure.[8] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other forms of air defense for a diverse, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[9]

The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to expedite the negotiations process and agree to a peace agreement while Russia is actively delaying negotiations and rejecting any agreement that does not amount to the complete capitulation of Ukraine. Three sources familiar with the matter told Reuters on February 6 that US and Ukrainian negotiators discussed a goal for Russia and Ukraine to agree on a peace deal by March 2026.[10] The sources stated that US officials called for Ukraine to hold a national referendum on a peace agreement, reportedly as soon as May 2026. The sources indicated that Ukrainian voters would vote on any proposed deal through a referendum and would simultaneously vote in national elections. One source stated that the United States is “in a hurry” to organize an election. Reuters noted that Ukrainian election authorities have projected that it would take roughly six months to change legislation and organize an election under the current conditions. The Kremlin has also repeatedly refused to commit to a ceasefire long enough to permit voting.[11] US pressure on Ukraine to plan for a vote on a peace agreement soon would be odd considering that the sides reportedly remain far apart on central issues and that the Kremlin continues to refuse compromises offered by both the United States and Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told journalists on February 7 that Ukraine agreed to a US-proposed meeting in the United States, likely in Miami, Florida, in one week (around February 12).[12] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that ”there was no talk about” a meeting in the United States and responded ”no” when asked about whether it is possible to participate in another round of peace negotiations in the United States.[13] Russian officials have continuously rejected offers for trilateral negotiations and negotiations at the leadership level to end the war and have continuously set conditions to justify further rejections immediately around the February 4 to 5 Abu Dhabi talks.[14] The Kremlin continues to show no willingness to compromise for good-faith peace negotiations or any indication that it will accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[15]

Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev is reportedly alive following a February 6 assassination attempt.[16] Russian state media outlet TASS reported on February 7 that Alekseyev regained consciousness after a surgery and that his injuries are no longer life-threatening.[17] A source close to the investigation claimed to Russian business outlet Kommersant that authorities detained two suspects in the assassination attempt, including the suspected shooter.[18]

Key Takeaways

Russia launched another massive strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 6 to 7 and specifically targeted substations that support Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs).
Russia used the temporary moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for devastating strikes on the nights of February 2 to 3 and February 6 to 7.
The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to expedite the negotiations process and agree to a peace agreement while Russia is actively delaying negotiations and rejecting any agreement that does not amount to the complete capitulation of Ukraine.
Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev is reportedly alive following a February 6 assassination attempt.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.

read the full Feb 7 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2026

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The Kremlin continues to reject any meaningful security guarantees that would protect Ukraine from complete diplomatic or military capitulation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on February 6 the Kremlin’s rejection of Western-provided security guarantees in Ukraine and reiterated the Kremlin’s support of the “security guarantees” that Russia agreed to in the April 2022 Istanbul talks.[1] The 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document did not provide the groundwork for meaningful security guarantees and would have left Ukraine defenseless against renewed aggression. The Istanbul Protocol draft stipulated that Russia – the aggressor in the war in Ukraine – would be treated as a neutral ”guarantor state” of Ukraine; that Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would have veto power over a mechanism to respond to future aggression in Ukraine; and that Ukraine commit to neutrality, severe restrictions on military size and composition, and never accepting military assistance from its allies.[2] Lavrov’s February 6 statement is the latest in a series from senior Kremlin officials indicating that the Kremlin continues to view the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty as the basis for any future peace settlement and is unwilling to compromise on its demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the US-proposed 28-point peace plan or any plan requiring Russia to compromise on any of its original war aims.[4]

The Russian military command is reportedly planning to deploy its likely limited strategic reserves to a planned Summer 2026 offensive in southern and/or eastern Ukraine. The Russian military likely lacks sufficient reserves to both adequately prepare for such an offensive and achieve the offensive’s objectives, however. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on February 5 that Russian forces have begun to prepare for their anticipated Summer 2026 offensive, which Mashovets forecasted will likely begin as soon as late April 2026.[5] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will likely focus on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction and/or the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City direction. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are struggling to seize the necessary starting positions to launch the summer offensive in the coming months, as Russian forces have become bogged down in achieving tactical objectives in these directions and are failing to advance rapidly enough to meet the Russian military command’s deadlines. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command does not want to use its strategic reserves, which Mashovets reported that Russian command has been trying to accumulate since Fall 2025, in order to accelerate these preparatory tactical actions as doing so would reduce consume reserves needed for the summer campaign. ISW has observed reports that Russia has been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since July 2025, potentially to facilitate such an offensive, but has been struggling to replace its losses in Ukraine and has had to deploy operational reserves to support ongoing combat operations.[6] The Russian military command will likely have to choose between deploying its likely limited strategic reserves now to better prepare for the summer offensive or risk using the strategic reserve later in the summer but from less advantageous positions.

Russian forces have been setting conditions for future offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City directions yet have been struggling to make significant advances in the area. Russian forces have been conducting strikes in the Slovyansk and Hulyaipole (northeast of Orikhiv) directions, particularly against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that supply forward positions, in order to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects and degrade Ukrainian defenses but have struggled to leverage these preparations to make operationally significant advances.[7] Russian forces been attacking north and south of Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk) but have been struggling to seize the town and have thus far been limited to small-scale infiltration missions into Lyman.[8] The recent successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kupyansk direction has also reportedly diverted Russian reserves from the Lyman direction to respond to Ukrainian attacks in and near Kupyansk. Russian forces seized Siversk in December 2025 and are still roughly 23 kilometers from Slovyansk.[9] Russian forces have also been unable to make significant progress fighting through Kostyantynivka (south of Slovyansk), where Russian forces are mostly relying on small group infiltration missions.[10]

Russian forces made relatively quicker advances in the Hulyaipole direction in November 2025 following an extended battlefield air interdiction (BAI) strike campaign but have not made operationally significant advances since.[11] Russian forces likely intended to bypass Ukrainian defenses south of Orikhiv from the Hulyaipole direction and to join the Russian efforts in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole direction to advance on Zaporizhzhia City but have failed to cut the T-0814 Hulyaipole-Orikhiv highway supplying Orikhiv and advance very far toward Orikhiv from the east.[12] Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are still roughly 35 kilometers from Orikhiv. Russian forces have also faced tactical struggles near Orikhiv itself, particularly in Mala Tokmachka (just southeast of Orikhiv) where Russian forces advanced using an at least reduced company-sized mechanized assault in November 2025 but subsequently lost these positions to Ukrainian counterattacks.[13] Russian forces have also been entangled in fighting for Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv and south of Zaporizhzhia City) and other settlements on the eastern bank of the largely dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir despite intensified assaults in the area since July 2025.[14]

Russian plans for a summer offensive highlight Russia’s determination to achieve its war aims, including the seizure of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts, through military means if need be. Senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly stated that Russia will continue efforts on the battlefield to achieve its aims if it cannot achieve them through negotiations.[15] The Russian military command’s intention to conduct a large-scale summer offensive — even if Russian forces may struggle to achieve its objectives — demonstrates the Kremlin’s disinterest in finding a solution to end the war via negotiations in the coming weeks or months.

Russian forces likely seized Hulyaipole — a town with a pre-war population of roughly 13,000 – after three months of fighting and are unlikely to make rapid advances beyond Hulyaipole without deprioritizing other areas of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces advanced beyond Hulyaipole at a prior date.[16] ISW has not observed evidence in the past few weeks that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain defensive positions in Hulyaipole, and the pattern of recent Russian infiltrations and advances in area suggests that Russian forces hold the town.[17] Russian forces began making relatively rapid advances in the Hulyaipole direction in early November 2025 after a months-long battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that degraded Ukrainian logistics and ability to sustain frontline forces and defense against subsequent Russian ground operations.[18] Russian forces first infiltrated into Hulyaipole in mid-to-late November 2025, began consolidating positions in the town by mid-December 2025, and claimed to have seized Hulyaipole as of December 27.[19] These advances were contingent upon both the weather conditions in the area and the Russian prioritization of the effort. The relatively rapid Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction exploited seasonal foggy and rainy weather conditions that hindered Ukrainian strike and reconnaissance drone operations, which allowed Russian forces to accumulate forces and advance under less threat.[20] These weather conditions did not last, however, as Russian forces entered the Hulyaipole built up area and winter conditions began degrading infantry operations since late December 2025.[21] The Russian military command had also committed elements of at least three combined arms armies (CAAs) to the areas east and northeast of Hulyaipole, while deprioritizing other sectors of the frontline.[22] Russian forces initially attempted to maintain simultaneous advances in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, but lacked the combat power to sustain both efforts, causing the Russian military command to deprioritize the Oleksandrivka direction.[23] Russian forces have consistently proven themselves unable to build large enough reserves to be able to flood a sector of the front without redeploying personnel from other areas.[24] Russian forces may seek to accelerate their advance in the Hulyaipole direction to support a potential Summer 2026 offensive toward Zaporizhzhia City from the south, but are likely unable or unwilling to redeploy forces and means from other frontline sectors to accomplish such an objective.

SpaceX’s block on unregistered Starlink terminal operations in Ukraine is reportedly hindering Russian ground operations and tactical strikes. Ukrainian General Staff sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on February 5 that SpaceX’s efforts to block unregistered Starlink satellite communication terminals have forced Russian forces to reduce the number of assaults on the frontlines and have temporarily stopped all assaults on unspecified areas of the frontline.[25] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces reduced their assault operations and first-person view (FPV) drone operations after SpaceX blocked unregistered Starlink terminals.[26] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces no longer have to expend additional resources striking Russian Starlink terminals in order to disable them. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force, whose area of responsibility comprises northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, reported that the Starlink terminal blocking is affecting both Russian and Ukrainian forces but that is affecting Russian forces more.[27] Russian milbloggers broadly expressed concern about the unregistered terminal block, claiming that the lack of access to Starlink is hindering Russian military operations and that Russian forces are ”scrambling to establish an equivalent.”[28] One milblogger indicated that the Starlink terminal block will likely impact Russian operations in the Kostyantynivka direction.[29] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that some Russian soldiers have managed to operate Starlink terminals, but ISW is unable to confirm this report, and it is unclear how, where, or in what capacity Russian forces would be operating these Starlink terminals.[30]

Unknown actors conducted an assassination attempt on Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev in Moscow City on February 6. Russia’s Investigative Committee claimed on February 6 that unknown actors fired three shots at Alekseyev near his home in northwestern Moscow City, leaving Alekseyev hospitalized.[31] A Russian insider channel claimed that the assailants shot Alekseyev’s torso and that he is in critical condition.[32] Alekseyev was reportedly heavily involved in Russian volunteer formations and private military companies (PMCs), including the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Redut PMC.[33] Alekseyev reportedly played a significant role in organizing Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, participated in negotiations for a humanitarian corridor from Mariupol in Spring 2022, and was affiliated with the Wagner Group PMC.[34] Alekseyev reportedly supported Wagner Group Head Yevgeny Prigozhin in Prigozhin’s June 2023 rebellion against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[35] Former Russian officer and imprisoned prominent ultranationalist, Igor Girkin, claimed in 2023 that Alekseyev was responsible for the creation of the Wagner Group.[36]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin continues to reject any meaningful security guarantees that would protect Ukraine from complete diplomatic or military capitulation.
The Russian military command is reportedly planning to deploy its likely limited strategic reserves to a planned Summer 2026 offensive in southern and/or eastern Ukraine. The Russian military likely lacks sufficient reserves to both adequately prepare for such an offensive and achieve the offensive’s objectives, however.
Russian forces have been setting conditions for future offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City directions yet have been struggling to make significant advances in the area.
Russian forces likely seized Hulyaipole – a town with a pre-war population of roughly 13,000 – after three months of fighting and are unlikely to make rapid advances beyond Hulyaipole without deprioritizing other areas of the frontline.
SpaceX’s block on unregistered Starlink terminal operations in Ukraine is reportedly hindering Russian ground operations and tactical strikes.
Unknown actors conducted an assassination attempt on Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev in Moscow City on February 6.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Feb 6 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2026

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US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 5. Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov noted that US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met in trilateral consultations and working groups — the same format as the February 4 talks.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated that the talks were “constructive.”[2] ISW will continue to monitor reports of the outcomes of the February 4-5 negotiations in Abu Dhabi.

The Kremlin is looking for new narratives to try to convince the United States and Europe to not agree to security guarantees for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used a February 4 interview with Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) to once again reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Lavrov referenced a recent report from the Financial Times (FT) outlining the reported multi-layered security guarantees agreement that the United States, Europe, and Ukraine have been discussing to respond to a possible Russian invasion of post-war Ukraine.[4] Lavrov claimed that the reported security guarantees document is “practically an ultimatum” to Russia and that Ukraine would stage a false flag attack and blame Russia in order to receive a “carte blanche” from the West to renew fighting. Lavrov rejected a ceasefire that precedes a final peace resolution, claiming that the West will use such a ceasefire to supply Ukraine with weapons. Kremlin officials have repeated the same rhetoric about Western security guarantees in recent months, consistently calling such guarantees “unacceptable” for Russia and labelling foreign troop deployments to Ukraine as “legitimate” Russian targets.[5] The Kremlin, however, appears to now be trying to find new narratives to reject Western security guarantees and to convince the United States and Europe to not agree to them, likely as the United States, Ukraine, and Europe move closer to finalizing the agreement. Kremlin officials started to use new narratives on February 2 and 3, claiming that the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine could lead to a third world war and direct military conflict between nuclear powers.[6] Lavrov’s February 4 claim about an alleged Ukrainian false flag attack is likely yet another attempt to find new ways to convince the United States and Europe to not provide security guarantees to Ukraine. RT is a Russian state media outlet with an extensive global reach in various languages, and the Kremlin is likely using Lavrov’s interview to disseminate these narratives to international audiences, including those in the United States.

Lavrov implied that Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality” aims to turn Ukraine into a pro-Russian proxy state. Lavrov claimed to RT that the only kind of Ukraine that Russia is “prepared to see as a long-term, eternal neighbor” is a “friendly” Ukraine that is “not necessarily an ally” but is “neutral” and “benevolent.”[7] Lavrov’s statement offers insight into the additional demands embedded in Russia’s original war demand for Ukrainian “neutrality” and indicates that Russia seeks to turn Ukraine into a proxy state even if Russia does not physically control all of Ukraine’s territory. Lavrov’s insistence that post-war Ukraine be “friendly” and “benevolent” implies that Russia will only be satisfied with a Ukraine led by a pro-Russian government that makes pro-Russian policies. Russia likely aims to turn Ukraine into another Belarus, which ISW assesses Russia has de facto annexed, even as Belarus maintains its borders and government.[8]

The Kremlin continues to reject the parts of the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan as well as the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan as insufficient to address Russia’s demands about minority rights in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that Russia received a peace plan proposal from the United States before the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit that allegedly included provisions about rights for national minorities and religious freedoms in post-war Ukraine that addressed Russia’s concerns.[9] Lavrov claimed, however, that the “latest version” of the 20-point peace plan appears to not include this provision. The draft of the 20-point plan that Ukraine released in December 2025 called for Ukraine to abide by EU regulations on religious and linguistic minorities, however.[10] Lavrov previously effectively rejected the November 2025 28-point peace plan that called for Ukraine to accept EU regulations protecting religious and linguistic minorities, claiming that the provisions were insufficient for Russia.[11] The Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of publicly available documents from the Alaska Summit to claim that Russia and the United States came to an understanding to end the war during the meeting.[12] Kremlin claims that the Alaska Summit provided the only satisfactory resolution to the minorities issue likely aim to create justifications for Russia to reject the latest 20-point peace plan, as well as any subsequent peace plans that do not satisfy Russia’s demands. ISW continues to assess that longstanding Russian claims that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and Russian Orthodoxy aim to justify the Kremlin’s original war demand for the removal of the current government for a pro-Russian puppet government and destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty.[13] Lavrov’s comments to RT about Ukrainian neutrality and minority rights further highlight how Russia is unwilling to compromise and is demanding that any future peace settlement give in to Russia’s original war demands from 2022.

Lavrov attempted to portray Russia’s adherence to the short-term energy strike ceasefire as an indicator of Russia’s interest in good-faith negotiations, even as the Kremlin has routinely used such ceasefires to stockpile weapons for subsequent large-scale strikes. Lavrov responded in the RT interview to a question about damage to Ukraine’s energy grid, claiming that “everyone forgets” previous examples of Russia’s alleged “goodwill.”[14] Lavrov claimed that one example of this goodwill was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support for and Russia’s claimed subsequent adherence to the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term energy strikes ceasefire in March and April 2025. Ukraine and the United States proposed the moratorium in late March 2025, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire, including agreements on the list of objects covered or the types of strikes prohibited, were never publicly clear or finalized.[15] Russian forces exploited the lack of clarity to continue to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the ceasefire.[16]

The Kremlin has used its support for short-term ceasefires to try to portray Russia as acting in good faith while consistently rejecting US and Ukrainian calls for a longer or permanent moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[17] ISW continues to assess that these shorter-term ceasefires, such as the recent energy strikes ceasefire in late January and early February, do not represent a significant Kremlin concession, as Russian forces have often used these ceasefires to stockpile missiles to maximize damage in subsequent strike packages shortly after the ceasefire’s expiration.[18] The March-April 2025 temporary ceasefire ended on April 18, 2025, and Russian forces launched a strike package containing 70 missiles on the night of April 23 to 24, 2025 — the highest number of missiles in one strike package in all of 2025.[19] Russian forces similarly conducted a strike with 71 missiles on the night of February 2-3 after the latest temporary ceasefire ended.[20] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to portray its adherence to the recent short-term energy strikes moratorium as a significant concession to gain leverage in the peace talks in Abu Dhabi.[21]

US and Russian officials on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi peace talks have reportedly discussed bilateral military relations, including measures to informally extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that expired on February 5. US European Command (EUCOM) reported that the United States and Russia agreed on February 5 to reestablish high-level military-to-military dialogue following meetings in Abu Dhabi between EUCOM Commander General Alexus Grynkewich and senior Russian and Ukrainian military officials.[22] Russia has notably used backchannels in the past to spread its information operations and influence Western leaders.[23] Three sources told Axios on February 5 that the American and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi have been discussing a deal to continue New START after its expiration but that the deal still needs presidential approval on both sides.[24] A US official reported that the United States and Russia cannot legally formalize an extension to the treaty but that both parties would continue to operate ”in good faith.“ A source reported that the United States and Russia are discussing plans to observe the terms of the treaty for another six months, during which Russia and the United States would negotiate a new deal. A White House official told Bloomberg that US President Donald Trump will decide the US path forward and will announce this path on his own timeline.[25]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Russian officials are using threats of escalation likely to push the United States to renew New START on terms that benefit not only Russia but also the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Russian MFA claimed on February 4 that the United States “deliberately ignored” Russia’s earlier proposal to extend New START for one year upon its expiration and that the US approach is “misguided and regrettable.”[26] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia assumes that the parties are no longer bound by any obligations or declarations within the context of the treaty and are “free to choose their next steps.” The Russian MFA claimed that Russia intends to act responsibly but remains prepared to take “decisive” countermeasures against additional threats to Russia’s national security. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the treaty’s expiration, stating that “winter is coming” — issuing an implicit threat in reference to a “nuclear winter” after large-scale nuclear war.[27] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik also issued threats, claiming that Russia has all the retaliatory weapons it needs and that the situation will escalate the longer the United States and Russia do not sign a new treaty.[28] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky urged the United States to extend the treaty, claiming that “the ball is in the [United States’] court.”[29]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 5 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and PRC President Xi Jinping discussed the “negative consequences” of the end of New START during their February 4 video call.[30] Peskov stated that Russia ”respects” the PRC’s position that Chinese nuclear potential is incomparable to that of the United States and Russia such that the PRC does not want to participate in strategic arms control talks.[31] The Kremlin is backing the PRC’s rejection to enter strategic arms talks with the United States, possibly in exchange for the PRC’s ongoing support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.[32] Russia is likely attempting to use New START’s February 5 expiration to divert US attention away from ongoing negotiations about Ukraine. The Kremlin has also been using New START’s expiration to push the United States to give in to Russia’s demands on Ukraine in exchange for renewed strategic arms talks.[33]

Ukrainian forces recently conducted FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against the Kapustin Yar site (approximately 430 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian international border) with Ukrainian-produced long-range weapons, including Flamingo missiles, in January 2026.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck hangar-type buildings, where Russian forces prepare intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missile launches. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused various degrees of damage to some buildings at the site but significantly damaged one hangar. Denys Shtilierman, the co-owner and chief designer of Ukraine’s Fire Point defense industrial company that produces the Flamingo missiles, posted footage on February 5 reportedly showing recent Flamingo missile launches, including against Kapustin Yar.[35] Russian forces launched their November 2024 and January 2026 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine from Kapustin Yar.[36]

Ukraine’s efforts to register Starlink terminals will likely impact Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 5 that the first group of officially authorized Starlink terminals are operational within the Ukrainian military and that Russian Starlinks cannot operate within Ukraine.[37] Fedorov noted the process to verify Ukrainian Starlinks is ongoing. Several Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces no longer could use terminals and voiced concerns about the effects that the loss of Starlink capabilities could have on the battlefield.[38] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade reported on February 5 that Russian forces had accumulated a significant number of Starlinks recently and that the terminals provided Russian forces with stable interunit communications.[39] The commander stated that Russian forces began integrating Starlinks to control drones but that efforts to block Russian Starlinks will deny Russian forces the ability to conduct reconnaissance and strike missions and communication between groups and complicate Russian offensive operations. The commander noted that the recent blocks on Russian terminals have not “brought down” Russian forces but have caused Russian forces significant losses.

Russian forces may not be able to conduct their BAI campaign at the same tempo and depth as in recent weeks without Starlink terminals. Russian forces have recently used Starlink-enabled drones to conduct real time targeting and extend the ranges on drones for strikes against moving targets like trains and against Ukrainian vehicles along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[40] Russian forces will likely struggle to maintain this BAI campaign at the same intensity levels in the near-term unless Russian forces are able to find workarounds to the blocks or adapt new technological solutions to replace Starlink.

Russia and Ukraine conducted a civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5 following trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced on February 5 that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Abu Dhabi agreed to exchange a total of 314 personnel.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine returned 157 Russian POWs and three civilians from Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia returned 157 Ukrainian POWs and civilians.[42] The United States and United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the 2026 Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia to frame Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state united around the ongoing war effort. Putin attended a ceremony on February 5 officially opening 2026 as the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia and stated that it is important to remember how Russian ethnic groups emerged.[43] Putin specifically highlighted the emergence of ethnic Russians as a “nation” and a “people” and the historic unification of “various Slavic groups.” Putin noted, however, that a multinational Russia gradually took shape with different cultures but united by “common values.” Putin claimed that Russians are united in their commitment to preserving their land, families, culture, and traditions and claimed that Russian forces fighting in Ukraine are also united despite their differences. Putin’s special emphasis on the centrality of ethnic Russians in Russia’s history but overarching message about Russia’s acceptance of other groups demonstrates how Putin has to balance the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation while placating the pro-war ultranationalist and xenophobic community.[44] ISW continues to assess that Putin is leaning into a concept of civic nationalism more consistent with the Soviet ideal than the Christian nationalism of Russian ultranationalists.[45]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Taras Chmut to represent the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency (DPA).[46] Fedorov reported on February 5 that he met with Chmut, who heads the Come Back Alive foundation that provides support to Ukrainian servicemembers, to discuss the MoD’s plans to support the DPA, identify the needs of the frontline, and ensure maximum transparency. Fedorov highlighted the need to ensure quality control and timely deliveries of supplies, to create a procurement system that can quickly respond to changes in the innovation cycle and reduce corruption.

Key Takeaways

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 5.
The Kremlin is looking for new narratives to try to convince the United States and Europe to not agree to security guarantees for Ukraine.
Lavrov implied that Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality” aims to turn Ukraine into a pro-Russian proxy state.
The Kremlin continues to reject the parts of the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan as well as the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan as insufficient to address Russia’s demands about minority rights in Ukraine.
Lavrov attempted to portray Russia’s adherence to the short-term energy strike ceasefire as an indicator of Russia’s interest in good-faith negotiations, even as the Kremlin has routinely used such ceasefires to stockpile weapons for subsequent large-scale strikes.
US and Russian officials on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi peace talks have reportedly discussed bilateral military relations, including measures to informally extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that expired on February 5.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Russian officials are using threats of escalation likely to push the United States to renew New START on terms that benefit not only Russia but also the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Ukrainian forces recently conducted FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast.
Ukraine’s efforts to register Starlink terminals will likely impact Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts.
Russia and Ukraine conducted a civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5 following trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the 2026 Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia to frame Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state united around the ongoing war effort.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Taras Chmut to represent the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency (DPA).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Feb 5 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2026

Toplines

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on February 4. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated on February 4 that the trilateral talks were “meaningful and productive” and that the parties continued to work in separate groups before resuming trilateral negotiations.[1] White House officials noted that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner traveled to Abu Dhabi to participate in negotiations.[2] Umerov added that US Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll and Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of US European Command General Alexus Grynkewich participated in the consultations.[3] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio cautioned that there will likely be no information about the progress of the talks until there is a “breakthrough,” even through leaks, and noted that the remaining unresolved issues are the “most difficult.”[4]

Senior Kremlin officials and mouthpieces reiterated Russia’s commitments to its war goals and explicitly rejected Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine, likely to set information conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to Russian demands. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated the Kremlin’s characterization of any deployment of Western troops to postwar Ukraine, including through the Coalition of the Willing, as “categorically unacceptable” for Russia.[5] Zakharova claimed that such a deployment would threaten Russia’s security and threatened that Russia would consider such troops as legitimate military targets. Zakharova stated that a resolution to the war is impossible unless it addresses Russia’s so-called “root causes,” which Russia aims to resolve through “military or political means.” Kremlin officials use “root causes” as shorthand to refer to Russia’s demands for the rollback of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its 1997 borders, the destruction of the Ukrainian military, and the replacement of the current democratically elected Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian regime.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on February 4 that Russia will continue its war in Ukraine until the Ukrainian government “makes the appropriate decisions,“ likely meaning until Ukraine capitulates to Russian absolutist demands.[7] Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia’s full-scale invasion — claimed on February 4 that statements about Western troop deployment to Ukraine make negotiations a “dead end” as Russia will “never allow“ the Coalition of the Willing to deploy forces in Ukraine.[8] Russian State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s rhetorical lines, also reiterated the Kremlin’s explicit rejection of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[9]

The United States concluded a deal to transport liquified natural gas (LNG) to Ukraine through the Vertical Gas Corridor. Reuters reported on February 2 that the United States concluded a deal with Greek joint venture Atlantic-See LNG Trade to transport US LNG to Ukraine through a pipeline that passes through Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, likely referring to the Vertical Gas Corridor pipeline.[10] The Atlantic-See LNG Trade S.A. stated that it will deliver the first shipment of LNG to Ukraine in March 2026.[11] The US Embassy in Kyiv confirmed on February 4 the deal to transport LNG through the Vertical Gas Corridor and noted that this deal marks a new route for US energy exports to replace Russian exports in Europe and demonstrates US business support for Ukrainian energy security.[12]

Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for a future offensive operations against Kostyantynivka using lessons learned from Pokrovsk. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 4 that Russian forces have recently focused efforts on interdicting Ukrainian logistics rather than conducting combat operations, in part due to freezing temperatures.[13] The commander stated that Russian interdiction efforts are forcing Ukrainian forces to rely more heavily on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to supply troops and positions within Kostyantynivka. The commander noted that the brigade’s use of UGVs in January 2026 increased twofold and that Ukrainian forces need to procure more UGVs at a cheaper rate to sustain logistics. The commander stated that Russian forces also interdict Ukrainian logistics by surveilling, striking, and remotely mining Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with first-person view (FPV) and sleeper drones; conducting drone ambushes; and destroying Ukrainian UGVs. The commander reported that it is difficult to rotate Ukrainian drone operators out of Kostyantynivka because Russian forces prioritize targeting Ukrainian drone operators, particularly with glide bombs, Molniya fixed-wing drones, and other FPV unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on January 8 that Russian drone ranges significantly increased in 2025, making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to travel into Kostyantynivka.[14] Russian forces began infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka in mid-October 2025 but have thus far not prioritized the seizure of Kostyantynivka in favor of completing the seizure of Pokrovsk.[15]

Russian forces are likely trying to replicate a new campaign design that Russia has successfully employed in Pokrovsk and later in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have been striking various targets in Ukraine’s near rear at an operational depth of about 25 to 100 or more kilometers. These targets include roads, railways, and bridges that support Ukrainian GLOCs, ahead of subsequent intensified ground operations. Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian drone operators to create exploitable gaps in Ukraine’s “wall of drones” defensive line.[16] Russian forces spent months conducting BAI campaigns to set conditions for intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, which ultimately enabled Russian advances in these directions in fall 2025.[17]

The Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) have already reportedly formed seven regiments, 25 battalions, one division, and three detachments separate from the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center.[18] Former Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Major General Ilya Pavlenko stated on February 3 that the Russian USF consists of 87,000 troops and plans to raise one brigade, four regiments, 96 battalions, two divisions, and 82 companies in 2026. Pavlenko stated that Russia also plans to reorganize the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces [VDV]) and the existing five USF regiments into six USF brigades.[19] Pavlenko noted that Russia appears to be reorganizing the BARS Center and existing USF units to improve decision-making and alleviate fragmentation between forces. It is unclear if Russia is planning to integrate Rubikon into the USF or is undertaking efforts to improve cohesion between Rubikon and USF units. Russia has been attempting to build out its USF since mid-2024 and presented its first USF regiment during the May 2025 Victory Day Parade in Moscow.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Major General Oleh Luhovskyi as the acting head of the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service on February 4.[21]

Key Takeaways

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on February 4.
Senior Kremlin officials and mouthpieces reiterated Russia’s commitments to its war goals and explicitly rejected Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine, likely to set information conditions to reject any peace deal that does not concede to Russian demands.
The United States concluded a deal to transport liquified natural gas (LNG) to Ukraine through the Vertical Gas Corridor.
Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for future offensive operations against Kostyantynivka using lessons learned from Pokrovsk.
The Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) have already reportedly formed seven regiments, 25 battalions, one division, and three detachments separate of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Major General Oleh Luhovskyi as the acting head of the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service on February 4.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Feb 4 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2026

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Russia resumed its combined missile and drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of February 2 to 3, following the brief moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 3 that Russian forces launched 450 drones and 71 missiles at Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles from occupied Crimea, 32 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from the Bryansk Oblast airspace, and 28 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea and Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 450 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 300 were Shahed drones — from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukraine downed 412 drones, the four Zirkon/Onyx missiles, 11 Iskander-M/S-300 missiles, three Kh-22/32 missiles, and 20 Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 27 missiles and 31 drones hit 27 locations and that drone debris fell at 17 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the drones and missiles struck energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Odesa oblasts.[2] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck combined heat and power plants (CHPP) and substations in Kyiv City and caused complete heat outages in the city’s Darnytskyi and Dniprovskyi raions that affected 1,170 high-rise buildings.[3] Russian forces reportedly struck energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, including CHPP-5 and two substations in Kharkiv City, prompting Ukrainian officials to declare a local state of emergency and leaving over 200,000 consumers without power.[4] Russian forces also reportedly struck thermal power plants in Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Odesa oblasts.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes against energy infrastructure left 50 settlements in Vinnytsia Oblast and over 50,000 energy consumers in Odesa Oblast without power.[6]

Russia’s overnight strike package contained an unusually high number of ballistic missiles, consistent with the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to stockpile missiles to maximize damage against civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces used a strike package that was 1.5 times larger than the strike packages Russian forces launched before the trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi on January 23-24.[7] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat assessed on February 3 that it appears that Russian forces adopted strike packages containing larger numbers of ballistic missiles because these missiles are more difficult for Ukraine to intercept.[8] Ihnat reported that the Kh-22/32, Zirkon, Onyx, and Iskander-M missiles all have a ballistic or semi-ballistic flight path. Ihnat stated that only 10 of the 38 missiles that Ukrainian forces downed were ballistic missiles and that the remainder were cruise missiles. Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significantly higher quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series to maximize damage. Russian forces have also modified their drones and missiles to inflict more damage, including by equipping Shahed drones with mines and cluster munitions, and such measures have disproportionately affected civilian and energy infrastructure.[9] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles.[10] Ukraine also requires partner support to maintain a diverse air defense umbrella that also incorporates interceptor drones, well-equipped mobile fire groups, fighter jets, and other kinetic and electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures.

The February 2 to 3 strike demonstrates that Russia never intended to use the energy strikes moratorium to de-escalate the war or seriously advance the US-initiated peace negotiations. Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that the overnight Russian strike was the most devastating Russian strike thus far in 2026.[11] Zelensky stated that the energy strikes moratorium was supposed to start after the January 23-24 trilateral talks and last until the next round of talks, which were originally scheduled for February 1 but have since been rescheduled to February 4 and 5.[12] Zelensky stated that the United States proposed the moratorium to de-escalate the war and that the US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations planned to decide on further de-escalation measures in the second round of talks. The Kremlin has previously offered short-term ceasefires to falsely portray the Kremlin as acting in good faith and feign Russia’s interest in peaceful war resolution while repeatedly rejecting Ukrainian and US calls for a longer or permanent moratorium on long-range strikes or a ceasefire.[13] The Kremlin will likely attempt to portray its adherence to this short-term energy strikes moratorium as a significant concession to gain leverage in the upcoming peace talks, even though the Kremlin used these few days to stockpile missiles for a larger strike package.

The short-term moratorium does not mark a significant Russian concession, however, as Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian logistics and infrastructure during the moratorium. Zelensky noted that Russian forces struck Ukrainian railroads and other infrastructure during the few days of the energy strikes moratorium — simply switching from targeting energy infrastructure to targeting logistics.[14] Ukraine also suffered a cascading blackout on January 31 despite the energy strikes moratorium in place at that time.[15] Russian forces did not conduct any strikes against energy infrastructure on January 31 that directly caused the outage, but the Ukrainian grid was so degraded from months of Russian strikes that it could not handle a technical malfunction and suffered a widespread failure. The Kremlin agreed to the short-term strikes moratorium only after inflicting severe damage to the Ukrainian energy grid.

The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject the Western security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to prevent another Russian invasion. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Russian State Duma officials reiterated on February 2 and 3 the Kremlin’s rejections of Western security guarantees for Ukraine, again labeling such guarantees as “unacceptable” for Russia and stating that Russia would view foreign troop deployments to Ukraine as “legitimate targets.”[16] Russian State Duma deputies explicitly stated that Russia “cannot agree” to US and European security guarantees and claimed that the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine could lead to a third world war and direct military conflict between nuclear powers.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has recently stated that US-Ukrainian security guarantee agreements are ready for the parties to sign, and Kremlin officials are likely using narratives about a possible escalation leading to a nuclear war to push the United States to refuse to sign the security guarantees document out of fear. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere, and that such threats are part of the Russian cognitive warfare effort to undermine the provision of Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[18] The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 2 that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe have been in discussions throughout December 2025 and January 2026 to create a multi-layered security guarantees agreement for post-war Ukraine to deter and defeat renewed Russian aggression.[19] FT stated that the different phases of the plans would include Western diplomatic responses, Ukrainian military responses, and a coordinated US-European military response.

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war demands for a peace settlement in Ukraine, particularly those that aim to destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ahead of the next round of the US-Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi. The Russian MFA stated on February 2 that Russia must examine all peace proposals to assess if they are “acceptable for Russia” and if they comply with Russia’s war goals and objectives.[20] The MFA claimed that Ukraine is trying to avoid discussions about the “White House plan,” which the MFA claimed is based on the understandings Russia and the United States allegedly agreed upon at the August 2025 Alaska Summit. Kremlin officials have repeatedly exploited the lack of clarity about the outcome of the 2025 Alaska Summit to claim that the United States and Russia had agreed to end the war based on the original Russian demands.[21] The MFA claimed that the Alaska Summit specifically discussed the alleged “root causes” of the war (a phrase the Kremlin often uses to discuss its original war aims from 2021 and 2022) and named NATO expansion and possible Ukrainian NATO membership as a “chief” root cause. Russia issued ultimatums to the United States and NATO in December 2021 before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, demanding “security guarantees” for Russia, such as halting the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member-states that joined NATO after 1997.[22] These demands amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance and a radical restructuring of the security architecture in all of Europe – a core Russian grand strategic goal that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains to this day.[23] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been signaling that any peace deal that does not address Russia’s demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia, nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations.[24]

The Kremlin continues to weaponize religion to demand restrictions on Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russia’s own systematic religious repressions in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Russian MFA claimed that the Ukrainian government is destroying the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[25] The MFA claimed that Russia raised its concerns about Ukraine’s alleged discrimination of the UOC MP to the United States at the Alaska Summit, where the MFA claimed Russia demanded that a peace settlement require Ukraine to repeal its 2024 law “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations” and to “restore” the rights of the UOC MP and its practitioners. The MFA asserted that a fair and lasting peace is “impossible” without the fulfillment of these demands.

The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization but rather an extension of the Russian state and an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare.[26] The UOC MP provided material support for Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and Russian soldiers used UOC MP churches as military storage depots, garrisons, field hospitals, and even fighting positions during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example.[27] Ukraine’s 2024 law on religious organizations bans religious organizations tied to the Russian state, including the ROC.[28] The law did not ban orthodoxy in Ukraine; however, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted the Autocephalous (independent) Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which is unrelated to the UOC MP and ROC, independence from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019.[29] Russia, in contrast, passed the “Yarovaya Law” in 2016, requiring all religious organizations and churches in Russia to register with the Russian government. The Russian government refuses to register undesirable religious organizations it seeks to suppress and has used the law to persecute several religious minorities.[30] Russia has applied these repressive practices to its occupation of Ukraine since 2014. Russian demands that Ukraine change its law on the ROC aim to restore the UOC MP as the Kremlin’s subversive arm in Ukraine and to dictate limits on Ukraine’s sovereignty and ability to create its own legislation.

The Kremlin continues efforts to distract attention from and secure concessions in the upcoming February 4-5 peace talks in Abu Dhabi, which will coincide with the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov commented on the expiration of New START on February 5, claiming that Russia’s nuclear triad is highly modernized and that Russia has created and deployed “significant resources” to guarantee its security.[31] Ryabkov claimed that no one can doubt that Russia can guarantee its security “from all sides” and implied that Russia does not need an arms race to create new weapons to ensure its security. Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to adhere to the terms of New START for another year upon its expiration, but only if the United States does the same.[32] The Kremlin has been using carrots and sticks related to New START to entice and scare the United States into conceding to Russia’s demands about Ukraine in exchange for renewed nuclear arms talks. The Kremlin is likely trying to use rhetoric about New START to influence the upcoming US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi on February 4 and 5 — the final days of New START before it expires.

The Kremlin has similarly been trying to use the prospect of US-Russian economic deals to persuade the United States to give in to Russia’s demands about Ukraine.[33] The Russian MFA claimed on February 2 that US-Russian contacts about a settlement in Ukraine are important but are not the only topics that “deserve attention.”[34] The MFA claimed that Russia and the United States, as fellow “great powers,” should focus on creating mutually beneficial projects in areas where their interests align, such as hydrocarbons and critical and rare earth minerals.

The Kremlin continues to attempt to disguise and dismiss the economic impacts of its costly war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and poor economic policy decisions. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on February 3 that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew only one percent in 2025, compared to 4.1 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024, but claimed that the reduction was “man-made” and part of the Russian government’s efforts to curb inflation.[35] Putin claimed that Russian inflation decreased to 5.6 percent by the end of 2025, down from Putin’s claimed high of 9.6 percent in 2024.[36] Putin acknowledged that inflation rose to 6.4 percent year-on-year in January 2026 but claimed that the Russian government expected this rise after Russia increased the value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026. The Russian government likely increased the VAT to buttress federal budget deficits that unsustainably high defense spending caused, placing the burden directly on the Russian population.[37] ISW has observed reports of sharp food price increases of up to 25 percent both before and after the VAT tax hike went into effect, suggesting that the true Russian inflation rate is higher than Putin is claiming.[38] The Kremlin’s continued false portrayal of the inflation rate aims to posture that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[39]

India is reportedly planning to curb its imports of Russian oil, which would likely further strain the Russian budget and deficit and hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war effort without more economic consequences. US President Donald Trump stated on February 2 that Indian Prime Minister Modi agreed to stop buying Russian oil and to increase purchases of US and possibly Venezuelan oil as part of US efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[40] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 3 that Russia has not received any notice from India about plans to cut off its imports of Russian oil, however.[41] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil and continued purchasing Russian crude throughout the summer and fall of 2025 despite Western secondary tariffs against India.[42] Russian oil exports that make up a significant portion of Russia’s federal revenues have largely funded Russia’s war against Ukraine.[43] Russian revenues from oil and gas counted for roughly 30 percent of Russia’s total federal revenues in 2024 but fell 22 percent year-on-year in 2025.[44] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov further acknowledged that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[45] Russian officials are also reportedly privately expressing concern over Russia’s increasingly high spending deficit, despite the Kremlin’s public claims of economic stability. Unspecified sources told Bloomberg on January 31 that Russian officials are concerned that federal budget spending will exceed planned levels again in 2026.[46] Bloomberg noted that the Russian government had to drastically revise its deficit target in 2025 from 0.5 percent to 2.6 percent of its GDP. The sources stated that Russia is attempting to find as much as 1.2 trillion rubles (roughly 16 billion USD) in new sources of income to balance a key budget indicator amid declining oil and gas revenues and the unintended consequences of the strengthened ruble. Bloomberg’s calculations found that already weak crude oil prices, coupled with the impacts of Western sanctions, could leave a shortfall of nearly 2.2 trillion rubles (roughly $29 billion) in 2026.

Russian forces are starting to use Gerbera drones as “motherships” to carry strike or reconnaissance drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on February 3 that Russian forces used a Gerbera drone as a mothership drone to carry a first-person view (FPV) drone for the first time, presumably in Ukraine.[47] Flash stated that Ukrainian forces have not been able to find the original FPV drone, so it is unclear if the FPV drone was a strike or reconnaissance drone. A Russian milblogger claimed that Gerbera drones (which are the much cheaper decoy version of Russia’s Shahed/Geran drone) can fly 300 to 600 kilometers.[48] Russian forces have employed other drones, like Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones, as motherships, including to conduct strikes against Zaporizhzhia City in early October 2025.[49] These drones have significantly shorter ranges than Gerbera drones. Russian forces are trying to leverage Gerbera’s already long range to deploy smaller FPV drones further into the rear. Russian forces have also been increasingly employing mothership drones to conduct reconnaissance to enable precision strikes against Ukrainian training grounds, air defense systems, rocket launchers, manpower concentrations, and moving targets in the Ukrainian rear.[50] Gerbera mothership drones will allow Russian forces to deploy reconnaissance drones even deeper into the Ukrainian rear, increasing the number of high-value and difficult targets for Russian forces to strike. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to use air defense systems to down these small FPV drones in the deep rear, emphasizing Ukraine’s need for interceptor drones and point-defense air defense systems, as EW systems are likely insufficient to defend all Ukrainian infrastructure against a geographically pervasive threat.[51]

An unidentified drone recently crashed near a Polish military facility. Polish Radio ZET reported on February 2 that an unidentified drone crashed near an ammunition depot at Poland’s 2nd Radioelectronic Center in Przasnysz (north of Warsaw) on January 28.[52] The 2nd Radioelectronic Center supports reconnaissance and EW missions and monitors the radio space in northeastern Poland, including the Suwalki Gap. Radio ZET reported that an unspecified source stated that Polish authorities suspect that the drone was a reconnaissance drone scanning antenna arrays and that Polish forces were “helpless” and could not stop the drone. The Polish Military Gendarmerie stated on February 2 that the drone did not cause damage and that Polish authorities are investigating the incident.[53] The gendarmerie reported that preliminary findings indicate that the drone did not have a memory or SIM card. Polish authorities have not identified the actor responsible for the incident, but other European authorities have suspected Russia in other drone incidents over European military infrastructure in recent months.[54] ISW continues to assess that Russia is engaged in its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[55]

Key Takeaways

Russia resumed its combined missile and drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of February 2 to 3, following the brief moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes.
Russia’s overnight strike package contained an unusually high number of ballistic missiles, consistent with the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to stockpile missiles to maximize damage against civilian infrastructure.
The February 2 to 3 strike demonstrates that Russia never intended to use the energy strikes moratorium to de-escalate the war or seriously advance the US-initiated peace negotiations.
The short-term moratorium does not mark a significant Russian concession, however, as Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian logistics and infrastructure during the moratorium.
The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject the Western security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to prevent another Russian invasion.
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war demands for a peace settlement in Ukraine, particularly those that aim to destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ahead of the next round of the US-Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi.
The Kremlin continues to weaponize religion to demand restrictions on Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russia’s own systematic religious repressions in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues efforts to distract attention from and secure concessions in the upcoming February 4-5 peace talks in Abu Dhabi, which will coincide with the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5.
The Kremlin continues to attempt to disguise and dismiss the economic impacts of its costly war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and poor economic policy decisions.
India is reportedly planning to curb its imports of Russian oil, which would likely further strain the Russian budget and deficit and hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war effort without more economic consequences.
Russian forces are starting to use Gerbera drones as “motherships” to carry strike or reconnaissance drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear.
An unidentified drone recently crashed near a Polish military facility.
Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 3 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2026

Toplines

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used a three-way interview with Western and Russian newswires and an ultranationalist milblogger to reaffirm that Russia’s demands for Ukraine “remain unchanged” and to reject security guarantees for Ukraine. Medvedev gave an interview on February 1 to Reuters, Kremlin newswire TASS, and pro-war Russian milblogger and head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov.[1] Medvedev stated that Russian demands for ending the war in Ukraine “remain unchanged” and that Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced these conditions during his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Medvedev also stated that Putin relayed these conditions to the United States at the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit. Putin demanded in his June 2024 speech that Ukraine and NATO capitulate to Russia’s original war demands and cede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including unoccupied areas of these regions.[2] Russia’s original war demands include Ukraine’s neutrality (the Kremlin’s ability to dictate Ukraine’s international alignment), demilitarization (reductions in the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government). Medvedev also stated that Russia considers the “dismantling” of the Ukrainian government to be an “extremely important task” and that the current Ukrainian government “must disappear.” Medvedev questioned the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Kremlin officials have repeatedly exploited the lack of clarity about the outcome of the 2025 Alaska Summit, including by claiming that the United States and Russia agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 MFA speech during the summit.[3]

Medvedev explicitly rejected proposals from the British and French-led Coalition of the Willing to station foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[4] Medvedev recalled that Putin, Medvedev, and Lavrov have all publicly stated that Russia does not accept such proposals and would consider troops from NATO countries as “legitimate targets.” Medvedev also demanded that Russia receive security guarantees. The Kremlin originally demanded “security guarantees” in its December 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO, which amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance by calling for halting the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member states that joined NATO after 1997.[5] Medvedev likely deliberately participated in the three-way interview with Reuters, TASS, and Pegov in an effort to disseminate Russia’s demands across Russian domestic and ultranationalist audiences, English-speaking outlets, and international media.

Medvedev continued to use nuclear carrots and sticks, likely in an attempt to distract attention from and secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine. Medvedev stated in the interview that Russia’s proposal to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires on February 5, remains on the table for the United States to agree to.[6] Putin previously offered to adhere to the terms of New START for another year upon its expiration, but only if the United States does the same.[7] Medvedev claimed in the interview that the risk of a global conflict is high and that the “Doomsday Clock” is moving forward. Medvedev referenced Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, stating that “no one should have any doubts” about Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons if the fate of Russia is at stake. Medvedev’s mix of thinly veiled nuclear threats and comments offering to engage the United States on nuclear arms treaties aims to use issues unrelated to Russia’s war in Ukraine to push the United States into giving in to Russia’s demands on Ukraine — as ISW has long assessed.[8]

Medvedev implicitly threatened and accused Finland of dismantling Russian-Finnish relations. Medvedev claimed that Finland “wiped” out the positive Russian-Finnish relations that emerged after the Soviet Union collapsed. Medvedev issued a subtle threat, claiming that Finland has forgotten how the Soviet Union “crushed” Finland when it was a Nazi ally and that Finland should not joke about its relations with Russia as the 20th-century conflicts were not in Finland’s “favor.” Medvedev referenced Finland’s historical ties to the Soviet Union and Russia, claiming that Finland should “thank” Vladimir Lenin — likely referring to Lenin’s 1917 recognition of Finland’s independence. Putin and other Russian officials have previously threatened Finland, including by using language that mirrors Russia’s justifications for its invasion of Ukraine to Finland.[9] Russian officials’ narratives about Finland have long invoked historic Finnish-Russian ties and Finland’s history as a Nazi ally during the Second World War.[10] These threats come as Russia is expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare Russia for potential future conflict with NATO.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unlikely to conduct a full-scale invasion of Finland at this time and that Medvedev’s statements are likely part of the Kremlin’s long-term cognitive warfare campaign to create justifications for a possible conflict with NATO in the future.

Medvedev subtly threatened Russians who do not support Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine and possibly against NATO. Medvedev responded to a question from TASS by claiming that Western states, particularly those in Europe, are Russia’s enemies who want to defeat and destroy Russia.[12] Medvedev directly compared the ongoing war against Ukraine to the Second World War, claiming that Russia, like the Soviet Union, is defending the state and the Russian people. Medvedev further claimed that those in Russia who are indifferent to Russian soldiers on the front, who are unwilling to help their own state, and who “lack basic patriotism” are Russia’s “internal enemies.” The Kremlin has often used the mythos of the Second World War to glorify the Russian military and unify the Russian people around the ongoing war effort in Ukraine.[13] Medvedev’s statements about external enemies and the Second World War aim to justify to the Russian population the sacrifices the Kremlin has been demanding of them and the need to maintain a war footing for the protracted war in Ukraine or even a possible conflict with NATO in the future. Medvedev’s statements about internal enemies likely aim to threaten those Russians who either oppose the war or the Kremlin itself, and to evoke memories of the Soviet-era “enemies of the people” to set a behavioral standard the Kremlin expects all Russians to adhere to. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population, and continued Kremlin discussion about alleged internal enemies aims to justify these increased repressions.[14][15]

Russian forces continue efforts to seize Lyman and subsequently launch an offensive on Slovyansk, but likely do not have the offensive capability to do so in the short-term, in part due to Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 2 that the main objective of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces in the Lyman direction is to reach the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the northeast, and that the Russian military command hopes to begin this offensive in May or June 2026.[16] Mashovets reported that Russian forces – namely elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) — must first seize Lyman and push Ukrainian forces from the north (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in the area. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command aims to do so by mid-to-late Spring 2026. Mashovets stated that the current Russian offensive operations, including attacks with elements of the 25th CAA from the northwest and with elements of the 20th CAA from the east and northeast, aim to establish favorable positions for a future effort to envelop Lyman.

Russian forces remain unlikely to meet their Spring 2026 deadlines for the Slovyansk direction without receiving additional reinforcements or deprioritizing the Kupyansk offensive. Russian forces first reached Lyman in November 2025 following intensified offensive operations in the area, but have been unable to build on these successes and make tactically significant advances near or within Lyman itself in the following months.[17] The 20th CAA has been operating in the Lyman direction since at least September 2022, and the 25th CAA has been in the area since October 2023.[18] ISW observed reports of elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division operating in the Lyman direction since at least April 2025.[19] These forces are likely degraded and unlikely to achieve the Russian military command’s reported timeline without significant reinforcement. Mashovets stated that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is unlikely to be able to use its reserves in the Lyman area, as Russian forces are currently using all available reserves in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command may have to redeploy elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division to the Kupyansk direction in the future — presumably to defend against the ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks that have successfully liberated most of Kupyansk and the surrounding areas. Mashovets noted that the reserves of the Western Grouping of Forces have deployed to the Kupyansk direction to defend against these counterattacks, leaving them unavailable to bolster offensive operations in the Lyman direction.[20]

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are at least several months away from being able to begin a ground offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the north or east. Russian forces would need to complete the seizure of Lyman and advance 14 kilometers from Lyman to Slovyansk (including crossing the Siverskyi Donets River) or would need to traverse 30 kilometers from Siversk (east of Slovyansk) to Slovyansk.[21] Elements of the Russian 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the Siversk direction may launch a direct offensive against Slovyansk from the east should they make the requisite advances before the 20th and 25th CAAs can seize Lyman and reach the Siverskyi Donets River. Russian forces in the Lyman direction have been attempting to use Russia’s new offensive campaign design, which consists of an initial monthslong effort to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics to forward positions ahead of ground operations.[22] Russian forces were able to employ this new campaign design to make relatively quicker advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, but the slow rate of Russian advances near and within Lyman suggests that Russian forces have so far not been able to completely degrade Ukrainian defenses in the area.[23] Russian forces would likely have to dedicate significant resources, including infantry and drone operators, to the Lyman direction in order to achieve their desired rate of advance, but this would come at the expense of other areas in the theater, such as offensive operations to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk or defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[24] The Kremlin has been attempting for months to convince the West that Russia’s seizure of the Fortress Belt will be easy and swift, but ISW continues to assess that these efforts — either from the south from the Kostyantynivka direction or from the north from the Lyman direction — could take years.[25][26]

The Ukrainian government is working with SpaceX to prohibit all non-registered Starlink satellite terminals from operating in Ukraine as part of joint efforts to counter Russia’s use of Starlink to operate drones in Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 2 that the Ukrainian government adopted a resolution to only allow officially registered and verified Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine and to disconnect all other terminals.[27] Fedorov stated that Russian drones equipped with Starlink terminals fly at low altitudes, are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW), and are controllable in real time at long distances. Fedorov noted that the Ukrainian military will register their Starlink terminals and that measures allowing only authorized Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine will deprive Russian forces of technological advantages and safeguard Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Fedorov did not provide an estimated timeframe on how long individual Ukrainians will have to register and verify their private Starlink terminals. The Ukrainian government has been working recently with SpaceX CEO Elon Musk to counter Russia’s use of Starlink.[28]

Belarus continues to increase the frequency of its balloon incursions into Polish airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Polish radar systems recorded the incursion of “balloon-like objects” into Polish airspace on the night of February 1 to 2.[29] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that there were fewer balloon violations than on previous nights. Belarus has launched balloon-like objects into Polish airspace four times in five days (since January 27).[30] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Russia is likely using airspace incursions into NATO states like Lithuania and Poland from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[31]

Key Takeaways

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used a three-way interview with Western and Russian newswires and an ultranationalist milblogger to reaffirm that Russia’s demands for Ukraine “remain unchanged” and to reject security guarantees for Ukraine.
Medvedev continued to use nuclear carrots and sticks, likely in an attempt to distract attention from and secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine.
Medvedev implicitly threatened and accused Finland of dismantling Russian-Finnish relations.
Medvedev subtly threatened Russians who do not support Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine and possibly against NATO.
Russian forces continue efforts to seize Lyman and subsequently launch an offensive on Slovyansk, but likely do not have the offensive capability to do so in the short-term, in part due to Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are at least several months away from being able to begin a ground offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the north or east.
The Ukrainian government is working with SpaceX to prohibit all non-registered Starlink satellite terminals from operating in Ukraine as part of joint efforts to counter Russia’s use of Starlink to operate drones in Ukraine.
Belarus continues to increase the frequency of its balloon incursions into Polish airspace.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

read the full Feb 2 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2026

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Russian drones struck a maternity hospital and a bus carrying miners on February 1, causing significant civilian casualties. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a maternity hospital in Zaporizhzhia City with unspecified drones during the day on February 1, starting a fire in the gynecological department’s reception area and injuring at least six people.[1] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck mines belonging to Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 1.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that four Shahed drones struck a DTEK bus carrying miners near Ternivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 12 people and injuring at least 16.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is prioritizing strikes against civilians to continue its long-standing campaign to demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[4]

The Kremlin continues to use issues unrelated to its war in Ukraine to push the Trump administration to give in to Russia’s demands regarding Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations would hold the next round of trilateral meetings in Abu Dhabi on February 4 and 5, not on February 1 as initially planned.[5] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 1 to try to curry favor with the Trump administration ahead of the upcoming meetings and to convince the United States to only engage in negotiations with Russia, not Ukraine and Europe.[6] Lavrov compared Russia to the United States as a fellow great power and claimed that the two countries need to implement bilateral economic and trade projects while being sure not to allow any differences to lead to a confrontation, especially a “heated one.” Lavrov further claimed that Europe is trying to “drive wedges” between Russia and the United States. The Kremlin has been using a negotiation tactic that tries to frame Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet Union’s “superpower status” since US President Donald Trump assumed office in early 2025.[7] Lavrov’s February 1 statements aim to use the prospects of economic deals or strategic arms talks to entice Trump into conceding to Russia’s demands about Ukraine, including the Kremlin’s demands that the United States not engage Europe in the peace process.

Insider reports continue to demonstrate that Russia is trying to portray itself to external audiences as a willing negotiator in order to gain control over all of Donetsk Oblast through diplomatic means. Bloomberg reported on January 31, citing unspecified knowledgeable sources, that Russia sees little chance of a breakthrough during ongoing peace talks.[8] The sources noted that Russian and Ukrainian military delegations have been discussing the technical details of a possible ceasefire implementation agreement, but assessed that a resolution to territorial issues will require leadership-level decisions. The sources stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers Ukraine’s cession of all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to Russia and the freezing of the current frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to be a “concession,” since Russia illegally annexed the entirety of the four oblasts in 2022, even though Russian forces have still not seized the territory of all four regions. Russian officials have made frequent statements demonstrating the Kremlin’s maximalist demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of all four oblasts during negotiations.[9] The initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan called for Ukraine’s cessation of all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the freezing of the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, and subsequent US-Ukrainian proposals have called for the creation of a demilitarized zone or “free economic zone” in Donetsk Oblast.[10] The Kremlin explicitly rejected in December 2025 the Ukrainian proposal to establish a demilitarized zone in Donestk Oblast, and the Kremlin may be trying to present Russia as amenable to the so-called “concession” of freezing the line in southern Ukraine in order to prevent further US-Ukrainian discussions about a demilitarized or economic zone in unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[11] Russian officials will likely continue efforts to present the demand that Ukraine give up all of Donetsk Oblast as a moderate position and a meaningful “concession” in order to extract concessions that would ultimately be strategically harmful to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that ceding the rest of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would be a strategic mistake, as Russia is unlikely to seize this territory quickly or easily but would then be in a more advantageous position to renew attacks against Ukraine in the future.[12]

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk restricted Starlink satellite terminals operating in Ukraine in order to counter Russia’s use of Starlink on drones. Musk stated on X (formerly Twitter) on February 1 that SpaceX, at Ukraine’s request, has taken “effective” steps to stop Russian forces’ use of Starlink and called on Ukrainian authorities to inform SpaceX about any necessary further measures.[13] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated in response to Musk that SpaceX’s first steps have achieved ”real results” and that Ukraine and SpaceX are working on next steps.[14] Musk’s and Fedorov’s statements come after recent reports that Russian forces, including elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, are using Starlink terminals to extend the range of BM-35 strike drones and cheap Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones to conduct mid-range drone strikes against the Ukrainian rear starting in late December 2025.[15] ISW continues to assess that these Russian strikes are an attempt to replicate prior Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that enabled recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 1 that Russian drone operators started to experience Starlink signal blocking when flying drones at speeds of over 75 to 90 kilometers per hour.[17] The milbloggers noted that the restrictions have impacted Shahed-type, Molniya, and BM-35 strike drones and caused significant disruptions to Russian Starlink-enabled drones.[18] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on January 31 that the Ukrainian MoD will continue to work with SpaceX and will collect information on Ukrainian military Starlink users in order to prevent the restrictions from affecting Ukrainian forces.[19]

Russia is building up military infrastructure near the Finnish border, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare the Russian force for a potential future conflict with NATO. Finnish national broadcaster Yle published satellite images between June 2024 and October 2025 showing Russian construction at the Rybka military base in Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia (approximately 175 kilometers from the Finnish border).[20] Yle reported that the Soviet-era garrison area has been mostly abandoned since the early 2000s but that the 44th Army Corps (AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) will use the base. Yle reported that the Rybka military base already contains a large air base and equipment depot. Yle reported that satellite imagery from May and August 2025 shows that Russia is also building a new military town in Kandalaksha, Murmansk Oblast (approximately 115 kilometers from the Finnish border) for the Luptsche-Savino garrison, which Russia started to build in Winter 2024-2025 for a new artillery brigade and an engineering brigade. ISW has previously reported on the expansion of other Russian military infrastructure along the border with Finland.[21] Russia restructured the Western Military District (WMD) into the LMD and Moscow Military District (MMD) in 2024, likely in order to improve Russia’s strategic command along its northern border and to posture against NATO along the Finnish border.[22] The Russian military command also formed the 44th AC in the LMD in 2024 as part of these efforts.[23] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have previously directly threatened Finland, including by applying language that Russia has used falsely justify its invasions of Ukraine to Finland.[24]

Belarus appears to be increasing the quantity and frequency of Belarusian balloon incursions into Polish and Lithuanian airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Belarus launched “balloon-like” objects into Polish airspace on the night of January 31 to February 1 and noted that the balloons aimed to reconnoiter and test Polish air defense reactions.[25] Belarus has launched balloon-like objects into Polish airspace three times in the last four days (since January 7), and Lithuania reported a record high of 42 Belarusian balloons in its airspace on the night of January 27 to 28.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus, and Russia is likely using Russia is using airspace incursions of Poland and Lithuania from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[27]

Several unidentified drones flew over German military infrastructure on February 1. German outlet Bild reported on February 1 that roughly 23 drones flew above the Immelmann military airfield in Lower Saxony, Germany on February 1.[28] German authorities have not identified the actor responsible for the drone overflights as of this writing. German authorities previously identified Russia as a possible actor responsible for drone flights over Germany in 2025, however.[29]

Key Takeaways

Russian drones struck a maternity hospital and a bus carrying miners on February 1, causing significant civilian casualties.
The Kremlin continues to use issues unrelated to its war in Ukraine to push the Trump administration to give in to Russia’s demands regarding Ukraine.
Insider reports continue to demonstrate that Russia is trying to portray itself to external audiences as a willing negotiator in order to gain control over all of Donetsk Oblast through diplomatic means.
SpaceX CEO Elon Musk restricted Starlink satellite terminals operating in Ukraine in order to counter Russia’s use of Starlink on drones.
Russia is building up military infrastructure near the Finnish border, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare the Russian force for a potential future conflict with NATO.
Belarus appears to be increasing the quantity and frequency of Belarusian balloon incursions into Polish and Lithuanian airspace.
Several unidentified drones flew over German military infrastructure on February 1.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

read the full Feb 1 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2026

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Russian forces’ months of strikes have significantly degraded and damaged the Ukrainian energy grid, which is now facing significant problems even during the moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s power grid suffered a significant shutdown of the 400-kilowatt (kW) line between the Romanian and Moldovan power systems and the 750-kW line between western and central Ukraine on the morning of January 31. Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on January 31 that the cause of the shutdown was an unspecified technological disruption, not a Russian strike.[1] The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance stated that a cyberattack did not cause the outages.[2] The Moldovan Energy Ministry stated that “serious problems” in the Ukrainian power grid caused the 400-kW line to disconnect, and Ukrainian Energy Research Center Director Oleksandr Kharchenko stated that existing damage to Ukraine’s energy system “complicated” the situation.[3] Shmyhal stated that the shutdowns caused cascading power outages in the Ukrainian power grid, activated protections at Ukrainian substations, and forced operators to unload Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.[4] Shmyhal reported emergency shutdowns in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Kharkiv oblasts. Shmyhal reported that Ukrainian authorities restored power to critical infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts by 1400 local time and were working to restore power to civilian consumers in Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Odesa oblasts.[5]

Russian strikes did not directly cause the large-scale outages, but the Russian strike campaign has already damaged and compromised the Ukrainian power grid to the point where the degraded grid is fragile and prone to significant disruptions due to technical malfunctions. Shmyhal notably reported on January 16 that Russian forces have struck every power plant in Ukraine since February 2022.[6] The Kremlin agreed to a week-long moratorium on strikes against some Ukrainian energy infrastructure on January 29 only after inflicting severe damage to Ukraine’s national energy grid. The enduring cascading blackouts in Ukraine through January 31 during the ceasefire further demonstrate how the temporary moratorium does not mark a significant Russian concession.[7]

A US delegation met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev in Miami, Florida, on January 31. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reported on January 31 that he, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and senior advisor to US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace Josh Gruenbaum met with Dmitriev in Miami.[8] Witkoff called the talks “productive” and “constructive” but did not offer details about the discussions. The United States will meet with Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Abu Dhabi on February 1, and ISW will continue to monitor for additional reports of ongoing negotiations.

Belarusian balloons illegally entered Polish airspace on the night of January 30 to 31 for the second time within 72 hours. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Polish military radar detected objects entering Polish airspace from Belarus overnight and that the objects were highly likely balloons.[9] Polish authorities temporarily restricted airspace over Podlaskie Voivodeship (along Poland’s eastern border with Belarus) in response. Belarusian balloons also entered Polish airspace on the night of January 28 to 29 and have frequently violated Polish and Lithuanian airspace since October 2025.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Russia is using airspace incursions of Poland and Lithuania from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[11]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces’ months of strikes have significantly degraded and damaged the Ukrainian energy grid, which is now facing significant problems even during the moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
A US delegation met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev in Miami, Florida, on January 31.
Belarusian balloons illegally entered Polish airspace on the night of January 30 to 31 for the second time within 72 hours.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

read the full Jan 31 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2026

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The Kremlin disagreed with the US position that territorial control of Donetsk Oblast remains the only unresolved issue at the US-Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on January 28 that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia have narrowed peace negotiations to only “one central issue,” which concerns Donetsk Oblast.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, who is often the sole Kremlin official to comment on US-Russian talks in recent months, disagreed with Rubio’s characterization of the peace process during a Russian state TV interview on January 29.[2] Ushakov also stated during an interview with another state TV channel that territorial issues are the “most important” but that “many other issues remain” on the agenda.[3] Ushakov’s comments to Russian state TV channels suggest that the Kremlin is continuing to set domestic information conditions, likely in an effort to justify Russia’s refusal to make concessions for a negotiated peace settlement.

The Kremlin acknowledged and reportedly agreed to US President Donald Trump’s request for a temporary moratorium on striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on January 30 that Trump made a “personal request” to Russian President Vladimir Putin to refrain from striking Kyiv until February 1 and confirmed that the Kremlin agreed to Trump’s request.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 30 that Russian forces did not conduct strikes against energy facilities in Ukraine on the night of January 29 to 30 but that Russian forces did strike energy infrastructure in several oblasts during the day on January 29.[5] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are now instead targeting Ukrainian logistics. Several Duma deputies insisted that the strikes moratorium is not a major Russian concession and indicated that Russian forces will not cease hostilities.[6] Prominent Russian milbloggers complained that the ceasefire does not support Russia and questioned Russian officials’ hesitation to comment on earlier ceasefire reports.[7] ISW continues to assess that the reported moratorium on energy strikes does not mark a significant Russian condescension as the Kremlin has been consistently rejecting a long-term ceasefire, including on January 29.[8]

Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POW) on the battlefield in violation of international law. The servicemember of a Ukrainian border unit reported on January 25 that elements of the Russian Senezh Spetsnaz Center (formerly subordinated to the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU] and now directly subordinated to the Russian General Staff) executed multiple Ukrainian border guards who had surrendered to the Russian forces during a cross-border attack in Chernihiv Oblast in December 2025.[9] Russian forces have sharply increased extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) on the frontline since late 2024 in violation of international law, particularly in areas of heavy combat.[10] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[11]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin disagreed with the US position that territorial control of Donetsk Oblast remains the only unresolved issue at the US-Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations.
The Kremlin acknowledged and reportedly agreed to US President Donald Trump’s request for a temporary moratorium on striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POW) on the battlefield in violation of international law.
Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Jan 30 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2026

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US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that the United States and Ukraine have finalized security guarantees for Ukraine. Rubio stated on January 28 that it “could [be] argue[d]” that the United States and Ukraine have finalized security guarantees.[1] Rubio stated that the United States will play a “key role” in security guarantees for Ukraine and noted that there is a “general consensus” on the possible deployment of a small contingent of European troops to Ukraine with US support.[2] Rubio also stated that the United States may send a representative to the planned upcoming Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi on February 1, but that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner will not participate.[3]

The Kremlin continues to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, however. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave an interview to Turkish media outlets on January 29 in which he rejected the terms of Western security guarantees to Ukraine by falsely dismissing Western security guarantees as an attempt to protect the “illegitimate” Ukrainian government and reiterating Russian commitment to the security guarantees framework Russia presented during the 2022 Istanbul negotiations.[4] The draft 2022 Istanbul amounted to Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia by imposing harsh limits against the size and activity of Ukraine’s military while imposing no such restrictions on Russia, as well as providing Russia with veto power over the ability of states guaranteeing Ukraine’s security to respond to future armed conflict in Ukraine.[5] Lavrov also reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to the demands that Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[6] Lavrov also falsely claimed that the current Ukrainian government poses a persistent threat to Russian security.

Other Russian officials continue to reiterate Russia’s commitment to achieving its original war demands on the battlefield. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov asserted on January 29 that the Kremlin should not negotiate with Ukraine and should instead continue the war.[7] The Russian Federation Council and State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s rhetorical lines, also reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to advancing on the frontline and false claims that Ukraine has no right to the territories that Russia has illegally annexed, and called for Ukraine to capitulate to Russia to make negotiations easier.[8] The Kremlin has continuously rejected any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine proposed during the peace process.[9] The Kremlin’s continued refusal of security guarantees for Ukraine suggests that it remains committed to Putin’s theory of victory — the theory that Russia can win in Ukraine by outlasting Ukraine’s ability to fight and the West’s desire to support Ukraine.[10]

US President Donald Trump stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to a week-long moratorium on strikes against some Ukrainian energy infrastructure, as the Kremlin continued to reiterate its unwillingness to commit to a long-term ceasefire. Trump stated on January 29 that he asked Putin to halt strikes against Kyiv and unspecified various towns for a week as of an unspecified date.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not directly confirm the reported short-term ceasefire and responded to Trump’s statement by noting that Ukraine is undergoing an extreme winter and thanking Trump and the United States for their “efforts to stop” Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector.[12] Russian officials have not confirmed this reported energy strikes moratorium, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to comment on initial reports of an alleged agreement with Ukraine regarding a moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure.[13] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also reiterated on January 29 that a long-term ceasefire of 60 or more days is “unacceptable” to Russia, claiming that Ukraine can use any ceasefire to rest, rearm, and reconstitute its military.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 29 that the Russian military command issued an order on January 28 to halt long-range strikes from 0700 on January 29 through February 3.[15] The milbloggers claimed that the moratorium includes all targets in Kyiv City and Oblast as well as all energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine. Some of the milbloggers hedged that it is unclear how accurate this information is, however.[16] The precise terms of this strikes moratorium remain unclear, and ISW will continue to monitor for further clarification.

The reported week-long moratorium on energy strikes does not mark a significant Russian concession, given that Russia continues to reject a long-term ceasefire and has previously offered similar short-term moratoriums to advance its political objectives. A temporary moratorium against long-range strikes can benefit Russia if both Russia and Ukraine participate in the moratorium. Russian forces will be able to amass drone and missile stockpiles that it can use to launch large, combined strikes in the future, while Ukraine ceases its strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[17] The Kremlin has previously offered short-term ceasefires as part of a cognitive warfare effort to portray the Kremlin as acting in good faith while rejecting Ukrainian and US calls for a longer or permanent moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[18] A Kremlin affiliated Russian milblogger emphasized in a response that the ceasefire is only temporary but criticized the Kremlin for accepting the ceasefire, claiming that the Kremlin is losing valuable leverage against Ukraine by halting the strikes.[19] The milblogger also claimed that the energy strikes moratorium is tied to the next round of Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi, reportedly scheduled for February 1. Other Russian milbloggers also criticized the strikes moratorium and expressed relief that the moratorium is so short, so Russia can continue to pressure Ukraine through its strike on energy infrastructure.[20] Another milblogger asserted that Russia’s war in Ukraine is part of a larger war and therefore if Russia makes concessions “at one point” then the Kremlin will leverage these concessions to advance its objectives.[21]

Russian forces are using cheap Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones equipped with Starlink satellite terminals to conduct battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian highways at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 or more kilometers from the frontline). Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on January 29 that Russian forces have recently begun conducting several Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone strikes per day against Ukrainian vehicles traveling along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway, roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline.[22] Ukrainian military sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on January 29 that Russian forces began employing Molniya drones in ongoing strikes against a section of the E-50 highway running between Troitske (roughly 35 kilometers behind the frontline) and Pavlohrad (roughly 78 kilometers behind the frontline) roughly two weeks ago (about mid-January 2026).[23] Russian forces have been employing fixed-wing drones against targets at an operational depth from the frontline for months, including using Molniyas and other drones as “mothership drones” to carry one or more shorter-range drones to areas far from the front line, including in strikes against Zaporizhzhia City in early October 2025.[24] Russian forces have recently begun equipping Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drones with Starlink satellite terminals to significantly expand their range and resistance to Ukrainian EW.[25] The recent strikes against the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway appear to be part of an attempt to replicate prior Russian BAI campaigns against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole against other parts of the frontline with relatively cheap Molniya drones.[26] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on January 29 that SpaceX and the Ukrainian MoD are cooperating to prevent Russian forces from using the Starlink system to guide Russian drones in strikes against targets in Ukraine.[27]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be conducting a dedicated recruitment campaign for the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) at Russian universities. Russian science outlet T-Invariant published an investigation on January 28 into the Russian MoD’s new dedicated recruitment effort for the USF at Russian universities.[28] T-Invariant spoke to several students at Russian universities, including several in Moscow City, who reported receiving a letter from their university informing the students that they failed their exams and faced expulsion and student debt. The letters stated that university officials would hold off from expelling the students for three days while the students considered a recruitment offer from the Russian MoD. The MoD reportedly offers a one-year fixed term military service contract with the USF in which the students are “guaranteed” to be released from military service if they decline to sign another contract upon the expiration of their initial contract; that the students can only serve in USF units and that the MoD cannot transfer the students to non-USF units; and that the students will receive financial benefits. T-Invariant reported that the Russian MoD began recruiting USF drone operators at Russian universities in December 2025 by offering salaries of 5.2 to 5.5 million rubles (about $69,103 to 73,090) per year and promises to place the students about 20 kilometers behind the frontlines. T-Invariant reported that these initial efforts at Russian universities were insufficient to attract students from the Russian Higher School of Economics, a prestigious, Moscow-based university. A Russian lawyer reported on January 24 that he received a copy of a guidebook from the Russian MoD for military centers in universities across Russia on expanding recruitment efforts for the USF, including recruitment of both male and female students.[29] The lawyer noted that the universities were to advertise special contracts guaranteeing only one year of service, but assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 2022 order establishing partial mobilization would likely supersede the language of a contract restricting service to only one year. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on January 27 that Russian military recruiters are characterizing these special contracts as a “bait and switch” that promised to put individuals in specific units but actually has no guarantee of an assignment into such units.[30] These reports are consistent with recent Russian reporting that the MoD had intensified its recruitment campaign for the USF at Russian universities.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia may intend to use at least some of those recruited for the USF to staff the conventional Russian ground forces.[32]

Ukraine and Russia exchanged killed-in-action (KIA) servicemembers on January 29. Official Ukrainian sources reported on January 29 that Russia returned to Ukraine the remains of 1,000 KIA soldiers in what was the first repatriation event of 2026.[33] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Ukraine returned to Russia the bodies of returned 38 KIA servicemembers.[34] It is unclear why the number of exchange KIA between Russia and Ukraine differed, but Russia routinely augments the number of KIA personnel provided to Ukraine to create a false perspective that Ukraine is suffering far higher losses than Ukraine.[35] Russian forces are losing more personnel than Ukraine; however, due to Russian tactics that favor highly attritional assaults.[36] Russia has also delivered unlabeled remains that may include Russian servicemembers to artificially augment the number of claimed Ukrainian KIA personnel as part of this cognitive warfare effort.[37]

Belarusian balloons illegally entered Lithuanian and Polish airspace on the nights of January 27 to 28 and January 28 to 29, respectively. Lithuanian National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkauskas reported on January 28 that Lithuanian authorities detected 42 balloons entering Lithuanian airspace from Belarus on the night of January 27 to 28, the largest number of Belarusian balloons violating Lithuanian airspace since the start of these balloon incursions in October 2025.[38] Vitkauskas stated that Lithuanian authorities shut down Vilnius International Airport three times on the evening of January 27 in response to the balloons. Vitkauskas stated that Lithuanian authorities recovered eight balloons with smuggled cargo on the morning of January 28, found the remains of several other balloons, and arrested four people. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on January 29 that Polish military radar detected balloon-like objects entering Polish airspace from Belarus late on January 28 and temporarily restricted airspace over Podlaskie Voivodeship (along Poland’s eastern border with Belarus) in response.[39] Belarusian balloons have frequently violated Polish and Lithuanian airspace since October 2025.[40] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” – the informational and psychological condition-setting phase – to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[41] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[42]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that the United States and Ukraine have finalized security guarantees for Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, however.
US President Donald Trump stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to a week-long moratorium on some Ukrainian energy infrastructure, as the Kremlin reiterated its unwillingness to commit to a long-term ceasefire.
The reported week-long moratorium on energy strikes does not mark a significant Russian concession, given that Russia continues to reject a long-term ceasefire and has previously offered similar short-term moratoriums to advance its political objectives.
Russian forces are using cheap Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones equipped with Starlink satellite terminals to conduct battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian highways at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 or more kilometers from the frontline).
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be conducting a dedicated recruitment campaign for the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) at Russian universities.
Ukraine and Russia exchanged killed-in-action (KIA) servicemembers on January 29.
Belarusian balloons illegally entered Lithuanian and Polish airspace on the nights of January 27 to 28 and January 28 to 29, respectively.

read the full Jan 29 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2026

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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to provide critical support to Russia’s weapons production, including Oreshnik missiles and Shahed long-range drones. The Telegraph reported on January 28 that it has identified $10.3 billion worth of technology and advanced equipment that the PRC has sent to Russia during an unspecified time frame.[1] The Telegraph reported that Russia is using Chinese computer numerical control machines (CNC) to produce Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) at the Votkinsk Plant in the Republic of Udmurtia and to produce Shahed-type drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Telegraph found that the PRC also supplies millions of dollars’ worth of microchips, memory boards, ball bearings, telescopic sights, and mounted piezoelectric crystals to Russia. The PRC continues to refrain from directly supplying Russia with weapons but is supplying components and equipment, many of which are dual-use, to the Russian DIB instead. ISW continues to assess that the PRC’s supplies to the Russian DIB have enabled Russia to improve and scale up its production of drones that Russian forces use to launch long-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear and to strike the Ukrainian near rear to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects along the front line.[2]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the front line and in the Russian near rear on the night of January 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck military assets in the Russian near rear, including a manpower concentration and drone control point near Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 23 kilometers from the front line); a manpower concentration near Hryhorivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 13 kilometers from the front line); and an ammunition depot near Nyzhnya Duvanka, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 25 kilometers from the front line).[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian military assets near the front line, including manpower concentrations near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Hulyaipole; a battalion command post near Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka); and a manpower concentration in Kolotylivka, Belgorod Oblast (west of Sumy City and north of Hrabovske). Ukrainian forces began increasing their mid-range strike campaign in late December 2025 and are undertaking their own battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to parallel Russia’s BAI campaign that enabled Russian advances in Fall 2025.[4] Ukrainian forces likely seek to use their mid-range strikes to counter recent Russian advances.

Key Takeaways

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to provide critical support to Russia’s weapons production, including Oreshnik missiles and Shahed long-range drones.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the front line and in the Russian near rear on the night of January 27 to 28.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

read the full Jan 28 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2026

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The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to cede the remainder of Donetsk Oblast to Russia in exchange for US security guarantees. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian concessions of territory that Russia is unlikely to seize quickly or easily militarily would be a strategic mistake.[1] The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 27, citing sources familiar with ongoing peace talks, that the Trump administration is signaling that the United States’ provision of security guarantees to Ukraine is contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace settlement that would likely involve ceding all of the territory of Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts) to Russia.[2] Two FT sources stated that the United States suggested that it would provide more weaponry to bolster Ukraine’s peacetime forces if Ukraine agreed to withdraw from all of Donbas. Two sources indicated that the proposed US security guarantees include a pledge that “mirrors” NATO’s Article 5 clause and a promise to conduct a coordinated military response in the case of a “sustained” Russian attack against post-war Ukraine. One of the sources suggested that the proposed guarantees may be “too vague” for Ukraine but “too broad” for Russia.

ISW continues to assess that Russia would need to expend significant amounts of resources, time, and personnel to seize the rest of Donbas.[3] Russian forces are unlikely to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast before August 2027, assuming Russian forces are able to sustain their rate of advance from late November 2025.[4] The Russian rate of advance slowed in late December 2025 and early January 2026, likely in part due to adverse weather conditions, and Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast could take longer than ISW previously forecasted.[5] A Ukrainian withdrawal from Ukrainian-held territory in Donetsk Oblast would put Russian forces in more advantageous positions to renew attacks against southwestern and central Ukraine in the future after rest and reconstitution.[6] A strong Ukrainian military and robust Western security guarantees are necessary to effectively deter such future Russian aggression, but Russian officials have repeatedly rejected these security guarantees.[7] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin, for example, claimed on January 26 that European states in the Coalition of the Willing are imposing conditions on a peace settlement that are “completely unacceptable” to Russia – likely referring to the coalition’s efforts to finalize a plan to deploy troops to post-war Ukraine.[8] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov explicitly rejected on January 27 the deployment of troops from NATO states in post-war Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin remains unlikely to accept any settlement that includes meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin’s continued refusal of security guarantees for Ukraine and persistent dismissals of the negotiating process suggests that it remains committed to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory — the theory that Russia can win in Ukraine by outlasting Ukraine’s ability to fight and the West’s desire to support Ukraine.[10]

The Russian military command continues to present demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to the demands that Russia remains unable to achieve militarily. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov inspected the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on January 27 and heard reports from the grouping commander, Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev.[11] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are advancing in virtually all directions on the battlefield and have seized 17 settlements and over 500 square kilometers since January 1. ISW has observed evidence indicating that Russian forces advanced or established a presence following infiltration missions in only 265.45 square kilometers between January 1 and 27, however. Gerasimov further claimed that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces advanced within 12 to 14 kilometers of the southern and southeastern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City.[12] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to roughly 18 kilometers south of the city, however. Gerasimov highlighted that Russian forces are expanding the “buffer zones” in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[13] Gerasimov stated that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which has been concentrating on seizing Pokrovsk, is now developing an offensive toward Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk).

Gerasimov particularly emphasized the Western Grouping of Forces’ alleged successes near Kupyansk. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) and are attacking toward Kivsharivka (just southeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi) and Hlushkivka (further southeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi).[14] Gerasimov claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are destroying encircled Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River and that Russian forces have blockaded 800 Ukrainian servicemembers within a four-by-six-kilometer area near Kupyansk. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force refuted Gerasimov’s claim that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and reported that Ukrainian forces maintain full control over the settlement.[15] ISW has also not observed evidence of a Russian presence within Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi. ISW has only observed evidence of recent Russian infiltration missions roughly 3.5 kilometers from the northern boundary of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and roughly 8.5 kilometers from the eastern boundary of the settlement.[16] ISW observed evidence on January 8 of Russian forces conducting an infiltration mission into eastern Podoly (just northeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi), but a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on January 16 that Ukrainian forces had liberated Podoly, and a Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces further stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces had cleared Russian infiltrators from Podoly.[17]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been lying about the scale of Russian advances for months, provoking repeated criticisms from even pro-war Russian milbloggers. Russian military officials have repeatedly presented inflated claims of Russian advances across the frontline in recent weeks.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military leaders have been exaggerating advances in the Kupyansk direction in particular, claiming that Russian forces seized the town in November 2025 despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary.[19] Pro-war Russian milbloggers have repeatedly refuted the Russian MoD’s exaggerations and continued to widely deny Gerasimov’s January 27 claims. A prominent Russian milblogger involved in crowdfunding for the Russian military stated that Gerasimov presented a “beautiful report” (a phrase Russian milbloggers often use to criticize false battlefield reports).[20] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are submitting false reports but to a lesser extent than those in the “notorious” Kupyansk direction.[21] One Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces do not control any settlements near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[22] Another milblogger stated that the Russian MoD’s reports about the Kupyansk direction continue to exist in a “parallel reality.”[23] The milblogger claimed that even the “most optimistic estimates” assess that Russian forces have only just reached the outskirts of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, while other estimates find that Russian forces are “still a long way off.” The milblogger sarcastically stated that there may be a “hidden side of Kupyansk” where “all these strange events” like the Russian MoD’s regular seizures and encirclements are occurring, as there are no alternative explanations.

The Russian military command has been boasting about the seizure of small, rural villages and presenting these seizures as alleged evidence of the prowess of the Russian military to further the false narrative that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Gerasimov highlighted the seizures of Symynivka, Starytsya (both northeast of Kharkiv City), Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Bondarne (southeast of Slovyansk), Zakitne (east of Slovyansk), Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka), and Novoyakovlivka (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and ongoing fighting within Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk), Kivsharivka, Hlushkivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), Drobysheve, Yarova, Sosnove (all northwest of Lyman), Ozerne (southeast of Lyman), Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[24] Data from the UN Humanitarian Data Exchange indicates that the largest of these settlements (Drobysheve) has a total area of about 8.3 square kilometers, but most of the settlements Gerasimov listed have a total area of less than two square kilometers. Senior Russian military commanders have been presenting long lists of settlements in their public reports in order to generate informational effects and create the appearance of sweeping Russian advances across the entire theater.[25] The Russian military command is trying to create an alternate battlefield reality in order to influence the ongoing US-led peace talks and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives or breakthroughs.[26] The seizure of small, rural villages only a few square kilometers in area does not portend Russia’s ability to seize the much larger and heavily fortified cities in Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast in the near future.

Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia’s demands go beyond control of territory in eastern Ukraine, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to claim to Western audiences that Donbas is the main issue in ongoing peace talks. Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev responded to the January 27 FT article about US security guarantees tied to Ukrainian territorial concessions, claiming that Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas is the “path of peace” for Ukraine.[27] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that the only possible solution to the war is for Ukraine to withdraw from the rest of Donbas.[28] Russia’s territorial demands, however, extend beyond Donbas, as evidenced by Gerasimov’s repeated references to buffer zones in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts during his January 27 report.[29] Russian officials have claimed that these buffer zones are necessary to protect Russian-occupied areas in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, but the latest public version of the 20-point US-Ukrainian-European peace plan called for Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[30]

Russia’s demands extend beyond Ukrainian territory and include demands for NATO and the West. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin claimed in a January 26 interview with Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti that a peace settlement must address the alleged “root causes” of the war.[31] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov also stated on January 27 in an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya-1 that Donbas is not the main issue and questioned how Russia will deal with NATO and alleged Ukrainian neo-Nazism.[32] Naryshkin’s and Zhuravlyov’s statements refer to Russia’s 2021 and 2022 demands for the cessation of NATO expansion, the rollback of NATO to its 1997 borders, and the replacement of the current democratically elected Ukrainian government with a Russian-selected regime. Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad tied Russia’s territorial demands in eastern Ukraine with Russia’s wider war aims in an editorial piece published on January 27.[33] Tsargrad questioned why Kremlin officials are calling for Ukraine’s withdrawal from eastern Ukraine but not from Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Tsargrad then amplified a Russian milblogger claiming that Russia will agree to only a temporary ceasefire if Ukraine withdraws from Donbas and that a temporary ceasefire will allow Ukraine to “consider” Russia’s other demands, such as Ukraine’s “denazification” and “demilitarization.”[34] ISW continues to assess that Russian officials’ statements aimed at domestic Russian audiences, such as Naryshkin’s and Zhuravlyov’s statements to Russian state outlets, confirm that Russia’s demands are not limited to territory in eastern Ukraine.[35]

Russia will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that does not meet all of its demands and is instead using informational tools to push for Ukraine’s pre-emptive capitulation. The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide cognitive warfare campaign that aims to push the West and Ukraine to give in to all of Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives.[36] Russian officials promoted narratives on January 26 and 27 that aim to paint the Russian military and economy as able to militarily achieve all of Russia’s demands in a protracted war — in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory.[37] Naryshkin claimed that Russian forces are “consistently” advancing throughout the theater, that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is developing at an “accelerated pace,” and that the Russian economy is resilient.[38] Naryshkin also claimed that the Russian population supports Putin’s policies and the Russian military. Naryshkin referenced the Burevestnik and Oreshnik ballistic missiles and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle that Russia debuted in 2024 and 2025 – an attempt to use implicit threats to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate. Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia can only resolve the war through military means and dismissed ongoing US-led diplomatic efforts.[39] Kolesnik called on Ukraine to “realize” that resistance is “futile” and claimed that Ukraine does not have the potential to stop Russian advances.[40] Kolesnik and Zhuravlyov claimed that Russian forces will inevitably seize Donbas “sooner or later.”[41] The Kremlin has also been demanding that any peace settlement not include meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine — a demand which Naryshkin repeated on January 27.[42] This cognitive warfare effort hopes to accomplish what Russia will fail to do militarily — secure victory over all of Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against a civilian passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on January 27, killing at least five people. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that a Russian drone strike hit a civilian passenger train near Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast (roughly 49 kilometers from the frontline) on January 27.[43] Zelensky reported that there were over 200 passengers on board, with 18 passengers in the car that Russian forces struck. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that the strike killed at least five civilians.[44] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck the train with three Shahed drones.[45] A Ukrainian soldier who was among the passengers told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske that a Shahed drone struck the train and that another Shahed did not reach the train, presumably crashing on the ground nearby.[46] ISW assesses that Russian forces have been leveraging recent drone adaptations, including equipping drones with artificial intelligence (AI), integrated cameras, and radio control capabilities, to increasingly target moving trains across Ukraine.[47] ISW has not observed reports as of this writing confirming that Russian forces used Shaheds with cameras or other adaptations to strike the moving train, but the use of multiple drones suggests that the strike was deliberate. Russian strikes causing disproportionate civilian loss of life, civilian injuries, and damage to civilian objects compared to the expected military gain from striking a civilian passenger train carrying a limited number of military personnel are likely a violation of international law.[48]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes on the battlefield, including in areas where Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations. Geolocated footage published on January 27 shows Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators striking and killing two civilians in Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[49] The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) reported on January 27 that Russian forces executed the two civilians as they were attempting to leave occupied territory near Hrabovske.[50] The 14th AC stated that the Russian FPV drones first hit and instantly killed a woman and that a second strike hit a wounded man next to the deceased woman. Russian forces launched a series of cross-border attacks in Hrabovske on the night of December 19 to 20, during which Russian forces forcibly deported about 50 civilians.[51] Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with launching the December 2025 attacks, and ISW has observed reports of the brigade operating near Hrabovske as recently as January 10.[52]

Key Takeaways

The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to cede the remainder of Donetsk Oblast to Russia in exchange for US security guarantees. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian concessions of territory that Russia is unlikely to seize quickly or easily militarily would be a strategic mistake.
The Russian military command continues to present demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to the demands that Russia remains unable to achieve militarily.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been lying about the scale of Russian advances for months, provoking repeated criticisms from even pro-war Russian milbloggers.
The Russian military command has been boasting about the seizure of small, rural villages and presenting these seizures as alleged evidence of the prowess of the Russian military to further the false narrative that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia’s demands go beyond control of territory in eastern Ukraine, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to claim to Western audiences that Donbas is the main issue in ongoing peace talks.
Russia will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that does not meet all of its demands and is instead using informational tools to push for Ukraine’s pre-emptive capitulation.
Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against a civilian passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on January 27, killing at least five people.
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes on the battlefield, including in areas where Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations.
Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.

read the full Jan 27 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2026

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The United States and Europe are finalizing security and economic guarantees with Ukraine that aim to deter future Russian aggression and rebuild Ukraine’s post-war economy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 25 that the US-Ukrainian document on US security guarantees for Ukraine is “100 percent ready” and that Ukraine is waiting for the United States to set a date and place for its signing.[1] Zelensky stated that the document will then go to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) and the US Congress for ratification. Zelensky stated that Europe will provide another “layer” of security guarantees, including security guarantees from the Coalition of the Willing and Ukraine’s future European Union (EU) membership.[2] Zelensky stated that EU membership is an “economic security guarantee” and that Ukraine aims to join the EU in 2027. Long-term efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s economy, including by integrating Ukraine into the EU market, are essential for Ukraine’s future security and prosperity, but are not a substitute for robust security guarantees that deter future Russian aggression, such as those from the United States and Coalition of the Willing.[3] Such security and economic guarantees have emerged from the peace process that US President Donald Trump has led in recent weeks, and ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to push Trump to abandon this US-led process and concede to Russian demands.[4]

The Kremlin continues to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to falsely portray Ukraine — not Russia — as the unwilling negotiating partner. Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is delaying the peace process by not accepting territorial concessions.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the territorial issue, which Peskov claimed is part of the “Anchorage formula,” is fundamentally important to Russia.[6] Peskov claimed that it would be a “mistake” to expect any significant results from the recent Ukrainian-Russian-US trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi.[7] Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea, Mikhail Sheremet, claimed that Zelensky has abandoned the negotiation process by refusing to withdraw Ukrainian forces from Ukrainian-held parts of Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts).[8]

Kremlin officials have been claiming that the Alaska summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine, despite no publicly available joint documents or communiques emerging from the summit.[9] Kremlin officials have not specified the details of the alleged “Anchorage formula” but have insisted that Ukraine’s withdrawal from all of Donbas is an important condition for a peace settlement.[10] A source close to the Kremlin recently told Reuters that the Kremlin considers the “Anchorage formula” to include Ukraine ceding all of Donbas to Russia and freezing the current frontlines elsewhere in southern and eastern Ukraine.[11] The Kremlin has long demanded that Ukraine cede parts of Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces currently do not occupy.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely only be able to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast in August 2027, assuming Russian forces are able to maintain their late 2025 rate of advance.[13] The Kremlin is demanding that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast in order to save Russia the time and resources needed to seize it militarily. Ukraine has made significant concessions as a result of the recent US-led peace talks, such as working to change Ukrainian laws to allow for elections during the current period of martial law.[14] The Kremlin is attempting to blame Ukraine for delaying the peace process despite Russia’s demonstrated unwillingness to offer any compromises on Russia’s original war aims.[15]

The Kremlin is reviving its use of nuclear arms control rhetoric to push the United States to make concessions on Ukraine in return for normalizing US-Russian relations. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev gave an interview to Russian state business outlet Kommersant published on January 26 about the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) nuclear arms control treaty, which expires on February 5, 2026.[16] Medvedev reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer of informally agreeing to adhere to the terms of New START for another year upon its expiration, but only if the United States does the same. Medvedev claimed that the United States has not responded to this proposal and that the prospects of broader US-Russian arms control cooperation are dependent upon the United States accepting Putin’s proposal. Medvedev claimed that the United States and Russia must first normalize bilateral relations before Russia can cooperate on bilateral arms control measures. Medvedev also levied thinly veiled threats if the United States does not shift its focus away from peace efforts and toward normalizing US-Russia bilateral relations as the Kremlin desires. Medvedev claimed that US-Russian arms control cooperation contributes to strategic stability but warned that other states could seek nuclear weapons in the absence of this stability. Medvedev asserted that Russia will counter any threats to its security and referenced the Burevestnik and Oreshnik ballistic missiles and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle that Russia debuted in 2024 and 2025.

Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly demonstrated that the Kremlin is not wavering from its original war demands and intends to achieve its objectives militarily if it cannot do so diplomatically.[17] Kremlin officials have often emphasized their commitment to Russia’s demands around high-profile negotiations, including following the August 2025 US-Russian summit in Alaska and the recent January 23 to 24 trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi.[18] The Kremlin has been attempting to use the prospect of improved bilateral US-Russia relations to distract the United States from peace efforts in Ukraine since US President Donald Trump took office in January 2025 and began leveraging the New START treaty in this effort in Summer-Fall 2025.[19] The Kremlin likely aims to convince the United States to concede to Russian demands on Ukraine in return for improved bilateral US-Russian relations. The Kremlin may also aim to push the United States to abandon the peace process in Ukraine without finalizing a peace settlement in exchange for strategic arms talks, therefore allowing Russia to continue its war unimpeded and without US pressure to make meaningful concessions.

Russian forces are increasingly using Starlink satellite systems to extend the range of BM-35 strike drones to conduct mid-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on January 26 that Russian forces used a Starlink-equipped BM-35 drone to strike Dnipro City (approximately 86 kilometers from the frontline) for the first time.[20] This strike comes less than two weeks after Beskrestnov reported the first recorded usage of Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones on January 15.[21] Beskrestnov noted that the BM-35 drone is more fuel efficient than Russian Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones and has a range of up to 500 kilometers. ISW has only observed evidence that the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies is fielding BM-35 drones to date.[22] Russian forces first began fielding the BM-35 in September 2025 and intensified BM-35 strikes in early January 2026.[23] Russian milbloggers and the Rubikon Center itself claimed that Rubikon drone operators employed BM-35s in January 12 to 13 strikes on cargo vessels near Odesa City and a January 17 strike against a Patriot air defense system southwest of Kharkiv City.[24] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on Starlinks to increase the range of operation of strike drones while increasing drone resilience against Ukrainian EW. The reported 500-kilometer range of Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones places most of Ukraine, all of Moldova, and parts of Poland, Romania, and Lithuania in range of these drones if launched from Russia or occupied Ukraine. ISW has observed reports of Starlink-equipped Shahed long-range strike drones beginning in September 2024 and of Rubikon equipping Molniya strike drones with Starlink systems beginning in December 2025.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian mid-range strikes, especially those conducted by Rubikon units, seek to exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems.[26] The threat of Russian mid-range strikes underscores Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to down drones, as electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely insufficient to defend Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from such a geographically pervasive threat.[27]

Russia’s domestic populace is increasingly bearing the economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 26 that prices for almost all essential goods and services in Russia have been rising since December 2025, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law in November 2025 that increased the value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026.[28] Russian independent investigative outlet 7×7-Horizontal Russia reported on January 23 that Russian civilians began reporting sharp food price increases since January 1.[29] 7×7-Horizontal Russia noted that Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data indicates that the official inflation rate was 1.26 percent from January 1 to 12, while prices of essential goods rose by 1.72 percent, meaning that the 26.7 percent of the price increase of essential goods is due to factors other than the Russian inflation rate. The disparity between the reported Russian inflation rate and price growth reduces consumer purchasing power and causes a decline in real income (an individual’s income after adjusting for inflation rates). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Russia service reported on December 28, 2025, that prices for essential goods and services rose across Russia throughout 2025 due to military spending and sanctions.[30] RFE/RL reported that excise taxes (taxes imposed per good that businesses often pass on to the consumer) and logistics costs drove up the prices of fuel, utilities, alcohol, and cigarettes in Russia, with gasoline prices rising twice as fast as the official inflation rate. RFE/RL reported that prices for common household items rose between 10 and 25 percent throughout 2025.
The Kremlin has prioritized the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and funding its war in Ukraine, which has led to Russian banks passing lending pressures from the Russian DIB onto consumers.[31] Labor shortages and competition between defense and civilian sectors have also inflated wages and fueled inflation and price spikes.[32] Russia’s domestic economic issues are also having outsized impacts on occupied Ukraine, with reported inflation rates of 106.9 percent in occupied Crimea at the beginning of 2026, causing price spikes in passenger transport services, fuel, private education, healthcare, and housing.[33] The increased VAT, which is functionally removing money from the Russian population as businesses pass most tax increases onto consumers, has only exacerbated already high prices and placed even more of the burden of Russia’s costly war in Ukraine onto the Russian people.[34]

Key Takeaways

The United States and Europe are finalizing security and economic guarantees with Ukraine that aim to deter future Russian aggression and rebuild Ukraine’s post-war economy.
The Kremlin continues to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to falsely portray Ukraine — not Russia — as the unwilling negotiating partner.
The Kremlin is reviving its use of nuclear arms control rhetoric to push the United States to make concessions on Ukraine in return for normalizing US-Russian relations.
Russian forces are increasingly using Starlink satellite systems to extend the range of BM-35 strike drones to conduct mid-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear.
Russia’s domestic populace is increasingly bearing the economic costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Slovyansk.

read the full Jan 26 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2026

Toplines

Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia’s commitment to its original war aims and reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, amid continued reporting that negotiations will resume in the coming days. Two US officials told Politico on January 24 that Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet in Abu Dhabi again on February 1.[1] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on January 24 that the Russian-Ukrainian-US trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi were “very productive” and confirmed that the delegations made plans to continue talks next week.[2] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated on January 24 Russia’s commitment to the alleged “fundamental understandings” that Russia claims that Russia and the US developed at the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit.[3] Kremlin officials have repeatedly exploited the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2024 Alaska summit to obfuscate Russia’s efforts to impede the peace process and claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine despite the lack of a clear joint outcome or communiqué.[4] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) amplified an interview from its Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polischuk on January 25 in which he reiterated Russia’s commitment to resolving the so-called “root causes” of the war, which Polischuk defined as Ukrainian neutrality and non-nuclear status, restoring protections for ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, ousting Ukraine’s current government, and resolving “security threats” against Russia – all a restatement of elements of Russia’s original war aims.[5] Polishchuk also reiterated Russia’s rejection of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine, including the deployment of a foreign peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. Polishchuk stated that the negotiating parties should finalize a peace agreement before negotiating security guarantees, rejecting both the timeline and component agreements of the effort that US President Donald Trump’s team is leading.

Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov made a statement suggesting that the Kremlin is using its participation in ongoing negotiations with the United States to stave off a significant increase in US pressure against Russia that could impede its war effort. Peskov stated on January 24 that Trump’s “knee-jerk” foreign policy methods do not align with Russia’s own and that the Kremlin views these methods as designed to force others to “bend over the knee.”[6] Peskov claimed that those who “bend” to Trump “will continue to bend over” and that it is imperative that Russia not bend to Trump. The Kremlin has been pursuing a balancing act since February 2025 between posturing strength to its populace and allies while engaging the United States enough to avoid additional American pressure that could compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to compromise from his original war aims and engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war.[7] Peskov’s overt criticism of Trump’s mode of foreign policy and assertion that Russia must not compromise in the face of US pressure suggests that the Kremlin seeks to ensure that the Trump administration does not dole out additional restrictive measures directly against Russia. Peskov’s statement may be a tacit Kremlin acknowledgement of Russia’s own vulnerabilities to increased pressure. ISW continues to assess that the West, including the United States, has failed to invalidate Putin’s theory of victory and that the Kremlin has offered no indication of a willingness to compromise.[8] The United States and Europe may be able to invalidate Putin’s theory of victory and compel Russia to make concessions through additional pressure, such as augmenting Ukrainian military capabilities, sanctioning and seizing foreign Russian assets, and reducing Russia’s access to resources it needs to sustain its long-term war effort.[9]

Russia continues to intensify recruitment efforts for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) that may also staff the conventional Russian ground forces. Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on January 22 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) launched a federal recruitment drive for contract soldiers in the Russian USF.[10] Kommersant reported that the Russian MoD is now offering one-year contracts stipulating that the MoD can only place the recruit in the USF, cannot transfer the recruit to non-USF units (such as infantry), and must discharge the recruit upon the expiration of the original contract if the recruit refuses to sign a renewal. Russian MoD representatives told Kommersant that the MoD seeks young candidates with analytical skills, computer proficiency, fine motor skills, and vestibular stability – prioritizing technological professionals and students. Other reporting suggests that the Russian MoD may use at least some individuals recruited for the USF in the conventional Russian ground forces, however. Russian opposition outlet Astra confirmed on January 24 that the Russian MoD has been conducting a recruitment campaign at Russian universities since mid-January 2026.[11] Astra spoke to students at Russian universities who attended a Russian MoD recruitment presentation and stated that the MoD forced students to sign an acknowledgement that they understood that the contract was for a year and that they could leave after one year of service. Astra reported that the Higher School of Economics in Moscow acknowledged in a separate response to a lawyer that Russian students were not signing a special contract for the USF but rather a standard MoD contract. Astra reported that the lawyer stated this standard contract could allow the Russian military command to assign these recruits as infantry and send them to the frontlines, possibly keeping the students in the military even after the expiration of the one-year contract. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is trying various means to increase recruitment to offset high casualties on the frontlines, which include using the need to protect critical infrastructure as a thin justification to conceal wider efforts to prepare active reservists for deployment.[12] The Kremlin has also concentrated compulsory partial call-up efforts in Russia‘s central regions to shield larger and more politically sensitive population centers, such as Moscow City, from compulsory force generation efforts.[13]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov as a Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology on January 25. Fedorov noted on January 25 that Beskrestnov is one of Ukraine’s best experts in the field of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and Russian military decision making; Beskrestnov will focus on developing systemic solutions against Russian strike and reconnaissance drones.[14]

Key Takeaways

Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia’s commitment to its original war aims and reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, amid continued reporting that negotiations will resume in the coming days.
Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov made a statement suggesting that the Kremlin is using its participation in ongoing negotiations with the United States to stave off a significant increase in US pressure against Russia that could impede its war effort.
Russia continues to intensify recruitment efforts for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) that may also staff the conventional Russian ground forces.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov as a Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology on January 25.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Novopavlivka.

read the full Jan 25 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 24, 2026

Toplines

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations concluded a second day of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 24. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky characterized the talks as constructive and reported on January 24 that the delegations discussed parameters for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine, the necessity of US involvement in ending the war, and security guarantees necessary to end the war.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold another round of trilateral meetings if all sides are willing, potentially during the week of January 25 to 31. A source in the Ukrainian delegation told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the trilateral talks on January 24 were three hours long and that senior White House officials characterized the meeting as “productive.”[2]

Kremlin officials continue to respond to ongoing negotiations by reiterating Russia’s commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original maximalist war aims in Ukraine while attempting to rhetorically shift the blame for the Kremlin’s own reticence onto Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 23 that it is important to implement the “Anchorage formula” as negotiations continue.[3] Kremlin officials often attempt to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine, and present the agreement in ways that benefit Russia — including by obfuscating Russia’s own efforts to impede the peace process.[4] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya on January 24 that Russia insists that Ukraine must end its alleged prosecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine, as a condition for peace in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin officials frequently demand that any military or diplomatic end to the war addresses the war’s “root causes.”[6] “The Kremlin has frequently used the concept of “root causes” as shorthand to call back to its original maximalist war justifications and demands, and has cloaked the issue of the UOC MP in this root causes language.[7] The Kremlin has long controlled the ROC’s spiritual doctrine and has used the UOC MP as an extension of the Kremlin and a tool of Russia’s hybrid warfare that seeks to enforce Russian ideologies in Ukrainian society and persecute religious minorities in occupied Ukraine.[8] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also seized on an alleged Ukrainian strike in occupied Kherson Oblast to claim that Ukraine took steps to escalate the war and is unwilling to negotiate, setting conditions for Russia’s own rejection of a peace deal that does not meet all of its demands.[9] The Kremlin has used the allegation of Ukrainian strikes to justify and deflect blame away from Russia for stalled peace negotiations, including with the claimed strike against Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29, and in occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast on January 1. These dates have each conveniently aligned with peace talks — including a Putin call with US President Donald Trump.[10] Kremlin officials have continuously and explicitly rejected a peace on any terms other than those Russia dictates.[11] The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end its war in Ukraine and to portray Ukraine rather than Russia as the impediment in the peace process — particularly by invoking the ambiguity around the August 2025 Anchorage summit and claimed Ukrainian strikes against Russia and occupied Ukraine.[12]

Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike overnight on January 23 to 24 primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 24 that Russian forces launched six Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles; two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles; 12 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles; one Kh-59/69 cruise missile; and 375 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 250 were Shaheds.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed nine Kh-22/32s, five Iskander-M/S-300s, one Kh-59/69, and 357 drones, that two missiles and 18 drones struck 12 locations, and that there is no information on the location of four missiles. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian strikes killed one civilian and wounded dozens in Kyiv City and left over 800,000 subscribers in Kyiv City and over 400,000 subscribers in Chernihiv City without power.[14] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 25 Shaheds and at least one Iskander-M against Kharkiv City overnight, injuring at least 31 civilians and damaging at least 44 buildings, including a civilian infrastructure facility.[15] Ukraine’s Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes also caused power outages in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts and that hourly power outages are in effect for most of Ukraine.[16]

Russia’s intensified long-range strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 has significantly degraded Ukraine’s energy grid, disproportionately effecting Ukrainian civilians. Maksym Timchenko, the head of Ukraine’s largest private energy company DTEK, told Reuters on January 23 that Russian strikes against DTEK energy infrastructure have degraded DTEK’s total power generation capacity by 60 to 70 percent and caused damages estimated at $64 to 70 billion to repair.[17] Timchenko stated that the temperature in Ukraine has fluctuated between negative 15 and 20 degrees Celsius (five to negative four degrees Fahrenheit) for the past two weeks. Timchenko stated that Russian strikes cause rolling blackouts that leave Ukrainian civilians with only three to four hours of power per day. Russia likely intends to degrade Ukraine’s power generation capacity and ability to provide Ukrainians with heat in the dead of winter, including by attempting to split Ukraine’s energy grid in half and create energy islands that are cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[18] Russia began increasing the intensity of its strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure throughout Fall 2025 into Winter 2025-2026 with the goal of causing large scale disruptions to the Ukrainian power system, in what ISW continues to assess is a Russian effort to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[19]

Russia’s continued devastating strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure emphasizes Ukraine’s urgent need for additional air defense systems and munitions for a holistic and well-rounded air defense umbrella. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 23 that US President Donald Trump agreed to provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems to combat Russia’s continued long-range strike campaign.[20] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat recently noted that Ukraine’s shootdown rate of Russia’s long-range strike packages is high, but that the drones and missiles that breach Ukraine’s air defenses cause extensive damage.[21] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significant quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series in order to maximize damage with larger strike packages.[22] Russia has also been equipping Shahed drones with cluster warheads and mines that detonate after being downed, innovating strike tactics, and adapting Shahed technology to enable the drones to change targets in real time–all of which have the effect of maximizing the damage Shahed drones can inflict on Ukrainian targets.[23] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.[24] Ukraine also requires partner support to maintain a diverse air defense umbrella comprised of not only high-end Patriot systems, but also interceptor drones, well-equipped mobile fire groups, and fighter jets.

Independent reporting continues to indicate that Russian forces and authorities continue systematically abusing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian detention in violation of international law. Human Rights Watch published a report on December 11, 2025, detailing Russia’s systematic physical and psychological abuse and torture of Ukrainian POWs, including interviews with six Ukrainian POWs, all captured in 2022, and who spent two to three years in Russian detention.[25] All six of the interviewed Ukrainian POWs described Russian forces committing violence against the POWs at all stages of the detention process between the frontline and more permanent detention facilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine. One of the POWs detailed a Russian battlefield commander torturing him for information about the Ukrainian military in a near-rear areas. All six POWs described how Russia frequently transferred personnel between permanent detention facilities and that the guards would beat the POWs upon their arrival at the new facility. Four of the POWs stated that Russian military personnel committed violent acts against POWs, not just sdetention facility staff. Five of the six POWs stated that Russian forces committed sexual violence against them, including rape. Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces and authorities inflicted the worst abuse against Ukrainians who joined the military before 2022, soldiers with high ranks or serving in especially valuable roles, and against younger soldiers. Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces and authorities steal the personal items and clothing from POWs, and four of the POWs described being left without adequate clothing items. Human Rights Watch detailed that Russian authorities deny POWs food, hygiene items, and clothing in adequate amounts and conditions; deny POWs sufficient time and facilities for personal hygiene; and overcrowd the detention facilities, contributing to significant health problems, including malnutrition and “catastrophic” weight loss among the POWs. Human Rights Watch reported that Russia aims to break the personality and dignity of the Ukrainian POWs.

Thousands of Ukrainians remain in Russian detention and are subject to this abuse. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) estimated on September 22, 2025 that Russian forces took at least 13,500 Ukrainian soldiers as POWs between February 2022 and September 2025 and that between 6,000 to 10,000 remained in Russian detention as of September 2025.[26] The OSCE noted that Russia has at least 222 detention sites for Ukrainian POWs, most of which are in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the remainder are largely scattered throughout Russia. The OSCE reported that Russia detained Ukrainian POWs and civilians for “countering the special military operation” — Russia’s vague shorthand to avoid acknowledging that it’s illegal invasion of Ukraine is a war –in order to deny Ukrainian POWs the protections afforded to persons considered hors de combat in international law. Russian forces have sharply increased extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian POWs on the frontline since late 2024 in violation of international law, particularly in areas of heavy combat.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[28]

Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the inconsistency between the Russian military command’s claims of advances and the reality on the battlefield particularly in the Kupyansk direction. A Russian milblogger published an image on January 23 reportedly showing encircled Russian servicemembers in central Kupyansk, reporting that Ukrainian forces have encircled the servicemembers for the past three months and that Russian forces cannot reinforce or resupply the position.[29] The milblogger stated that the Russian servicemembers have managed to hold their position by retrieving ammunition and weapons from dead Ukrainian soldiers. Another Russian milblogger responded to this report by criticizing the gap between the Russian military command’s exaggerated claims of Russian control of Kupyansk and the reality for Russian forces in the town.[30] The milblogger further criticized the Russian General Staff for demanding exaggerated claims of advances from subordinate echelons that sometimes result in an eight-to-10-kilometer gap between claimed Russian advances and the real frontline, including in the Pokrovsk and Slovyansk directions and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] Another milblogger criticized the Russian military command on January 17 for the discrepancy between the claimed battlefield victories and the actual situation for Russian forces on the ground.[32] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for wasting personnel on flag-raising missions in areas that Russian forces do not control to support these claimed advances, but noted that these Russian personnel frequently die on such missions. A third Kremlin-affiliated milblogger warned on January 17 that the situation with inflated gains in the Kostyantynivka direction could become as bad as the Kupyansk direction, publishing a map showing the discrepancy between the inflated claims and the “actual” extent of Russian advances in the area (actual as claimed by the milblogger, which is likely also somewhat inflated).[33] Russian milbloggers have increasingly been rejecting the alternate battlefield reality that Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military commanders are trying to create, but the Russian military command appears to remain committed to this alternative reality.[34]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed former Deputy Digital Transformation Minister Valeria Ionan as a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on international projects.[35] Fedorov stated that Ionan will focus on systemic international assistance to Ukraine’s defense projects and strengthening existing and creating new partnerships.

Key Takeaways

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations concluded a second day of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 24.
Kremlin officials continue to respond to ongoing negotiations by reiterating Russia’s commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original maximalist war aims in Ukraine while attempting to rhetorically shift the blame for the Kremlin’s own reticence onto Ukraine.
Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike overnight on January 23 to 24 primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City.
Russia’s intensified long-range strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 has significantly degraded Ukraine’s energy grid, disproportionately effecting Ukrainian civilians.
Russia’s continued devastating strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure emphasizes Ukraine’s urgent need for additional air defense systems and munitions for a holistic and well-rounded air defense umbrella.
Independent reporting continues to indicate that Russian forces and authorities continue systematically abusing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian detention in violation of international law.
Thousands of Ukrainians remain in Russian detention and are subject to this abuse.
Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the inconsistency between the Russian military command’s claims of advances and the reality on the battlefield particularly in the Kupyansk direction.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed former Deputy Digital Transformation Minister Valeria Ionan as a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on international projects.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Slovyansk.

read the full Jan 24 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2026

Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with a US delegation in Moscow on the night of January 22 to 23 and agreed to trilateral US, Russian, and Ukrainian working group meetings in Abu Dhabi on January 23 and 24. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and Josh Gruenbaum, senior advisor to US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace.[1] Ushakov stated that the parties discussed Trump’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Davos, Switzerland, on January 22 and other US meetings with Ukrainian and European delegations in December 2025 and January 2026. Ushakov stated that Putin agreed that Russia will meet with Ukraine and the United States at trilateral working group meetings to discuss security issues in Abu Dhabi on January 23 and 24. Ushakov stated that Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov will lead a Russian delegation consisting of representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the trilateral talks.[2] Zelensky reported on January 23 that Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov is leading the Ukrainian delegation, which includes Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov, Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia, Advisor to the Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Oleksandr Bevz, First Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office Serhiy Kyslytsya, First Deputy Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Yevhenyi Ostryanskyi, Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov, Head of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Oleh Ivashchenko, GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, and First Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) Oleksandr Poklad.[3] Ushakov additionally stated that the lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev and Witkoff will hold bilateral working group meetings on economic issues in Abu Dhabi.[4]

The Kremlin is trying to push Trump to abandon the negotiation process with Ukraine and Europe that he has been leading and to concede to the demands Russia made at the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Ushakov stated after Putin’s January 22-23 meeting with the US delegation that “there is no hope” of achieving a long-term settlement to the war without resolving the territorial issue according to the “formula” the United States and Russia allegedly agreed to in Alaska.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 23 that the Kremlin considers it “inadvisable” to “publicly delve into the details” of the “Anchorage formula” but that Ukraine’s withdrawal of its forces from all of Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts) is an important condition for a peace settlement.[6] A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that the Kremlin considers the “Anchorage formula” to include Ukraine ceding all of Donbas to Russia and freezing the current frontlines elsewhere in southern and eastern Ukraine.[7] Trump has led conversations with Ukraine and Europe in recent weeks that have made significant progress in determining the conditions necessary to ensure an enduring and reliable peace in Ukraine. These US-led talks have notably led to Ukraine making considerable concessions, such as changing Ukrainian laws to allow for elections during the current period of martial law.[8] Trump also worked with Ukraine and Europe to alter the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan into the latest iteration of the 20-point plan, signaling the administration’s commitment to working with Ukraine and Europe to secure a just end to the war. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been trying to manipulate the lack of publicly available agreements resulting from the Alaska Summit, presenting the alleged US-Russian agreements in ways that benefit Russia.[9] The Kremlin has been using the ambiguity around the summit to try to conceal the way Russia — not Ukraine — has been impeding the negotiations process by maintaining its original war demands. Russia is likely attempting to convince Trump to walk away from US efforts to work with Ukraine and Europe by offering the ambiguous “Alaska formula” as a way to end the war.

The Kremlin is engaged in an informational campaign aimed at Ukraine’s partners that attempts to present control over Donbas as the main issue left to discuss in peace talks, but Russian officials’ statements for domestic audiences have repeatedly confirmed that Russia’s demands go beyond eastern Ukraine. Peskov repeated Kremlin demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal of its forces from all of Donbas on January 23.[10] A Reuters source close to the Kremlin discussed Russian demands about southern and eastern Ukraine, but did not specify Russian demands about Russian-occupied areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in northern Ukraine.[11] Kremlin officials often reference the “buffer zones” Russian advances have created in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claiming in December 2025 that Russian advances in and near Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, are necessary to protect Russian-occupied territory in northern Luhansk Oblast.[12] Russian State Duma officials, whose rhetoric largely targets the Russian population and not international audiences, continue to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with any agreement that freezes the current lines in southern Ukraine. Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik, for example, stated on January 23 that Russia needs international and Ukrainian recognition of the “constituent entities” outlined in the Russian Constitution, referring to all of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[13]

Kremlin officials, including Putin, have also recently reiterated Russia’s other demands that are unrelated to Ukrainian territory, namely demands that NATO halt expansion and roll back to its 1997 borders.[14] Russian Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin stated on January 23 that Russian negotiators in Abu Dhabi have the authority to demand resolutions to the strategic and political issues that Russia outlined at the start of its full-scale invasion — likely including Russia’s 2021 ultimatums to NATO.[15] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that his demands are greater than those encapsulated in the US-proposed 28-point plan and subsequent US-Ukrainian-European peace plans.[16]

Long-term support for Ukraine’s economy and reconstruction is essential for Ukraine’s security, but it is not a substitute for robust security guarantees that deter future Russian aggression. Zelensky noted on January 23 that Trump supports the idea of a free trade zone in Ukraine, which Zelensky noted will help Ukrainian businesses, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reported that the EU has almost completed work with the United States and Ukraine on a “prosperity package” for Ukraine’s reconstruction.[17] Politico reported on January 23 that a draft of the prosperity plan outlines a 10-year agreement that includes fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU membership and investments from the US, EU, and international organizations into Ukraine’s recovery.[18]

Economic support for Ukraine will be insufficient to safeguard Ukraine’s future security, however. Ukraine requires reliable security guarantees that credibly and effectively deter future Russian aggression, ensure the strength of the Ukrainian military, and include a strong partner-led reassurance force. Zelensky noted on January 23 that he is ready to sign the main US-Ukrainian security guarantees document that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada and US Congress will ratify, and von der Leyen reported that the EU is also making progress towards finalizing the security guarantees that the Coalition of the Willing discussed in Paris on January 6.[19] The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that Russia views any security guarantees required to ensure a lasting peace as unacceptable and has repeatedly demanded significant reductions in the Ukrainian military and rejected foreign troop deployments to post-war Ukraine.[20]

Kremlin officials indicated that Russia wants to use its assets frozen in the United States to benefit the Russian economy and offset the cost of Russia’s full-scale invasion — as ISW recently assessed. Ushakov stated after Putin’s January 22-23 meeting with the US delegation that the parties discussed Putin’s proposal to contribute $1 billion to Trump’s Board of Peace from Russian assets currently frozen in the United States.[21] Ushakov reiterated Putin’s other proposal that the remaining funds in the United States go toward reconstructing Ukrainian territories that sustained damage during the war.[22] Peskov clarified on January 23 that Russian assets could help rebuild territory in Donbas, and Zelensky stated that Putin proposed that the funds go towards rebuilding Kursk Oblast.[23] The Kremlin is demanding that Ukraine hand over all of Donbas to Russia, suggesting that the Kremlin hopes to use the frozen assets to rebuild Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, not Ukrainian-held areas. ISW recently assessed that Putin’s initial January 21 proposal to use the frozen funds for reconstruction likely did not include the Ukrainian-held territories that Russian strikes have severely damaged.[24] The use of frozen Russian assets to rebuild Russian-occupied Ukraine or Kursk Oblast would effectively release the funds back to Russia and offset the costs Russia incurred with its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russian access to additional funds for the reconstruction of occupied Ukraine would allow Russia to maximize its economic exploitation of Ukrainian territories, thereby funneling profits back into the Russian economy and supporting Russian efforts to forcibly integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.

The Kremlin is likely preparing to carefully manage the succession plan for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in order to avoid a tumultuous transfer of power that may result in unrest in Chechnya and divert Chechen resources from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on January 23 that a source close to the Kremlin and the ruling United Russia party stated that the Kremlin is working to find a solution to possible succession problems in Chechnya against the backdrop of reports that Kadyrov is seriously ill and that his son and possible successor, 18-year-old Adam, was recently in a car accident.[25] A Russian insider source claimed on January 22 that Adam Kadyrov required surgery for fractures, facial injuries, and spleen injuries following the January 16 car crash.[26] Vazhnye Istorii noted that Kadyrov is promoting his son, Adam, to be his successor, as ISW has previously assessed, and noted that Adam Kadyrov cannot legally govern the republic until he turns 30.[27] A former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and a member of the Chechen diaspora stated that the next leader will likely be someone from the Benoi teip (a Chechen clan), the largest teip in Chechnya, to which Kadyrov is a member. Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian State Duma Deputy for Chechnya Adam Delimkhanov and Chechen Republic Parliament Deputy Magomed Daudov, who are both part of the Benoi teip, may take over as head of the Chechen Republic – presumably until Adam Kadyrov turns 30. Delimkhanov has held influence in a variety of spheres in Chechnya, including by coordinating Chechen forces fighting in Ukraine, fulfilling diplomatic roles, and navigating political and religious tensions between Russian and Chechen societies.[28] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported in May 2025 that Kadyrov tasked Delimkhanov with acting as a “coach-mentor” to Adam Kadyrov, including by connecting him with political and criminal contacts in Russia and abroad.[29]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has long relied on Kadyrov’s control over Chechnya to maintain stability in the area, which historically had a tense relationship with Moscow before the accession of the Kadyrov regime. A tense power struggle in the region could lead to unrest and internal fighting, which would require attention from Moscow. Elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are stationed in Chechnya, and numerous Chechen units are currently operating in Ukraine.[30] Kadyrov’s control over Chechnya has allowed Putin to employ these forces in the war in Ukraine without having to make considerations for issues in Chechnya that would require the attention of Russia’s military and security services. The Kremlin may not have sufficient forces to handle any future unrest emerging from internal Chechen power struggles while also maintaining its current deployments in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely to prioritize finding a solution to Chechen succession issues that avoids the potential for regional unrest.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy Sternenko to advise the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on scaling up the use of drones on the front.[31] Fedorov stated that Sternenko will focus on systematizing drone supplies and increasing the lethality of underperforming Ukrainian drone units. Sternenko is a prominent Ukrainian volunteer and fundraiser who has previously provided the Ukrainian military with first-person view (FPV) fiber optic drones and FPV drones with autonomous detection and strike capabilities.[32] Sternenko created the largest non-state FPV drone supplier for the Ukrainian military on January 15, 2025.[33] Sternenko survived a Russian intelligence-sponsored assassination attempt in May 2025.[34] Sternenko met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on January 15 to discuss legislative support for volunteers helping the Ukrainian military and targeted work with Ukrainian brigades.[35]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with a US delegation in Moscow on the night of January 22 to 23 and agreed to trilateral US, Russian, and Ukrainian working group meetings in Abu Dhabi on January 23 and 24.
The Kremlin is trying to push Trump to abandon the negotiation process with Ukraine and Europe that he has been leading and to concede to the demands Russia made at the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
The Kremlin is engaged in an informational campaign aimed at Ukraine’s partners that attempts to present control over Donbas as the main issue left to discuss in peace talks, but Russian officials’ statements for domestic audiences have repeatedly confirmed that Russia’s demands go beyond eastern Ukraine.
Long-term support for Ukraine’s economy and reconstruction is essential for Ukraine’s security, but is not a substitute for robust security guarantees that deter future Russian aggression.
Kremlin officials indicated that Russia wants to use its assets frozen in the United States to benefit the Russian economy and offset the cost of Russia’s full-scale invasion, as ISW recently assessed.
The Kremlin is likely preparing to carefully manage the succession plan for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in order to avoid a tumultuous transfer of power that may result in unrest in Chechnya and divert Chechen resources from the war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy Sternenko to advise the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on scaling up the use of drones on the front.
Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and Novopavlivka.

read the full Jan 23 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2026

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Note: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with US envoys in Moscow ended after the completion of this update and will be covered in ISW’s January 23 report.

Ukrainian and US officials continued meetings in Switzerland on January 22. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 22.[1] Zelensky stated that they discussed air defenses for Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov reported that he, Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia, and Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin met with former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Davos to discuss Ukraine’s economic development, post-war recovery, and security guarantees.[2] Witkoff and Kushner met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on the night of January 22, but the meeting has not concluded as of this writing. ISW will report on the US-Russia meeting as information becomes available.

Witkoff and Western outlets offered limited reporting about what the US-Russian meeting may discuss. Witkoff stated on January 22 that peace talks still need to resolve one issue but did not specify.[3] Witkoff stated that Trump is considering ideas such as a “tariff-free zone” for Ukraine to boost its economy.[4] FT reported that two sources stated that the United States and Ukraine have discussed proposing a limited ceasefire in which Russia would stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and Ukraine would stop strikes against Russian oil refineries and shadow fleet tankers.[5]

Putin is trying to use Trump’s Board of Peace to curry favor with Trump and negotiate the release of frozen Russian assets to fuel the Russian economy. Putin stated on January 21 that Russia is considering Trump’s proposal to join Trump’s Board of Peace and that Russia could send the required one billion dollars from frozen Russian assets held in the United States.[6] Putin stated that the remaining frozen Russian assets in the United States could go towards rebuilding “territories damaged by the fighting” after a Russia-Ukraine peace treaty. Putin stated that he would address the issue in his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner. Putin is likely referring to Russian-occupied territories, not Ukrainian-held territories ravaged by Russian strikes. Putin appears to be trying to negotiate the unfreezing of Russian assets not only to fund Trump’s Board of Peace but also to rebuild the areas that Russian forces have damaged in Russia’s full-scale invasion. The use of frozen Russian assets to rebuild Russian-occupied Ukraine would effectively release the funds back to Russia and offset the costs Russia caused by invading in 2022. Funding towards reconstruction in occupied Ukraine would put this money back into the Russian economy and would help Russia further integrate occupied Ukraine’s economy, society, and infrastructure into the central Russian system.

There is conflicting reporting about possible US, Ukrainian, and Russian meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 23 and 24. Zelensky stated that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials will hold a trilateral meeting in the UAE on January 23 and 24.[7] Zelensky’s office clarified to the Financial Times (FT) that a trilateral meeting was still unconfirmed and that the United States and Ukraine are still waiting for Russia’s response.[8] An unspecified source told FT that Russian officials told the United States that Putin was open to holding parallel talks with Ukraine, with US mediators shuttling between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations. Witkoff stated that he and Kushner would go to Abu Dhabi to participate in “working group” meetings discussing “military-to-military” issues and Ukrainian “prosperity” after their meeting with Putin in Moscow.[9] Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated that he is open to bilateral or trilateral meetings with Putin and that Ukraine is open to direct negotiations, but Putin has often resisted such meetings.[10]

The Russian military command is reportedly prioritizing the provision of light motorized vehicles to Russian troops, further demonstrating how the Russian military is optimizing itself for positional warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 22 that the Russian military command plans to provide over 2,600 light vehicles, including buggies, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), from the Russian General Staff reserve to Russian assault units in 2026, with the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) delivering about 4,200 vehicles in the first quarter of 2026.[11] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is relying on “non-systemic purchases,” such as volunteer assistance, donations, and budgetary contributions from individual oblasts, to meet its total goals. Russian forces are largely using light motorized vehicles to transport infantry closer to frontline positions.[12] The Russian military command’s focus on light vehicle production and provision further demonstrates ISW’s ongoing assessment that Russian forces have optimized themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine and that Russian advances will likely remain constrained to a foot pace in the near to medium-term.[13]

The Russian military command is reportedly introducing a tactical-level situational awareness system to help streamline battlefield decision-making, seeking to use artificial intelligence to compensate for the low level of junior officer training and initiative in the Russian military, among other things. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command is accelerating the implementation of the Svod situational awareness system for tactical commanders.[14] Mashovets stated that the system will collect different types of intelligence, including satellite data, aerial photography, electronic and engineering reconnaissance data, and open-source intelligence, into a single information space that will enable real-time target detection and identification. Mashovets stated that the system will also analyze data, including with help from AI, and will model scenarios for operations and missions taking into account changing dynamics. Mashovets added that Russian forces will likely begin testing the system in combat units at the battalion level across elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, starting in the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs, Central Military District [CMD]) in April and May 2026. The Central Grouping of Forces is currently overseeing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.

The Svod system likely aims to replicate the functionality of similar Ukrainian IT systems that help with target detection and identification. The Svod system, particularly its use of AI, likely further aims to help with real-time decision-making on the battlefield at the tactical level. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command has optimized its military decision-making process around a system designed to use lower quality individual service members who choose a plan from a playbook of battle orders and execute it with minimal alterations.[15] The highly tactical nature of the Svod system reflects the Russian military command’s need to micromanage junior officers with limited training to compensate for a Russian military hierarchy that discourages autonomy. Russian efforts to integrate technologies such as AI as tactical decision-support tools are thus likely in part attempts to empower tactical units and commanders. The Russian military command appears to be trying to fulfill its long-held goal of offsetting junior officer incompetence by generating templated yet responsive decision-making platforms. It is unclear if Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies will be incorporated into the Svod system. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated in August 2025 that the newly created Svod system will undergo combat testing between September and November 2025, and the reason for the delays is unclear.[16]

The Russian General Staff is reportedly creating a new drone brigade that will incorporate a large variety of unmanned systems, likely as part of wider efforts to centralize drone units in the Russian military. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command plans to create the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade of the Supreme Command from the Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) by December 2026.[17] Mashovets reported that the brigade will include crews from a variety of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including reconnaissance UAVs, Lancet loitering munitions, Geran strike UAVs, fiber-optic UAVs, and interceptor UAVs. Mashovets reported that a major general will lead the brigade, that the brigade will consist of approximately 7,000 servicemembers, and that the brigade would be stationed in various Russian oblasts and in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[18] The Russian military command reportedly plans to form the brigade in four stages – to be completed by February 1, April 1, and September 1, and December 1.[19] Mashovets reported that the brigade will be exclusively subordinated to the Russian General Staff through the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The reported size and commander’s rank of the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade do not correspond with the traditional characteristics of a brigade. The Russian General Staff may be trying to fit an elite organizational structure into the Russian order of battle, and the brigade will likely not function as a brigade in reality. The new brigade appears part of wider efforts to establish control over and centralize informal drone units in the Russian military.[20] It is unclear how this brigade will relate to or interact with the Rubikon Center. ISW will continue to monitor reports of the brigade’s development and functional role on the battlefield.

European states are increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers following a series of similar US actions in recent weeks. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the French Navy boarded and diverted a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea on the morning of January 22.[21] Macron stated that the tanker was travelling from Russia and was under international sanctions. The French Maritime Prefecture of the Mediterranean later confirmed that French authorities inspected and diverted the Grinch cargo tanker in the Alboran Sea as it was en route from Murmansk, Russia, and confirmed suspicions that the vessel was flying a false flag.[22] The French Maritime Prefecture reported that the UK cooperated with France in the inspection, and French military officials told the Associated Press (AP) that the UKgathered and shared intelligence that enabled French forces to intercept the vessel.[23] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Grinch sailed under the Comoros Islands flag and confirmed that the ship left an area near Murmansk on January 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky applauded the French seizure of the tanker and called for states to apprehend more Russian tankers operating near European shores.[24] France has previously taken action against the Russian shadow fleet, boarding a tanker in late September 2025.[25] The January 22 seizure comes against the backdrop of similar US actions to seize tankers tied to the Russian shadow fleet in the Caribbean Sea off the coast of Venezuela.[26]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov dismissed five deputy defense ministers on January 22. Fedorov reported that he dismissed Anatoliy Klochko, Oleksandr Kozenko, Mykola Shevtsov, Volodymyr Zaverukha, and Hanna Hvozdiar.[27] Fedorov stated that some of the dismissed deputy ministers will continue to work in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in other areas as advisors or heads of project offices.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian and US officials continued meetings in Switzerland on January 22.
Putin is trying to use Trump’s Board of Peace to curry favor with Trump and negotiate the release of frozen Russian assets to fuel the Russian economy.
There is conflicting reporting about possible US, Ukrainian, and Russian meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 23 and 24.
The Russian military command is reportedly prioritizing the provision of light motorized vehicles to Russian troops, further demonstrating how the Russian military is optimizing itself for positional warfare.
The Russian military command is reportedly introducing a tactical-level situational awareness system to help streamline battlefield decision-making, seeking to use artificial intelligence to compensate for the low level of junior officer training and initiative in the Russian military, among other things.
The Russian General Staff is reportedly creating a new drone brigade that will incorporate a large variety of unmanned systems, likely as part of wider efforts to centralize drone units in the Russian military.
European states are increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers following a series of similar US actions in recent weeks.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov dismissed five deputy defense ministers on January 22.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

read the full Jan 22 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2026

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US officials will meet with Ukrainian officials on January 21 and 22 and with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 22 to continue peace negotiations. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 20, and US President Trump stated on January 21 that he will meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the forum on January 22.[1] Witkoff stated that he and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner would meet with Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, on the evening of January 21 and will meet with Putin in Russia on January 22.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Witkoff and Kushner will meet with Putin on January 22.[3] Witkoff stated that negotiations on the 20-point peace plan are “down to land deals now.”[4] Witkoff stated that he and Kushner will travel to the United Arab Emirates to meet with “working groups” after the meeting in Russia.

The Kremlin remains committed to its original war aims and is not publicly showing any new willingness to commit to meaningful compromises to end its war against Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that unspecified sources stated that Putin received a draft peace plan earlier in January 2025 from Dmitriev and that the Kremlin viewed the proposal as a significant step forward even though it fell short of a finalized agreement.[5] The sources noted that many issues that are important to Russia are either not included in the draft plan or framed in “unsatisfactory” ways. Bloomberg’s sources stated that US recognition of occupied Crimea and other unspecified occupied territories of Ukraine as under Russian control is a priority for Putin and that Russia remains opposed to the deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine as part of future security guarantees for Ukraine. The sources stated that Russia is seeking protections for the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church (a Kremlin-controlled arm of influence) in Ukraine.

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on January 21 that Russia is “reclaim[ing] its own lands” in Ukraine through the war and Russia’s illegal, sham referendums in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022.[6] Medvedev claimed that these lands and people have been part of Russia “for centuries.” Medvedev’s statements are in line with repeated Kremlin statements, including those calling for Ukraine to cede “Novorossiya” to Russia — referring to an invented region that Kremlin officials often claim is “integral” to Russia and that includes not only Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, but also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. The US-proposed 28-point peace plan only allowed for Russian occupation of Crimea, all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and the currently occupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, requiring Russia to cede occupied territories outside of these five regions, including in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[7]

Russia’s position remains fundamentally unchanged, as Kremlin officials have repeatedly called for a future peace settlement to address the alleged “root causes” of the war, including Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.[8] Kremlin officials have also repeatedly rejected the use of foreign troops in security guarantees for post-war Ukraine — a core element of the peace plan that the Trump administration has thus far negotiated. The Kremlin is attempting to position itself as a reliable negotiating partner interested in peace while indicating that its commitment to achieving its original war aims is unchanged.

Reports of the draft list of the top United Russia candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections have reportedly generated internal Kremlin discussions that not only reflect factional maneuvering to gain power but also show the Kremlin’s concern about the Russian public’s attitude toward a protracted war. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 21 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and United Russia stated that the recently reported list of top five leaders to represent United Russia in the September 2026 elections is not finalized and that the content and even the format of the list could still significantly change.[9] Meduza’s sources stated that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev could become candidates on the list. Russian outlets recently reported that Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev was on the list, and Meduza’s sources stated that Medvedev is trying to position himself at the top in order to change his image in the eyes of the Russian elite and public away from being seen an “internet troll” in an “obscure position.”[10] Meduza’s sources noted that some Russian officials do not support Medvedev’s inclusion on the list, with Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko reportedly fearful that Medvedev’s inclusion would strengthen Medvedev’s position as a potential successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin threatened by Medvedev possibly replacing him in that role. Meduza sources stated that United Russia will struggle with Medvedev at the top the list due to his “controversial image” and “clearly pro-war” position as the Russian people are “tired of war” and that other war-related figures on the list could exacerbate the perception of United Russia as a “party of war.” A source assessed that the Kremlin political bloc is including people related to the war on the list in order to please Putin, who wants to see war-related figures emerge as the new elite in Russia. A source stated that the list will need to completely change if there is peace or a truce in Ukraine, including possibly to include Dmitriev (likely since he has been leading the Russian negotiating team in peace talks). Meduza’s sources also reported that there are disagreements within the Kremlin about United Russia’s future platform and ideological messaging, with some calling for a platform of self-sacrifice and collectivism while Kiriyenko is advocating for a campaign with “hints at post-war development.” Meduza’s sources largely presented internal debates about the United Russia list as centered around concerns about Russian domestic attitudes about the war, suggesting the Russian inner circle is divided about the wisdom of campaigning on a platform directly or indirectly promoting a protracted war in Ukraine and calling for more sacrifices from the Russian people.

The United States seized another oil tanker involved with shipping sanctioned Russian oil off the coast of Venezuela. US Southern Command reported on January 20 that it seized the Sagitta tanker as part of US President Donald Trump’s quarantine of sanctioned vessels in the Caribbean Sea.[11] The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Sagitta in January 2025 for transporting Russian crude oil.[12] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the vessel sailed under the flag of Guyana as of January 16 and that the tanker exported Russian oil and oil products, including to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India.[13] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the ship has sailed under both the Panamanian and Guyanese flags and that the ship has not turned on its automatic identification systems (AIS) signal since May 11, 2025, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Key Takeaways

US officials will meet with Ukrainian officials on January 21 and 22 and with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 22 to continue peace negotiations.
The Kremlin remains committed to its original war aims and is not publicly showing any new willingness to commit to meaningful compromises to end its war against Ukraine.
Reports of the draft list of the top United Russia candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections have reportedly generated internal Kremlin discussions that not only reflect factional maneuvering to gain power but also show the Kremlin’s concern about the Russian public’s attitude toward a protracted war.
The United States seized another oil tanker involved with shipping sanctioned Russian oil off the coast of Venezuela.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Jan 21 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2026

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Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure cut power to electrical substations powering the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant on January 20, consistent with a recent warning from Ukrainian military intelligence. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi reported on January 20 that military activity damaged several Ukrainian electrical substations vital for nuclear safety at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and cut all power to the NPP — the second time since about January 12 that Russian strikes have damaged substations supporting the Chornobyl NPP.[1] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that engineers have since restored power to the Chornobyl NPP as of January 20.[2] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on January 17 that Russia was planning strikes on electricity transmission substations, which Ukrainian nuclear power plants depend on to operate.[3] Grossi stated on January 16 that IAEA teams had observed military activities or air raid alarms at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine from January 11 to 18.[4]

Russia downplayed the impact of Russian strikes on the Chornobyl NPP even as Russia continues to pose increasing threats to all of Ukraine’s NPPs. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov — who also represents Russia to the IAEA — responded to the Chornobyl NPP power outage by criticizing “attempts to create the impression” that “minor power outages” at NPPs are “fraught with the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe.”[5] Ulyanov claimed that Russia is not deliberately attempting to degrade power supplies to Ukraine’s NPPs and criticized Ukraine for seeking assistance from the IAEA in the aftermath of Russian strikes. Reporting on Ulyanov’s statement, Russian state newswire TASS characterized Ukraine’s condemnations of the strikes as “dramatization,” further diminishing the impact of Russian strikes.[6] Ulyanov claimed that the IAEA’s document on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale states that power outages pose “zero nuclear threat” as justification for his dismissive statements.[7]

Ulyanov is deliberately ignoring the context of this power outage amid the systemic threat and damages that Russia has caused to Ukrainian NPPs throughout the course of the war. The January 20 Russian strike against a substation supporting the Chornobyl NPP was not an isolated incident, as Russia conducts repeat strikes against individual substations and other electricity generation and transmission infrastructure in Ukraine.[8] These repeated strikes significantly raise the possibility of either destroying the infrastructure object or damaging it so seriously that it takes months or years to render operable again. Russian strikes and other military operations have directly impacted Ukrainian NPPs, particularly the Chornobyl NPP. A Russian Shahed drone notably struck the sarcophagus containing the Chornobyl NPP’s melted-down nuclear reactor in February 2025, damaging the containment structure so severely that it could no longer adequately contain the radiation from the reactor without significant repairs.[9] Repeated power outages also strain the ability of NPPs to conduct their base safety functions, as demonstrated by Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP), which has suffered dozens of partial power outages since February 2022.[10] The ZNPP has suffered at least 10 total power outages in its entire operational history, all of which occurred due to Russian military activity since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.[11] Russia has also heavily militarized the ZNPP by storing military equipment next to the ZNPP’s nuclear reactors, stationing military personnel at and around the ZNPP, and launching drones from the ZNPP’s grounds.[12] The Kremlin has continually attempted to portray Ukraine as an unsafe steward of the ZNPP and other nuclear power plants to obfuscate that the greatest threat to Ukrainian nuclear security is not Ukraine but is actually Russia and its continued war.[13] The Kremlin likely seeks to downplay its role in the degradation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and ongoing threat to nuclear security as part of efforts to continue justifying its war effort, including the Russian long-range strike campaign that seeks to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure and deprive Ukrainians of heat in the dead of winter.

Russian missile and drone strikes overnight on January 19 to 20 significantly damaged additional energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 20 that Russian forces launched 18 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles; one Zirkon hypersonic cruise missile; 15 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and 339 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 250 were Shaheds.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 14 Iskander-M/S-300s, 13 Kh-101s, and 315 drones, that five missiles and 24 drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukrainian forces were unable to down the Zirkon hypersonic missile, which struck an infrastructure facility in Vinnytsia Oblast.[15] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes left 173,000 households in Kyiv City without power after restoring power to another 162,000 households that also lost power.[16] Ukraine’s Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes also caused power outages in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Rivne, and Kharkiv oblasts.[17]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukraine received a shipment of air defense missiles on January 18, which significantly supported Ukraine’s capability to down a majority of the Russian drones and missiles in the January 19 to 20 strike.[18] Ihnat noted on January 20 that Ukraine’s shootdown rate for this strike package was relatively high but that the drones and missiles that did breach Ukraine’s air defenses caused extensive damage.[19] Russia has been conducting a long-range strike campaign that purposefully targets Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure and disproportionately impacts civilians throughout the war and has intensified these strikes in recent months.[20] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significant quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling their missiles between strike series in order to launch larger strike packages to maximize damage.[21] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.[22]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to its original war demands against the background of expected peace talks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 20, and falsely accused Ukraine of beginning the war by attacking Russia. Lavrov gave a speech and held a press conference outlining Russia’s foreign policy in 2025 and reiterated Russia’s commitment to addressing the so-called “root causes” of its war in Ukraine.[23] Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined these “root causes” as NATO expansion and alleged discrimination against Russian people, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church (a Kremlin-controlled arm of influence) in Ukraine.[24] Lavrov also reiterated on January 20 the Kremlin’s rejection of any peace deal that does not cede all of “Novorossiya” to Russia and that provides Ukraine with security guarantees from Europe. Novorossiya is an invented region that the Kremlin often claims is “integral” to Russia and includes areas of eastern and southern Ukraine beyond the oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.[25] Lavrov explicitly rejected the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and listed demands inconsistent with terms in the original US-proposed 28-point peace plan, including the demand for territories that go beyond those that Russia has illegally annexed.[26] Lavrov also rejected a possible temporary or permanent ceasefire in Ukraine because Ukraine could “then attack the Russian Federation again” — falsely accusing Ukraine of having attacked Russia in the past, whereas Russia has been the one to initiate all military aggression against Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly demonstrated that Russia will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that does not meet Russia’s uncompromising terms or that only pertains to Ukraine and does not radically restructure NATO.[27] Lavrov’s January 20 statements set conditions for Russia to justify to domestic audiences its rejection of any terms that emerge from talks at the Davos Summit.

Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are increasingly conducting mid-range strikes against Ukraine’s high-value, Western-provided air defenses and rocket launchers. Rubikon posted geolocated footage on January 20 showing a first-person view (FPV) drone striking a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) moving along a road on the night of January 19 to 20 near Novobakhmetieve (northwest of Pokrovsk and roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that the signal and image quality of the footage suggest that Rubikon used a drone leveraging communications with a Starlink system.[29] Rubikon also posted geolocated footage on January 17 of an FPV drone striking the launcher and AN/MPQ-53 radar station of a Patriot air defense system near Berezivka (just southwest of Kharkiv City and roughly 44 kilometers from the front line).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Rubikon used a BM-35 strike drone but disagreed whether Russian forces hit a real Patriot system or a decoy.[31] One milblogger noted that the FPV strike on the Patriot demonstrates how some Russian frontline drones can now fly far beyond Kharkiv City (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline), especially with the help of “mothership drones” (such as Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones) that carry one or more shorter-range drones to areas far from the front line.[32] Russian forces equip Molniya-2 drones with Starlink satellite systems and have long leveraged “mothership” drones that can carry and extend the range of FPV drones, increasing the range and efficiency of Russian drone strikes against Ukraine’s near rear.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are trying to exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to down reconnaissance and strike drones, as electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely insufficient to defend Ukrainian infrastructure and high-value targets from such a geographically pervasive threat.[34]

Ukrainian forces reportedly created a tactical kill zone that denies Russian forces from using vehicles within 20 to 25 kilometers of the front line or using infantry within one kilometer of the front line near Kupyansk — a capability that Ukraine should deepen and expand across the entire theater. A Ukrainian drone unit reported on January 20 that Ukrainian forces created a kill zone using unmanned systems near Kupyansk that can destroy up to 88 percent of Russian forces before they approach Ukrainian positions.[35] The unit reported that unmanned systems deny Russian infantry movement and maneuver within one kilometer of the frontline and deny Russian vehicles and mechanized equipment movement and maneuver within a range equal to or greater than 20 to 25 kilometers from the front line. ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces could likely deny Russian advances and enable Ukrainian counterattacks across the theater if Ukrainian forces can replicate the reported effects achieved in Kupyansk across the entirety of the theater, and at greater operational depths, such that Ukrainian forces deny Russian infantry from maneuvering within even deeper sections of the front line. Ukraine could significantly degrade the effectiveness of Russian infiltration tactics if Ukrainian forces deny Russian forces from operating vehicles within 50 + kilometers of the front line, thereby forcing the Russian infantry to infiltrate greater and untenable distances on foot, for example.

Russian forces are using training missiles to strike ground targets in Ukraine, possibly by equipping them with live warheads. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck ground targets in Ukraine with RM-48U surface-to-air training missiles for the first time on January 19 to 20, which Ukrainian sources characterized as an “ersatz ballistic missile.”[36] RM-48U missiles are decommissioned 5V55 and 48N6 surface-to-air missiles for S-300/400 air defense systems that Russian forces have modified for training purposes. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told The New Voice of Ukraine (NV) that Russia had over 400 RM-48U missiles stockpiled as of December 1, 2025.[37] Ukrainian outlets noted that it is unclear if Russian forces used the decoy version of the RM-48U missile in the January 20 strike or a missile with a live warhead.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted tests of surface-to-surface missiles for the 51P6 launcher of the S-400 system at the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast in October 2023, claiming these missiles have a higher range and accuracy than the “outdated” 5V55 missiles Russia launches at ground targets from the S-300 system.[39] Russia has long used S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles to strike ground targets in Ukraine, particularly against Kharkiv City, and Russia switching to modifying a training missile rather than using existing missiles in stockpiles indicates that Russia may be running low on its S-300 and S-400 missile stockpiles, given their frequent and unconventional usage in Ukraine.[40]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov as the new deputy commander of Ukraine’s Air Force on January 20. Zelensky noted that Yelizarov will assist in integrating a new air defense approach encompassing mobile fire groups, interceptor drones, and other light air defense capabilities.[41] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that Yelizarov will be responsible for developing Ukraine’s drone interception capabilities in order to create an “anti-drone dome” protecting Ukraine.[42] Yelizarov previously served as the commander of the Lasar Group, a Ukrainian National Guard drone unit reportedly responsible for 20 percent of all Ukrainian strikes against Russian tanks.[43]

Key Takeaways

Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure cut power to electrical substations powering the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant on January 20, consistent with a recent warning from Ukrainian military intelligence.
Russia downplayed the impact of Russian strikes on the Chornobyl NPP, even as Russia continues to pose increasing threats to all of Ukraine’s NPPs.
Ulyanov is deliberately ignoring the context of this power outage amid the systemic threat and damages that Russia has caused to Ukrainian NPPs throughout the course of the war.
Russian missile and drone strikes overnight on January 19 to 20 significantly damaged additional energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to its original war demands against the background of expected peace talks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 20, and falsely accused Ukraine of beginning the war by attacking Russia.
Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are increasingly conducting mid-range strikes against Ukraine’s high-value, Western-provided air defenses and rocket launchers.
Ukrainian forces reportedly created a tactical kill zone that denies Russian forces from using vehicles within 20 to 25 kilometers of the front line or using infantry within one kilometer of the front line near Kupyansk — a capability that Ukraine should deepen and expand across the entire theater.
Russian forces are using training missiles to strike ground targets in Ukraine, possibly by equipping them with live warheads.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov as the new deputy commander of Ukraine’s Air Force on January 20.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

read the full Jan 20 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2026

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The Kremlin reportedly established a list of the top five State Duma candidates to represent the Kremlin’s United Russia ruling party in the September 2026 State Duma elections. Three sources told Russian outlet RBK on January 19 that the Russian Presidential Administration’s office and ruling United Russia Party decided on the top five leaders to represent United Russia in the September 2026 State Duma elections: Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Yunarmia Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin, Maryana Lysenko (a prominent Russian doctor who led City Clinical Hospital No. 52 and received the title of Hero of Labor for her work combatting the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia), and Kremlin-coopted and Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny.[1] The candidates in these recurring lists historically have been domestically popular political figures who hold prominent positions in the Russian political sphere, including other senior government posts, and who will likely decline their parliamentary seats in favor of retaining their more powerful or lucrative positions that they currently occupy.

Putin’s reported platforming of hardline pro-war public figures highlights a Kremlin effort to present pro-war figures as the role models who embody Russia’s informal state ideology and political priorities going into 2026. The list is not officially confirmed and is not final. The final unified federal list can contain up to 15 candidates, however the ballot will only list the first five candidates representative of the United Russia Party’s, and thereby Russian President Vladimir Putin’s, political agenda.[2] RBK’s sources indicated that Putin decides on the final list of candidates himself.[3] RBK reported that Medvedev, who frequently represents fringe Kremlin positions and has previously issued veiled and overt nuclear threats aimed at Europe and the United States, will likely rank first on the list.[4]

Medvedev’s position on the list is noteworthy. Medvedev has threatened Europe with language that directly mirrors the Kremlin’s false justifications for its invasion of Ukraine.[5] Medvedev also staunchly continues to support Putin’s war in Ukraine, frequently parroting Kremlin narratives to justify the continuation of the war.[6] Medvedev’s reported position on the United Russia list suggests that Medvedev’s bellicose public statements — including those threating Europe and the United States — are representative of the Kremlin’s promoted messaging, rather than his own idiosyncratic inflammatory remarks. Lavrov similarly is a pro-war ally of Putin, frequently justifying Russia’s war in Ukraine and invoking the ”root causes” of the war (a term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand to mean its original maximalist war justifications and demands).[7] Lavrov recently claimed that a peace settlement to Russia’s war in Ukraine needs to resolve the issue of those living in Novorossiya — an invented region that Kremlin officials often claim is “integral” to Russia and that includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine, including those that Russia has not illegally annexed.[8] The reported list also notably includes a Russian milblogger that was not fully Kremlin-controlled prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – Yevgeny Poddubny. The Kremlin coopted Poddubny in December 2022 and has since used him to disseminate official narratives in the Russian ultranationalist information space.[9] The reported inclusion of Poddubny on the list indicates Putin’s commitment to the continued militarization of Russian society and the preparation of the domestic audience for a protracted war in Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.[10] It is unclear how these five individuals are related to Putin’s announced “Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia ” which Putin stated would be a major focus in 2026.[11] Pro-war politics may in fact supersede the thematic focus over the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026.

The list, if genuine, suggests that Putin is attempting to further cement a pro-war ideological vanguard in Russian political life by platforming public figures who push Putin’s war and larger pro-war political agenda. RBK characterized Lavrov and Medvedev as domestically popular, with sources reportedly claiming that Medvedev is especially popular with the Russian cleavage that prefers “to vote for the government.”[12] RBK similarly amplified Kremlin-controlled domestic polling that positions Lavrov as “one of the most popular politicians in Russia.” The candidates strongly endorse Russia’s war in Ukraine, aggressive and hawkish rhetoric toward Europe, and nationalistic messaging that encourages Russian society to rally around the Kremlin line. The reported list is not indicative of Russian Duma election results, but is noteworthy as it offers Putin an opportunity to publicly define early in the year his political and ideological positions that all Russians should emulate. Most if not all of the five mentioned candidates will likely waive their positions, so the list is a symbolic representation of Putin’s endorsement of their public support of the war, and another indicator that Putin continues to condition Russian society for protracted war against Ukraine and possibly NATO.

Russia reportedly has begun using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with thermobaric artillery launchers to adapt artillery to current drone-dominated battlefield conditions. A Ukrainian-telegram channel published footage on January 19 that shows Russian forces testing the Malvina-M — the first Russian unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) equipped with thermobaric artillery.[13] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on January 19 that Russian engineers integrated 220mm guide rails from the TOS-1A Solntsepek thermobaric artillery system with the Malvina-M UGV.[14] Thermobaric weapons, also known as vacuum or aerosol bombs, are a specialized type of explosive munition that generates a significant overpressure explosion and extreme heat by dispersing and igniting an aerosol cloud of explosives while sucking out the surrounding oxygen.[15] Traditional thermobaric artillery systems are effective in destroying fortified structures such as entrenched infantry positions and bunkers. Russia’s principal thermobaric artillery launcher, the TOS-1A, is a large, expensive, relatively slow-moving vehicle on a tank chassis with a short firing range that requires Russian forces to bring the system within about six kilometers of the frontline, making them highly susceptible to Ukrainian drones. Russia’s integration of thermobaric artillery onto UGV platforms could allow Russian forces to conceal and launch thermobaric artillery much closer to the frontline and mitigate factors that degrade the effectiveness of traditional heavy thermobaric artillery systems.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin reportedly established a list of the top five State Duma candidates to represent the Kremlin’s United Russia ruling party in the September 2026 State Duma elections.
Putin’s reported platforming of hardline pro-war public figures highlights a Kremlin effort to present pro-war figures as the role models who embody Russia’s political priorities going into 2026.
The list, if genuine, suggests that Putin is attempting to further cement a pro-war ideological vanguard in Russian political life by platforming public figures who push Putin’s war and larger pro-war political agenda.
Russia reportedly has begun using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with thermobaric artillery launchers to adapt artillery to current drone-dominated battlefield conditions.
Russian forces have reportedly split the grouping operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area into two tactical groups: the Dzerzhinsk (the Russian name for Toretsk) and Bakhmut tactical groups.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and near Slovyansk.

read the full Jan 19 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2026

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Russian forces are reportedly preparing to conduct long-range strikes against substations powering Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on January 17 that Russia is considering strikes on electricity transmission substations on which Ukrainian nuclear power plants depend to operate.[1] The GUR stated that Russia seeks to disconnect the nuclear power plants from Ukraine’s energy grid, leaving Ukrainian civilians without electricity and heat. Recent Russian strikes have threatened Ukrainian-controlled nuclear power plants. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi reported on January 16 that military activity damaged an electrical substation critical to Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant operations over the past week (roughly since January 12).[2] Grossi stated that IAEA teams have reported military activities or air raid alarms at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine over the past week. Zelensky stated on January 16 that Ukraine needs about 18 gigawatts of power to meet domestic consumption needs in the winter but that Ukraine’s power generation capacity can currently only produce 11 gigawatts of power — a number that would likely decrease significantly should Russian strikes disconnect one or more Ukrainian nuclear power plants from the energy grid.[3]

This warning comes as Russia continues its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, resulting in widespread blackouts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 201 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which 120 were Shahed-type drones —from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City on the night of January 17 to 18.[4] Ukrainian officials indicated that 30 Russian drones struck 15 locations, including critical infrastructure in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia cities and in Odesa Oblast.[5] Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on January 16 that Russian forces have struck every power plant in Ukraine since February 2022 and have inflicted 612 total strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.[6] Shmyhal noted that problems with energy are the most severe in Kyiv City and in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and other frontline oblasts.[7] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Kyiv City only has half the electricity that it needs and called on residents to leave the city if possible.[8] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been attempting to split Ukraine’s energy grid and create energy islands that are cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[9] ISW has also observed reports that Russian forces are striking Ukraine’s energy grid in an effort to divide it into two parts along an east-west divide.[10] Russia’s continued devastating strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure emphasizes Ukraine’s urgent need for additional air defense systems and munitions, particularly amid reports that Russia’s campaign may soon turn toward nuclear power plants in the dead of winter.

Russian state media amplified a Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian politician’s statements to prepare the Russian domestic populace for the Kremlin’s rejection of peace in the near-team amid ongoing US, Ukrainian, and European negotiations. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion — claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on January 18 that “there will be no peace in Ukraine in 2026.”[11] Medvedchuk also reiterated claims that “time is on the Kremlin’s side” and emphasized the Kremlin’s commitment to achieving its original war aims without negotiating with Ukraine. Medvedchuk also reiterated the Kremlin’s longstanding rhetoric falsely framing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a war against the West, claiming that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, and rejecting Ukrainian elections (which the Kremlin itself has demanded to secure a peace deal) on anything but Russia’s terms.[12] Putin and Kremlin officials have repeatedly used these rhetorical lines to emphasize Russia’s commitment to its original war aims and its theory of victory that maintains that the Russian military and economy can outlast Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine — a theory the West can help disprove with support to Ukraine.[13] The Kremlin uses Medvedchuk to make more extreme statements than Putin and Kremlin officials themselves make through a voice claiming to represent Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely using Medvedchuk’s January 18 interview to justify Russia’s rejection of peace efforts to resolve its war in Ukraine. Medvedchuk’s statements come against the backdrop of ongoing US-European Union-Ukraine peace talks to develop a peace plan and the most recent round of Ukraine-US talks in Miami on January 16.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely intends to reject outright any peace proposal that does not acquiesce to Russia’s full demands, including terms that result from the recent negotiations.[15]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are reportedly preparing to conduct long-range strikes against substations powering Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.
This warning comes as Russia continues its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, resulting in widespread blackouts.
Russian state media amplified a Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian politician’s statements to prepare the Russian domestic populace for the Kremlin’s rejection of peace in the near-team amid ongoing US, Ukrainian, and European negotiations.
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Jan 18 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 17, 2026

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US and Ukrainian officials held another round of peace negotiations in Miami, Florida, on January 17.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov, Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, and Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia arrived to the United States to discuss details of a peace agreement with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll on January 17.[2] The outcome of these negotiations is unclear as of this writing, and ISW will continue to monitor reports of US-Ukrainian peace negotiations in the coming days.

European countries appear to be cracking down against oil tankers associated with the shadow fleets of Russia and its allies. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that an unregistered oil tanker claiming to be the Arcusat turned back from a heading between Denmark and Sweden toward German waters to sail north toward Russia’s Arctic coast.[3] Bloomberg reported that prominent shipping organizations did not find a ship linked to the tanker’s claimed registration identity and that the Arcusat originated from a Chinese shipyard and disappeared from records in April 2025. Bloomberg reported that data shows that the Arcusat has sailed under different flags, including the flags of Tanzania and Cameroon. The German Federal Police recently denied the Tavian, another name for the Arcusat, entry into German territorial waters – the first time a European country has turned away a shadow fleet tanker from its territorial waters. The German Federal Police stated that it has recently denied several Russian ships passage through German territorial waters.[4] The Italian Guardia di Finanza and Customs Agency of Brindisi seized on January 17 a Tuvalu-flagged ship illegally carrying 33,000 tons of Russian ferrous material after it sailed from Russian territorial waters in the Black Sea.[5] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that monitoring service data indicates that the detained ship is likely the Turkish-owned bulk carrier Hizer Reis.[6] Commercially available maritime tracking data indicates that the ship stopped at a port in Novorossiysk from November 13 and 16, and monitoring services indicated that the vessel sailed frequently between Turkish and Russian ports.[7] European countries appear to be increasingly cracking down on vessels affiliated with Russia and its allies, whose shadow fleets are often intermingled. Dozens of shadow fleet tankers off the coast of Venezuela have reportedly switched to using Russian flags in recent months, and many shadow fleet vessels with Russian associations are sanctioned for carrying cargo in support of the Iranian regime.[8]

NATO jets scrambled in response to another Russian military aircraft flight close to NATO airspace. NATO Air Command reported that Italian Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets based in Estonia intercepted a Russian Be-200 multirole amphibious aircraft approaching the Baltic Sea during the day on January 16.[9] The January 16 interception is part of a broader pattern of Russian flights close to and violations of NATO airspace, likely intended to gauge NATO responses to Russian aggression.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[11]

Key Takeaways

US and Ukrainian officials held another round of peace negotiations in Miami, Florida on January 17.
European countries appear to be cracking down against oil tankers associated with the shadow fleets of Russia and its allies.
NATO jets scrambled in response to another Russian military aircraft flight close to NATO airspace.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk.

read the full Jan 17 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2026

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Russian milbloggers continue to loudly reject the alternate battlefield reality that Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military commanders are trying to create. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on January 16 and heard reports from the grouping commander, Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev.[1] Kuzovlev claimed that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction seized Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), Podoly, and Kurylivka (both southeast of Kupyansk) in December 2025. Belousov specifically asked if Russian forces are clearing Kupyansk, to which Kuzovlev responded that Russian forces control all areas of Kupyansk and that Ukrainian attempts to break through into the town have been unsuccessful. Belousov’s and Kuzovlev’s claims about Russian control over Kupyansk follow similar claims from Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on January 15 about the seizure of Kupyansk and the imminent seizure of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[2] Senior Russian commanders have been issuing similar exaggerations about Kupyansk since November 2025.[3] Ukrainian forces have largely liberated most of Kupyansk and the surrounding area, however.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is committing to its false claims about the seizure of Kupyansk, despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary.[5]

Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and multiple pro-war ultranationalist milbloggers, vehemently refuted the Russian military command’s repeated false claims about Kupyansk and nearby settlements. Russian milbloggers denied that Russian forces control Kupyansk, Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Podoly, Kurylivka, and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), with some describing the Russian presence in Kupyansk as “several pockets of defense” and a “localized defense.”[6] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that there is video evidence showing a Ukrainian presence within Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[7] The milblogger stated that footage from about one week ago (roughly January 9) shows Russian artillery continuing to fire on Podoly, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claiming on January 4 that Russian forces had seized the settlement.[8] The milblogger stated that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is “in no hurry” to stop sending “embellished” reports to higher-ups, directly citing Belousov’s January 16 meeting with Kuzovlev as an example.

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Western Grouping of Forces stated that Gerasimov’s presentation of a “parallel reality” failed to mention the surrounded Russian soldiers in Kupyansk, who held out “longer than anyone expected” but whom other Russian forces cannot reach.[9] The milblogger noted that only a “handful” of Russian forces have been able to reach Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, but that Ukrainian forces have already destroyed them. The milblogger stated that a group of Russian forces was filming a flag-raising video in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (likely to support Russian officials’ false claims of its seizure in the near future) before Ukrainian forces struck the group. The milblogger noted that the final moments of the video “will not be published anywhere.” The milblogger stated that Russian forces only recently reached Petropavlivka and Podoly but have been unable to gain control over the settlements, despite Russian MoD claims that Russian forces seized them as of November 21 and January 4, respectively.[10]

One Russian milblogger stated in direct response to Belousov’s January 16 meeting that statements about Russian control over Kupyansk are “not only inaccurate” but “do not even come close to reflecting the actual situation on the ground,” as Russian forces have not controlled Kupyansk “for a single day.”[11] Milbloggers widely complained about repeated “failures” in the area and criticized the practice of sending “beautiful reports” alleging Russian advances to higher-ups.[12] Russian milbloggers complained that the Western Grouping of Forces’ practice of “groundlessly” claiming advances is leading to insufficient Russian countermeasures to the Ukrainian offensive to liberate the area, high losses “in the hundreds”, difficulties in unit coordination, and “brutal” assaults.[13]

The Russian military command has displayed a clear pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort that aims to influence US decision-making about ongoing peace negotiations. These Kremlin claims aim to spread the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives or breakthroughs. Kupyansk has become a particular point of neuralgia for the Russian military command, likely due to the fear that the battlefield realities in the area will undermine the narratives about Russia’s military prowess that Putin and senior Russian military commanders have been trying to spread.

Falling Russian oil and gas revenues and Russia’s continued depletion of its liquid reserves will likely complicate Kremlin efforts to fund a protracted war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 15 that Russian oil and gas revenues in 2025 dropped to a five-year low amid declining gas exports due to Western sanctions and falling crude oil prices.[14] The Russian Ministry of Finance stated on January 15 that Russia’s federal budget received a total of 8.48 trillion rubles (roughly $108 billion USD) in oil and gas taxes in 2025, which Bloomberg noted is a decrease of 24 percent compared to 2024.[15] Bloomberg noted that Russia’s federal budget received fewer rubles for each barrel produced and sold in 2025 due to the strengthened ruble. The strengthened ruble increased Russia’s purchasing power on the global market, making parallel imports cheaper amid Western sanctions, but had adverse effects on Russia’s export profits.[16] Russia’s oil and gas revenues accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia’s total federal revenues in 2024 but fell 22 percent year on year in 2025.[17] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in September 2025 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[18]

Russia has also gradually depleted its liquid reserves over the last four years of its war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that Russia has spent more than half of its sovereign wealth fund to bridge the widening gap between revenues and spending and has turned to expensive borrowing that will take years to pay back.[19] The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned investment fund from which Russia pulls money to avoid incurring debt, but Russia has been steadily depleting the fund’s liquid reserve to fund its war, including by selling its gold reserves in late November 2025.[20] Putin has grossly mismanaged Russia’s economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[21] ISW continues to assess that increased Western sanctions on Russia — in tandem with continued Western military support to Ukraine — will likely further impact the Russian economy and Russia’s ability to fund a protracted war.[22]

Insufficient infrastructure investments in Russia’s Far East are likely hurting Russian economic agreements with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that the PRC halted electricity purchases from Russia as of January 1 after Russian export prices rose above domestic Chinese prices for the first time.[23] Kommersant stated that the PRC refused to purchase the minimum contracted volumes under its long-term agreement, despite the contract running through 2037. Kommersant stated that electricity prices in Russia’s Far East have been rising since the beginning of 2026 and that price dynamics indicate that electricity prices could be up to 42 percent higher than in January 2025. Kommersant credited the rising prices to “market liberalization” in the Far East. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged in September 2024, however, that energy shortages in the Far East were holding back industrial and infrastructure projects, and Russian authorities have not maintained energy infrastructure in the region, causing power shortages and rising prices for residents.[24] Years of neglect of the Far East’s infrastructure likely contributed to the shortages and price spikes that led to the PRC halting electricity purchases.

Ukrainian forces are countering recent Russian Shahed strike drone adaptations that allowed Russian forces to target Ukrainian aircraft, highlighting the short offense-defense technological cycle in the war. Ukrainian drone charity Wild Hornets posted footage on January 15 showing Ukrainian forces successfully using a Sting interceptor drone to down a Russian jet powered Shahed (Geran) drone equipped with an R-60 air-to-air missile.[25] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on December 1 that Ukrainian forces downed for the first time a Russian Shahed drone equipped with an R-60 missile meant to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds, and Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed on December 15 that Russian forces modified their Shahed drones with the R-60 missiles.[26] Russian forces have continuously adapted their Shahed drones to maximize their damage potential, including a recent innovation of attaching man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Shaheds to target mobile components of the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[27] Ukrainian and Russian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense technological race throughout the full-scale invasion, and Ukrainian forces have repeatedly innovated new air defense measures to combat modifications to Russia’s long-range strike campaign.[28] ISW continues to assess that Western support for Ukraine’s interceptor drone program is vital not only for Ukraine’s defense against Russian strikes against the frontline and the rear but also for the defense of Europe.[29]

Media reports suggest that a car accident seriously injured Adam Kadyrov, the son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and possible successor, but ISW cannot independently verify these reports. Two unspecified sources told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s North Caucasus service Kavkaz Realii that Adam Kadyrov is unconscious in intensive care at a hospital in Grozny, Republic of Chechnya, following a car accident.[30] A Chechen opposition outlet claimed that Adam Kadyrov’s motorcade encountered an unidentified obstacle and crashed.[31] The outlet cited local reports about a large convoy of vehicles, including ambulances, driving toward the Grozny airport and authorities flying Kadyrov and other victims to Moscow City for medical treatment.[32] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform on January 11 that Ramzan Kadyrov is undergoing inpatient dialysis for kidney failure and is in the process of selecting a new leader of the Republic of Chechnya.[33] Kadyrov previously appointed Adam, who is currently 18 years old, to a senior position within the Chechen government, and ISW has previously observed reports indicating that Kadyrov was likely planning on positioning Adam as his successor.[34]

Ukraine’s European partners announced new aid to support the Ukrainian military and energy grid. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 16 that Finland will provide a military aid package worth 98 million euros (roughly $114 million) to Ukraine and that the contents of the package are classified.[35] Czech President Petr Pavel stated on January 16 that the Czech Republic will provide Ukraine with unspecified combat aircraft capable of downing drones and may also supply early warning systems, including passive radars.[36] United Kingdom Defense Secretary John Healy told Bloomberg on January 15 that the United Kingdom will open a business center in Kyiv City in 2026 to assist defense startups in accelerating sales of air defense systems and drones.[37] The United Kingdom announced on January 16 that it will provide 20 million pounds (roughly $26.7 million) to support repairs to Ukrainian energy infrastructure that intensified Russian strikes have damaged.[38] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported on January 16 that Italy will provide Ukraine with about 80 industrial boilers worth a total of 1.85 million euros (roughly $2.1 million) and with capacities ranging from 550 to 3,000 kilowatts (kW).[39] Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide announced on January 12 that Norway will provide $200 million to Ukraine to restore energy infrastructure, including immediate energy needs and gas procurement.[40]

Key Takeaways

Russian milbloggers continue to loudly reject the alternate battlefield reality that Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military commanders are trying to create.
The Russian military command has displayed a clear pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort that aims to influence US decision-making about ongoing peace negotiations.
Falling Russian oil and gas revenues and Russia’s continued depletion of its liquid reserves will likely complicate Kremlin efforts to fund a protracted war in Ukraine.
Insufficient infrastructure investments in Russia’s Far East are likely hurting Russian economic agreements with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Ukrainian forces are countering recent Russian Shahed strike drone adaptations that allowed Russian forces to target Ukrainian aircraft, highlighting the short offense-defense technological cycle in the war.
Media reports suggest that a car accident seriously injured Adam Kadyrov, the son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and possible successor, but ISW cannot independently verify these reports.
Ukraine’s European partners announced new aid to support the Ukrainian military and energy grid.
Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

read the full Jan 16 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2026

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Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that only pertains to Ukraine and does not radically restructure NATO. Putin claimed on January 15 that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a “direct response” to the West ignoring Russia’s interests by expanding NATO, despite alleged public promises to Russia not to do so.[1] Russia issued ultimatums in late 2021 to NATO that amounted to the destruction of the alliance and required an overhaul of the European security architecture, including demands that NATO roll back to its 1997 borders.[2] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that his demands are greater than those encapsulated in the US-proposed 28-point plan and subsequent peace plans.[3] Putin remains committed to his original war goals from 2021 and 2022, which extend beyond territory and are not limited to Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to forward the false narrative that Ukraine’s defenses are on the verge of collapse, but data on Russian gains since the start of the full-scale invasion demonstrates otherwise. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 15 that the situation is deteriorating for Ukraine every day and that Ukraine’s “corridor for decision-making” is “narrowing,” implying that Ukraine should give in to Russia’s demands now before Ukraine is unable to defend itself and must capitulate in the future.[4] Ukrainian defenses are not on the verge of collapse, however, and Ukrainian forces have been able to prevent Russian forces from militarily achieving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal of subjugating all of Ukraine. At the height of Russian gains in Ukraine in March 2022, Russian forces had seized 26.16 percent of Ukraine. The subsequent Ukrainian counteroffensive to push Russian forces back from Kyiv City and northern Ukraine, however, reduced this to 20.21 percent by the end of April 2022. Russia’s territorial control continued to decrease to 17.84 percent by the end of 2022 following Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives. The extent of Russia’s control over Ukraine stayed relatively constant in 2023, 2024, and 2025. Russian forces controlled between 17.9 and 18.52 percent of Ukraine in 2023 and 2024, and this figure rose to 19.32 percent by the end of 2025. Russian forces have thus occupied an additional 1.5 percent of Ukraine’s territory in the last three years. Russian gains have been marginal and reduced to a foot pace as Russian forces have had to resort to highly attritional infantry-led assaults and have been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield. Russian gains will likely continue to be slow and grinding and are unlikely to lead to a quick collapse of the frontline.

Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to offer demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains to forward the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian military victory is inevitable. Gerasimov claimed on January 15 that Russian forces are advancing in virtually all directions on the front and that Ukrainian attempts to stop Russian advances have been unsuccessful.[5] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized more than 300 square kilometers of territory in the first two weeks of January 2026.[6] ISW has observed evidence indicating that Russian forces increased their presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in only 73.82 square kilometers between December 31 and January 13 — about one-quarter of the gains that Gerasimov claimed.

Gerasimov boasted about the seizure of two small, rural border villages in northern Ukraine as alleged evidence of extensive Russian successes on the battlefield. Gerasimov stated that Russian forces are expanding the buffer zone in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and specifically highlighted the recent seizure of Hrabovske (southwest of Sumy City) and claimed seizure of Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City).[7] The frontline in these areas has been largely dormant for years, and the recent limited Russian cross-border attacks into these small villages in late December 2025 and mid-January 2026 likely aimed to generate informational effects.[8] The Kremlin is trying to portray these small-scale attacks as the opening of a new sector of the front and evidence that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the theater. ISW continues to assess, however, that there are no indications that Russian forces are launching a major ground offensive in these areas.[9]

The Russian military command remains committed to its false claims that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk, despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary. Gerasimov claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces continue to eliminate the surrounded Ukrainian forces on the east back of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[10] Gerasimov claimed that Ukrainian forces have tried to “demonstrate their presence” within Kupyansk, including through flag raisings, since the Russian military command claimed to have seized the town in November 2025.[11] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are engaged in street fighting in Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi (south of Kupyansk) and are completing the seizure of the settlement.[12] Ukrainian forces have largely liberated most of Kupyansk and the surrounding area, however, despite Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claiming on December 29 that Russian forces will complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk in January to February 2026.[13] Ukrainian forces are currently clearing the remaining Russian forces in the town, and President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 22 that only about 80 to 100 Russian servicemembers remained in the settlement.[14] Ukrainian forces have also largely eliminated the Russian presence near Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi, demonstrating the extent of Gerasimov’s exaggerations. ISW only observed evidence on January 8 of Russian forces conducting an infiltration mission into eastern Podoly (just northeast of Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi) and has not observed evidence of a Russian presence in or near Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi since then.[15] Russian milbloggers, including many within the pro-war ultranationalist community, have acknowledged that the Russian military command’s repeated claims about Kupyansk are false.[16] Gerasimov’s January 15 claims are part of a demonstrated Kremlin pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield. These Kremlin efforts aim to spread the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that only pertains to Ukraine and does not radically restructure NATO.
The Kremlin continues to forward the false narrative that Ukraine’s defenses are on the verge of collapse, but data on Russian gains since the start of the full-scale invasion demonstrate otherwise.
Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to offer demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains to forward the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian military victory is inevitable.
The Russian military command remains committed to its false claims that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk, despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary.
Gerasimov’s January 15 claims are part of a demonstrated Kremlin pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield. These Kremlin efforts aim to spread the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Slovyansk, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

read the full Jan 15 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2026

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Russian advances slowed in late December 2025 and early January 2026, likely due to less advantageous winter weather conditions and the end of efforts to meet arbitrary deadlines at the end of the year. ISW observed evidence indicating that Russian forces increased their presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in 276.44 square kilometers of Ukraine between December 1 and 17; 89.05 square kilometers between December 17 and 31; and 73.82 square kilometers between December 31 and January 13. The 7-day moving average of Russian gains in late 2025 peaked on December 1 and 2 and then steadily declined through the end of the year. Russian forces were able to take advantage of poor weather conditions in Fall and early Winter 2025 that hindered Ukrainian drone operations to make relatively faster advances.[1] ISW previously noted, however, that these advantageous weather conditions were not permanent.[2] Russian forces are likely struggling to maintain this faster rate of advance as colder temperatures have set in, complicating Russian forces’ ability to successfully implement their new offensive template that heavily relies on infantry infiltration missions that must traverse dozens of kilometers of territory on foot with limited supplies.[3] Russian forces may also have initially increased their tempo of offensive operations in December 2025 in order to meet demands from the Russian military command to reach certain objectives by the end of the year.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine go beyond the territory that is currently under discussion in the latest peace plans to include all of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Lavrov stated on January 14 that a future peace settlement will need to resolve the “issue of the fate of the people living in Crimea, Novorossiya, and Donbas.”[4] Novorossiya is an invented region that Kremlin officials often claim is “integral” to Russia.[5] Novorossiya includes not only Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, but also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Kremlin officials have repeatedly labelled Odesa City a “Russian” city and publicly discussed “Novorossiya” as a part of the Russian Federation.[6] The US-proposed 28-point peace plan only allowed for Russian occupation of Crimea, all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and the currently occupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, requiring Russia to cede occupied territories outside of these five regions, including in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[7] Lavrov’s January 14 reference to Novorossiya is not a new demand but is further evidence that Russia’s demands are greater than those encapsulated in the original 28-point plan. Lavrov’s statement was likely an attempt to set conditions ahead of a possible upcoming meeting between US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia.[8]

Kremlin officials continue to insist that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe accept Russian demands, rejecting recent US-led peace efforts to find compromises to end the war. Lavrov claimed on January 14 that Russia is willing to negotiate with Europe but dismissed discussions of either a permanent or 60-day ceasefire.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has called for a temporary ceasefire to allow Ukraine to hold elections as a step toward ending Russia’s war.[10] Kremlin officials have repeatedly called for elections in Ukraine, yet Lavrov’s statement is a rejection of the very measures necessary for Ukraine to fulfill these demands.[11] Lavrov also claimed that a ceasefire would allow the West more time to support Ukraine, obfuscating the fact that the Kremlin has been delaying the peace process for months in order to protract the war and achieve Russia’s original war aims through military means.[12]

Russian State Duma deputies similarly dismissed the peace proposals currently under discussion within the US-led peace process. Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik stated that Russia is only open to negotiations with Europe about “something tangible,” “not just meaningless, formal documents,” possibly referring to the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan or agreements on security guarantees currently under discussion within the Coalition of the Willing.[13] Kolesnik stated that Europe must present approaches that Russia can “at least discuss.” Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet reiterated Kremlin statements that foreign troops sent to post-war Ukraine to guarantee a settlement would be “legitimate” targets for the Russian military.[14] Lavrov’s and the Duma deputies’ statements come against the backdrop of reports that four unspecified Duma deputies are going to meet with members of the US Congress to discuss peace talks in the near future.[15] The Kremlin statements continue to demonstrate that Russia is increasingly uninterested in discussing the agreements that have emerged from the peace process that US President Donald Trump has been leading since the presentation of the November 2025 28-point peace plan.
Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 14 that Russian forces seized Komarivka, a border settlement roughly 90 kilometers northwest of Sumy City and about 67 kilometers north of the main Russian salient in northern Sumy Oblast.[16] The Russian MoD claimed that the seizure is part of efforts to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[17] ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the MoD’s claim, and Russian milblogger reporting on the claimed seizure was limited. Select Russian milbloggers mostly amplified the MoD’s claim, with some attributing the alleged seizure to elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]).[18] The Kremlin began in late December 2025 a cognitive warfare campaign using cross-border attacks with the seizure of Hrabovske (southwest of Sumy City and immediately on the international border) and advances into Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City, immediately on the international border).[19] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely aims to portray these limited cross-border attacks as a broad new Russian offensive that reinforces the Kremlin’s narrative that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[20]

Russian forces have still not set conditions for a major ground offensive in northern Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, however, and ISW continues to assess that these cross-border attacks are not part of a major Russian offensive. The frontline near Komarivka has been dormant since 2022, andISW has not observed any indicators that Russian forces have prepared to launch a significant new offensive into Ukraine from the north. Russian forces have not conducted a sustained battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to degrade Ukrainian logistics to defensive positions and to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults along the international border in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, as Russian forces did in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[21] ISW also has not observed indications of a major redeployment of Russian forces to conduct such an offensive. ISW has most often observed reports of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in Kherson Oblast, but elements of its 33rd Motorized Rifle Battalion have reportedly been operating in border areas in northern Ukraine since at least Winter 2024-2025.[22]

The recent Russian cross-border attacks near Hrabovske and Sotnytskyi Kozachok have not resulted in any notable Russian advances since they began on December 20 and 21, indicating that the Russian military command is not redeploying the additional forces that would be needed to conduct a major offensive in the area.[23] The areas that Russian forces have been targeting in these various cross-border attacks are small border villages, and Russian forces have not made significant advances toward any operationally significant objective. The Kremlin will nonetheless likely attempt to portray these limited cross-border attacks against rural villages as part of a broad new Russian offensive in order to reinforce the false narrative that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the theater and that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[24] ISW continues to assess that the frontlines in Ukraine are in no danger of imminent collapse — particularly as the rate of Russian advance has slowed in recent weeks.[25]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted Russia’s partnerships with Venezuela and Iran on January 14 while criticizing the Trump Administration’s recent actions in Venezuela. Lavrov stated on January 14 that Russia remains committed to maintaining strategic relations and agreements with Venezuela and condemned recent US military operations in Venezuela.[26] Lavrov also responded to potential US tariffs against countries doing business with Iran, stating that no third party can change the “fundamental nature of relations” between Russia and Iran. Lavrov claimed that the United States abandoned its principles, showing that the United States is “unreliable” and that its “competitive position” is “steadily deteriorating.” Russia has relied heavily on Iran for weapons supplies and technology, particularly to fuel Russia’s long-range drone strikes against Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion.[27] Russia signed strategic partnership agreements with Iran and Venezuela in January and May 2025, respectively.[28]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved several personnel changes within the Ukrainian government on January 14. The Rada approved former Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov as the new minister of defense on January 14.[29] The Rada also approved former Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal as the new minister of energy and first deputy prime minister.[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 14 that Fedorov will prioritize finding systematic solutions to Ukraine’s mobilization and recruitment problems, increasing Ukrainian air defenses, and auditing defense financing.[31] Zelensky stated that Fedorov will also focus on increasing drone supplies to Ukrainian forces, including by purchasing specialized drones to strike Russian forces at a greater depth from the front.

Polish officials reported that Russia conducted cyberattacks against the Polish energy grid in late December 2025. PolishDeputy Prime Minister and Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski reported on January 13 that Russia launched a cyberattack on Poland’s energy infrastructure at the end of December 2025 that risked causing a blackout in Poland.[32] Polish Energy Minister Milosz Motyka stated that the attack was the largest cyberattack against Poland’s energy infrastructure in recent years, and targeted a thermal power plant and several renewable energy sources across Poland.[33] The Russian cyberattack is likely part of the Kremlin’s ”Phase Zero” campaign aimed at setting political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future war against NATO.[34]

Key Takeaways

Russian advances slowed in late December 2025 and early January 2026, likely due to less advantageous winter weather conditions and the end of efforts to meet arbitrary deadlines at the end of the year.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine go beyond the territory that is currently under discussion in the latest peace plans to include all of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.
Kremlin officials continue to insist that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe accept Russian demands, rejecting recent US-led peace efforts to find compromises to end the war.
Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.
Russian forces have still not set conditions for a major ground offensive in northern Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, however, and ISW continues to assess that these cross-border attacks are not part of a major Russian offensive.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted Russia’s partnerships with Venezuela and Iran on January 14 while criticizing the Trump Administration’s recent actions in Venezuela.
The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved several personnel changes within the Ukrainian government on January 14.
Polish officials reported that Russia conducted cyberattacks against the Polish energy grid in late December 2025.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on January 14.

read the full Jan 14 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2026

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Russian strikes caused significantly more civilian casualties in Ukraine in 2025 compared to previous years. Bloomberg reported on January 12 that a comprehensive assessment by unspecified European governments found that Russian strikes killed roughly 2,400 Ukrainian civilians and injured almost 12,000 in 2025 — nearly a 30 percent increase from 2024.[1] The report noted that Russian strikes killed over 2,000 civilians (about 83 percent of the total 2025 deaths) after US President Donald Trump’s March 2025 phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which they agreed to start talks toward a ceasefire, and that Russian strikes killed over 220 of these civilians after the initial reports about the 28-point peace plan in November 2025. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) similarly reported on January 12 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine killed 2,512 civilians and injured 12,142 in 2025, 31 percent higher than in 2024 and 70 percent higher than in 2023.[2] The UN HRMMU noted that Russian strikes against Ukrainian-controlled areas caused 97 percent of the total civilian casualties in 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Russia conducted its deadliest individual strike of 2025 on November 19 against Ternopil City, which killed at least 28 and injured at least 99.

Russia dramatically increased the size, scale, and destructiveness of its strike packages throughout 2025, which likely contributed to the increase in civilian casualties. Russian forces only launched three strike packages containing over 200 projectiles in 2024, with the largest consisting of 287 projectiles in December 2024.[3] In contrast, Russian forces launched 42 strike packages containing over 300 projectiles in 2025, with the largest comprised of 823 projectiles in September 2025.[4] Bloomberg noted that the European government report found that Russian strikes have killed roughly 15,000 civilians and injured more than 40,000 since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[5] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 13 that Russian forces have launched over 13,300 missiles and 142,300 drones against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.[6] Russia has been able to dramatically increase the size and frequency of its strike packages by scaling up production with support from partners such as North Korea, Iran, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[7] The makeup of Russian strike packages and Russian strike tactics has also increased civilian harm, as ISW previously reported.[8]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 12 to 13 that significantly damaged energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine and hit a postal terminal in Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 18 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk, Bryansk, and Voronezh oblasts and seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 293 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Kacha, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian ballistic missiles targeted Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts and that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-M/S-300 missiles, five Iskander-K missiles, and 240 drones as of 0930 local time on January 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that an unspecified number of missiles and 48 drones struck 24 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, educational, railroad, port, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Donetsk oblasts.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes largely targeted energy generation infrastructure and substations.[11] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes significantly damaged two power facilities in Odesa City, leaving 46,000 families without power.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a postal terminal in Kharkiv Oblast with two missiles and then four drones, killing four civilians.[13] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significant quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling their missiles between strike series in order to launch larger strike packages to maximize damage against Ukraine.[14] Zelensky warned on January 12 that Ukrainian intelligence has information that Russian forces are preparing a new massive drone and missile strike, possibly in the coming days.[15] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are trying to take advantage of the cold weather in Ukraine, likely to maximize the consequences of strikes on the Ukrainian energy grid. Zelensky similarly warned about a new massive Russian strike on the afternoon of January 8, before the Russian Oreshnik ballistic missile strike on Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9.[16]

Ukrainian officials reported on January 12 that Russian drones also struck two vessels in the Black Sea — a Panamanian-flagged civilian vessel waiting to enter the port of Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast, and a San Marino-flagged dry cargo ship that was leaving the port.[17] The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies posted geolocated footage on January 12 showing drone strikes against two cargo ships near Odesa City. Russian milbloggers claimed that Rubikon elements struck the two foreign-flagged ships with BM-35 strike drones.[18] Rubikon elements conducted drone strikes against a Ukrainian helicopter in Poltava Oblast and a transport aircraft in Mykolaiv Oblast in late December 2025, demonstrating how Rubikon is becoming increasingly involved in strikes in the Ukrainian rear.[19]

Russia continues to scale up the production and innovation of inexpensive strike drones that have succeeded in generating favorable battlefield effects for Russian forces. Russianforces have recently begun equipping Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones with Starlink satellite systems, which has dramatically increased their battlefield efficiency.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 13 that Russia has heavily invested in the production of Molniya-2 variants, but reports that Russia spent over $1 billion to produce over 900,000 such drones from January to August 2025 are exaggerated by at least double.[21] Mashovets noted that the Molniya-2 drone is resistant to electronic warfare (EW) jamming, is sometimes equipped with Starlink terminals, and has a favorable price to performance ratio for Russian forces. Russia’s Rubikon Center for Unmanned Technologies began employing Starlink-enabled Molniya-2 variants in December 2025, reportedly increasing the range of this drone variant to over 230 kilometers compared to 50 kilometers (the range of Molinyas operating on a mobile network).[22] Russia has been expanding and scaling drone production and adaptation to support its ongoing efforts to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects across the frontline.[23] Russia’s BAI campaign involves strikes against important logistics targets in the Ukrainian near- and operational-rear, including roads, railways, and bridges, to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain its frontline forces.[24] Russian technological adaptations have facilitated recent Russian advances, and Russia will likely continue to focus on scaling the production of inexpensive drones that have proven effective in the current battlespace.

Russian forces are struggling with other technological aspects of the battlespace, however, including the effectiveness of some guided artillery munitions. Mashovets reported that the current success rate of Russia’s Krasnopol guided artillery munitions was around 50 percent as of November 2025, compared to 66 to 67 percent in 2022 when Russian forces first began widely using Krasnopols, and a peak effectiveness of over 70 percent at an unspecified time.[25] Mashovets noted that there are several variables limiting the effectiveness of this munition on the frontline. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) jamming is responsible for 75 to 80 percent of Krasnopol guidance system failures or guidance system instability. Mashovets noted that Krasnopol crews cannot conduct reconnaissance on the ground under threat of Ukrainian drone strikes, and that drone spotting for Krasnopol strikes is also ineffective and can contribute to premature detonation. Mashovets stated that most munition targeting systems are also not optimized for terrain obstacles, including heavy vegetation and dense urban areas.[26] Mashovets noted that the Krasnopol-D variant can conduct strikes in suboptimal terrain conditions but that the Russian military command heavily restricts the use of these munitions to frontline areas where Russian forces are focusing on offensive operations. Russian forces have sought to improve the Krasnopol munition’s ability to operate under suboptimal weather, terrain, and EW conditions, but Mashovets’ January 13 report indicates that Russia has failed to implement these improvements at the scale necessary to increase the munition’s overall performance in the current battlespace environment.[27]

Western sanctions on aircraft components will likely continue to constrain Russia’s ability to produce military aircraft. Russia plans to significantly replenish the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) in 2026 to both replace losses and further enhance VKS capabilities, but will likely struggle to achieve replenishment or modernization at scale.[28] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated in July 2025 that the Russian government planned to allocate at least 765 billion rubles ($9.6 billion) for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft production from 2026 to about 2031.[29] Mashovets reported on January 13 that the VKS hopes to receive 82 aircraft and 84 helicopters in 2026, including two Tu-169M2 strategic bombers; seven Il-78 aerial refueling aircraft; 47 tactical fighter airframes, including 13 Su-57 steals, two Su-30SM2s, 17 Su-35Ss, and 15 Su-34NVO frontline bombers; 26 training aircraft; 59 attack helicopters, including 20 Ka-52Ms, 34 Mi-28NMs, five Ka-35s, and one land version of the Ka-31 naval military helicopter; and 25 transport and combat helicopters.[30] Russia has struggled to produce, repair, and modernize its military aircraft throughout the war, amid ongoing sanctions, persistent quality issues, and manufacturing delays, however.[31] Russian aircraft also heavily rely on foreign components, which Russia attempts to import in violation of Western sanctions through various smuggling schemes that have high volatility.[32] Mashovets also noted that financial factors and crises in related industries cause great variability in aircraft production speed.[33] Russia will therefore likely struggle to meet these production goals in 2026 amidst ongoing Western sanctions. ISW has previously assessed that Russia may deprioritize the aircraft industry to prioritize other areas of the Russian defense production, such as drones and weapons needed on the battlefield in Ukraine.[34] If Russia does prioritize other sectors of defense production, its ability to fulfill VKS production and replenishment will likely be greatly hindered.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used an unspecified Ukrainian-made missile to strike the Atlant Aero drone production facility in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, on the night of January 12 to 13.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported a fire at the Atlant Aero enterprise, which designs, manufactures, and tests Molniya fixed-wing drones and components for Orion reconnaissance drones. Geolocated footage published on January 13 shows a fire near the drone facility in Taganrog.[36] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that locals speculated that Ukrainian forces also hit the Beriev Aircraft Repair Plant in Taganrog.[37] Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that Russian forces destroyed seven drones over Taganrog and Krasnosulinsky Raion, and that drone debris damaged an industrial facility, residential buildings, gas lines, and vehicles in Taganrog.[38]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, stated on January 12 that a strike caused a fire at the Oryol thermal power plant (TPP) in Oryol City.[39] A Ukrainian source posted footage showing a fire at the Oryol TPP, and Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that the footage of the smoke and bright burning color indicates damage to industrial infrastructure, likely a power unit or an auxiliary system.[40] Militarnyi noted that the Oryol TPP supplies energy to Oryol City and nearby military facilities.

Unidentified drones struck multiple oil tankers off the Russian coast in the Black Sea. Western outlets and Russian opposition sources reported on January 13 that drones struck two oil tankers sailing in the Black Sea toward the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[41] The drones reportedly struck the Kazakh-chartered Matilda tanker and the Delta Harmony, a tanker under the management of the Greek company Delta Tanker.[42] The drone strikes reportedly caused minimal damage to the tankers and caused no injuries. Reuters reported that Delta Tankers stated that earlier reports from industry sources that the strikes hit another of its tankers were untrue, and the Greek company TMS similarly denied reports that drones hit one of its tankers.[43] The actor involved in the drone strikes is unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly dismissed Russian Navy Deputy Commander for Coastal and Ground Forces Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov. Russian sources claimed on January 13 that the Russian MoD removed Akhmedov from his post.[44] Akhmedov previously commanded the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and later the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]).[45] The Russian military command reportedly removed Akhmedov from his command of the 20nd CAA in May 2024 following Russian information space complaints about his command of the highly attritional assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in Winter 2022-2023 as 155th Naval Infantry Brigade commander and additional complaints about his role in a Ukrainian strike against a Russian rear area near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast in Summer 2023 that resulted in significant casualties.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Akhmedov was dismissed from his most recent position due to failed Russian mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya tactical area that resulted in heavy casualties in December 2025.[47] One Russian milblogger claimed that Akhmedov oversaw elements of the 55th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) when they suffered heavy losses in northern Sumy Oblast.[48] Russian forces exploited a tactical breakthrough toward Dobropillya in August 2025 and seized a narrow salient that they failed to hold, and Ukrainian forces have since recaptured much of this territory.[49]

Key Takeaways

Russian strikes caused significantly more civilian casualties in Ukraine in 2025 compared to previous years.
Russia dramatically increased the size, scale, and destructiveness of its strike packages throughout 2025, which likely contributed to the increase in civilian casualties.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 12 to 13 that significantly damaged energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine and hit a postal terminal in Kharkiv Oblast.
Russia continues to scale up the production and innovation of inexpensive strike drones that have succeeded in generating favorable battlefield effects for Russian forces.
Russian forces are struggling with other technological aspects of the battlespace, however, including with the effectiveness of some guided artillery munitions.
Western sanctions on aircraft components will likely continue to constrain Russia’s ability to produce military aircraft.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets.
Unidentified drones struck multiple oil tankers off the Russian coast in the Black Sea.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly dismissed Russian Navy Deputy Commander for Coastal and Ground Forces Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov.
Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Jan 13 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2026

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The Russian people are increasingly feeling the effects of the Kremlin’s continued prioritization of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). In a January 12 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov highlighted Russia’s industrial development growth in 2025, primarily within the Russian DIB.[1] Manturov claimed that investment in the manufacturing sector grew 23 percent or roughly five trillion rubles (roughly $64 billion) in the first nine months of 2025 and that manufacturing industries were growing at the rate of about three percent at the end of 2025 despite recent cooling of the Russian economy. Manturov said that the Russian government’s Industrial Development Fund, which provides low-interest loans to Russian manufacturers, was the main driver of growth in the manufacturing sector. Manturov stated that the Russian DIB employs 3.8 million people, having added an additional 800,000 workers over the last three years. The Russian government has struggled to find financing for its DIB amidst heavy Western sanctions and restrictions and has introduced a series of measures to increase the capital available to the Russian DIB, including through the Industrial Development Fund, off-budget subsidies, and policies strongarming banks into providing preferential lending to defense industrial enterprises.[2] The Russian Central Bank also lowered its key interest rate four times in 2025, likely as part of the Russian government’s efforts to make more capital available for the Russian DIB and to lower the price of borrowing money for DIB producers.[3]

Putin’s prioritization of the Russian DIB is costing the Russian people as Russian banks pass lending pressures from the Russian DIB onto consumers. Russian labor shortages and competition between Russia’s defense and civilian sectors have raised average wages across Russian industries, fueling inflation and causing price spikes.[4] Several major Russian civilian manufacturers have introduced a four-day work week and announced layoffs in the second half of 2025 due to falling demand.[5] Russian civilians are struggling to afford homes, with most Russian commercial housing rates estimated at 20 percent or higher in January 2026.[6] Putin also signed a law in November 2025 increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT), a federal tax imposed on most Russian goods and services domestically, from 20 to 22 percent — placing more of the burden of Russia’s costly war in Ukraine on the Russian people.[7] ISW continues to assess that increased Western economic pressure on Russia, along with helping Ukraine maintain and even increase pressure on the battlefield, remains critical to changing Putin’s calculus and forcing Putin to face more serious tradeoffs between continuing to pursue his maximalist war aims and sacrificing the quality of life of the Russian people.[8]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launched on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City, which is consistent with the available visual evidence.[9] The Russian MoD claimed on January 12 that the Oreshnik IRBM strike against the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant in Lviv City halted operations at the plant.[10] The Russian MoD further claimed that the strike damaged production workshops, drone warehouses, and infrastructure at the plant’s airfield. ISW has not observed confirmation or Ukrainian official reporting about the Russian MoD’s claims of the damage. Geolocated footage published on January 9 of the Oreshnik attack indicated that Russian forces struck in the vicinity of southwestern Lviv City, and OSINT analysts on X (formerly Twitter) and Russian milbloggers assessed that the geolocated footage indicated that Russian forces were targeting the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant.[11]

Dozens of shadow fleet tankers off the coast of Venezuela have reportedly switched to using Russian flags in recent months. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on January 11 that Lloyd’s List Intelligence identified more than 15 tankers involved in shipping sanctioned oil that re-registered as Russian-flagged in the past two weeks (since roughly December 29), and Lloyd’s List editor-in-chief Richard Meade noted that changing flags is likely an attempt to gain protection against raids.[12] The WSJ reported that most of the shadow fleet had sailed until recently under “obscure,” “convenient,” or “bogus” flags from countries like Gabon, Liberia, East Timor, and Malawi. The WSJ noted that S&P Global Market Intelligence reported that 25 tankers switched to the Russian flag from October to December 2025, with 18 switching in December 2025 alone. Sixteen of the tankers are under US or UK sanctions. The BBC reported on January 11 that the UK has identified legal mechanisms to enable the UK military to board and detain vessels transporting sanctioned oil in the shadow fleet that are not legitimately flagged.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky applauded the approach that governments are taking against elements of the shadow fleet.[14]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide weapons and military equipment to Ukraine. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall reported on January 12 that Ukraine will receive its first five Lynx KF41 infantry fighting vehicles from a December 2025 contract as early as the beginning of 2026.[15] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 11 that the UK is developing the Nightfall short-range ballistic missile, with a likely range of more than 500 kilometers, a 200-kilogram warhead, and the ability to operate in areas with heavy electromagnetic interference.[16] The UK MoD reported that Ukrainian forces will be able to launch the missile from a range of vehicles, fire multiple missiles in quick succession, and withdraw quickly. The UK MoD noted that the UK will produce 10 missile systems per month at a maximum price of £800,000 (roughly $1 million) per missile. The UK will award contracts to three enterprises in March 2026 to design, develop, and deliver their first missiles within a year for Ukrainian forces to then test.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 11 that he met with Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi to discuss air defense supplies from Ukraine’s partners.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukraine’s first priority is procuring more missiles for air defense, including through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s long-range drone strikes seek to exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to defend frontline areas and critical infrastructure in the rear in the face of such a geographically pervasive threat.[18]

Key Takeaways

The Russian people are increasingly feeling the effects of the Kremlin’s continued prioritization of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launched on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City, which is consistent with the available visual evidence.
Dozens of shadow fleet tankers off the coast of Venezuela have reportedly switched to using Russian flags in recent months.
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide weapons and military equipment to Ukraine.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on January 12.

read the full Jan 12 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2026

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Russian forces are reportedly fielding a new Geran long-range strike drone variant, the Geran-5, a drone derived from an Iranian interceptor drone design. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 11 that Russian forces used a new Geran-5 strike drone during combined air strikes against Ukraine sometime between January 1 and 11.[1] The GUR reported that the Geran-5 can carry a warhead of about 90 kilograms, has a stated range of about 1,000 kilometers, and has similar components and assembly to other Geran drones. Russia has likely opened a domestic production line for this new type of drone, enabled through an Iranian technology transfer. Russia produces its Geran drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), though it is unclear where Russia could be producing the Geran-5.[2] Russia likely intends to use the Geran-5 to strike aerial targets, rather than only ground targets, potentially augmenting Russian strike packages and air defense capabilities. The GUR reported that Russian forces are developing a way to launch Geran-5 drones from aircraft, including the Su-25 attack aircraft, and to equip the Geran-5s with R-73 air-to-air missiles. The GUR reported that the Geran-5 is based on the Iranian Karrar air-to-air drone, which can also be launched from fighter jets, is equipped with air-to-air missiles, and is part of Iran’s air defense umbrella.[3] Russian forces are increasingly modifying their Shahed/Geran-type drones to target the aerial aspects of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella interceptor drones and fighter jets — likely to augment the damage that Russian long-range strike series inflict on Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian air defense innovations.[4]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 11 that Ukrainian drones struck the Lukoil drilling platforms in the Filanovsky, Graifer, and Korchagin oil fields in the Caspian Sea overnight and are still conducting a battle damage assessment.[5] Geolocated footage published on January 11 shows Ukrainian drones striking drilling platforms in the Filanovsky, Graifer, and Korchagin oil fields.[6] Ukrainian forces have struck oil infrastructure in the Caspian Sea at least five times since December 10, 2025.[7]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are reportedly fielding a new Geran long-range strike drone variant, the Geran-5, a drone derived from an Iranian interceptor drone design.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 10 to 11.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka, and Hulyaipole directions and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full Jan 11 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2026

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Available visual evidence indicates that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City. Geolocated footage published on January 9 of the Oreshnik strike indicates that Russian forces struck in the vicinity of southwestern Lviv City.[1] OSINT analysts on X (formerly Twitter) and Russian milbloggers assessed that the geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces were targeting the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant in southwestern Lviv City.[2] Reuters reported on January 9 that a senior Ukrainian official stated that the Oreshnik struck an unspecified state enterprise in Lviv City, and a Ukrainian source reported on the night of January 8 to 9 that the strike hit the southwestern outskirts of the city.[3] A local Ukrainian Telegram channel and some Russian milbloggers had claimed on January 9 that the missile may have targeted the underground gas storage facility in Stryi, Lviv Oblast, but the sources did not provide evidence of a strike on Stryi, and Ukrainian officials and expert sources denied the claims at the time.[4] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Member Serhiy Nahornyak also stated on January 9 that gas infrastructure in Lviv Oblast was not the target of the strike and that Russian forces struck an unspecified facility that is not connected to gas supplies.[5] A pro-Russian Ukrainian Telegram channel, whose website Ukrainian authorities banned in 2019, was among the first to report that Russian forces may have struck gas infrastructure in Stryi, but amplified on January 10 the geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces had struck southwestern Lviv City.[6] Russian media have notably been amplifying the various reports from the pro-Russian Ukrainian channel about the Oreshnik strike.[7]

Russian officials are explicitly using the recent Oreshnik strike to deter Western states from deploying troops to post-war Ukraine, in line with ISW’s assessment about the purpose of the strike. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, on January 10, on his English-language X account, threatened that Russia could use Oreshnik missiles to strike European or NATO troops that deploy to post-war Ukraine as part of security guarantees.[8] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated on January 9 that Russian retaliation against future “blatant violations of red lines” is “inevitable.”[9] ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine, particularly the deployment of a multinational assurance force, as the Coalition of the Willing is currently discussing.[10]

The United Kingdom (UK) is preparing for the possible deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees in a future peace agreement. The UK government announced on January 9 the allocation of £200 million (about $268 million) to prepare British forces to deploy as part of a multinational force to post-war Ukraine.[11] The funding will go toward upgrading vehicles, communications systems, counter-drone protections, and force-protection equipment. The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that Western security guarantees would be “unacceptable” for Russia and that foreign troops would be “legitimate” targets for the Russian military.[12]

Ukraine continues to collaborate with its Western partners to expand the production of the interceptor drones that are crucial to Ukraine’s ability to down Russian long-range drones on the front and in the rear. UK Defense Minister John Healey announced on January 9 that the UK will begin production of the Ukrainian-designed “Octopus” interceptor drones, which can intercept Russian Shahed-type drones, in January 2025.[13] Healey stated that the UK aims to make thousands of these Octopus drones per month for Ukraine and noted that the production cost of each Octopus drone is less than 10 percent of the cost of the Russian Shahed-type drone. Healey stated that the UK will update the design every six weeks in order to stay ahead of Russian technological adaptations. Russian forces have been increasingly adapting and modifying their Shahed-type drones, including by adding integrated cameras and radio control capabilities that have allowed Russian forces to strike moving targets such as locomotives and by equipping Shaheds with thermobaric warheads and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).[14] Ukrainian and Russian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense race to develop new technologies throughout the full-scale invasion, as Russian forces have escalated their long-range strike campaign and Ukrainian forces have responded by innovating new air defense countermeasures. Russia’s continued efforts to degrade Ukrainian air defenses through constant innovation and adaptation underscore the need for a flexible, well-rounded, and well-provisioned Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an arsenal of interceptor drones. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s ability to field technological adaptations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine’s ability to offset Russia’s quantitative materiel advantages.[15] ISW continues to assess that Western support for Ukraine’s interceptor drone program is vital not only for Ukraine’s defense against Russian strikes against the frontline and the rear but also for the defense of Europe.[16]

Key Takeaways

Available visual evidence indicates that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City.
Russian officials are explicitly using the recent Oreshnik strike to deter Western states from deploying troops to post-war Ukraine, in line with ISW’s assessment about the purpose of the strike.
The United Kingdom (UK) is preparing for the possible deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees in a future peace agreement.
Ukraine continues to collaborate with its Western partners to expand the production of the interceptor drones that are crucial to Ukraine’s ability to down Russian long-range drones on the front and in the rear.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Jan 10 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2026

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Ukrainian and Russian officials confirmed that Russian forces conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9, likely as part of the Kremlin’s reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western support for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a medium-range ballistic missile from the Kapustin Yar test site in Astrakhan Oblast overnight, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Russian forces used an Oreshnik missile.[1] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) posted pictures on January 9 of fragments from the Oreshnik missile in Lviv Oblast and reported that Russian forces launched the missile from Kapustin Yar.[2] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda stated that Ukrainian monitoring channels reported that Russian forces may have used an Oreshnik missile without a warhead, and the BBC’s Russia service similarly assessed that the warhead most likely carried dummy warheads.[3] Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated that the strike marked the first time a Russian ballistic missile struck Lviv Oblast.[4] Russian forces have struck Lviv Oblast with drones and non-ballistic missiles before.[5]

A local Ukrainian Telegram channel and some Russian milbloggers, citing unspecified local Ukrainian Telegram channels, claimed that the missile may have targeted the underground gas storage facility in Stryi, Lviv Oblast, but Ukrainian officials and expert sources denied these claims.[6] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Member Serhiy Nahornyak stated that Lviv Oblast suffered gas supply problems due to the shockwave from the Oreshnik strike, but that the region’s gas infrastructure was not the target of the strike.[7] Nahornyak stated that Russian forces struck a facility that is not connected to gas supplies and that there was no critical damage to gas infrastructure in Lviv Oblast. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov noted that the Oreshnik strike against Lviv Oblast pierced two floors and burned an archive housing documents in a basement, and that Russian claims about a deep strike penetrating dozens of meters into the ground are unrealistic.[8] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the Oreshnik with a conventional warhead could not have damaged the underground gas storage facility, as the facility is hundreds of meters underground and would require either a nuclear weapon or an extremely powerful “seismic” impact to cause even partial damage.[9] Another Russian milblogger noted that the available footage of the strike does not show the “expected” explosion.[10]

The Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine. The Russian MoD attempted to justify the strike as a response to the claimed Ukrainian drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Valdai, Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29.[11] Western media outlets reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) found that there was no attempted strike against Putin’s residence, however, in line with ISW’s assessment.[12] The Oreshnik strike was likely instead part of Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling and aimed to scare Western countries from providing military support to Ukraine, particularly from deploying forces to Ukraine as part of a peace agreement. The Coalition of the Willing has recently been working to finalize the details of security guarantees for post-war Ukraine, including the deployment of a multinational assurance force to Ukraine.[13] The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that such Western security guarantees would be “unacceptable” for Russia and that foreign troops would be “legitimate” targets for the Russian military.[14] The use of a nuclear-capable missile with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload targeting far-western Ukraine was likely meant to threaten the Coalition of the Willing and deter such troop deployments, which would likely enter Ukraine from the west and could potentially operate away from the front line in western Ukraine. Putin framed Russia’s first use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine in November 2024 as a direct response to Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes against military objects in Russia, demonstrating how Russia has used the Oreshnik to conduct performative strikes in the past to discourage Western military support for Ukraine.[15]

Russian forces conducted a long-range combined drone and missile strike on the night of January 8 to 9 that resulted in massive power outages, particularly in Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast, 22 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, and one medium-range ballistic missile from the Kapustin Yar test site in Astrakhan Oblast.[16] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 242 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 150 were Shahed drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 226 drones, eight Iskander-M/S-400 missiles, and 10 Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 18 missiles and 16 drones struck 19 locations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged critical, residential, educational, and transport infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that four people in Kyiv City died, and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that the strikes injured at least 25 people.[18] Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike against rescue workers responding to an initial strike against residential buildings in Kyiv City.[19] Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows a damaged ambulance in Kyiv City.[20] Zelensky noted that Russian drones damaged the Qatari Embassy in Kyiv City, which the embassy later confirmed.[21] Ukrainian officials reported that two Iskander-M missiles also struck civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, injuring at least 23 and killing one.[22] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast during the day on January 9, damaging two civilian vessels.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes significantly damaged electricity transmission systems and power generation infrastructure, leaving at least 500,000 consumers in Kyiv City and 3,000 in Chernihiv Oblast without power.[24] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Ukrainian authorities restored power to over one million people in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast after the Russian strikes on the night of January 7 to 8, but that over 34,000 people in the region remain without power as of the morning of January 9.[25]

The US Navy seized another oil tanker with links to Russia that was attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil. US Southern Command reported on January 9 that the US Navy and Department of Homeland Security boarded and seized the Olina oil tanker in the Caribbean Sea.[26] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the Olina has the same unique ship identifying number as the Minerva M, which the United States sanctioned in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[27] The WSJ reported that the Olina loaded 700,000 barrels of crude oil from a Venezuelan terminal on December 24, 2025. The Olina previously sailed under a Panamanian flag, and the international shipping registry listed the tanker as having an invalid registration for flying a false flag of Timor-Leste.[28] The ship last transmitted its position in mid-November 2025 near Venezuela.[29]

Multiple oil tankers operating near Venezuela have reregistered under Russian flags in recent weeks. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 9 that a sanctioned oil tanker leaving Venezuela, the Veronica, recently changed its name to Galileo and its flag to Russia this week in an effort to evade US Coast Guard boarding attempts.[30] The NYT reported on January 7, citing the official Russian vessel registry, that five oil tankers operating in Venezuelan waters in recent weeks — all under US sanctions for shipping either Russian or Iranian oil — recently switched to Russian flags and declared home ports in Sochi or Taganrog, Russia.[31] The Russian Ministry of Transport also authorized the Bella-1, which the United States seized on January 7, to fly under the Russian flag as of December 24.[32]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian and Russian officials confirmed that Russian forces conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9, likely as part of the Kremlin’s reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western support for Ukraine.
The Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a long-range combined drone and missile strike on the night of January 8 to 9 that resulted in massive power outages, particularly in Kyiv Oblast.
The US Navy seized another oil tanker with links to Russia that was attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Jan 9 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2026

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Preliminary unconfirmed reports suggested that Russian forces may have conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8, but Ukrainian officials have not yet confirmed these reports. The Ukrainian Air Force issued a missile alert in all of Ukraine around 23:30 local time due to the threat of a Russian ballistic missile launch from Kapustin Yar (where Russia reportedly stores Oreshnik missiles and the alleged launch site of the first Russian Oreshnik strike against Ukraine in November 2024) and noted explosions in Lviv Oblast.[1] The BBC’s Ukrainian service stated that unofficial monitoring channels reported launch activity at the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast.[2] Ukrainian outlets and X (formerly Twitter) accounts noted that Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channels suggested that Russian forces may have conducted an Oreshnik strike.[3] A Ukrainian Telegram source posted footage reportedly showing multiple strikes in quick succession, which may be showing Oreshnik’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that an Oreshnik struck the gas field and storage facility near Stryi, Lviv Oblast.[5] Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated that there was a series of powerful explosions in the city in the evening, and Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maksym Kozytskyi stated that Russian forces struck an unspecified critical infrastructure facility in the region.[6] Sadovyi later reported that it is currently unknown if Russian forces used an Oreshnik against Lviv Oblast.[7] ISW cannot independently verify if the strike against Lviv Oblast was an Oreshnik strike.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had warned on the afternoon of January 8 about a possible “new massive Russian strike” on the night of January 8 to 9.[8] The US Embassy in Kyiv City reported on January 8 that it received information about a potentially significant air strike “over the next several days.”[9] Russian forces have only conducted one other known strike with the Oreshnik, which struck Dnipro City on November 21, 2024, as part of a larger missile strike against the city’s critical infrastructure and industrial enterprises.[10] The Kremlin has leaned on the November 2024 Oreshnik strike and subsequent threats to use the Oreshnik against Ukraine as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at discouraging Western support for Ukraine and has intensified efforts to threaten the West with Oreshniks since Fall 2025.[11]

The Kremlin again explicitly rejected the security guarantees for Ukraine that the United States and Europe are currently finalizing with Ukraine as part of a peace agreement. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded on January 8 to the Coalition of the Willing’s recent efforts to finalize the details about a multinational force deployment to Ukraine in order to guarantee a future ceasefire, which Zakharova labeled as “militaristic declarations” from an “axis of war.”[12] Zakharova stated that Russia will consider Western military deployments to Ukraine as a “foreign intervention” that will pose a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and as “legitimate combat targets” for the Russian military. Zakharova reiterated Kremlin calls for any future peace agreement to address the war’s alleged “root causes” and to include stipulations on Ukrainian neutrality, “demilitarization” (reductions in the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), “denazification” (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government), and protections for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine — Russia’s original stated war aims from 2022. Zakharova also called for an agreement to recognize the “territorial realities” that resulted from Russia’s sham and illegal referendums in 2014 and 2022 — referring to Kremlin demands for recognition of illegally annexed Crimea and all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of the Russian Federation. Zakharova’s January 8 statements are the latest in a string of Kremlin statements rejecting the peace plan that Ukraine, the United States, and Europe are currently discussing, particularly provisions on security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.[13]

The owner of the Russian-flagged Bella-1 oil tanker that the US Coast Guard seized on January 7 is reportedly affiliated with Russian efforts to evade sanctions against the Venezuelan oil sector. The United States had previously sanctioned the owner of the Bella-1 for cooperating with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IGRC-QF), but the tanker re-registered as the Marinera under the ownership of Russian company Burevestmarine in late December 2025.[14] Russian businessman Ilya Bugai owns and directs Burevestmarine, which Bugai registered in July 2025.[15] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on January 8 that Bugai is also the CEO of Rusneftekhimtorg, which former Odesa City Councilmember Viktor Baransky (a pro-Russian politician whose citizenship Ukraine stripped in 2024) owns.[16] Baransky is linked to the Fides Ship Management LLC and Rustanker LLC, both of which the United States sanctioned in 2021 for violating US sanctions against Venezuelan oil.[17] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported in December 2024 that some entities of Baransky’s group of companies, the Palmira Group, participated in sanctions evasion schemes to transport Venezuelan and Russian oil and Iranian goods.[18]

Russia appears to be attempting to distance itself from the Bella-1 oil tanker even as it seeks to protect other likely shadow fleet vessels. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published on January 8 another response to the US seizure of the Bella-1 that rejected US assertions that the Bella-1 had been flying under a false flag and aimed to circumvent sanctions against Venezuela.[19] The Russian MFA condemned the seizure of the Bella-1 and claimed that US and Western sanctions against Venezuelan oil are illegitimate.[20] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia had granted the vessel “temporary permission” to fly a Russian flag as of late December 2025, notably refraining from describing the Bella-1 as a Russian vessel despite its new registration under a Russian company. The MFA briefly acknowledged that the Bella-1 had been en route to an unspecified Russian port at the time of the seizure. The New York Times reported on January 6 and 8, citing the official Russian vessel registry, that five oil tankers operating in Venezuelan waters in recent weeks — all under US sanctions for shipping either Russian or Iranian oil — have switched to Russian flags and declared home ports in Sochi or Taganrog, Russia, in recent days.[21]

The Russian military command reportedly continues to create new military units and formations but will likely struggle to staff them to their full doctrinal end strength. John Hardie, the deputy director of the Russia program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, reported on January 7 that Russian milblogger accounts and military recruitment sites are recruiting for the 1244th Guards Artillery Brigade, a reserve unit of the 31st Combined Arms Army (CAA), possibly located in Tver Oblast.[22] Hardie noted that the Russian military command is reportedly going to equip the brigade with self-propelled guns, Giatsint-B and D-30 towed howitzers, and Uragan and Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and will equip the brigade’s reconnaissance-strike battalion with Orlan-10/30, Zala, and Supercam reconnaissance drones and Lancet loitering munitions.[23] It is unclear in which military district the 31st CAA will operate.

Hardie also stated that the Russian military command formed the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade in the Leningrad Military District (LMD).[24] Hardie noted that elements of the brigade marched in the May 2025 Victory Day parade in Luga, Leningrad Oblast and that the Kurgan Oblast government in February 2025 confirmed the existence of the brigade, which reportedly includes many residents from Kurgan Oblast.[25] Hardie assessed that the 76th Artillery Brigade may be the brigade that Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov referenced in his December 18 speech when announcing the formation of an artillery brigade in 2025.[26] Hardie also amplified a Russian social media post from October 2025 claiming that the brigade was operating in the “Chernihiv direction” and a letter from the unit’s commander from December 2025 stating that the brigade is engaged in the ”counterterrorism” zone, likely referring to oblasts along the Russian-Ukrainian border.[27] Leaked Russian documents that Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative published in October 2025 further list the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade as operating in the Bryansk direction.[28]

Hardie additionally reported that Russian media outlets and social media posts indicate that the Russian military command is creating the 34th Artillery Division in the Moscow Military District (MMD), including its 273rd and 303rd artillery brigades.[29] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets first reported in January 2024 on the problems the Russian military command was facing in meeting its deadline to create the 34th Artillery Division by late February 2024.[30] The creation of the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 34th Artillery Division may be part of then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s military reforms from late 2022 and late 2023 to reconstitute the LMD and MMD.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely struggling to build out its strategic reserve to staff new units and formations due to high losses in Ukraine, and the Russian military command will likely similarly struggle to staff the new units and formations at their doctrinal end strength.[32] The new units and formations will likely, in reality, be much smaller, particularly as fighting continues in Ukraine.

The United Kingdom provided Ukraine with air defense systems amidst Russia’s escalating long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure. UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Al Carns reported on January 6 that the United Kingdom delivered 13 Raven air defense systems and two prototype Gravehawk air defense systems to Ukraine and that the first batch of the remaining 15 contracted Gravehawk systems will arrive to Ukraine at an unspecified date in the near future.[33] Russia’s long-range missile and drone strikes seek to exploit Ukraine’s insufficient quantity of air defense systems to protect both the front and rear, and British provisions will help create a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella.

Key Takeaways

Preliminary unconfirmed reports suggested that Russian forces may have conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8, but Ukrainian officials have not yet confirmed these reports.
The Kremlin again explicitly rejected the security guarantees for Ukraine that the United States and Europe are currently finalizing with Ukraine as part of a peace agreement.
The owner of the Russian-flagged Bella-1 oil tanker that the US Coast Guard seized on January 7 is reportedly affiliated with Russian efforts to evade sanctions against the Venezuelan oil sector.
Russia appears to be attempting to distance itself from the Bella-1 oil tanker even as it seeks to protect other likely shadow fleet vessels.
The Russian military command reportedly continues to create new military units and formations but will likely struggle to staff them to their full doctrinal end strength.
The United Kingdom provided Ukraine with air defense systems amidst Russia’s escalating long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure.
Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

read the full Jan 8 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2026

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The US Coast Guard seized two oil tankers with links to Russia for attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil. US officials confirmed on January 7 that US Coast Guard forces boarded and seized the Bella-1, also known as the Marinera, and the M/T Sophia oil tankers in the North Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, respectively.[1] US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem stated that both vessels had either last docked in Venezuela or were en route to Venezuela at the time of the US operations.[2] The Bella-1 appears to have been about 300 kilometers south of Iceland when US forces boarded the vessel.[3] The Bella-1 was reportedly not transporting any oil, and the M/T Sophia was reportedly transporting about 1.8 to 2 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil when US forces detained the vessels. A US official told Western media outlets that Russia deployed a submarine and other naval assets to escort the Bella-1 before the US operation to seize the vessel.[4] The Bella-1 is linked to Louis Marine Shipholding Enterprises S.A, which the United States sanctioned in 2024 for carrying cargo in support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF).[5] The Bella-1 previously flew a Panamanian flag, but the Russian Ministry of Transport stated on January 7 that it authorized the Bella-1 to fly the Russian flag under the name Marinera as of December 24.[6] The M/T Sophia is linked to Sunne Co Limited, which the United States sanctioned in January 2025 for participating in the Russian economy and shipping Russian crude oil sold for well above the $60 per barrel price cap on Russian oil in violation of US sanctions.[7] White House Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that the United States was carrying out a court order for the detention of the Bella-1 and arrest of its crew and will bring its crew to the United States for prosecution.[8] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that it is closely monitoring the situation regarding the US seizure of the Bella-1 and acknowledged that Russian citizens were among its crew.[9] The Russian MFA called for the United States to treat the Russian citizens well and to “not impede their speedy return” to Russia.[10]

US, Ukrainian, and Coalition of the Willing officials continued talks in Paris on January 7, and details of the potential security guarantees for Ukraine are beginning to emerge. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 7 that he met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner as part of continuing negotiations.[11] Newly-appointed Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 7 that the negotiations achieved “tangible results” but that he cannot disclose further details.[12] Zelensky summarized, on January 6, details of the Coalition of the Willing decisions thus far regarding a post-war multinational force and ceasefire monitoring mechanisms in Ukraine.[13] Zelensky stated that the states determined the countries that will take the lead in guaranteeing a ceasefire on the ground, in the sea, and in the sky, as well as in reconstructing Ukraine; and the command and control structure of a multinational force that would deploy to Ukraine. The technical details of this arrangement are not public as of this writing. Zelensky stated that the coalition states still need to work out the monitoring mechanism itself and the size and components of the post-war Ukrainian military. Zelensky stated that Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and France determined the deployment, quantity, weapons, and components of the militaries necessary for a multinational peacekeeping force. Ukraine, France, and the United Kingdom signed a declaration of intent on January 6 stating that France and the United Kingdom intend to deploy armed forces to Ukraine as part of a multinational force; involve the multinational force in deterrence operations in the land, sea, and air; help construct, protect, and use facilities for material, weapons, military equipment, and strategic reserves in Ukraine; and create a negotiating group to form an international agreement with other Coalition of the Willing member states.[14] European leaders indicated that Belgium will contribute to coalition obligations in the sea and air and will also support training Ukrainian forces; that Sweden is willing to provide Gripen fighter jets for aerial surveillance, maritime resources for Black Sea demining, and to train Ukrainian forces; and that Germany, Spain, and Lithuania may deploy ground forces to Ukraine after the war as part of the multinational force.[15]

Zelensky also indicated that there was progress in “bilateral security guarantees” and “trilateral” documents, possibly referring to US-Ukrainian security guarantees and US-Ukraine-Russia peace agreements, and that he expects to sign these documents in the near future.[16] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and the United States still need to work out territorial issues and control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), however, and that he may discuss these issues with US President Donald Trump directly if the US and Ukrainian delegations do not make further progress in negotiations.

Russian forces are likely unable to simultaneously replace losses suffered in Ukraine and build out their strategic reserves. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 7 that the Russian military command only formed four new divisions out of 17 maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades that Russia had planned to form in 2025.[17] These divisions are the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], LMD), the 55th Naval Infantry Division (formerly 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, Pacific Fleet), and the 120th Naval Infantry Division (formerly 336th Naval Infantry Regiment, Baltic Fleet), and are likely not staffed at their doctrinal end strength. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have abandoned forming motorized rifle divisions according to prewar structures in favor of forming assault infantry- and light vehicle-heavy divisions that field limited armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and trucks with minimal organic air defense, artillery, and logistics elements.[18] The Russian inability to form divisions to the pre-2022 template for mechanized divisions is consistent with ISW’s assessment that wartime equipment losses, insufficient AFV production, and tactical shifts favoring massed infantry assaults and infiltration missions over mechanized assaults have resulted in Russian forces optimizing for positional warfare.[19] Mashovets also assessed that Russian forces are unlikely to generate a surplus of over 70,000 troops in 2026 to generate a strategic reserve, a number insufficient to form the planned 17 maneuver divisions.[20] Then-Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on December 27 that Russia has not yet developed a strategic reserve to its desired capabilities as it “constantly” activates its operational reserve to support ongoing combat operations in Ukraine.[21] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces suffered about 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for a daily average of 1,141 casualties, roughly the loss of a division’s worth of personnel every 10 days.[22] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will likely suffer increased casualties in 2026 while storming increasingly fortified Ukrainian positions, including Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[23]

Key Takeaways

The US Coast Guard seized two oil tankers with links to Russia for attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil.
US, Ukrainian, and Coalition of the Willing officials continued talks in Paris on January 7, and details of the potential security guarantees for Ukraine are beginning to emerge.
Russian forces are likely unable to simultaneously replace losses suffered in Ukraine and build out their strategic reserves.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Hulyaipole direction.

read the full Jan 7 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2026

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Ukrainian forces continued their long range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on January 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the 100th Arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Neya, Kostroma Oblast.[1] Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian media outlets that the strike caused secondary explosions of ammunition.[2] The sources added that the arsenal supplied ammunition depots in the Russian Central and Moscow military districts. Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows a smoke plume near the arsenal.[3] Kostroma Oblast Governor Sergei Sitnikov claimed on January 6 that falling drone fragments started a fire at an unspecified military base in Neysky Raion, and announced the opening of an evacuation point for residents of southern Neya.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Gerkon Plus oil depot near Streletskie Khutora, Usmansky Okrug, Lipetsk Oblast, starting a fire.[5] Sources within the SBU told Ukrainian media outlets that the depot supplies oil to Tambov, Voronezh, and Lipetsk oblasts.[6] Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows a fire at the depot.[7] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on January 6 that falling drone fragments started a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in Usmansky Okrug.[8]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with leaders of states in the Coalition of the Willing in Paris on January 6 to discuss possible security guarantees for post-war Ukraine. The Coalition of the Willing issued a statement reiterating that ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and lasting security will be an “integral” part of a future peace agreement.[9] The coalition stated that it is ready to commit to politically and legally binding guarantees that will activate upon the start of a ceasefire. The guarantees will include a US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; the long term military assistance and armament of Ukraine; a multinational force to support deterrence measures in the air, at sea, and on land; binding commitments to support Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian aggression, including the use of military capabilities, intelligence and logistics support, diplomatic initiatives, and the implementation of additional sanctions on Russia; and deepening long-term defense cooperation with Ukraine, including joint training and defense industrial production. Kremlin officials have repeatedly labelled such Western security guarantees for Ukraine, particularly the deployment of foreign troops, as “unacceptable” to Russia.[10]

A German military document reportedly describes how Russia is using covert attacks against German infrastructure to prepare for a potential Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war in the future, in line with ISW’s ongoing assessments. Western outlets reported in late December 2025 and early January 2026 that a German military document states that Russia is intensifying its covert attacks on key German infrastructure, likely as possible preparation for a wider conflict.[11] The document reportedly also frames Russian cyber operations and influence campaigns as preparation for a military confrontation. The document further notes that Germany expects Russia to target German energy and defense infrastructure early, given Germany’s role as a NATO hub for moving and sustaining forces and forecasts that Russia will see Germany as a priority target for long range missile strikes, armed drones, and special forces after an open armed attack on NATO’s eastern flank. The document presents an assessment that Russia will develop these capabilities and “strategic options” by 2029 at the latest, even if Russia’s war against Ukraine continues unchanged. ISW continues to assess that Russia would likely be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many Western estimates, particularly in the event of a future ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russian forces and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute.[12] Russian covert attacks against German infrastructure are likely a line of effort within Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[13]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces continued their long range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on January 5 to 6.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with leaders of states in the Coalition of the Willing in Paris on January 6 to discuss possible security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.
A German military document reportedly describes how Russia is using covert attacks against German infrastructure to prepare for a potential Russia-NATO war in the future, in line with ISW’s ongoing assessments.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk and Hulyaipole directions.

read the full Jan 6 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2026

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Russia is modifying its Shahed long-range strike drones to target Ukrainian aircraft as part of a wider effort to innovate and maximize long-range drone capabilities. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov published images and footage on January 4 showing a downed Shahed drone equipped with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), likely a Verba MANPADS, operating as a remotely launched short range air defense system. Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces fielded the modified drones for the first time overnight on January 3 to 4.[1] The footage indicates that Russia mounted the Verba MANPADS on the top of the drone and mounted an antenna for remote control on the wing stabilizer. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces also modified the Shahed with a camera and a radio modem, allowing the drone operator to control the drone as it flies. The MANPADS are positioned to fire in front of the drone as it flies, indicating that Russian forces likely intend to use this adaptation to target Ukrainian fighter jets and helicopters operating as part of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella. Verba MANPADS have an operational range of roughly six kilometers and a maximum altitude of trajectory of about 4.5 kilometers when fired from the ground.[2] Russian forces have continuously innovated modifications to Shahed drones throughout the war to maximize capabilities and damage potential. Previous modifications have allowed Russian forces to target mobile components of the Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including Ukrainian mobile target groups on the ground and aircraft in the air.[3] Russian forces previously equipped Shahed drones with other air-to-air weapons as part of the effort to degrade Ukrainian air defenses.[4]

Ukrainian and Russian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense race since 2022 to develop new technology, as Russian forces have escalated their long-range strike campaign and Ukrainian forces have responded by innovating new air defense measures to combat the strikes.[5] Ukrainian drones have developed interceptor drones capable of downing Russian drones.[6] The MANPADS on the Shahed drones are front-facing, leaving the drones vulnerable to Ukrainian interceptor drones that approach Russian drones from behind. Russia’s continued efforts to degrade Ukrainian air defenses through constant innovation and adaptation underscore the need for a flexible, well-rounded, and well-provisioned Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an arsenal of interceptor drones.

Russian forces struck a hospital in Kyiv City and an American-owned enterprise in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during missile and long-range drone strikes overnight on January 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts and 165 Shahed, Gerbera, and other types of long-range strike drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities, and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[7] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 137 drones and that 26 Russian drones struck 10 locations. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows the Medikom Medical Center burning in Kyiv City following a Russian drone strike.[8] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against the medical center in Kyiv City killed at least one patient and injured at least three others, and that there were about 70 patients at the facility at the time of the strike.[9] Additional geolocated footage published on January 5 shows a drone strike and explosion at an American-owned vegetable oil enterprise in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials corroborated reports of a strike against the enterprise and reported that the strike spilled 300 metric tons of vegetable oil.[11] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck energy infrastructure in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on January 5. Zelensky signed a decree on January 5 appointing Major General Yevheniy Khmara, head of the Alpha Special Operations Center of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), as acting head of the SBU.[13] SBU Head Lieutenant General Vasyl Malyuk announced his resignation on January 5 but stated that he will remain in the SBU to direct asymmetric operations.[14] Zelensky stated on January 5 that he and Malyuk discussed potential candidates to head the SBU permanently.[15]

European authorities are investigating deliberate damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea for the second time since December 31. Lithuanian National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkauskas stated on January 5 that Lithuanian and Latvian authorities are investigating deliberate damage to an undersea optics cable in the Baltic Sea that occurred on the evening of January 2.[16] Vitkauskas stated that authorities are currently investigating an unspecified ship and its crew, currently docked in the port of Liepaja, but did not name the ship or its affiliation or attribute the damage to a specific actor. Finnish and Estonian authorities reported damage to an undersea communications cable between Estonia and Finland due to deliberate cutting on December 31 and detained the crew of the Fitburg, a ship carrying sanctioned Russian steel products from St. Petersburg, under suspicion of cutting the cables, but have not yet attributed a specific actor to the incident.[17] The December 31 and January 2 undersea cable incidents come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[18]

Key Takeaways

Russia is modifying its Shahed long-range strike drones to target Ukrainian aircraft as part of a wider effort to innovate and maximize long-range drone capabilities.
Russian forces struck a hospital in Kyiv City and an American-owned enterprise in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during missile and long-range drone strikes overnight on January 4 to 5.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on January 5.
European authorities are investigating deliberate damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea for the second time since December 31.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Jan 5 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2026

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Russian officials continue to respond to the US military operation in Venezuela, but the response from senior Kremlin decisionmakers remains relatively muted. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Belarusian Foreign Minister Mikhail Ryzhenkov discussed the US operation in Venezuela during a phone call on January 3 and issued a joint, boilerplate condemnation of US actions and called for the United States to return Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife to Venezuela.[1] Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev heavily criticized the US military operation in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS, accusing US President Donald Trump of violating international laws and expressing Russia’s support for Maduro.[2] Medvedev also used the US operation to seize Maduro in order to threaten German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[3] Russian State Duma deputies also criticized the US operation, claiming that the United States rejects the sovereignty of states in the Western Hemisphere and aims to establish control over Venezuelan oil reserves.[4] The Kremlin’s response to the US operation in Venezuela has been boilerplate thus far.[5] The Kremlin will likely have to balance its responses between maintaining its credibility as a partner to other states with its continued efforts to cater to the Trump administration.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Ukrainian State Border Guard Service First Deputy Head Major General Valeriy Vavrynyuk as acting head of the State Border Guard Service on January 4.[6]

Key Takeaways

Russian officials continue to respond to the US military operation in Venezuela, but the response from senior Kremlin decisionmakers remains relatively muted.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Ukrainian State Border Guard Service First Deputy Head Major General Valeriy Vavrynyuk as acting head of the State Border Guard Service on January 4.
Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Jan 4 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2026

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The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a boilerplate response condemning the US military operation against Venezuela on January 3. The Russian MFA condemned the US operation and reaffirmed Russia’s support for the Venezuelan leadership’s policies to protect Venezuelan national interests.[1] The MFA called for the United States and Venezuela to find a resolution through dialogue and stated that Russia is prepared to assist in these efforts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on January 3 with Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and reiterated the MFA’s statements during the call.[2] The Russian MFA denied a January 3 report from Reuters claiming that Rodriguez is in Russia.[3] Russian milbloggers responded to the US operation in Venezuela, including by criticizing the Venezuelan military as weak and unprepared and highlighting Russia’s missile stockpiles and nuclear deterrence capabilities in comparison.[4]

Ukraine met with national security advisors from its Western allies and partners in Kyiv on January 3. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 3 that he met with the national security advisors of member states of the Coalition of the Willing and representatives of the European Council, European Commission, and NATO.[5] Zelensky reported that the officials discussed a framework peace plan, security guarantees, and the reconstruction and economic recovery of Ukraine. First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya stated that Ukraine presented the main documents from the ongoing peace negotiations to the national security advisors ahead of the January 6 meeting of leaders of the Coalition of the Willing states in Paris.[6]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and military. Zelensky reported on January 2 that he proposed current Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov to take the position of minister of defense.[7] Zelensky noted that Fedorov can implement his experience in facilitating Ukraine’s “Drone Line” project (which aims to integrate drone and ground operations in the Ukrainian military) and digitalizing state services and processes in the defense sector. Zelensky proposed to appointcurrent Ukrainian Defense MinisterDenys Shmyhal as the new minister of energy and first deputy prime minister.[8] Zelensky additionally announced that he will appointFirst Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya as the first deputy head of the Office of the President and noted that Kyslytsya will continue to work in the Ukrainian negotiating delegation.[9] Zelensky further reported that he is considering new candidates to head the military administrations in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Ternopil, and Chernihiv oblasts.[10]

Key Takeaways

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a boilerplate response condemning the US military operation against Venezuela on January 3.
Ukraine met with national security advisors from its Western allies and partners in Kyiv on January 3.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and military.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full Jan 3 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2026

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Russian officials accused Ukraine of conducting a strike against a hotel and cafe in occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast, that reportedly killed at least 28 people and injured at least 50, and called for the intensification of Russia’s war efforts, including its campaign of strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[1] Russian occupation authorities claimed that about 100 people had gathered at the cafe and hotel for New Year celebrations when three Ukrainian drones struck the cafe and hotel minutes apart just after midnight on January 1, causing a fire that trapped people inside the building.[2] Occupation authorities and Russian sources claimed that five Ukrainian drones continued to fly overhead following the strike, preventing first responders from immediately responding.[3] Russian and occupation officials claimed that there were no military personnel at the cafe and hotel at the time of the strike or military targets nearby and accused Ukraine of deliberately targeting civilians.[4] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed that soldiers and medics of the 4th company of the BARS-Sarmat Special Purpose Center military were in Khorly at the time of the strike and provided assistance, however.[5] Occupation authorities claimed that at least one of the drones had a payload of 10 to 20 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and later claimed that at least one drone had an incendiary warhead that caused a massive fire.[6] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo briefed Russian President Vladimir Putin on the strike and its aftermath on January 1.[7] Russian authorities and media published images showing fragments of a drone that allegedly struck the cafe and hotel.[8] Geolocated footage published on January 1 shows a fire at the cafe and hotel, and Russian authorities published additional images showing widespread destruction at the site of the fire.[9]

Ukraine rejected Russian claims that it targeted civilians in occupied Khorly. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi responded to the Russian claims on January 1, stating that Russian political and military leadership is spreading disinformation and false statements.[10] Lykhovyi stated that the Ukrainian General Staff published an “exhaustive” list of strikes that Ukrainian forces conducted against areas in Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight on December 31 to January 1, and this list did not include any strikes against occupied Kherson Oblast.[11] An anonymous source in Ukraine’s defense forces told AFP in response to a question about the Khorly strike on January 2 that Ukraine did conduct a strike but that Ukrainian forces targeted a military gathering that had been closed to civilians.[12] A local Crimea-based Telegram account reported on January 1 that Russian soldiers, their families, and local occupation officials were at the hotel and cafe at the time of the strike.[13] The available footage of the fire is sufficient for ISW to assess that there was very likely a strike that significantly damaged the cafe and hotel in occupied Khorly, though ISW is not prepared to assess the intended target of the strike. ISW has observed no statements or evidence to assess that the strike was a Russian false flag operation.

The strike against occupied Khorly reportedly killed Russian occupation officials. Russian authorities have published the names of 12 people killed at the hotel and cafe as of this report, and at least three are tied to the Russian occupation administration.[14] BBC’s Russia service reported on January 2 that Sergei Bogan, who died in the strike, is the former head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in occupied Kalanchak, Kherson Oblast (a larger settlement about 16 kilometers north of Khorly) and that his wife is a current member of the Nova Kakhovka occupation administration.[15] It is currently unclear if Bogan’s wife was also at the Khorly cafe and hotel at the time of the strike. The BBC reported that the strike also killed Mikhail Voloshko, the head of the Kalanchak occupation administration’s information technology department, and Iryna Dyagileva, who previously served as an occupation election commissioner in occupied Crimea and has since run for office in the occupation government.[16] The strike also killed Makhmud Admisayev, who reportedly frequently travelled between Russia and occupied Crimea with a school official of occupied Havrylivka, Kherson Oblast.[17] The strike also killed the owner of the cafe and hotel, who reportedly began collaborating with Russian occupation officials in 2023.[18] Available information about the remainder of the identified victims is limited as of this report.

Russian officials seized on the Khorly strike to call for the intensification of Russia’s years-long intensive strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Russian officials responded to the Khorly strike on January 1 and 2 around a few common themes: that the strike only strengthens Russia’s commitment to rapidly achieving its war goals, which include unseating the Ukrainian government and that Ukraine would use a potential ceasefire to plan more strikes.[19] Russian officials called on Russia to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure in response, absurdly claiming that Russia has been abstaining from such strikes and never hits civilian objects.[20] Russia has been conducting a long-range strike campaign that purposefully targets Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure and disproportionately impacts civilians throughout the war and has intensified these strikes in recent months.[21] Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine just in 2025 and adapted these weapons to inflict maximum damage, which has increased damage against civilian areas and civilian casualties.[22] The Kremlin may secondarily intend to use the Khorly strike as justification for its continued lack of engagement in the peace process.

Ukraine warned that Russia is likely preparing a false flag operation that will inflict significant casualties to disrupt ongoing peace negotiations. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on January 1 that the Kremlin is preparing large scale false flag attacks, likely on the eve of or during Orthodox Christmas (January 6 and 7), at a religious building or other symbolic location in Russia or occupied Ukraine to disrupt US-led peace negotiations.[23] The SZRU reported that the Kremlin has been spreading new false claims to prepare Russians and foreign audiences for further escalation, following the alleged attempt to strike on Putin’s residence on the night of December 28 to 29. The SZRU noted that Russia will likely conduct the attack from a frontline location and plans to use fragments of Western-made drones as manufactured evidence of Ukraine’s supposed involvement.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to present alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29 but this evidence remains unpersuasive. The Russian MoD published footage on January 1 showing Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov handing over supposed route data and a flight controller of a drone that allegedly targeted Putin’s residence to the US military attaché at the US Embassy in Russia.[24] Kostyukov claimed that Russia decoded the alleged Ukrainian drone’s data, “unequivocally” confirming that Ukraine targeted Putin’s residence.[25] The circumstances of the alleged December 28 to 29 strike continue not to conform to the pattern of observed evidence that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes, and the Kremlin’s continued claims and presentations of alleged evidence continue not to account for these discrepancies.[26]

Ukraine announced on January 1 that it received and deployed two more Patriot air defense systems to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure following recent agreements with Germany.[27] Patriot air defense systems remain Ukraine’s only air defense systems capable of reliably downing Russian ballistic missiles. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including additional Patriot systems, would degrade Russia’s ability to conduct successful long-range strikes.[28]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced several personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and military on January 2. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that he has accepted Zelensky’s offer to head the Office of the Ukrainian President.[29] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZR) Head Oleh Ivashchenko would replace Budanov as the GUR head.[30] Zelensky also announced that Serhiy Deineko is stepping down from his position as head of Ukraine’s State Border Service but will continue to work within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[31] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko will propose candidates to replace Deinenko.

Finnish and Estonian authorities reported damage to an undersea communications cable between Estonia and Finland that may be due to deliberate cutting on December 31.[32] Estonian authorities reported that the damage site is located within the Estonian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and that a cargo vessel had been travelling in the area at the time the damage occurred.[33] Finnish Border Guards located and intercepted the Fitburg cargo ship and have since arrested at least two crewmembers and interviewed the remainder under suspicion of deliberately damaging the undersea cable.[34] Albros Shipping & Trading, a Turkish company based in Istanbul, manages the Fitburg, which was traveling from St. Petersburg, Russia, to Haifa, Israel, under the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines when Finnish authorities intercepted it.[35] Finnish authorities reported that the Fitburg was carrying illegal Russian steel products.[36] Estonian Central Criminal Police Chief Leho Lauri reported on January 1 that Estonia and Finland will form an international investigations team in response to the December 31 cable event.[37] Finnish authorities have not officially attributed the damage to any specific actor. The December 31 cable incident comes against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[38]

Key Takeaways

Russian officials accused Ukraine of conducting a strike against a hotel and cafe in occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast, that reportedly killed at least 28 people and injured at least 50, and called for the intensification of Russia’s war efforts, including its campaign of strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Ukraine rejected Russian claims that it targeted civilians in occupied Khorly.
The strike against occupied Khorly killed Russian occupation officials.
Russian officials seized on the Khorly strike to call for the intensification of Russia’s years-long intensive strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.
Ukraine warned that Russia is likely preparing a false flag operation that will inflict significant casualties to disrupt ongoing peace negotiations.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to present alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but this evidence remains unpersuasive.
Ukraine announced on January 1 that it received and deployed two more Patriot air defense systems to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure following recent agreements with Germany.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced several personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and military on January 2.
Finnish and Estonian authorities reported damage to an undersea communications cable between Estonia and Finland that may be due to deliberate cutting on December 31.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full JAN 2 report

In observance of New Year’s Day, ISW did not publish on January 1

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 31, 2025

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Russian forces increased their average rate of advance in 2025 due to a new operational template supported by technological adaptations and a shift in assault tactics. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers in Ukraine and regained roughly 473 square kilometers that Ukrainian forces had taken in Kursk Oblast in 2025. Russian gains in Ukraine amounted to 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Russian forces had seized 3,604 square kilometers in Ukraine in 2024. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces suffered 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for an average of 78 casualties per square kilometer seized in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast. The average daily Russian rate of advance in 2025 was 13.24 square kilometers per day — higher than the daily average of 9.87 square kilometers per day in 2024. The Russian rate of advance has not been consistent throughout 2025, however. The Russian rate of advance was highest in November at 20.99 square kilometers per day, but this high came after one of the slowest months in 2025 — 8.8 square kilometers per day in October — and subsequently slowed to 15 square kilometers per day in December.

Russian forces began employing a new operational template that relies on a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults that enabled the Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions that occurred in Fall 2025.[1] Russian forces began achieving some BAI effects by using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in early Spring 2025.[2] The Russian military began to proliferate its elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies — the elements that have been largely responsible for successes in Russia’s operational BAI efforts — across the frontline in April and May 2025.[3]

Russian technological adaptations have also supported Russia’s BAI campaign. Russian forces have scaled the production of fiber optic UAVs that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and have increased the range of their fiber optic UAVs from roughly seven kilometers in early Spring 2025 to around 20 kilometers in Summer 2025.[4] Russian forces also introduced “mothership” drones that can carry and extend the range of first-person view (FPVs) drones and significantly increase the reach of Russian drone strikes in the near rear.[5] Recent Russian technological adaptations have further extended the range of Russian fiber-optic drones to between 50 and 60 kilometers.[6] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted on December 30 that Russia’s concentration of fiber optic drones with ranges of more than 20 kilometers in the Siversk direction enabled Russia’s seizure of Siversk.[7] Russian forces’ use of fiber optic drones has also improved their ability to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in forested areas, such as the Serebryanske forest area, where radio-controlled drones struggle to operate.[8]

Russian forces changed their tactical-level assault methods as well, moving away from highly attritional infantry-led assaults in June 2025 to infiltration tactics (and flag raisings) to make (and falsely claim) gains across the front.[9] This shift in tactics has enabled a more rapid rate of Russian advance in 2025, but Russian forces continue to suffer high casualty rates for gains that remain small.[10]

The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intended to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 — both of which tasks Russian forces failed to complete.[11] Russian forces prioritized efforts to seize Pokrovsk, advance in western Donetsk Oblast, and push into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in 2025. Russian forces advanced into Pokrovsk in September 2025 and have seized 67.63 percent of the town as of December 2025.[12] Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka in late January 2025, intensified efforts toward Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole, and began making notable advances towards the towns in November 2025.[13] Russian forces began operating within Hulyaipole in early December 2025.[14] Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups infiltrated toward Dobropillya in August 2025, but the Russian military command was unable to reinforce the penetration and turn tactical-level advances into an operational-level breakthrough, and Ukrainian forces subsequently retook roughly 70 square kilometers of the penetration.[15] Russian forces also continued attempts to envelop Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the northeast and southwest. Intensified Russian offensive operations northeast of Slovyansk resulted in Russian advances into Lyman (roughly 15 kilometers from Slovyansk) and the likely seizure of Siversk (roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk) in December 2025.[16] Russian forces continued efforts to envelop the Fortress Belt from the southwest and completed the seizure of Toretsk by August 1, 2025, having taken 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk, and began efforts to seize Kostyantynivka in October 2025.[17]

Russian forces completed efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in March 2025 and launched a largely unsuccessful offensive operation in northern Sumy Oblast aimed at creating a “buffer zone.”[18] Russian forces also continued efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast and opened an offensive toward Velykyi Burluk in July 2025, but this sector of the frontline remained largely dormant until December 2025.[19] The Russian military command intensified efforts to seize Kupyansk in Summer 2025 but failed to complete the seizure of the town, despite the Kremlin’s claims, and Ukrainian forces retook most of Kupyansk in December 2025.[20]

The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. Russian forces made their most rapid advances in 2025 in the Velyka Novosilka and Hulyaipole directions near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, an area characterized by small settlements and open fields. Russian forces initially intensified offensive operations toward Hulyaipole from the south and southeast in May 2025 but failed to make tactically significant advances by mid-July 2025 due to Ukraine’s extensive defensive line oriented against attacks from the south.[21] Recent Russian advances toward Hulyaipole have come from the northeast and east, bypassing these south-facing defenses. Ukraine’s south-facing defensive lines continue to constrain Russian forces elsewhere in Zaporizhia Oblast, however. Ukrainian defenses in the Orikhiv direction, also oriented to defend against attacks from the south, have largely constrained Russian advances toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City. The Russian military command indicated on December 29 that it intends to join the Russian efforts in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions in order to advance on Zaporizhzhia City, likely intending to bypass Ukrainian defenses south of Orikhiv by moving westward from the Hulyaipole direction.[22] Russian forces have also spent 18 months fighting to seize the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area — a heavily fortified Ukrainian area. The success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.

The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations — conditions that will not last indefinitely. Russian forces have been leveraging rain, fog, and snow, which all constrain Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drone operations, to conduct attacks according to their new offensive template. Russian forces fought more effectively in 2025 than in 2024, but have still not restored maneuver to the battlefield and are advancing slowly. Russian casualties remain disproportionately high relative to the territory gained, and it is unclear whether Russia will be able to sustain this tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term.

Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own BAI campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia. Ukrainian forces have noticeably increased their mid-range strikes against Russian energy military assets throughout December 2025 and appear to have significantly escalated such strikes on December 30 to 31.[23] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on December 31 that USF elements struck several Russian energy and military objects at or near operational depths (25 to 100 kilometers) in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and Crimea.[24] Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in occupied Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 124 kilometers from the frontline), and geolocated footage shows the strike and fire at the depot.[25] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck positions of the Russian Rubikon-D Spetsnaz unit (Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies), 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline); substations in occupied Melitopol and Molochansk, Zaporizhia Oblast (50 kilometers and 35 kilometers from the frontline, respectively); and the base of the Russian 92nd River Boat Brigade and an ST-68 radar station near Olenivka, Crimea.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Olenivka strike occurred overnight on December 30 to 31 and reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian ammunition depots near Blizhnye and Siatel, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 74 kilometers and 90 kilometers behind the frontline, respectively).[27] Russian sources and occupation officials indicated that Ukrainian forces likely conducted the Rovenky oil depot and Melitopol and Molochansk substation strikes on the night of December 30 to 31.[28] Ukrainian forces likely seek to use these mid-range strikes to counter recent Russian advances. This Ukrainian BAI campaign is still in its early stages, so the immediate effects on Russian offensive operations are still unclear.

Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine in 2025. The sizes of Russia’s overnight strike packages have grown significantly throughout 2025. Prior to 2025, Russian forces launched their largest strike package against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024, with 210 drones and missiles.[29] Russian forces in 2025 have launched 52 strike packages containing 210 or more projectiles.[30] Russian forces launched their largest-ever strike package on September 6 to 7, 2025, containing 810 drones and 13 missiles.[31] Russian forces have launched a total of 18 strike packages that each contain over 500 projectiles in 2025.[32] The Russian defense industrial base’s (DIB) ramped-up production in 2025 has allowed Russia to produce and launch missiles and drones at such high numbers and frequencies.[33] Russian strikes during Fall and Winter 2025 have largely targeted Ukraine’s energy grid with devastating effects.[34] Russian forces have also significantly increased their strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure to impede Ukrainian logistics.[35] Russian forces have used a series of technological adaptations to their missiles and drones to achieve these effects in 2025, including integrated cameras and radio control capabilities on Russian Shahed-type drones that have allowed Russian forces to strike moving targets such as locomotives.[36] Russia has also leaned on its partners and allies to increase production, importing critical components from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and relying on North Korea for KN-23 missiles and labor to work at Russia’s Shahed-producing factory in the Republic of Tatarstan.[37]

The Kremlin is presenting alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but the alleged evidence continues to be unpersuasive. Major General Alexander Romanenko, chief of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), gave a briefing on December 31 about the alleged Ukrainian drone strike against Putin’s residence.[38] Romanenko repeated many of the claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) December 29 report, including the claim that Russian forces downed 91 total Ukrainian drones targeting Putin’s residence over Novgorod, Bryansk, and Smolensk oblasts.[39] The Russian MoD first issued a report about downed Ukrainian drones on the morning of December 29 and subsequently updated that report later in the day, likely to correct some of the discrepancies that did not conform to Kremlin claims about the alleged Ukrainian strike.[40] The Russian MoD is likely leveraging Romanenko as a high-ranking commander to try to bring credibility to the Kremlin’s claims.

The Russian MoD posted a map on December 31 of the alleged flight paths of the Ukrainian drones.[41] The map appears to show dozens of drones flying over or near Smolensk City, east of the Russian-Belarusian border. ISW had not observed reports of Russian forces downing drones over Smolensk Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, and it is unlikely that Russian air defenses would have engaged these drones over a major city with nearby military infrastructure. It is also unclear how the Russian MoD would have been able to confirm that drones flying over Bryansk Oblast were targeting Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast, as drones could have been targeting many other areas in various directions from Bryansk. ISW did not observe reports or evidence of Russian forces downing drones over Bryansk Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29 in any event. The absence of such evidence is not in itself proof that there were no Ukrainian drone overflights in these areas, but it is part of a pattern of silence that is unusual when Ukraine conducts strikes deep into Russia.

The Russian MoD posted footage on December 31 showing a Russian servicemember next to a drone that Russian forces allegedly downed while it was flying toward Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29.[42] The servicemember in the footage claimed that the drone was targeting a “protected facility” in Valdai Raion, Novgorod Oblast.[43] The servicemember highlighted the technical characteristics of the drone and claimed that the drone’s high-explosive warhead is designed to destroy “personnel or civilian targets.” The footage offers no distinguishing features to confirm the location or timing of filming. The Russian MoD’s footage of the alleged drone wreckage comes after Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists on December 30 that he does not think there “should be any evidence” of the strike, but that questions about any downed drone debris as possible evidence are a matter for the Russian military.[44] ISW continues to note that strikes such as the one Russia is claiming Ukrainian forces conducted on December 28-29 typically generate the rapid publication of various sorts of evidence of the strike, such as footage, statements from Russian authorities about Russian air defense activity, and reports from local sources and media about the strike and damages.[45] The circumstances of the alleged December 28-29 strike continue do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes. Kremlin statements and presentations of alleged evidence do not account for these discrepancies. ISW is aware of reports that US intelligence officials have confirmed that Putin’s residence was not the target of Ukrainian strikes, but has no ability to confirm those reports.[46]

Russian President Vladimir Putin officially named 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in his annual New Year’s Eve address. Putin described Russians as “together one large family” and appealed to “traditions, faith and memory” as unifying characteristics.[47] Putin emphasized that the Russian people are united ”in [their] selfless and devoted love” for Russia and in their support of Russia’s war effort. ISW continues to note that Putin’s narratives about Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state whose people come together under a united love for the Russian Federation are at odds with the xenophobic views of the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin’s core constituencies with ardent supporters of the war effort that advocates for a Russia centered on the ethnic Russian identity and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).[48] Putin notably continues to lean into a concept of civic nationalism more consistent with the Soviet ideal than with the Christian nationalism of Russian ultranationalists and emphasized on December 19 that the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026 carries special significance in wartime.[49]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces increased their average rate of advance in 2025 due to a new operational template supported by technological adaptations and a shift in assault tactics.
The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals.
The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas helped to hinder Russian advances in select areas in 2025.
Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own BAI campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia.
Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine in 2025.
The Kremlin is presenting alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but the alleged evidence continues to be unpersuasive.
Russian President Vladimir Putin officially named 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in his annual New Year’s Eve address.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

read the full DEC 31 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 30, 2025

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The Kremlin continues to offer no evidence to support its claims that Ukrainian drones targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence on the night of December 28 to 29 and even rejected the notion that it should provide evidence. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 30 that he does not think there “should be any evidence” of a massive Ukrainian drone strike targeting Putin’s residence, likely referring to his residence in Valdai, Novgorod Oblast.[1] Peskov responded to a follow-up question about whether the drone strike left any debris that could be evidence, stating that he “cannot say” and that this question is a matter for the Russian military.

The Kremlin appears to be trying to correct some of the discrepancies in its previous claims about the alleged December 28-29 strikes. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) initially claimed on the morning of December 29 that Russian forces downed 41 drones over Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, fewer than half the number that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed targeted Putin’s residence in the oblast on the same night.[2] Several Russian and Western sources noted the discrepancy between Lavrov’s claim and the MoD’s claim at the time.[3] The Russian MoD issued an updated situational report (SITREP) on the evening of December 29, claiming that Russian forces downed 91 total drones that were targeting Putin’s residence, including 41 drones over Novgorod Oblast itself and 41 drones over Bryansk Oblast and one over Smolensk Oblast that the MoD claimed had been flying toward Novgorod Oblast.[4] Valdai is roughly 210 kilometers from the Smolensk Oblast border and roughly 435 kilometers from the Bryansk Oblast border. Bryansk and Smolensk oblasts each contain legitimate military and defense industrial targets that Ukraine plausibly could have targeted on the night of December 28 to 29, and Ukraine has struck objects in Bryansk and Smolensk oblasts before.[5] Any instance of Ukrainian drones flying in Bryansk and Smolensk oblast airspace thus does not dispositively mean the drones were heading towards Novgorod Oblast. Moreover, ISW observed no reports or evidence that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Bryansk or Smolensk oblasts on the night of December 28 to 29 in any event.

ISW has still not observed any of the footage or reporting that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes to corroborate the Kremlin’s claims of Ukrainian strikes threatening Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast.[6] Russian and Western sources continue to report counter-indicators to a Ukrainian deep strike targeting Novgorod Oblast. Russian opposition and insider sources reported that residents of Valdai and the surrounding areas did not hear or observe sounds of drones operating or air defenses activating, both of which the residents reported they usually hear, even during previous Ukrainian strikes far from Valdai itself.[7] Le Monde reported on December 30 that a source close to French President Emmanuel Macron stated that there is “no solid evidence” to corroborate Russian claims about the strike against Putin’s personal residence, even after French authorities cross-checked information with its partners.[8]

Kremlin officials are using the alleged Ukrainian strike against Novgorod Oblast to justify Russia’s continued insistence that both Ukraine and the West capitulate to Russia’s original demands from 2021 and 2022. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the Kremlin will “harden” its negotiating position following the alleged Ukrainian strike but would not disclose this new stance publicly.[9] Peskov stated that Russia is not withdrawing from the negotiation process but will continue dialogue primarily with the United States.[10] Several Russian State Duma deputies echoed Peskov’s statements, with one deputy calling for Russia to present a US-Russian peace plan to Ukraine as a fait accompli and another adding that Russia can “only” negotiate Ukraine’s capitulation now.[11] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used a December 30 interview with Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) to reiterate Russia’s original war demands that Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out when launching the full-scale invasion in 2022, namely demands for Ukraine’s neutrality, demilitarization (reductions in the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government).[12] Lavrov repeated demands that Ukraine and the West recognize Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Lavrov stated that Russia is “convinced” that the ultimatums that Russia submitted to the United States and Europe in December 2021 can serve as a “starting point” for peace talks. Many of the original Russian demands that Lavrov repeated go against the last publicly available version of the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan.[13] ISW assessed on December 29 that the Kremlin may intend to use the alleged Ukrainian strike against Putin’s residence to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.[14] Kremlin statements about Russia’s 2021 ultimatums, which would have amounted to the destruction of the NATO alliance and required an overhaul of Europe’s security architecture, continue to signal that Russia’s goals in the war are not confined to Ukraine and that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia.[15]

Russian forces continue to increase the range of their drones to strike deeper into Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for traditional air defense systems. The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies published geolocated footage on December 29 showing Russian forces conducting a drone strike against a Ukrainian Mi-24 helicopter at a forward base northeast of Bilyky, Poltava Oblast (150 kilometers from the Russia–Ukraine border) and an An-26 transport aircraft at the Mykolaiv International Airport (60 kilometers from the Russian-occupied Kinburn Spit).[16] An OSINT analyst reported that satellite imagery has shown the An-26 parked at the airport since 2022, indicating that it is a retired airframe.[17] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed that Russian forces conducted the strikes with Molniya drones guided through Starlink, rather than through mobile networks, and stated that Russian forces either used sabotage and reconnaissance groups to launch the drones from a closer position or mothership drones to extend the drones’ range.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces installed LTE modems on the Molniya drones to extend their range.[19] The recent long-range drone strikes exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to down drones, as electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely insufficient to defend Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from such a geographically pervasive threat.

The Kremlin is moving forward with efforts to mobilize active reservists compulsorily, likely to eventually deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine as Russia continues to suffer a disproportionately high casualty rate compared to its territorial gains. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 30 to authorize the deployment of active reservists to special training camps to ensure the protection of critical facilities starting in 2026.[20] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia fulfilled its 2025 plan to recruit 406,000 personnel but that Russian losses amounted to 410,000 or more personnel.[21] ISW has observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through assaults or infiltration missions) in 4,899.75 kilometers in 2025 — indicating that Russian forces have sustained at least 83 casualties per square kilometer. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to mobilize reservists for likely deployment to Ukraine in the future further indicate that Russia is facing compounding pressure to sustain its force generation requirements through the legacy system that uses high financial incentives to recruit volunteers due to a lack of volunteers, a lack of resources to fund the payouts, or both.[22] The Kremlin’s efforts to deploy reservists to Ukraine are a domestically risky policy threatening to break the Kremlin’s ongoing social contract with the population, and the Kremlin would likely not pursue this force generation method unless necessary.

Russian President Vladimir Putin officially enacted into law on December 29 the 2026 conscription decree which will transition Russia’s conscription cycle away from biannual spring and fall conscription cycles to a single year-round conscription cycle.[23] Russia historically holds a conscription cycle in the spring and fall every year, where conscripts serve 12 months of mandatory military duty outside the active combat zone in Ukraine.[24] Russian military recruiters under this system conduct the administrative processing for each conscription cycle during three-month periods in the spring and fall. The new decree that Putin signed officially transitions administrative processes for conscription to a year-round process, keeping Russian military recruiters active year-round. This reform will allow Russia to augment its military administrative capacity and enable Moscow to call up a larger volume of conscripts with more flexibility at any point during the year.[25] Putin’s December 29 decree specifies that Russia will call up 261,000 people for mandatory conscript military service throughout 2026, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russia called up 135,000 personnel for its Fall 2025 conscription cycle, indicating that Russia intends to call up roughly the same number of conscripts in 2026 as it has in 2025.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) clarified on December 29 that Russia will still dispatch conscripts twice a year even as administrative processes necessary for running and staffing recruitment offices will occur year-round.[27] Putin also signed a law in April 2025 that simplified conscription procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for compulsory military service — significantly reducing bureaucratic hurdles and allowing Russian authorities to process called-up conscript candidates more quickly.[28] These decrees are part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia’s force generation efforts during large-scale mandatory call-ups. Changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military and allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently during both a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO, though the Kremlin is not mobilizing conscripts for war.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin continues to offer no evidence to support its claims that Ukrainian drones targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence on the night of December 28 to 29 and even rejected the notion that it should provide evidence.
Kremlin officials are using the alleged Ukrainian strike against Novgorod Oblast to justify Russia’s continued insistence that both Ukraine and the West capitulate to Russia’s original demands from 2021 and 2022.
Russian forces continue to increase the range of their drones to strike deeper into Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for traditional air defense systems.
The Kremlin is moving forward with efforts to mobilize active reservists compulsorily, likely to eventually deploy reservists to combat in Ukraine as Russia continues to suffer a disproportionately high casualty rate compared to its territorial gains.
Russian President Vladimir Putin officially enacted into law on December 29 the 2026 conscription decree which will transition Russia’s conscription cycle away from biannual spring and fall conscription cycles to a single year-round conscription cycle.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Kupyansk.

read the full DEC 30 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 29, 2025

Toplines

The Kremlin accused Ukraine of conducting a long-range drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 91 long-range drones against Putin’s residence overnight on December 28 to 29 in Novgorod Oblast, likely referring to the residence in Valdai, Novgorod Oblast.[1] Lavrov claimed that Russian forces downed the drones and that the strike caused no damage. Lavrov condemned this alleged strike and stated that Russia will “revise” its negotiating position due to the strike. US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on December 29, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated that Putin informed Trump about the claimed strike and told him that Russia will “reconsider” its position on peace agreements.[2] The United States has not published a readout of the December 29 Trump-Putin call as of this writing, though US officials — including Trump — confirmed the call occurred and that Putin made claims to Trump about the alleged strike.[3]

The circumstances of this alleged strike do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence when Ukrainian forces conduct strikes into Russia. Confirmed Ukrainian strikes in Russia typically generate evidence observable in open sources. Such evidence includes footage, often geolocated, of air defense operations, explosions, fires, or smoke plumes near targeted objects; statements from local and regional Russian authorities, usually downplaying successful Ukrainian strikes as “debris” from downed drones; and reports from local sources and media of fire or damage to such objects. ISW has not observed any such footage nor local or regional reporting about Ukrainian strikes near Putin’s residence to corroborate Lavrov’s claim. Lavrov’s claim of downing 89 Ukrainian drones over Novgorod Oblast is also inconsistent with the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) claim that Russian forces downed 47 Ukrainian drones over the oblast overnight on December 28 to 29, further undermining the claim. Ukrainian forces previously struck numerous military targets in Novgorod Oblast, which produced evidence.[4] The Kremlin has offered no evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian forces targeted Putin’s residence on December 29.

Russian opposition outlet Sota published an investigation into the alleged strike on December 29, reporting that Valdai residents did not hear air defenses operating overnight, even though Russian air defenses would have had to operate to down up to 91 Ukrainian drones.[5] Sota reported that drones launched from Ukraine’s northern border would have to cross into heavily protected Russian airspace, including multiple installations of Strategic Missile Forces facilities, air defense units, military aviation, and other assets that would either be under heavy air defense protection or themselves act as the Russian air defense umbrella. Sota concluded that Ukraine would have been able to strike Putin’s residence in Valdai through a “miracle” or deliberate Russian military negligence. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)’s Russia service reported in August 2025 that Russia increased the number of air defense systems defending Valdai from two to 12 from 2022 to August 2025.[6]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted the alleged strike against Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast and warned that Russia will use this claim to justify strikes against Kyiv City and Ukrainian government buildings.[7] Russia has already targeted Ukrainian government buildings in previous long-range strikes, including Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv City in September 2025.[8] Lavrov stated that Russia has determined the targets and timing for retaliatory strikes against Ukraine but did not provide further specifics.[9] Russia has already intensified its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months, however, specifically targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[10] Russia has notably intensified strikes against Ukraine around negotiations multiple times since the Trump administration began pursuing peace efforts in Winter 2025, including most recently overnight on December 26 to 27, ahead of Zelensky’s talks with Trump in Florida on December 28.[11] Russian overnight long-range strike packages purposefully target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and disproportionately impact civilians.[12]

The Kremlin may intend to use this claimed strike to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.[13] Ushakov’s readout of the December 29 Trump-Putin call criticized the US-Ukrainian framework, likely referring to the 20-point peace proposal, as “still leav[ing] room” for Ukraine to “avoid” unspecified obligations and rejected the notion of a ceasefire.[14] Since the Trump administration began peace efforts in January-February 2025, the Kremlin has sought to delay and prolong peace negotiations in order to continue its war undisturbed, prevent the U.S. from imposing measures intended to pressure Russia into meaningful negotiations, and even to extract concessions about bilateral US-Russian relations.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders held another meeting to aggrandize tactical details and create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse. Putin met with the leadership of the Russian General Staff and grouping of forces commanders on December 29 — following a string of performative, publicized meetings between Putin and his commanders in recent weeks, including the most recent meeting on December 27.[16] Putin, Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and the groupings of forces commanders made a series of exaggerated claims about Russian successes across the battlefield, all of which rely on exaggerated quantitative data intended to obfuscate the relatively slow rate of Russian advances. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized over 700 square kilometers and 32 settlements in Ukraine in December 2025 and 6,640 square kilometers and 334 settlements in total in 2025. ISW has observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through assaults or infiltration missions) in 480 square kilometers, and that Russian forces seized or completely infiltrated 23 settlements in December 2025. ISW has also observed evidence indicating a Russian presence in 4,952 square kilometers and seized or completely infiltrated 245 settlements in all of 2025. Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov claimed that Russian forces seized 940 square kilometers in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in 2025. ISW has observed evidence to assess a Russian presence in 639 square kilometers in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts during 2025. Nikiforov notably claimed that Russian forces have advanced to within 20 kilometers of Sumy City in 2025 — an implicit acknowledgement that Russian forces have advanced under seven kilometers deep in the area, given that Sumy City is located roughly 27 kilometers from the Sumy Oblast northern international border where Russian forces hold the deepest positions.

Putin and senior Russian military officials continued to heavily aggrandize Russian operations near Kupyansk despite all available evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have liberated much of the town and surrounding area.[17] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed that Russian forces will complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk in January to February 2026, which is incredibly slow compared to how long Russian officials have been making claims about nearly completing the seizure of Kupyansk.[18] Gerasimov notably claimed that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk as of October 26 and had seized Kupyansk as of November 20.[19] A Russian milblogger reporting on the Western Grouping of Forces claimed on December 21 that the Russian military command had set the deadline to seize Kurylivka and Pishchane (both southeast of Kupyansk) by January 1, 2026.[20]

Gerasimov and the other Russian commanders claimed that Russian forces seized Dibrova (northwest of Siversk), Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman), and Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) as of December 29. ISW has not observed geolocated evidence to assess any Russian presence in Dibrova or Drobysheve as of December 29, or that Russian forces completed the seizure of Lukyanivske. Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Medvedev claimed on December 29 that Russian forces have seized 40 to 45 percent of Kostyantynivka — contradicting Gerasimov’s December 27 claim that Russian forces seized over half of the buildings in Kostyantynivka.[21] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in five percent of Kostyantynivka. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control over half of Lyman, Donetsk Oblast though ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in only six percent of Lyman. Dnepr Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky claimed that Russian forces advanced within 15 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia City, and ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced within 20 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia City. The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to portray the front line as imminently collapsing across the theater and claim that Russian forces are capable of imminently threatening Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Available evidence continues to indicate that the front line is not collapsing, and Russian forces would require at least two to three years to seize all of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[22]

Pro-war Russian ultranationalist milbloggers are publicly acknowledging that the Russian military command’s claims are exaggerated. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger questioned Gerasimov’s claim that Ukrainian forces are not conducting counteroffensive operations, likely referring to ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks that have pushed Russian forces back from most of Kupyansk.[23] The milblogger also noted that available evidence does not support Gerasimov and Teplinsky’s claim that Russian forces are operating within Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast, as Russian forces are only on the “southern approaches” of the town. The milblogger added that such high-profile meetings underscore the Kremlin’s intention to continue the war rather than agree to a ceasefire that freezes the front line. Other Russian milbloggers also continue to contradict the Russian MoD’s portrayal of the situation in Kupyansk, and one milblogger criticized the Russian military command as being a “witness to a lie” and acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have encircled Russian forces operating within the town.[24]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office reported on December 29 that Russian forces executed two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Shakhove, Donetsk Oblast (east of Dobropillya) on December 27 after disarming the POWs and forcing them to partially undress.[25] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on December 28 that Russian forces also executed three Ukrainian POWs south of Hulyaipole, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 20.[26] Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported on December 29 that on December 20 two Russian servicemembers of the 1st Assault Battalion of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) broke into a house in Pokrovsk where civilians were sheltering, shot and killed seven civilians and injured another, and then set the building on fire.[27] Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported that another servicemember of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) tortured and killed a civilian in Pokrovsk and raped his wife in Pokrovsk on December 22.[28] ISW observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions since late October and November 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in these directions and advanced into the towns.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[30]

Several dozen Belarusian smuggling balloons illegally entered Polish airspace, and Polish aircraft intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft near the international border overnight on December 24 to December 25.[31] Polish authorities reported on December 25 that Polish fighter jets intercepted, identified, and subsequently escorted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Baltic Sea near Polish airspace overnight on December 24 to 25.[32] A source in Polish law enforcement told Polish outlet RMF24 that 59 balloons violated Polish airspace and that authorities found four downed balloons in Podlaskie Voivodeship in northeastern Poland and three in Lubelskie Voivodeship in eastern Poland.[33] The balloons carried illegal cigarettes and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking equipment. Polish authorities told RMF24 that the balloon violations may have been testing the response of Polish air surveillance systems.[34] Belarusian balloons frequently violated Lithuanian airspace throughout October and November 2025, often forcing airports to temporarily cease operations.[35] SW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed and that Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[37]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin accused Ukraine of conducting a long-range drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29.
The circumstances of this alleged strike do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence when Ukrainian forces conduct strikes into Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted the alleged strike against Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast and warned that Russia will use this claim to justify strikes against Kyiv City and Ukrainian government buildings.
The Kremlin may intend to use this claimed strike to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders held another meeting to aggrandize tactical details and create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse.
Pro-war Russian ultranationalist milbloggers are publicly acknowledging that the Russian military command’s claims are exaggerated.
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions.
Several dozen Belarusian smuggling balloons illegally entered Polish airspace, and Polish aircraft intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft near the international border overnight on December 24 to December 25.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.

read the full DEC 29 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2025

Toplines

US and Ukrainian delegations met in Florida on December 28 to discuss the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and other documents related to a potential peace settlement. US Donald Trump stated that he and Zelensky spoke to European, NATO, and EU leaders after the US-Ukrainian meeting.[1] Trump stated that a few issues remain unresolved, including territorial issues related to Donbas and a possible ceasefire to allow Ukraine to hold a referendum on a future peace agreement. Trump stated that the meeting discussed the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) at length and that Ukraine and Russia are working together to open the plant. Zelensky stated that the parties have almost agreed on the 20-point peace plan and on a document between the United States, Ukraine, and Europe on security guarantees for Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the parties have “100 percent” finalized another document between Ukraine and the United States on security guarantees. Zelensky noted that discussions continue about a plan to ensure Ukraine’s post-war economic prosperity. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian and European delegations will meet in the coming weeks to continue discussions, and Trump stated that Ukrainian, American, and Russian working groups will meet in January 2026. Trump called Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 28 before his meeting with Zelensky, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov reported that Trump and Putin also discussed the working groups, one of which will focus on security issues, while another will focus on economic issues.[2]

Recent Kremlin statements are at odds with several of the positions that Trump presented as the basis for ending the war. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected European-led security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Kremlin officials have also called for any future peace agreement to address Russia’s demands that NATO cease expansion and roll back its borders.[4] Ushakov reported that Putin used his call with Trump to make “very detailed arguments” about the importance of adhering to the agreements the United States and Russia allegedly made at the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[5] Kremlin officials have claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[6] Putin also referenced his 2024 MFA speech during a meeting with Russian military commanders on December 27.[7] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin statements demonstrate that Russia’s goals in Ukraine exceed territorial demands such as the seizure of Donetsk Oblast and that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia, nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations.[8]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders continue to aggrandize tactical details to create the false impression that Ukrainian defenses across the frontline are on the verge of collapse. Putin met on December 27 with the leadership of the Russian General Staff and grouping of forces (GoFs) commanders – the latest in a string of performative, publicized meetings between Putin and his commanders in recent weeks.[9] The Kremlin likely timed the meeting to fall on the eve of the December 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Florida in order to influence the US-Ukrainian meeting. Putin, Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and the GoF commanders made a series of likely exaggerated claims about Russian successes across the battlefield. Russian Central GoF Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces seized Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya), and Eastern GoF Commander Colonel General Andrei Ivanaev claimed that Russian forces seized Hulyaipole. Gerasimov briefly mentioned Kupyansk during his report to Putin, claiming that the Russian Western GoF is eliminating the Ukrainian forces blocked on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk. Gerasimov likely limited his remarks about the Western GoF given the widespread backlash the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has received in recent days from Russian milbloggers concerning the exaggerations and lies the MoD has platformed about the alleged seizure of Kupyansk and Ukrainian successes to liberate a significant portion of the town.[10]

Gerasimov reported to Putin that Russian forces will continue to conduct combat missions to seize all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[11] ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of 14.4 square kilometers per day in 2025, meaning it would take Russian forces until April 1, 2029 (1,190 days) to seize the rest of the four oblasts should the current tempo persist. This calculation, however, does not take into account the many obstacles Russian forces would face along the way, such as crossing the Dnipro River, overcoming other water features throughout the oblasts, and seizing the major cities of Zaporizhzhia City (with a pre-war population of about 710,000 people) and Kherson City (with a pre-war population of about 280,000). Russian advances are not likely to be linear, and it will likely take Russian forces longer than 1,190 days to seize all four oblasts.

Putin and the commanders continue to falsely portray future Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast as a quick and easy endeavor. The Fortress Belt consists of four heavily fortified major population centers – Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk – that make up the backbone of Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk Oblast.[12] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control more than half of the buildings within Kostyantynivka and are “rapidly” advancing toward Slovyansk following the recent seizure of Siversk.[13] Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces seized Sofiivka, which Solodchuk called an “important” settlement and “key” for further Russian offensive operations northward toward the Fortress Belt cities. ISW has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in five percent of Kostyantynivka. Putin and the commanders are presenting claimed subtactical- or tactical-level Russian successes, such as the seizure of the small settlement of Sofiivka, as having operational- or even strategic-level significance. Ukraine’s Fortress Belt is much larger and more populous than any of the settlements or towns Russian forces have seized in recent years, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities of this size since 2022. ISW assessed in late November 2025 that Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027, assuming Russian forces will be able to maintain their rate of advance at that time.[14]

ISW has observed recent open-source evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Rodynske and that Russian forces have operated within less than half of Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on December 28 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Rodynske, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to operate in the settlement.[15] Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Myrnohrad.[16] Additional geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Russian forces raising flags at multiple locations in northern Myrnohrad and central Rodynske during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[17] ISW has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) within only 49 percent of Myrnohrad. The Ukrainian General Staff on December 27 refuted the Russian claims of the seizure of Myrnohrad and noted that Russian forces have yet to seize Pokrovsk – even as Russian forces have notably been fighting within Pokrovsk itself for almost 150 days.[18] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces also reported on December 28 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within northern Pokrovsk.[19]

ISW has only observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in roughly 55 percent of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern, central, southern, and southeastern Hulyaipole.[20] Additional geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags at multiple locations in western and southwestern Hulyaipole during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces refuted on December 27 the Russian claims of the seizure of Hulyaipole and stated that Ukrainian forces continue defensive operations within the town, though the situation is “difficult.”[22] The Southern Defense Forces acknowledged that Russian forces control part of the town but reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold a significant part of Hulyaipole.[23] The Southern Defense Forces reported that Russian forces possess significant numerical superiority in personnel and equipment in Hulyaipole – in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment that Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas.[24]

Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts. Geolocated footage published on December 27 and 28 shows small groups of two to three Russian servicemembers raising flags throughout Myrnohrad and Hulyaipole, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published the footage to coincide with the Russian military commanders’ reports to Putin that Russian forces had seized the settlements.[25] These flag raising videos are notably more complex and higher-production edited montages of several clips and Russian forces scattered throughout numerous locations in both Myrnohrad and Hulyaipole. Previous flag raising videos, in contrast, were shorter one-off videos in one or a few locations throughout a settlement. The increased sophistication and use of montage videos to assert territorial gains suggests that the Kremlin is engaging in a coordinated campaign to support the higher Russian military command’s informational efforts. The Kremlin in Fall 2025 began relying on footage showing small groups of Russian infiltrators raising flags in order to claim broad advances or seizures as part of an informational effort to portray Russian successes as more expansive than the battlefield reality.[26] ISW assessed at the time that the Kremlin was trying to exploit mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources.[27] Russia is likely increasing the level of sophistication of its flag-raising videos as it has since become clear that a flag raising does not necessarily signify control. Russian forces notably engaged in similar flag raising tactics throughout Kupyansk to support the Russian MoD’s false claim that Russian forces had seized the town.[28] These flag raisings aim to support Putin’s aggrandized claims of Russian advances and the false narrative that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the theater.

Putin’s meeting with military commanders platformed on-the-ground tactical commanders in an effort to lend credence to the Russian military command’s aggrandized claims. The meeting prominently featured reports from frontline company and brigade commanders purportedly calling in from the field near Myrnohrad and Hulyaipole.[29] The commanders described Russian offensive operations over the past months in both sectors of the front in granular detail, essentially describing how Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers toward Myrnohrad over four months and roughly seven kilometers toward Hulyaipole over 23 days. One brigade commander near Myrnohrad reported on Russian advances as minutely as “up to one kilometer” over the course of 24 days in September. Russian milbloggers have long complained about the widespread practice of false reports in the entire Russian chain of command and exaggerated advances, and false claims about the alleged seizure of Kupyansk recently reignited these milblogger complaints.[30] The inclusion of lower-echelon commanders in the December 27 meeting among Russian General Staff leaders and Russian Grouping of Forces commanders likely aims to bring credibility to Putin’s and other high-ranking senior Russian military officials’ exaggerated claims of sweeping Russian advances.[31]

Putin and Russian military commanders continue to discuss the need to form “buffer zones” in areas of Ukraine outside of the four oblasts Russia illegally annexed in 2022. Putin stated that Russian forces’ efforts to establish a buffer zone in the border areas of the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are proceeding at a “good pace.”[32] Solodchuk noted that Russian offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast aim to implement Putin’s instructions to create a buffer zone to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed at the December 17 Russian MoD board meeting that the alleged seizure of Kupyansk was part of Russian efforts to expand the buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast to reduce the threat of shelling against northern areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast.[33] Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts are not any of the regions that Russia illegally annexed, and recent peace negotiations have not discussed ceding this territory to Russia but have rather called for Russia to withdraw from these territories.[34]

ISW has not observed evidence of commensurate offensive activity in northern Ukraine to support Putin’s claim that Russian offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts are advancing at a “good pace.” Russian forces recently conducted limited cross-border attacks across a broad part of previously dormant areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts on December 20 and 21, but these attacks have since stalled, supporting ISW’s assessment at the time that Russia was conducting the assaults as part of a cognitive warfare effort to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.[35] Russian activity in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast has been low, with the Ukrainian General Staff consistently reporting only a small number of Russian attacks in the area.[36] Russian forces have slightly increased their activity in the Vovchansk direction in recent weeks, but Russian forces have only advanced about nine kilometers deep from the Russian border since beginning the offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[37] Ukrainian forces have also retaken significant swaths of land in Kupyansk, significantly slowing Russian efforts to create a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast.[38]

Key Takeaways

US and Ukrainian delegations met in Florida on December 28 to discuss the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and other documents related to a potential peace settlement.
Recent Kremlin statements are at odds with several of the positions that Trump presented as the basis for ending the war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders continue to aggrandize tactical details to create the false impression that Ukrainian defenses across the frontline are on the verge of collapse.
Putin and the commanders continue to falsely portray future Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast as a quick and easy endeavor.
ISW has observed recent open-source evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Rodynske and that Russian forces have operated within less than half of Myrnohrad.
ISW has only observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in roughly 55 percent of Hulyaipole.
Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts.
Putin’s meeting with military commanders platformed on-the-ground tactical commanders in an effort to lend credence to the Russian military command’s aggrandized claims.
Putin and Russian military commanders continue to discuss the need to form “buffer zones” in areas of Ukraine outside of the four oblasts Russia illegally annexed in 2022.
Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 28 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 27, 2025

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Russian forces are currently unable to build out a strategic reserve and will therefore likely be constrained to grinding, slow advances at their current rate and scale in the coming year. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 27 that Russia had fulfilled its plan to recruit 403,000 people in 2025 on December 3 and will surpass its set goal by the end of the year.[1] Budanov stated that Russia can continue recruitment for a “long time” given its population and financial resources and has plans to increase its mobilization to 409,000 people in 2026. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is setting conditions for involuntary partial reserve call-ups to sustain its military manpower and possibly to try to establish a strategic reserve in the face of its continuing high casualty rate in Ukraine.[2] ISW’s assessments have focused on challenges Russian recruiters appear to face in attracting voluntary recruits at costs the Kremlin is willing to pay, an issue that Budanov did not address in this interview. Budanov stated that Russia has not yet developed a strategic reserve to its desired capabilities as it “constantly” activates its operational reserve to support ongoing combat operations in Ukraine.[3] Russian forces currently maintain a rate of incoming personnel sufficient to replace losses but have been unable to build large enough reserves to be able to flood a sector of the front without redeploying personnel from other areas. The requirement to draw reserves from some sectors of the line to focus on operationally significant undertakings often leaves Russia’s flanks undermanned in ways that create vulnerabilities, sometimes allowing Ukrainian forces to counterattack and retake land. Ukrainian forces were recently able to retake land north of Hulyaipole during Russia’s push into central Hulyaipole, and Ukraine liberated a significant portion of the Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction (northwest of Pokrovsk) during Russia’s offensive on Pokrovsk in early November.[4] The Ukrainian liberation of much of Kupyansk also benefited from the concentration of Russian forces elsewhere on the line and the lack of ready Russian operational reserves in the area. Russian forces are currently unable to open a new front and cannot expand recent limited cross-border attacks in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[5] Constraints on Russia’s available military manpower, in contrast with its overall numerical superiority in population, are a severe constraint on Russian operations and will likely remain so in the coming year.

Russian forces are therefore unlikely to dramatically change the pace and scale of Russian advances along the frontlines in 2026 if support for Ukraine continues at current levels. The grinding nature of Russian advances incurs high casualty rates, and Russian forces need incoming personnel to replenish losses in active sectors of the frontlines to maintain a slow but steady rate of advance. Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to claim that Russian forces are advancing all along the line, which is untrue, and to intimate that Russian forces can increase the scale and speed of their advances at any moment of his choosing.[6] ISW forecasts that Russian forces will continue fighting at their current scale and rate of advance. Russian forces are constrained in the scale and rate of their advances not only by the lack of mobilized military personnel but also because the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has optimized Russian forces for positional warfare instead of focusing on restoring maneuver warfare.[7] Russian forces cannot currently conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances. Russian forces are currently unable to address any of the factors complicating its ability to conduct rapid advances or significantly increase its current rate of advance.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure overnight on December 26 and 27, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 519 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, of which about 300 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 10 Iskander-M ballistic/Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Ryazan and Bryansk oblasts; seven Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast and the Black Sea; 21 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Vologda Oblast; and two Kh-22 cruise missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 474 drones, six Iskander-M/Kinzhal missiles, four Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles, and 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles as of 1300 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 10 Russian missiles and 25 drones struck 30 locations; that debris fell at 16 locations; that one missile did not reach its target; and that Ukrainian forces are clarifying information that 15 drones were “locally lost” (likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] interference). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes primarily targeted energy and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast.[10] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that Russian strikes left nearly 600,000 Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast residents without power, and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts.[11] Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz reported that Russian forces targeted Naftogaz’s thermal power plant (TPP) and gas production facilities with Shahed drones.[12] Kyiv City officials reported that the strikes damaged residential and civilian infrastructure in seven raions of the city, killed one person, and injured 32.[13] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces targeted industrial and residential infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast, resulting in one person being trapped under rubble of a destroyed building in Vyshhorod and one death in Bila Tserkva.[14] Cherkasy Oblast officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six missiles and 21 drones over the region and that Russian forces damaged at least 123 buildings in Uman, of which nine were completely destroyed.[15] The Odesa Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces struck industrial and port infrastructure in the region, damaging equipment for grain transport.[16]

A high-ranking Kremlin official explicitly stated that Russia will not deviate from its war demands “one bit.”[17] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on December 26 that Russia will not retreat from its positions, goals, and objectives and emphasized that the Russian leadership has affirmed this position “every day.” Zakharova noted that current US-Russian talks reflect the understandings that the Kremlin claims were reached at the Alaska Summit in August 2025. Zakharova also specifically called US-Russian discussions “contacts,” stating that “some call it a negotiation process” but “others call it contacts,” supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin sees its “offers” as ultimata and does not see itself participating in an actual negotiations process.[18] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated on December 26 that several provisions in the publicly available US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan are “a priori unacceptable” and called on the United States to adhere to the “spirit of Anchorage” in order to achieve real progress to end the war.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 26 to CNN that Ukraine ceding the rest of Donetsk Oblast to Russia “could contribute significantly” to a peace deal — implying that such a Ukrainian concession would not be sufficient for Russia to end its war and effectively rejecting the key point of the 20-point peace plan on freezing the current frontline.[20] No public agreements emerged from the Alaska Summit and US President Donald Trump stated at the time that the parties had not reached a deal.[21] Russian officials subsequently claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian MFA, in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO before the start of negotiations.[22]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is intensifying its efforts to cover up recent Russian failures in Kupyansk amid ongoing widespread criticism from Russian milbloggers. The Russian MoD suddenly resumed its publication of detailed situational reports about the Kupyansk direction on December 27 after facing extensive milblogger criticism about Russian military commanders’ and Kremlin officials’ exaggerations and lies about Russian advances in Kupyansk.[23] The Russian MoD posted footage and statements on December 27 from company commanders of the Russian 1427th, 1468th, and 1843rd motorized rifle regiments (all three of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) claiming that elements of the 6th CAA control Kupyansk and that Russian forces are operating in central and northeastern Kupyansk.[24] A Russian military journalist and retired colonel, who frequently contributes to Russian state media reporting on the war, recently observed that Russian state media had decreased its coverage of the Kupyansk direction after Ukrainian successes in the area, even though the Russian MoD had been providing daily, detailed accounts about Kupyansk in late November 2025.[25] The Russian MoD likely leveraged lower ranking commanders in the December 27 reports to try to restore the MoD’s credibility within the Russian information space. The Kremlin is also likely trying to leverage Russian State Duma deputies, who are avidly denying Ukrainian advances, to mitigate the backlash over Kupyansk with the general Russian public. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik accused Ukraine on December 27 of faking Ukrainian control in Kupyansk, for example.[26] The Russian MoD, Kremlin officials, and Russian state media appear to be engaged in a whole-of-government effort to cover up battlefield failures in Kupyansk and to address widespread milblogger and ultranationalists’ criticism of the Kremlin’s false reports.

There is ample evidence to indicate that Ukrainian forces have liberated most of Kupyansk, however. Geolocated footage published on December 16, 20, and 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway and the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway in central Kupyansk.[27] ISW has observed ample geolocated footage in recent weeks indicating Ukrainian advances near and within Kupyansk — in line with statements from Ukrainian officials about Ukrainian successes in the area.[28] Russian milbloggers, including some who have traditionally been hesitant to criticize the Russian MoD, have engaged in an unusual discourse acknowledging Ukraine’s successes and aggressively blaming the MoD for lying about Russian advances.[29] Select Russian milbloggers have tried to downplay or write off Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction, which other milbloggers stated was “manipulative” and diverting attention away from the main problem at hand — the systemic culture of lying in the Russian military.[30] The Russian MoD is likely now doubling down on its efforts to cover up its failures in Kupyansk in order to not weaken Russia’s position in the ongoing peace talks with the United States. The scale of available open-source evidence of Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction, coupled with the uncharacteristically high number of corroborating reports from Russian sources who do not typically discuss Ukrainian battlefield successes, seriously undermine the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort that aims to paint a Russian military victory as inevitable and Ukrainian defenses on the verge of collapse.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with Western partners ahead of his December 28 meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida. Zelensky told journalists on December 27 that he will stop in Canada on December 27 to meet with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.[31] Zelensky stated that European leaders will join his meeting with Carney virtually to discuss the details of the peace plan documents Zelensky will discuss with Trump.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are currently unable to build out a strategic reserve and will therefore likely be constrained to grinding, slow advances at their current rate and scale in the coming year.
Russian forces conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure overnight on December 26 and 27, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast.
A high-ranking Kremlin official explicitly stated that Russia will not deviate from its war demands “one bit.”
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is intensifying its efforts to cover up recent Russian failures in Kupyansk amid ongoing widespread criticism from Russian milbloggers.
There is ample evidence to indicate that Ukrainian forces have liberated most of Kupyansk, however.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with Western partners ahead of his December 28 meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 27 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 26, 2025

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Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated that the Kremlin will not sign any peace agreements to end the war in Ukraine “right now.” Ryabkov stated in a December 24 interview with Russian newswire Interfax that reports about imminent progress in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine should not be interpreted as a sign that Russia is ready to sign any “packages of documents right now.”[1] Ryabkov similarly stated in an interview on Russian state television on December 26 that it is inappropriate to set specific dates for a peace settlement and that there is “no point” in establishing any deadlines to sign a peace agreement.[2] Ryabkov rejected the 20-point peace plan, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shared on December 24 after talks with the United States and Europe, claiming that it “differs radically” from the points Russia has been working on with the United States in recent weeks.[3] Ryabkov also attempted to frame Ukrainian and European contributions to the draft peace plan as an impediment to peace efforts and reiterated Russia’s commitment to continuing its war until the accomplishment of the Kremlin’s goals.[4] The Kremlin’s stated objectives for its war in Ukraine include the destruction of the Ukrainian military, capitulation of the Ukrainian government, and the undermining of Ukraine’s sovereignty.[5] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have been effectively rejecting key points of the 28-point peace plan and signaling that the plan would not serve as the final agreement.[6]

Ryabkov and other Kremlin officials are trying to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the US-Russian Alaska Summit in August 2025 to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine — contrary to US accounts of the summit. Ryabkov stated in the December 24 interview that the framework that Russia and the United States allegedly formed during the Alaska Summit “has no alternative” and that the United States and Russia were able to agree and formalize a framework “generally acceptable” to Russia in the “Anchorage agreement.”[7] Ryabkov stated in the December 26 interview that the alleged framework from Alaska is “fundamental” and “imperative” for Russia and that Russia cannot “go beyond” the boundaries of this framework when considering a peace agreement.[8] Ryabkov added that any peace deal outside of the alleged Alaska framework risks not only the formalization of an “unstable agreement” but also the possibility that the parties will not reach any agreement.[9] The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) similarly claimed in its December 26 report on key foreign policy outcomes in 2025 that the United States and Russia reached an “understanding” in Alaska that could form the framework for addressing the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which the MFA defined as NATO expansion and the claimed discrimination of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine.[10] Putin reportedly stated at the December 25 Russian State Council meeting that he is ready to make the “concessions” he offered during the Alaska Summit – possibly referring to Putin’s reported willingness at the summit to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine that include the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia as a guarantor.[11] No public agreements were issued after the Alaska Summit, but Lavrov subsequently claimed that the parties agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian MFA, in which Putin demanded that Ukraine and the West capitulate to Russia’s original war demands before the start of negotiations.[12] US President Donald Trump notably stated at the press conference following the Alaska Summit, however, that the meeting had been “productive” but that the US and Russian delegations reached “no deal.”[13] The Kremlin’s continued insistence that any future agreement adhere to Russia’s demands is a dismissal of Trump’s renewed peace efforts in recent weeks.

Ryabkov demanded that any peace agreement must completely address the ultimatums that Russia issued to the West in late 2021, demonstrating how Russia is demanding a radical restructuring of the security architecture in all of Europe. Ryabkov responded on December 24 to a question on whether the peace agreement in Ukraine would satisfy Russia’s 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO. Russia demanded “security guarantees” from NATO in late 2021 that would have amounted to the destruction of the NATO alliance and required an overhaul of Europe’s security architecture.[14] The Kremlin also demanded in January 2022 (as part of the extended negotiations on the initial 2021 suite of demands) that NATO roll back to its 1997 borders.[15] Ryabkov responded to the interview question that Russia started its war in Ukraine as a “forceful resolution” of Russia’s “national security challenges,” implying that Russia launched its war because the United States and NATO did not meet Russia’s demands of NATO about NATO itself, Russia’s demands concerning Ukraine notwithstanding. Ryabkov noted that Lavrov again recently mentioned the 2021 ultimatums on December 11 in an effort to convey that Russia must resolve the underlying issues that prompted Russia to issue the 2021 ultimatums in the first place- a statement indicating that Russia likely will not be satisfied with any peace agreement that pertains to only Ukraine and that also does not weaken or destroy NATO.[16] The terms of Russia’s 2021 ultimatums notably contradict provisions of every iteration of the 28-point peace plan, as Russia continues to insist on a rollback of NATO forces already present in eastern Europe, rather than just freezing further NATO expansion as provided in the 28-point plan.[17] The most recent publicly available 20-point plan also included no mention of either NATO expansion or Ukraine’s possible membership in the alliance, although these provisions may be present in the unpublished documents that accompanied the 20-point plan.[18] Ryabkov effectively signaled that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia, nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations. Russia’s goals in Ukraine, therefore, exceed territorial demands such as the seizure of Donetsk Oblast or other objectives that concern only Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Donald Trump on December 28 to continue talks to finalize the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan. Zelensky stated on December 25 that he and members of the Ukrainian negotiating team spoke on the phone with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner.[19] Zelensky stated on December 26 that the 20-point peace plan is 90 percent ready.[20] Zelensky stated that he will meet with Trump on December 28, and Axios reported that Ukrainian official sources stated that the meeting is likely to happen at Mar-a-Lago.[21] Zelensky noted that he is in constant contact with European leaders, who will join the December 28 meeting virtually. Zelensky stated that he and Trump will discuss security guarantees for Ukraine, territorial issues, and Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.[22] Zelensky reported that Ukrainian parliamentary groups are discussing how Ukraine can hold a referendum for the Ukrainian people to decide on “sensitive issues” in a future peace plan.[23] Zelensky noted that the 20-point plan calls for such a referendum and that this was a US initiative. Axios stated that a senior US official stated that Russia has agreed that a temporary ceasefire to allow Ukraine to hold a referendum is necessary.[24] The source reportedly stated that Ukraine is seeking a 60-day ceasefire, but that Russia may demand a shorter ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 26 that Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov spoke on the phone with US representatives following lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev’s recent meetings with the United States in Miami.[25]

Ukrainian forces continue to make tactical gains in Kupyansk, and Russian milbloggers are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian successes. Geolocated footage published on December 24 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in central Kupyansk, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[26] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have advanced in central, western, northwestern, and southern Kupyansk, and one milblogger stated that Russian forces do not maintain positions in central Kupyansk.[27] A milblogger active in Russian crowdfunding efforts stated that Russian forces maintain positions in northeastern Kupyansk but that Ukrainian forces are active in the remaining urban areas.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are operating throughout almost all of Kupyansk and retain control over Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[29] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian advanced near Zapadne and maintain positions southeast of Holubivka (both north of Kupyansk).[30] One milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces have lost control over Kindrashivka, Radkivka (both northwest of Kupyansk), and Myrove (west of Kupyansk).[31] A Russian milblogger stated that recent Ukrainian advances in eastern Kupyansk have made the situation for Russian forces on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River “hopeless” as this was the last area through which Russian forces could supply units on the right bank.[32] The milblogger reported that Russian forces therefore had to immediately abandon a significant portion of their positions on the right bank.

Russian milbloggers continued to blame Russia’s deteriorating situation in Kupyansk on the widespread Russian practice of sending false reports up the chain of command.[33] A Russian milblogger assessed that the Russian military command will need to redeploy additional forces to the Kupyansk sector and adjust their plans to reflect the actual situation – not the “reported situation” – in order to stabilize the area.[34] The milblogger assessed that a rapid turnaround in Russia’s favor is unlikely, however. Another Russian milblogger stated that Russia’s problems with false reports about Kupyansk have been accumulating since Summer 2025, when the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces had semi-encircled Kupyansk and seized a number of settlements to the west.[35] The milblogger stated that Russian forces never established solid and sustainable control over Radkivka, Myrove, and Sobolivka (all northwest and west of Kupyansk), however, and that Ukrainian forces were able to exploit these weak points. The milblogger added that Russian forces only controlled slightly more than half of Kupyansk when the Russian MoD announced the seizure of the town in late November 2025. The Russian milblogger active in crowdfunding efforts amplified footage of a Russian soldier commenting on Kupyansk, stating that you cannot surrender something you have not completely captured.[36]

Some Russian milbloggers, however, downplayed Ukrainian successes in the area, and the situation in Kupyansk is dividing the milblogger community. Some Russian milbloggers reacted to the deteriorating situation by stating that enemy counteroffensive operations are a “natural process” in war.[37] One milblogger claimed that Russia will “of course” experience “unpleasant” events on the front, but that this will not change the war’s final outcome.[38] Another milblogger claimed that Russian defenses in the town are still holding despite other sources’ claims to the contrary.[39] One milblogger minimized widespread reports of Ukrainian successes, claiming that most of Kupyansk is a contested “gray zone” covered by the fog of war.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russia “has not lost” Kupyansk but is engaged in fighting that is extremely difficult given the “geographical complexity” of the area. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces’ chances of stabilizing the situation are currently “out of the question” but that Russian forces should work to recapture lost positions later.[41] The milblogger claimed that Russia “needs” to seize Kupyansk as the frontline may freeze under a future peace settlement, and it is not guaranteed that there will be post-war territorial swaps. The milblogger’s fear of losing the town if the front freezes along the current lines is noteworthy as it demonstrates the way the Kremlin has not socialized Russian society, particularly the milblogger community, to the idea of possible Russian territorial losses.[42]

The scale of Russian milblogger complaints about Kupyansk, including from milbloggers whom the Kremlin has largely coopted in recent years, demonstrates the scale and egregiousness of the Russian military command’s lies about Kupyansk. Russian President Vladimir Putin held multiple public meetings with Russian military commanders in late November and December 2025 that flaunted the claimed seizure of Kupyansk.[43] Putin awarded Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev the Hero of Russia award on December 9, likely for commanding the operation to seize Kupyansk.[44] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed in October 2025 that Russian forces encircled 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk.[45] These public spectacles were part of the wider Kremlin effort to present claimed Russian advances as alleged evidence of the inevitability of a Russian victory in Ukraine. This Kremlin cognitive warfare effort aims to influence the ongoing negotiations by pushing Ukraine and the West to give in to Russia’s demands by arguing that Russian forces are on the verge of a breakthrough while Ukrainian forces are on the verge of collapse. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor even noted that the false reports about Kupyansk “fit seamlessly” into media narratives that Russian forces are “confidently” maintaining the initiative and are inflicting “vastly superior” losses on Ukrainian forces.[46] Another milblogger assessed that Russian commanders’ reports to Putin about Russia’s control of Kupyansk were likely part of a plan to enter the next round of negotiations “on the back of strong news.”[47]

The situation in Kupyansk highlights how Kremlin claims that Russian forces can take all of Donetsk Oblast quickly are not true. Putin and Russian military commanders’ claimed advances are not only purposely exaggerated for informational effects, but Russian military leaders are routinely receiving false reports from the ground about battlefield successes — as Russian milbloggers have long noted.[48] Assessments about Kremlin claims about the quick tempo or relative ease of future Russian advances must take into account the pervasiveness of the culture of lying, both internally within the military and externally in public statements. ISW continues to assess that it will take Russian forces at least another two-to-three years to seize the remainder of Ukrainian-controlled Donetsk Oblast.[49]

The situation in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions continues to show how Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 25 that Ukrainian forces liberated five settlements southeast of Oleksandrivka — Orestopil, Novoselivka, Sosnivka, Khoroshe, and Vorone — during an operation that lasted over 100 days (since at least mid-September).[50] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on December 22 that Ukrainian forces had advanced on the outskirts of Orestopil on a previous date.[51] The Ukrainian counterattacks as part of this activity have likely blunted the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces’ attempts to cross the Vovcha River in the area for the time being.

Geolocated footage published on December 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Hulyaipole.[52] Russian forces reportedly recently seized the headquarters of a Ukrainian battalion in central Hulyaipole.[53] Ukrainian reporting suggests that Russian forces took advantage of Ukrainian tactical mistakes to make this advance within Hulyaipole, similar to how Russian forces exploited tactical Ukrainian errors during a rotation near Ocheretyne in the Avdiivka direction in April 2025 to narrowly penetrate Ukrainian defenses.[54] Recent Russian advances in Hulyaipole are also likely due to Russia’s numerical superiority in the area. Russian forces have concentrated two Russian combined arms armies (CAA) — the 35th and 5th CAAs (both of the Eastern Military District [EMD]) – and the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) to the Hulyaipole area.[55] The prioritization of forces to the effort to seize Hulyaipole, however, likely left other nearby areas, such as the Orestopil-Novoselivka-Khoroshe-Vorone-Sosnivka area, roughly 30 kilometers north of Hulyaipole, vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces have shown that they can advance — although still at a foot pace and at high costs — when they concentrate high quantities of personnel and equipment on a certain sector. ISW assessed that Russian forces achieved a tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025 in part by concentrating and accumulating over several months a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction against relatively smaller Ukrainian forces.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on December 13 that Russian forces are increasingly struggling to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in the 5th CAA’s area of responsibility (AOR) east and northeast of Hulyaipole and in the AOR of the 36th CAA (EMD) in the Oleksandrivka direction.[57] Mashovets assessed that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces will need to regroup or receive troops and materiel reinforcements from other operational directions in order to continue offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military officials continue to claim that Russian forces are continuously making advances along the entire frontline, but Russian failures to protect the flanks while focusing on Hulyaipole belies Russia’s actual ability to do so.[58] Russian efforts to start the battle for the Fortress Belt — Ukraine’s main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — will likely further stretch Russian resources, and Russia will likely need to concentrate even more forces and deprioritize other sectors to try to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast.[59]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces are using Belarusian territory to intensify Russian drone strikes against railway infrastructure in western Ukraine.[60] Zelensky stated on December 26 that Russian forces are using Belarusian territory to bypass Ukrainian drone interception systems and credited the increase in Russian Shahed drone strikes against western Ukraine to Russia’s exploitation of Belarusian territory and technical means to enable Russia to launch these strikes. Zelensky noted the December 26 Russian drone strikes against the Kovel railway station in Volyn Oblast (64 kilometers south of the Belarusian border), which reportedly damaged Lviv Railway’s locomotive and a freight wagon and shattered windows at a locomotive depot workshop.[61] Russian forces recently targeted a freight train near Korosten, Zhytomyr Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers south of the Belarusian border), derailing the freight train and a passenger train.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used Geran (Shahed) drones with artificial intelligence capabilities to strike the freight train, and Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed on December 23 that a Russian drone operator likely located in Belarus (roughly 80 kilometers from the derailed train) used a first-person view (FPV) Shahed drone with online controls to strike the moving train.[63] ISW previously observed Russian forces pursuing locomotives in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts with Shahed and Geran drones that have integrated cameras and radio control capabilities.[64] ISW assessed on December 22 that Russian forces either launched the drones in the Zhytomyr Oblast strike from Belarus or were using a new Russian capability.[65] Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and has used Belarus as a sanctuary from which to conduct strikes and launch its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[66] Russia will likely continue to develop its military capabilities in Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine and set conditions to use Belarus for any future military contingency with NATO.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov appears to be trying to replicate the Ukrainian model with the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). BBC Russia reported on December 26 that sources in the Russian drone industry confirmed multiple Russian milblogger reports that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Vaganov as the commander of the USF.[67] Vaganov sold plumbing fixtures before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and began delivering humanitarian aid to residents in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 2022. Vaganov became one of the main suppliers of first-person view (FPV) drones to the Russian military, having based his production on the Sudoplatov Battalion volunteer group. The Sudoplatov Battalion produces drones and trains drone operators, eventually becoming an official drone supplier of the Russian MoD.[68] BBC Russia noted that an award ceremony in October 2025 introduced Vaganov as an advisor to the Russian deputy defense minister for armaments. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi was similarly a businessman with experience in construction, industry, and agriculture before the full-scale invasion.[69] Belousov, who previously served as the Russian Minister of Economic Development, also did not have military experience before becoming the defense minister.[70] Belousov is likely bringing in people with business backgrounds who can apply their skills to the Russian military’s efforts to scale up drone production and procurement.

The Russian military command continues efforts to integrate new drone units into the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on December 25 that it formed a new regiment within the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).[71] The Russian MoD claimed that the regiment began training to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and operate unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) at a training ground in the Moscow Military District (MMD). The MoD published footage of a servicemember of the new regiment with an MMD patch, indicating that the new regiment is directly subordinated to the MMD and is intended to operate as a Grouping of Forces-level unit, similar to the 7th Unmanned Systems Regiment that is reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces.[72] A Russian milblogger recently claimed that the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) is also forming a new separate drone battalion based in occupied Kherson Oblast.[73] ISW previously observed that the 3rd Separate Drofa Drone Battalion and the Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion are directly subordinated to CAAs.[74]

Key Takeaways

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated that the Kremlin will not sign any peace agreements to end the war in Ukraine “right now.”
Ryabkov and other Kremlin officials are trying to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the US-Russian Alaska Summit in August 2025 to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine — contrary to US accounts of the summit.
Ryabkov demanded that any peace agreement must completely address the ultimatums that Russia issued to the West in late 2021, demonstrating how Russia is demanding a radical restructuring of the security architecture in all of Europe.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Donald Trump on December 28 to continue talks to finalize the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan.
Ukrainian forces continue to make tactical gains in Kupyansk, and Russian milbloggers are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian successes.
Russian milbloggers continued to blame Russia’s deteriorating situation in Kupyansk on the widespread Russian practice of sending false reports up the chain of command.
The scale of Russian milblogger complaints about Kupyansk, including from milbloggers whom the Kremlin has largely coopted in recent years, demonstrates the scale and egregiousness of the Russian military command’s lies about Kupyansk.
The situation in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions continues to show how Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces are using Belarusian territory to intensify Russian drone strikes against railway infrastructure in western Ukraine.
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov appears to be trying to replicate the Ukrainian model with the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).
The Russian military command continues efforts to integrate new drone units into the Russian military.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, western Zaporizhia Oblast, and near Siversk and Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 26 report

In observance of Christmas Day, ISW did not publish on December 25

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 24, 2025

Toplines

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky released the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan on December 23, which the United States will reportedly present to Russia.[1] The 20-point plan appears to summarize the US-Ukrainian-European proposals, and Zelensky stated that there are three additional, unpublished documents: a US-Ukrainian-European document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine; a US-Ukrainian document about the US military’s role in security guarantees that includes a detailed plan of action and response mechanisms in the event of renewed Russian aggression; and a US-Ukrainian document called the “Roadmap for Ukraine’s Prosperity” outlining Ukraine’s post-war recovery and economic development.[2] The 20-point plan appears to include points that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe have largely agreed upon, but Zelensky noted that some points, including issues related to control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and mechanisms to create a demilitarized zone or “free economic zone” in Donetsk Oblast, remain unresolved and still under discussion.[3]

The 20-point plan differs from the November 2025 28-point plan in significant ways. The 28-point plan called for Ukraine to withdraw from the remainder of unoccupied Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), for the creation of a demilitarized zone in Donbas that would be internationally recognized as de facto Russian territory, and for the war to freeze along the current frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[4] The 28-point plan also capped the Ukrainian military during peacetime at 600,000 personnel and called for Ukraine to abandon its efforts to seek NATO membership. The 20-point plan, in contrast, calls for the war to freeze in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts along the frontline as of the date of the agreement’s signing; caps Ukraine’s peacetime military at 800,000; and does not mention Ukraine’s possible NATO membership.[5] References to Ukrainian NATO membership may be in the other unpublished documents, however.

The Kremlin will need to compromise on demands it has long insisted on, including many that are incompatible not only with the latest 20-point peace plan but also with the initial 28-point plan. US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker stated on December 23 on Fox News that “the ball is currently in [Russia’s] court” to respond to the four documents that emerged from the recent US-Ukrainian-European talks.[6] Whitaker noted that the high casualties that Russian forces have been taking in exchange for “very small” gains on the battlefield have not been pushing the Kremlin to try to end the war. The Kremlin has already signaled that it is not interested in accepting Ukrainian or European counterproposals to any peace agreement, with Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stating on December 21 (before the publication of the 20-point plan) that he is “certain” that the proposals that Ukrainian and European delegations made during their talks with the US delegation in Miami would be “rather unconstructive” and not “improve” the then proposed settlement agreement.[7] The Kremlin has repeatedly made demands that are incompatible with many proposals in the 20-point plan and shown that it is not interested in a resolution based on compromises, like the ones the latest document seems to embody. Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined as recently as December 19 his commitment to the demands he laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations and commitment to neutrality; Ukraine’s demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), Ukraine’s denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government), international recognition of Russia’s annexations of the four Ukrainian oblasts and Crimea in international agreements; and the lifting of all Western sanctions against Russia.[8] Putin’s June 2024 demands essentially repeated his demands from the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Kremlin officials have also claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding based on Putin’s June 2024 demands during the August 2025 summit in Alaska, but no publicly available agreements emerged from the summit.[9] The Kremlin’s continued references to the June 2024 speech and alleged agreements from Alaska demonstrate the Kremlin’s rejection of the proposals in the 28- and 20-point plans to freeze the current lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts or in all four oblasts.

Statements from Russian State Duma deputies and insider sources about Russia’s likely discontent with the latest proposals are in line with Kremlin statements and messaging in recent weeks about Russia’s demands and uncompromising negotiating position. The Kremlin has not officially and publicly responded to the latest US-Ukrainian-European peace proposal as of this writing. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa criticized the plan’s lack of a provision prohibiting Ukrainian membership in NATO and rejected proposals about Ukrainian participation in the management of the ZNPP.[10] Chepa stated that Russia will make significant adjustments to the clause on territories, the current version of which Chepa noted will not satisfy the Kremlin. Bloomberg reported on December 24 that a source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia will likely seek changes to the 20-point plan as the plan lacks provisions that are important to Russia.[11] The source reportedly stated that Russia’s concerns about the document include the lack of guarantees prohibiting NATO’s eastward expansion, insufficient limits on Ukraine’s peacetime military forces and weapons, the lack of provisions about Ukraine’s neutral status should Ukraine join the EU, and the lack of assurances about the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that the source stated that the Kremlin also wants provisions on frozen Russian assets and the removal of Western sanctions in the peace proposal. The Kremlin has repeatedly called for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged “root causes” of the war, which the Kremlin defines as NATO expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[12] Russia’s demonstrated unwillingness to engage in compromises and its unwavering commitment to achieving its original war goals from 2022 suggest that the prospects for this peace agreement to end the war remain low at this time.

Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers are acknowledging significant Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction and criticizing the Kremlin and the Russian military command for providing false battlefield reports. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger retroactively claimed on December 24 that Russian forces lost a significant part of their bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River as Ukrainian forces regained positions immediately north and northwest of Kupyansk in Kindrashivka and Radkivka, and on the outskirts of Myrove on a prior unspecified date.[13] The milblogger noted that the three settlements were the only settlements that Russian forces controlled prior to the launch of Ukrainian counterattacks in recent weeks, despite Russian military officials claiming control over 11 settlements in the area. The milblogger published a refined map that refuted previous Russian claims and showed that Ukrainian forces maintained or regained positions north of Kupyansk in Dovhenke, southeast of Zapadne, and northeast of Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk in the area northeast of Holubivka; east of Kupyansk in, northeast of, and southeast of Petropavlivka and in Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk in, northeast of, east of, and south of Pishchane and in Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk in the area east and northwest of Kolisnykivka.[14] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for exaggerating Russian gains in and around Kupyansk and for prematurely redeploying reserves from the Kupyansk direction to reinforce other frontline sectors, leaving the town vulnerable to Ukrainian infiltrations. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command similarly tried to exaggerate successes in the Siversk direction in 2024. Another Russian milblogger claimed, citing sources in the Russian 112th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]), that Russian forces had “lost” Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces cut off elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) from their ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[15] A prominent milblogger involved in Russian crowdfunding efforts stated that local Russian reports suggest that Russian positions continue to deteriorate as Ukrainian forces achieved successes in Myrove, Radkivka, and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[16] Russian milbloggers, therefore, have acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have liberated or maintained positions in 182.64 square kilometers in the Kupyansk direction since December 11.

Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that information is emerging about the “real state of affairs” in the Kupyansk direction and that the Russian military command has been blatantly “lying” to the “very, very top,” referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[17] The milblogger stated that the Russian military command is exaggerating Russian successes in a “number of areas” along the front. A Russian military journalist and retired colonel, who frequently contributes to Russian state media reporting on the war, stated that the situation in Kupyansk is challenging for Russian forces as Ukrainian forces continue to infiltrate in an effort to regain positions on the west bank of the Oskil River.[18] The journalist observed that Russian state media has deliberately decreased its coverage of the Kupyansk direction despite the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had been providing detailed accounts about Kupyansk in late November 2025. The journalist stated that the Russian MoD has turned to reporting only “dry statistical reports” that are not useful. The prominent milblogger involved in Russian crowdfunding efforts claimed that exaggerated or false reports of Russian advances in Kupyansk misled the Russian military command into issuing inappropriate orders, such as redeploying reserves before Russian forces consolidated positions in the Kupyansk direction and ultimately undermined Russian forces’ operational effectiveness.[19] The milblogger also accused the Kremlin of stopping compensations for Russian servicemembers fighting in Kupyansk after “rosy” reports that Russian forces had “captured everything” in the area became official.[20] A Russian milblogger covering the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian commanders tailor their reports at each command level in an effort to appease the expectations of senior commanders and officials, creating an inefficient system that undermines decision-making.[21] The widespread milblogger criticism of the Kremlin’s and the Russian military command’s false and exaggerated claims in Kupyansk further exposes how the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare effort, which aims to paint Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse and major Russian battlefield victories as inevitable, does not reflect the battlefield realities.[22]

Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Russia’s failures in Kupyansk indicate that Russia does not have sufficient manpower or materiel to imminently defeat the northern part of the Fortress Belt while simultaneously continuing offensive operations elsewhere. The Fortress Belt refers to Ukraine’s main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 that includes four cities — Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka.[23] The Russian milblogger covering the Russian Western GoF implied that the Russian failure to seize Kupyansk, continue advances in the area, and further develop the ongoing Lyman offensive before 2026 is fixing a significant number of Russian troops in the area.[24] The milblogger claimed that multiple Russian units failed to meet their objectives. The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) did not fully seize Kupyansk nor reach the Blahodativka-Nechvolodivka line (southwest of Kupyansk); that elements of the 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) did not start assaults against Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk); that elements of the 423rd Motorized Riffle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) failed to seize Korovii Yar, Yarova, and Sosnove (all northwest of Lyman); and that elements of the 19th Tank Regiment and 31st and 36th motorized rifle regiments (all three of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) did not seize Lyman.[25] The milblogger noted that Russian attempts to conduct multi-pronged offensives are preventing Russian forces from “methodically” breaking Ukrainian defenses in one priority area. The prominent milblogger involved in Russian crowdfunding efforts claimed that Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction will prevent Russian forces from exploiting recent Russian advances near Lyman and Siversk, thus inhibiting Russia’s offensive toward Slovyansk.[26] The milblogger added that Russian forces will need to cross the Siverskyi Donets River in the Lyman direction to reach Slovyansk and will need to protect their flanks from Ukrainian forces in Izyum. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces are unable to develop the Slovyansk offensive from the Siversk direction because they do not have a sufficient number of troops to conduct a frontal assault against Slovyansk. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command’s redeployment of reserves from the Kupyansk direction to other sectors and Russian failures in Kupyansk show that Russian forces are unable to secure positions in previously seized areas without additional reserves.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain the Kremlin’s desired multi-pronged offensives in different directions due to the long-term materiel and manpower costs of these simultaneous operations.[27] Russian efforts to start the battle for the Fortress Belt will likely further stretch Russian resources, and Russia will likely need to deprioritize other frontline sectors in order to concentrate even more forces to the Fortress Belt area. The Kremlin is therefore making demands in negotiations that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast, likely in order to save Russia the personnel and materiel resources and possibly to put Russia in a more advantageous position to re-invade in the future to pursue Putin’s longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in Ukraine and particularly targeted critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast overnight on December 23 and 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 116 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones — of which roughly 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[28] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 60 drones in northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces directed a significant number of drones against critical infrastructure facilities in Chernihiv Oblast and that 48 drones struck 19 locations as of 0830 local time. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported power outages in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts following the overnight strikes.[29] Chernihiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck critical and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv Raion on the evening of December 23 and on December 24, causing tens of thousands of Chernihiv Oblast residents to lose power.[30] Chernihiv City officials also reported that Russian forces struck an apartment building and at least two other locations in the city, possibly with a jet-propelled Shahed drone.[31] Kharkiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck a thermal power plant (TPP) in the Kharkiv City suburbs, possibly with a Tornado multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), killing at least one person and injuring 13, and damaging a nearby transportation enterprise.[32] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that the strike disrupted power generation, heat supplies, and transport in the city and that serious damage to the TPP forced the city to switch to providing power via “energy islands.”[33] Kherson City Military Administration Head Yaroslav Shanko also reported that Russian forces struck critical and residential infrastructure in Kherson City, killing at least one person and injuring another.[34] Ukrainian oil and natural gas extracting company Ukrnafta reported that Russian forces launched almost 100 strike drones against Ukrnafta’s production facilities between December 22 and 24, causing damage to equipment and forcing Ukrnafta to temporarily stop some production.[35] Russia’s December 23 to 24 strikes follow the large-scale combined missile and drone strikes that primarily impacted energy infrastructure in western Ukraine on December 22 to 23.[36] Russian consecutive strikes on energy infrastructure in western and eastern Ukraine are likely part of the Russian ongoing campaign to split Ukraine’s energy grid in half.[37]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky released the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan on December 23, which the United States will reportedly present to Russia.
The Kremlin will need to compromise on demands it has long insisted on, including many that are incompatible not only with the latest 20-point peace plan but also with the initial 28-point plan.
Statements from Russian State Duma deputies and insider sources about Russia’s likely discontent with the latest proposals are in line with Kremlin statements and messaging in recent weeks about Russia’s demands and uncompromising negotiating position.
Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers are acknowledging significant Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction and criticizing the Kremlin and the Russian military command for providing false battlefield reports.
Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Russia’s failures in Kupyansk indicate that Russia does not have sufficient manpower or materiel to imminently defeat the northern part of the Fortress Belt while simultaneously continuing offensive operations elsewhere.
Russian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in Ukraine and particularly targeted critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast overnight on December 23 and 24.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 24 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2025

Toplines

Russia conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on December 22 and 23, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure using 635 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones (of which around 400 were Shaheds); three Kinzhal Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles; and 35 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 587 drones and 34 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles as of 1130 local time; that the three Kinzhal missiles did not reach their targets; and that 39 strike drones struck 21 locations while drone debris fell in eight locations.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat credited Ukrainian F-16 fighter aircraft with shooting down most of the Russian cruise missiles.[3] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that the attack primarily damaged energy infrastructure in western Ukraine.[4] Ukrainian regional officials reported that Russian forces struck critical and energy infrastructure in Novohrod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; Shostka, Sumy Oblast; and Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Lviv oblasts.[5] Ukrainian Acting Energy Minister Artem Nekrasov stated that Russian strikes caused nearly full power outages in Rivne, Ternopil, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and milder power outages in Vinnytsia, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.[6] The Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo stated that the December 22 to 23 strike is the ninth large-scale Russian combined strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of 2025, and Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that the strike marked the seventh large-scale attack on DTEK’s thermal power plants (TPPs) since October 2025.[7]

Ukrainian officials reported that drone debris fell in Svyatoshynskyi Raion, Kyiv City and injured five people, and that Russian strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast killed one person and injured three.[8] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian strikes killed one child and injured five people in Zhytomyr Oblast; damaged a two-story apartment building in Rivne Oblast; and damaged 14 residential buildings in Vinnytsia Oblast.[9] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian forces targeted energy, port, transport, industrial, and residential infrastructure in Odesa Oblast – damaging 112 buildings, causing power outages, and striking an empty storage facility.[10] Ukraine’s Sea Port Administration also reported that Russian strikes damaged a civilian Lebanese-flagged vessel that was transporting Ukrainian soy in Odesa City port and Reniyskyi port infrastructure (southwest of Odesa City).[11] Zaporizhstal (Zaporizhzhia Steel Works) metallurgical plant announced that it temporarily stopped production after losing power.[12] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted that Russia launched the combined strike after rejecting the US and German-proposed Christmas ceasefire, and Zelensky emphasized Ukraine’s need for additional Western air defense systems.[13]

Russian forces conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and a reduced-platoon sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka direction on December 22. Ukraine’s 1st Azov Army Corps [AC] reported that Russian naval infantry forces conducted a series of mechanized assaults moving along different routes in the Dobropillya direction on the morning of December 22.[14] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that elements of the Russian Pacific Fleet’s 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (recently reformed into the 55th Naval Infantry Division) conducted the assaults with a total of 24 armored vehicles and dozens of motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[15] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Russian forces moved in four armored columns during the attack.[16] The 1st AC reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed six tanks, nine infantry fighting vehicles, five armored personnel carriers, and one armored repair and recovery vehicle. The 1st AC reported that Russian forces used ATVs in the final assault phase and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 10 out of 11 ATVs. The 1st AC noted that Ukrainian forces used a combination of strike drones, tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), small arms, and land mines to repel the assaults. Geolocated footage of the assault shows destroyed Russian vehicles near Razine and Fedorivka (both southeast of Dobropillya and northeast of Pokrovsk).[17]

Two Ukrainian brigades operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces conducted a reduced-platoon mechanized assault from the directions of Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka), Shcherbynivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and Ivanopillya (north of Shcherbynivka) on December 22.[18] One of the Ukrainian brigades reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the two tanks and three all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) involved in the assault.[19] Geolocated footage of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kostyantynivka and likely seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka) on a prior date.[20]

Combat footage showing failed Russian mechanized assaults continue to demonstrate that Russian forces have been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for conducting the mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction, noting that Russian forces do not currently have the capability to successfully maneuver in mechanized columns. One milblogger claimed that the density of Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone and artillery strikes is such that even heavily protected vehicles cannot withstand multiple hits and are eventually immobilized.[21] The milblogger noted that experience has “repeatedly shown” that mechanized assaults during daylight hours and good weather conditions without concealment from fog “rarely lead to anything good.” Another milblogger criticized the mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and implied that Lieutenant General Sukrab Akhmedov, the former commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and later the 20th Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), commanded the mechanized assault.[22] The Russian military command reportedly removed Akhmedov from command of the 20th CAA in May 2024 after complaints that he commanded the Russian attritional assaults near Vuhledar in Winter 2022-2023 as the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade commander or his role in significant casualties after a Ukrainian rear strike in Summer 2023.[23] The milblogger complained that Akhmedov now “received even more power” and formed several naval infantry columns near Dobropillya.[24] The milblogger noted that the nature of the battlefield situation in the Dobropillya sector – and the wider frontline in the current war – means that groups larger than two soldiers would lead to “deadly consequences” as both Ukrainian and Russian drones have the immediate rear under “total surveillance.” The milblogger stated that Russian forces can only ensure advances via their ongoing infiltration tactics using groups of one to two personnel who move on foot to concealed rally points areas before launching subsequent attacks. Another milblogger questioned why Russian forces are still using mechanized columns after achieving some battlefield successes recently using infiltration tactics.[25] The milblogger noted that a breakthrough with heavy armored vehicles requires proper planning, condition setting, and comprehensive support, such as the destruction of Ukrainian drone crews, adequate counterbattery fire to a significant depth, and coordination between units across a wide area. The milblogger particularly noted Ukraine’s ability to strike the depth of the Russian Dobropillya salient from positions north of Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk and observed that rivers and the lack of bridges, anti-tank ditches, and lowlands in the area also constrain Russia’s ability to maneuver.

Russian gains likely will continue to be constrained to a slow foot pace, and any sudden Russian operational-level breakthrough remains unlikely. Russian forces have been relying on infiltration tactics to make tactical gains across the front in recent months.[26] Ukrainian forces have been reliably defeating Russia’s periodic attempts to conduct mechanized assaults at and above the platoon level. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have optimized for positional warfare in Ukraine, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s December 17 statements about Russian technological and tactical adaptations in 2025 enforced this assessment.[27] Russian gains across the theater – even in areas of relatively more rapid advances – have been limited to a foot pace, and Russia’s inability to conduct mechanized assaults that result in large-scale gains confirms that Russian forces will be unable to make rapid breakthroughs and collapse Ukrainian defenses. The Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort that aims to paint Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse and major Russian battlefield victories as inevitable does not reflect the battlefield realities about the ongoing nature and tempo of Russian advances.[28]

The Russian Baltic Fleet is reportedly reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 120th Naval Infantry Division – the ninth new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.[29] The Kaliningrad Oblast-based Russkiy Zapad media outlet reported on December 2 that the Russian Baltic Fleet is reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 120th Naval Infantry Division and that the division will have the 336th Naval Infantry Regiment.[30] Russkiy Zapad reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had already begun reforming the brigade on an unspecified prior date. The Russian MoD indirectly confirmed on December 22 that the Russian Baltic Fleet is forming a new division and that elements of the division are undergoing intensive training at the Khmelevka Training Ground, Kaliningrad Oblast.[31] An OSINT analyst observed that elements of the 120th Naval Infantry Division is currently operating near Shakhove in the Dobropillya direction alongside the recently reformed 55th Naval Infantry Division (formerly 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, Pacific Fleet), 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet), and 117th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla).[32] Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako earlier announced that the Pacific Fleet reformed the 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Naval Infantry Division on December 1.[33] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that the Russian military command intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including by expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[34] ISW has observed evidence to support the formation and combat deployment of at least nine new Russian divisions since December 2022.[35] The Russian military command has formed the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 27th, 68th, 69th, and 71st motorized rifle divisions from previously existing brigades, the 55th Naval infantry Division, and the new 67th, 70th, and 72nd motorized rifle divisions since December 2022. ISW continues to assess that the expansion of Russian conventional forces and the Russian military’s larger force structure reform back to maneuver divisions is in line with Russia’s preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future, as the Russian military command likely assesses that the Russian military will require more mass and higher echelon formations to wage effective combat operations.[36]

Key Takeaways

Russia conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on December 22 and 23, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in western Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and a reduced-platoon sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka direction on December 22.
Combat footage showing failed Russian mechanized assaults continue to demonstrate that Russian forces have been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.
Russian gains likely will continue to be constrained to a slow foot pace, and any sudden Russian operational-level breakthrough remains unlikely.
The Russian Baltic Fleet is reportedly reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 120th Naval Infantry Division – the ninth new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full DEC 23 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 22, 2025

Toplines

False reports are likely shaping Russian President Vladimir Putin’s understanding of the battlefield situation. The Financial Times (FT) reported on December 22 that two unspecified officials stated that Russian military and security authorities regularly give Putin updates that inflate Ukrainian battlefield casualties, highlight Russia’s resource advantages, and downplay tactical failures.[1] FT reported that Russian Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, is responsible for briefing Putin about the war. The sources reportedly stated that the “rosy picture” that military officials paint during their briefs has led Putin to believe that Russia can win the war. FT stated that the sources noted that Putin regularly meets with “confidants” who tell him that the war has become a “growing drag” on the Russian economy, however. The Washington Post reported on December 22 that a Russian official stated that a banking or non-payments crisis in Russia is possible and that they do not “want to think about a continuation of the war or an escalation.”[2] A Russian academic source close to senior Kremlin diplomats told the Washington Post that 2026 will be the “first difficult year” since the start of the full scale invasion but assessed that growing economic problems will not lead to social or political problems.

FT and the Washington Post‘s reports cohere with ISW’s observations from open source information about the pervasive culture of lying in the Russian military, in contrast with the increased willingness of Kremlin officials overseeing the economy to present more truthful reports to Putin. High ranking Russian military officials, including Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, recently publicly briefed Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the battlefield situation, providing exaggerated and false reports about Russian gains.[3] On December 18, Gerasimov presented even more exaggerated reports than Belousov did on December 17, suggesting that Russian military officials may be competing with each other to present Putin with optimistic reports. Russian milbloggers have long complained about commanders submitting “beautiful” but erroneous reports to their superiors that subsequently result in unnecessary losses, indicating that false reports are affecting the chain of command in the Russian military broadly.[4] Russian officials, such as Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, in contrast, have provided more sober and downbeat public statements about issues affecting the Russian economy, including by acknowledging that Russia had exhausted many of its “free resources” throughout the war and that the share of the Russian federal budget from oil and gas revenues is significantly dropping.[5]

Putin’s own cognitive warfare effort, which exaggerates Russian advances to push Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands during negotiations, feeds on and likely encourages the false reports his military officials provide him. The inaccurate battlefield reports that Putin receives are likely confirming for him his long-held theory of victory in Ukraine, which assumes that the Russian military and economy can outlast Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine.[6] Putin, believing that Russia can win a war of attrition, has repeatedly rejected peace proposals short of his demands and continues to declare his willingness to continue hostilities to achieve his war aims militarily.[7] Kremlin officials have been engaged in a cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing the ongoing negotiations to achieve Russia’s demands through diplomatic means.[8] Kremlin officials have been publicly presenting exaggerated claims of Russian advances as alleged evidence of the inevitability of a Russian military victory in Ukraine. Putin notably presented even more exaggerated claims of battlefield successes on December 19 than either Belousov or Gerasimov did, suggesting that Putin himself is exaggerating the already inflated battlefield reports he receives as part of this cognitive warfare effort.

Senior US and Ukrainian officials commented on the outcome of separate meetings between US and Ukrainian as well as US and Russian representatives in Miami. US Vice President JD Vance stated on December 22 that negotiations have yet to resolve issues about the future of Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk Oblast, the control of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the status of Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied territories and ethnic Russians in Ukraine, and the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine.[9] Vance observed that Russia “really wants” to control all of Donetsk Oblast, a demand that Vance noted would “understandably” pose a “major security problem” for Ukraine and would take Russian forces a year or more to achieve militarily. ISW continues to assess that it would likely take Russia at least two to three years of difficult and costly battles to militarily seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast at the current tempo.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on December 22 that Ukrainian and US delegations have completed 90 percent of the “first developments” in negotiations and have a concrete but unfinalized 20-point plan.[11] Zelensky stated that the plan includes a document on security guarantees with secret clauses and details on postwar military support for the Ukrainian military that the US Senate would have to ratify. Zelensky stated that the parties have also completed a first draft of an agreement on Ukraine’s reconstruction. The November 23 Ukraine-Europe-US talks in Geneva resulted in a 19- and then 20-point plan, which is likely the basis of the 20-point plan that Zelensky referenced.[12]
Ukrainian officials also continue to work toward establishing legal mechanisms to hold elections in Ukraine during martial law, something that both the US and the Kremlin have been calling for, although the Kremlin is now signaling that it will not recognize Ukrainian elections that it cannot easily manipulate.[13] Head of the Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Davyd Arakhamia announced on December 22 that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada is forming a working group on holding elections during martial law.[14] Ukraine’s Constitution and law notably prohibit Ukraine from holding elections during martial law, which the statute prohibits the Ukrainian government from lifting while Ukraine remains under attack.[15] Ukraine’s efforts to hold elections are in line with the initial US-proposed 28-point plan.[16]

Russia reportedly rejected a US-proposed temporary ceasefire, and a high ranking Kremlin official publicly indicated that Russia will reject many of the latest Ukrainian and European peace proposals. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 22 that Russia rejected a Christmas ceasefire that the United States had proposed to serve as a signal that both parties were interested in finding a diplomatic solution to end the war.[17] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Russia’s position is clear and that Russia does not support a temporary ceasefire.[18] Ryabkov called for a permanent ceasefire as part of an agreement that eliminates the alleged “root causes” of the war (a term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand to mean its original war justifications and demands). Ryabkov also called for a peace settlement to guarantee the results of Russia’s sham and illegal referendums in occupied Ukraine in 2022 and the Russian Constitution’s inclusion of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of the Russian Federation.
Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 21 that the Kremlin will decide which proposals Russia can accept and which Russia must “absolutely” reject when lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev reports back about his recent meetings with the US delegation in Miami.[19] Ushakov stated that he is “certain” that the proposals that Ukrainian and European delegations made during their talks with the US delegation in Miami are “rather unconstructive” and do not “improve” the proposed settlement agreement.[20] Ushakov stated that Russia will adhere to the agreements it allegedly made with the United States during the August 2025 Alaska Summit and at other unspecified meetings with US delegations.[21] No agreements from the Alaska Summit were made public, but Kremlin officials have recently claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding at the meeting based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech, in which Putin reiterated his original war demands and called for Ukraine to withdraw entirely from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and abandon its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aspirations.[22] Repeated Russian references to the June 2024 speech signal the Kremlin’s rejection of the original 28-point plan that called for freezing the current lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.

Ryabkov claimed on December 22 that Russia is ready to legally formalize its intention not to attack European Union (EU) or NATO states in a future resolution to end the war in Ukraine.[23] The 1994 Budapest Memorandum formalized Russia’s commitment not only to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity but also to take action in the event of any aggression against Ukraine in return for the Soviet nuclear weapons then on Ukraine’s territory.[24] Putin has repeatedly shown his willingness to change Russian law to serve his own purposes, including by changing the Russian Constitution in 2020 to allow him to continue to hold the presidency. The Kremlin’s pattern of violating international agreements and modifying its own constitution demonstrates the hollowness of such Russian promises and highlights the need for robust security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent renewed Russian aggression.

Ukrainian security services likely assassinated Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff’s Operational Training Department, in Moscow City on December 22. The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) reported on December 22 that unknown actors detonated a car bomb, killing Sarvarov in Moscow City.[25] Sledkom claimed that Ukrainian security services may have been involved in Sarvarov’s assassination.[26] Ukrainian security services killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Moscow on December 17, and unknown actors similarly detonated an IED on a vehicle to kill deputy head of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.[27]

Russian security services likely assassinated former leader of the Russian Hispaniola Brigade Stanislav Orlov in occupied Crimea on December 4. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on December 22 that it obtained surveillance footage from emergency services in occupied Crimea showing four vehicles arriving at Orlov’s residence in Sevastopol on December 4.[28] The vehicles had black plates, which Astra implied usually belong to Russian military or security personnel. Astra observed masked men with machine guns leave the vehicles and reported that Orlov’s neighbors heard several rounds of gunshots. Astra reported that the footage later showed ambulances arriving without any flashing lights or sirens to remove Orlov’s body. Astra’s sources claimed that Russian security services suspected Orlov of arms trafficking and participating in an organized crime group and that Russian officials earlier arrested another well known former commander of the Hispaniola Naval Detachment on the same charges several weeks ago. Orlov was a prominent Russian ultranationalist who had fought in eastern Ukraine since 2014 alongside other prominent ultranationalists, such as Alexander Khodakovsky. Orlov participated in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and fought in the Second Chechen War. Orlov created the Hispaniola Detachment, which was composed of ultranationalists, football fans, and former Russian veterans, as part of Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) militia in spring 2022. Astra reported that the Hispaniola Detachment later became the Hispaniola Separate Private Military Group (also known as the 88th Hispaniola Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade under the Russian Volunteer Corps) until the Kremlin suddenly disbanded the unit in October 2025. ISW last observed elements of the Naval Spetsnaz Detachment of the 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade operating in occupied Crimea in late October 2025.[29]

Key Takeaways

False reports are likely shaping Russian President Vladimir Putin’s understanding of the battlefield situation.
FT and the Washington Post’s reports cohere with ISW’s observations from open-source information about the pervasive culture of lying in the Russian military, in contrast with the increased willingness of Kremlin officials overseeing the economy to present more truthful reports to Putin.
Putin’s own cognitive warfare effort, which exaggerates Russian advances to push Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands during negotiations, feeds on and likely encourages the false reports his military officials provide him.
Senior US and Ukrainian officials commented on the outcome of separate meetings between US and Ukrainian as well as US and Russian representatives in Miami.
Russia reportedly rejected a US-proposed temporary ceasefire, and a high ranking Kremlin official publicly indicated that Russia will reject many of the latest Ukrainian and European peace proposals.
Ukrainian security services likely assassinated Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff’s Operational Training Department, in Moscow City on December 22.
Russian security services likely assassinated former leader of the Russian Hispaniola Brigade Stanislav Orlov in occupied Crimea on December 4.
Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full DEC 22 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 21, 2025

Toplines

Russian forces are conducting a new cognitive warfare campaign through limited cross-border attacks across a broad part of the previously dormant northern frontline in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Ukrainian authorities reported on December 20 and 21 that Russian forces entered Hrabovske, Sumy Oblast (a small rural village southeast of Sumy City along the international border) overnight on December 19 to 20, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on December 20 and 21 that elements of the Russian had seized Hrabovske and Vysoke (immediately south of Hrabovske).[1] Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Communications Directorate Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on December 21 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from several positions near Hrabovske and are working to stabilize the area.[2] Available evidence indicates that Russian forces have likely seized Hrabovske. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Hrabovske is a contested “gray zone” that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces currently control, however.[3] Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces advanced across the international border into Hrabovske under the cover of night and fog and also entered Ryasne (immediately west of Hrabovske).[4] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force acknowledged on December 21 that fighting continues for Hrabovske but rejected reports that Russian forces had entered Ryasne.[5] Russian sources credited elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the seizure of Hrabovske.[6]

Russian forces also conducted a geographically separate across-border attack against another small rural border village in Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on December 21 shows Russian infantry (about two squads totaling around 15 infantry) attacking Ukrainian positions in northern Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City, about 15 kilometers east of Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast, and less than half a kilometer from the international border), and a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the border area reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault.[7]

These two cross-border attacks likely intend to advance the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare campaign to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing, such that Ukraine should concede to all of Russia’s demands. The Kremlin likely intends to portray these limited cross-border attacks against small rural border villages in long-dormant areas of the international border as part of a broad new Russian offensive to reinforce a false narrative that Ukraine’s frontline is collapsing across the theater. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on December 17 that Russia will achieve all of its war goals militarily if it cannot do so diplomatically, including the creation and expansion of a “buffer zone” in Ukraine.[8] Putin first proposed creating a “buffer zone” in Ukraine in June 2023 following limited Ukrainian cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast.[9] The Kremlin has since invoked the concept of this buffer zone multiple times to signal broader territorial demands in northern Ukraine, including Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, likely to set conditions to later demand that Ukraine cede some or all of this territory due to Russia’s alleged need for a buffer zone.[10] The Kremlin will likely seek to use these attacks in combination with existing narratives about the creation of a buffer zone in Ukraine to convince the West to push Ukraine to concede to Russia because Russia will inevitably seize these areas regardless.[11] ISW continues to assess that the frontlines in Ukraine are not in danger of rapid collapse and that a Russian victory is not inevitable.[12]

Russian forces have not set conditions to start a new offensive across the international border in northern Ukraine. ISW has not observed evidence that would indicate that Russian forces are preparing for or capable of conducting a significant offensive operation across the international border area into northern Ukraine. Much of the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblast border area, including near Hrabovske has been dormant since late Summer 2025.[13] The frontline near Sotnytskyi Kozachok has been dormant since Summer 2024.[14] Russian forces have been struggling to advance in the international border area north and northeast of Sumy City since late June 2025 and have deprioritized this area of the frontline.[15] ISW has observed no evidence to suggest that Russian forces have conducted a large-scale redeployment of forces to the Northern Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility or near Ukraine’s northern international border that could support a dedicated offensive operation. Elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which Russian sources credited with the seizure of Hrabovske, have been operating in the border area since at least December 2024.[16] Russian forces, rather, have redeployed forces and means away from Sumy Oblast since Summer 2025, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units that Russia uses to bear the brunt of offensive operations in prioritized areas of the frontline.[17] Russian forces most recently redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division from the Sumy direction to the Hulyaipole direction in September 2025 and the Pokrovsk direction in November 2025, Russia’s two most prioritized areas of the front.[18] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence assessed that Russian forces have not massed sufficient forces and means to ”overwhelm” Ukrainian forces near Hrabovske.[19]

Russian forces notably have not prepared the battlefield in northern Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts for a major ground offensive through intermediate-range strikes against Ukrainian logistics.[20] Russian forces have not conducted a sustained battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign with drones against operational and tactical rear areas along the international border in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults, as the Russian forces have done in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[21] These BAI campaigns are part of a new Russian campaign design that aims to set conditions for intensified ground operations by degrading Ukrainian logistics and defenses ahead of such ground operations.[22] The absence of such preparation of the battlefield in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts is therefore noteworthy, as such shaping operations have become the standard Russian operational template for enabling ground operations. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov’s stated that the Russian operations in the border area do not appear to be an effort to conduct a large-scale breakthrough or a major military operation but are a local provocation — a statement consistent with all available open-source information.[23]

The Russian tactics in the assault in Sotnytskyi Kozachok are not consistent with Russian assault tactics across the theater and suggest the attack was designed to be seen. Russian forces conducted the assault into northern Sotnytskyi Kozachok with about two squads of personnel crossing the border in lines shoulder-to-shoulder with little dispersion. Such a manner of movement is inconsistent with Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) elsewhere in the theater that emphasize dispersion, infiltration, and movement in small groups of two to five soldiers to avoid detection and fire damage from Ukrainian drones. Russian forces have largely switched to conducting infiltration missions in teams of two to five personnel throughout the theater as the main mode of offensive maneuver, so the observation of an anomalously large group of Russian infantry conducting a frontal assault using outdated tactics near Sotnytskyi Kozachok is notable.[24] It is currently unclear why Russian forces conducted this assault with a large group of personnel operating in close proximity to each other in contradiction of current Russian TTPs. Russian forces may have incorrectly assessed that they would not come under Ukrainian drone and artillery fire. The Russian command in the area may have made this decision out of incompetence, though this is likely not enough to explain this decision, given how prolific the TTPs for using small-group Russian assaults and infiltration missions have become throughout the theater. The Russian military command may have designed the attack to be highly visible to ensure that Ukrainian drone crews and Western analysts undoubtedly would observe a large group of personnel to map a new Russian effort in a remote part of Kharkiv Oblast to achieve an informational effect.

Forecast and indicators: Russian forces may seek to conduct further cross border assaults in the coming days and weeks as part of this cognitive warfare campaign to influence ongoing peace negotiations by portraying the northern front as collapsing. The Kremlin and Russian media may issue intensified statements that portray these limited assaults as part of a new Russian offensive. The appearance of new small-scale tactical attacks punctuating the northern frontline and intensified Russian informational agitation around such activity would not indicate an actual new major ground offensive, however. Such activity would indicate that the primary objective of these tactical assaults is to achieve informational effects and not seize territory as part of a broader offensive.

Counterindicators: This assessment will be invalidated, and Russian forces will be more likely to be conducting an actual new ground offensive operation in northern Ukraine if Russian forces begin a concerted BAI campaign targeting Ukraine’s tactical and operational rear to degrade Ukraine’s frontline logistics or if Russian forces redeploy or commit new forces to the Northern Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility. Such redeployments very likely would require the Russian theater command to deprioritize the southern and eastern frontlines. Both of these counterindicators remain unobserved as of December 21.

Russian forces forcibly deported about 50 civilians from Sumy Oblast in violation of international law. Hrabovske Mayor Larysa Kremenza stated on December 20 that there had been about 50 civilians left in Hrabovske when Russian forces entered the settlement and that Russian forces forcibly deported these civilians to Russia.[25] Kremenza stated that there were no children among those forcibly deported, and Lykhovyi stated that most of these civilians are elderly and had previously refused to evacuate.[26] Ukrainian officials indicated that they are increasing evacuation measures in Sumy Oblast border areas.[27] Forced deportation refers to an occupying power deporting residents of an occupied area across de jure international borders and is illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention.[28] Russia has conducted an extensive forced deportation campaign in areas of occupied Ukraine for various purposes, including to Russify Ukrainian citizens, provide labor to industries in Russia, and undermine Ukraine’s ability to reintegrate areas currently under occupation.[29] This campaign across all of occupied Ukraine intends to rob Ukraine of its multigenerational potential and damage Ukraine’s future claims to its own people.[30]

Russian forces have likely seized Siversk — a town with a pre-war population of less than 11,000 — after 41 months of fighting. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 21 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Siversk, advanced to heights west and northwest of Siversk, and reached the chalk quarry west of Siversk.[31] Mashovets reported that Russian forces also made tactical gains north of Svyato-Pokrovske and seized Fedorivka and Vasyukivka (all southwest of Siversk) since mid-November 2025.[32] The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk as of December 11, and Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian defense officials have since been using the seizure of the town to promote the false narrative that Ukrainian lines are collapsing and that Russian forces are capable of immediately threatening Slovyansk.[33] The Russian efforts in the Siversk direction have been extremely lengthy, especially given that Siversk has an area of about 10 square kilometers with a pre-war population of about 11,000. Russian forces took 41 months to advance roughly 12 kilometers from Lysychansk (east of Siversk) to the western administrative boundary of Siversk.[34] Ukrainian resistance significantly delayed Russian efforts on the approaches to Siversk: ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Verkhnokamyanske (about four kilometers east of Siversk) as of October 9, 2024, Bilohorivka (about 10 kilometers northeast of Siversk) as of February 23, 2025, and Serebryanka (about four kilometers northeast of Siversk) as of August 16, 2025.[35] ISW first observed evidence that Russian forces entered Siversk’s town limits no later than November 18, indicating that Russian forces likely took 33 days to completely seize the town (with an area of three Central Parks) once entering it.[36] Russian forces must still advance the 30 kilometers from Siversk to Slovyansk and complete the seizure of Lyman before they can begin a direct assault on Slovyansk itself.[37] The Kremlin has been exaggerating the immediate implications of the seizure of Siversk in attempts to falsely portray Russian forces as imminently threatening the northern part of the Fortress Belt and making significant simultaneous advances across the theater, such that the frontline is imminently collapsing. Russian gains continue to be slow and grinding as they have been for the past two years.

US delegations continued separate meetings with Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Miami on December 21, as the Kremlin continues to reject making compromises to end the war. Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov reported that he and Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov conducted a third day of meetings with US negotiators in Miami on December 21.[38] Russian state media reported that the lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev held separate meetings with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner on December 21.[39] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 21 that he is “confident” that European and Ukrainian proposals “do not improve” the peace proposal or “enhance the chances of achieving long-term peace.”[40] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the US-proposed 28-point peace plan or any plan requiring Russia to compromise on any of its original war aims.[41] Putin notably used his December 19 Direct Line televised press conference to outline his demands for a future peace settlement — the same demands with which he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[42]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are conducting a new cognitive warfare campaign through limited cross-border attacks across a broad part of the previously dormant northern frontline in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.
These two cross-border attacks likely intend to advance the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare campaign to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing, such that Ukraine should concede to all of Russia’s demands.
Russian forces have not set conditions to start a new offensive across the international border in northern Ukraine.
Russian forces notably have not prepared the battlefield in northern Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts for a major ground offensive through intermediate-range strikes against Ukrainian logistics.
The Russian tactics in the assault in Sotnytskyi Kozachok are not consistent with Russian assault tactics across the theater and suggest the attack was designed to be seen.
Russian forces forcibly deported about 50 civilians from Sumy Oblast in violation of international law.
Russian forces have likely seized Siversk — a town with a pre-war population of less than 11,000 — after 41 months of fighting.
US delegations continued separate meetings with Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Miami on December 21 as the Kremlin continues to reject making compromises to end the war.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the border area of Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction, in the border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, and near Borova and Siversk.

read the full DEC 21 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 20, 2025

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US delegations met separately with a Ukrainian-European delegation and a Russian delegation in Miami on December 19 and 20, respectively. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner met with Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov and Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov on December 19, and Umerov stated that European representatives also joined the talks at the invitation of the United States.[1] Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on December 19 that two unspecified sources stated that national security advisors from Germany, France, and the UK joined the US-Ukrainian talks on December 19.[2] Ravid stated that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani joined the December 19 talks. Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev arrived in Miami on December 20 to meet with Witkoff and Kushner.[3] Reuters reported that a Russian source stated that there would not be a meeting between Dmitriev and the Ukrainian delegation.[4]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated that both Russia and Ukraine must make compromises to end the war after Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed his unwavering commitment to his full war aims on December 19. Rubio noted on December 19 that Ukrainian-Russian negotiations to end the war will require that both sides “give something” and that the United States is trying to figure out “what both sides are prepared to give.”[5] Putin used his December 19 Direct Line televised press conference to outline his demands for a future peace settlement — the same demands with which he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in contrast, reiterated on December 20 his readiness to hold presidential elections in Ukraine as a step toward ending Russia’s war. Zelensky stated that he is ready to hold elections in Ukraine if conditions are in place for Ukrainian authorities to ensure “proper, decent, and democratic elections.”[7] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is working to prepare and ensure the necessary infrastructure to hold elections abroad, as the number of Ukrainian citizens living abroad has grown.[8] Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian military must be able to participate in the elections and that there must be international observers and a ceasefire, even if a temporary one, to hold elections. Russia’s unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and compromise from its demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation continues to demonstrate the need for robust security guarantees to ensure that any future agreement produces a sustainable peace and prevent renewed Russian aggression. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected such security guarantees, however.[9]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian military and oil assets overnight on December 19 to 20. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU forces struck two Russian Su-27 fighter jets at the Belbek Airbase near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, overnight.[10] The SBU reported that one of the aircraft was carrying ammunition and taxiing for a combat mission at the time of the strike, which destroyed the aircraft. The SBU published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian drones hitting the Su-27s.[11] Ukrainian forces struck long-range radar systems, air defense systems, and a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft at the Belbek Airbase overnight on December 17 to 18.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian RSP-6M2 radar system overnight on December 19 to 20, which Russian forces used to assist aircraft landing in poor visibility, near occupied Krasnosilske, Crimea.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that several Ukrainian drones also struck a Project 22460 Okhotnik-class patrol boat patrolling near an oil and gas field and a drilling rig in the Filanovsky oil field in the Caspian Sea and that Ukraine is conducting a battle damage assessment.[14] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project assessed that Ukrainian forces used FP-2 long range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and likely struck the Rasul Gamzatov patrol boat.[15] Ukrainian forces have struck oil infrastructure at the Filanovsky oil field three times since December 10.[16]

Three drones — at least two of which are reportedly Russian drone models — have entered Turkish airspace or crashed into Turkey since December 15. The Turkish Ministry of National Defense reported on December 15 that Turkish and NATO forces shot down a drone approaching Turkish airspace from the Black Sea.[17] Turkish authorities did not specify the type or origin of the drone. The Turkish Interior Ministry reported on December 19 that Turkish authorities found a downed Russian Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone near Izmit in northwestern Turkey.[18] Turkish outlets reported on December 20 that a third drone crashed in Balıkesir Province in northwestern Turkey, possibly on an earlier date, and that there were no identifying markings on the drone.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that the third drone was a Russian Merlin-VR reconnaissance drone.[20] Turkish authorities have not directly attributed the incidents to Russia as of this writing. ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[21]

Key Takeaways

US delegations met separately with a Ukrainian-European delegation and a Russian delegation in Miami on December 19 and 20, respectively.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated that both Russia and Ukraine must make compromises to end the war after Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed his unwavering commitment to his full war aims on December 19.
Ukrainian forces struck Russian military and oil assets overnight on December 19 to 20.
Three drones — at least two of which are reportedly Russian drone models — have entered Turkish airspace or crashed into Turkey since December 15.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 20 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 19, 2025

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Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 to reaffirm his commitment to achieving his full war aims in Ukraine. Putin stated that Russia is ready and willing to end the war based on the principles he outlined during his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).[1] Putin used that speech to lay out his conditions to agree to a ceasefire and only then start negotiations: Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations.[2] Putin stated in this 2024 speech that Russia’s “fundamental” position calls for Ukraine’s neutral status, demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government). Putin had also demanded that the international community enshrine its recognition of Russia’s annexation of the four oblasts and Crimea in international agreements and that the West lift all sanctions against Russia. Many of Putin’s June 2024 demands, which Putin reiterated on December 19, directly contradict the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations. The 28-point plan, for example, called for freezing the war along the current frontlines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and for the United States to recognize Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and Crimea as Russian territory de facto rather than de jure.[3] That plan did not require other states, including Ukraine, to recognize the occupied regions as Russian territory de jure. Putin’s statements continue to make clear that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement along the lines of those based on the 28-point proposal currently under discussion. Putin may make temporary compromises, as he claimed during his Direct Line speech he did during the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit, but his unwavering commitment to his original, maximalist war aims shows that he will not be satisfied with such an agreement and will continue to pursue his full goals even after he signs an agreement. Any peace agreement must therefore ensure a strong Ukraine with robust security guarantees in order to establish a lasting and sustainable peace and prevent renewed Russian aggression. The Kremlin has publicly and explicitly rejected such security guarantees multiple times, however.[4]

Putin made even more exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield victories than his senior military officials have made in recent days. Putin claimed that Russian forces have seized the small town of Siversk in Donetsk Oblast and Vovchansk in Kharkiv Oblast.[5] Putin also claimed that Russian forces have seized 50 percent of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast and Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia Oblast and more than half of Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm any of these claimed seizures or extensive advances and has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in 7.3 percent of Hulyaipole and 2.9 percent of Lyman. Even Russian milbloggers’ claimed advances do not support many of Putin’s claims, with milbloggers claiming that Russian forces have seized a maximum of about seven percent of Lyman and 11 percent of Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets further reported on December 18 that Russian forces are currently struggling to completely push Ukrainian forces out of southern Vovchansk.[6] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is having to allocate forces meant to continue offensive operations south of the settlement to repel Ukrainian forces counterattacking within Vovchansk. Putin’s claims are even more exaggerated than the December 17 and 18 claims from Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov respectively.[7] Belousov and Gerasimov claimed that fighting was ongoing within Lyman and Hulyaipole but did not offer any figures on how much territory in the settlements Russian forces had allegedly seized.

Putin’s claims are part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to frame the seizures of small settlements — which required months of difficult fighting and significant losses — as evidence of the apparent ease with which Russian forces will take significantly larger population centers in Donetsk Oblast. Putin framed Russian advances in Siversk and Lyman as paving the way for the Russian seizure of Slovyansk and stated that he has “no doubt” that Russian forces will seize Kostyantynivka.[8] Vovchansk, Lyman, Siversk, and Hulyaipole each had a pre-war population between about 12,000 and 20,000 people — considerably smaller than the cities of Slovyansk (about 105,000) and Kramatorsk (about 147,000) that make up the northern part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Kremlin officials have repeatedly attempted to aggrandize tactical Russian successes of seizing small- to medium-sized settlements to support the false narrative that Russian forces can rapidly seize the Fortress Belt.[9] The cities in the Fortress Belt are larger in terms of both area and density than any of the settlements Russian forces have seized since 2022, and Ukrainian forces have been fortifying the cities since 2014 — as Putin noted in his Direct Line speech.[10] ISW continues to assess that it will take Russian forces two or more years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at great cost at current rates of advance and losses.[11]

Putin tried to conceal Russia’s recent defeats in Kupyansk, doubling down on the false narrative that Russian successes in Kupyansk demonstrate that a Russian battlefield victory is inevitable. Putin repeated ongoing Russian military officials’ claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk “several weeks ago.”[12] Putin claimed that Russian forces are “not yet” advancing westward from the town because they must first eliminate the Ukrainian group on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the area and seize Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk on the east bank) — an attempt to deflect from the fact that Ukrainian counterattacks have pushed Russian forces back and prevented any westward advances. Putin attempted to discredit footage of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s December 12 visit to the southwestern outskirts of Kupyansk as fake, claiming that Ukrainian and Russian drones in the area make it impossible to approach the town. ISW has observed mounting evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated a significant portion of Kupyansk, however.[13] Mashovets further stated on December 19 that Ukrainian forces have encircled up to two understrength Russian companies in central and southern Kupyansk along both banks of the Oskil River.[14] Mashovets assessed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces command will likely have to commit forces and means from other nearby sectors to the Kupyansk area following successful Ukrainian counterattacks within and north of Kupyansk. Mashovets also assessed that Russia’s inability to secure Kupyansk has had effects on other nearby sectors of the front, with the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) thinly stretched between the Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions.[15]

Putin, however, claimed that Ukrainian attempts to retake lost positions in Kupyansk have been unsuccessful and resulted in heavy losses.[16] Putin claimed that these unsuccessful efforts should “encourage” Ukraine to end the war peacefully as Ukraine has “practically” no forces left to commit to the Kupyansk effort. Putin’s statements are the latest in the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort that aims to paint Ukrainian defenses as on the brink of collapse and a Russian victory as inevitable.[17] This Kremlin effort is meant to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia’s demands now out of fear of further Russian offensive operations. Putin’s explicit use of Kupyansk — the sector of the front where Ukrainian forces have had the most success recently — as the illustrative example of why Ukraine should capitulate is notable and demonstrates the extent to which the Kremlin is trying to cover up Russian forces’ inability to maintain positions in a town that the Russian military command falsely claimed that Russian forces fully seized in late November 2025.[18] Putin’s efforts to conceal the battlefield realities in Kupyansk demonstrate the degree to which he sees Ukrainian successes in the area as a major informational setback for the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare efforts to influence ongoing negotiations.

Putin continued to praise the strength and resilience of the Russian economy, but Kremlin economic policies indicate that the economy is performing markedly worse than Putin is portraying. Putin claimed that the Russian federal budget will be able to continue to meet the needs of the Russian military.[19] Putin claimed that Russian inflation will be 5.6 to 5.8 percent by the end of 2025, meeting the Kremlin’s goal of reducing it at least to six percent. Putin also referenced the Russian Central Bank’s December 19 decision to cut the key interest rate by 0.5 percent to 16 percent.[20] Putin claimed that the Central Bank’s international reserves are growing and are currently worth $741.5 billion. Putin congratulated the Russian federal government on balancing the budget but noted that the Kremlin had to raise the value-added tax (VAT) in order to do so. Putin also lauded Russia’s low unemployment rate of 2.2 percent, which Putin noted is even lower than Russia’s previous historic low of 2.5 percent in 2024.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent estimated actual Russian inflation to be over 20 percent in October 2025.[21] Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation. Russia has also likely had to resort to importing labor from foreign states, including North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to compensate for these labor shortages.[22] The Russian Central Bank began selling its physical gold reserves in late November 2025 for the first time as part of the Russian Ministry of Finance’s operations to fund the state budget.[23] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves funding its war in Ukraine and has had to resort to selling its gold reserves due to unsustainable spending. Kremlin efforts to promote the alleged strength of the Russian economy are part of wider efforts to convince the West and Ukraine that Russia can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield such that Ukraine should capitulate now to Russian demands at the negotiating table. Russia’s economic policies demonstrate, however, that the Russian economy is not as resilient against Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as Putin has long claimed.

Putin continues to promote Russia as a multinational, multireligious state ahead of the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026. Putin used his Direct Line speech to applaud the contributions of ethnic minorities in Russia, particularly those serving in the Russian military, to the war effort and highlighted how Russian soldiers of different nationalities and religions are fighting “for their homeland shoulder to shoulder.”[24] Putin specifically spotlighted Senior Lieutenant Naran Ochir-Goryaev, a native of the Republic of Kalmykia and assault company commander who briefed Putin about the alleged Russian seizure of Siversk, throughout Direct Line in several likely highly staged interactions.[25] Putin stated that the upcoming Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026 is especially important during the war because “when a country faces such challenges, it unites.”[26] Putin stated that a Russian soldier’s religion does not matter when under fire on the battlefield and that all the peoples of Russia have common values that unite them.

Putin specifically highlighted the role of religion and Islam in Russia.[27] Putin praised Islam as sharing many traditional values with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and noted that over 10 percent of Russian citizens are Muslim. Putin stated that the Russian government is actively developing Islamic education in the Republic of Bashkortostan and promised to support all traditional religions within Russia. Putin also praised the Republic of Tatarstan, claiming that leaders of Islamic countries look to Tatarstan as an example of peaceful coexistence between people of different nationalities and religions.

Putin’s narratives about Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state whose people come together under a united love for the Russian Federation is at odds with the xenophobic views of the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin’s core constituencies with ardent supporters of the war effort — about the need for Russian identity to center on ethnic Russians and the ROC as well as its loud complaints about migrants, especially Muslim migrants. Putin has long had to balance using migration to help address Russia’s demographic problems and labor shortages — both significantly exacerbated by Putin’s war in Ukraine — with the demands of this ultranationalist constituency.[28] Putin is notably leaning into a concept of civic nationalism more consistent with the Soviet ideal than with Christian Russian nationalism.[29]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide financial support to Ukraine. The EU agreed on December 18 to provide Ukraine with an interest-free loan of 90 billion euros (about $105 billion) in 2026-2027.[30] European Council (EC) President António Costa stated that Ukraine would pay back the loan only if Russia paid reparations to Ukraine for the war. The loan does not use frozen Russian assets but is backed by the EU budget.[31] The EU has not yet made a decision on the potential seizure of frozen Russian assets.

Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet. Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told several Ukrainian outlets on December 19 that the SBU struck the QENDIL, a Russian shadow fleet tanker, with unspecified aerial drones in the neutral waters of the Mediterranean Sea.[32] The sources noted that the ship was not carrying cargo at the time of the strike but that the strike critically damaged the vessel, preventing it from performing its intended tasks. Ukrainian military intelligence similarly reported to Ukrainian outlets about strikes against Russian shadow fleet vessels in late November and early December 2025.[33]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 to reaffirm his commitment to achieving his full war aims in Ukraine.
Putin made even more exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield victories than his senior military officials have made in recent days.
Putin continued to praise the strength and resilience of the Russian economy, but Kremlin economic policies indicate that the economy is performing markedly worse than Putin is portraying.
Putin continues to promote Russia as a multinational, multireligious state ahead of the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026.
Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide financial support to Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas.

read the full DEC 19 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 18, 2025

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continue to publicly demonstrate their commitment to achieving Russia’s original war aims while exaggerating Russian battlefield gains. Putin stated during a December 17 ceremony awarding medals to Russian servicemembers that Russia will achieve all of its goals and claimed that Russian forces have seized “strategically important settlements” that are opening up opportunities for further offensives.[1] The Kremlin readout from the event highlighted statements from a recipient of the Hero of Russia award, who stated that Russian forces are fulfilling Putin’s mandate to seize Russia’s “ancestral lands.” Putin’s December 17 statements are in line with his other recent statements, indicating his commitment to his 2022 maximalist war aims, such that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement based on the US-proposed 28-point plan.[2]

Putin continued to exaggerate Russian successes, alleging that Russian forces had seized Siversk.[3] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized about 77 percent of Siversk. Gerasimov also claimed during a December 18 briefing for foreign military attachés that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk (despite mounting evidence of Ukrainian forces liberating a significant portion of the town) and control 50 percent of Kostyantynivka.[4] ISW has not observed evidence or even claims of Russian advances in Kostyantynivka close to Gerasimov’s figure. ISW has observed evidence that Russian forces have seized only 1.6 percent of Kostyantynivka, while maintaining a presence within only five percent of the town (either through infiltration missions or assaults). Even Russian milbloggers’ maximalist claims about Russian advances are not as extensive as Gerasimov’s, with milbloggers claiming that Russian forces have seized only about 11 percent of the town.

Gerasimov further claimed that Russian forces have seized over 6,300 square kilometers in 2025 — slightly more than Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s December 17 claim of 6,000 square kilometers.[5] ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized only about 4,700 square kilometers in 2025, but even Gerasimov’s more exaggerated claim only amounts to an area slightly larger than the state of Delaware or just 1.04 percent of Ukraine’s total land area. Gerasimov’s and Belousov’s exaggerated claims actually demonstrate the slow pace of Russian advances and undermine the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort to portray a Russian battlefield victory in Ukraine and the collapse of Ukrainian defenses as inevitable.[6] Gerasimov used his briefing to foreign military officials to repeat many of the claims from Putin’s and Belousov’s addresses to the December 17 Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board meeting, likely in order to spread these Russian narratives to an international audience.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to signal his commitment to negotiations as high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to publicly and explicitly reject significant points of the peace plan currently under discussion. Zelensky reiterated on December 18 his readiness to hold presidential elections in Ukraine as a step toward a peace agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine — in line with the initial US-proposed 28-point plan requiring that Ukraine hold elections within 100 days of codifying the agreement. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on December 18 that Russia continues to see the deployment of any Western troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees for post-war Ukraine “unacceptable” and that Russia would see such troops as “legitimate.”[7] The Kremlin has repeatedly voiced its unwillingness to agree to any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine, likely to allow Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine after a peace to achieve Putin’s maximalist war aim of gaining full effective control over Ukraine. Zelensky has, in stark contrast, demonstrated Ukraine’s willingness to make meaningful compromises.[8] Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected elements of the 28-point plan, calling into question Putin’s willingness to accept even that outline agreement and demonstrating how essential a reliable security guarantee for Ukraine will be for the sustainability of any peace agreement.

Three Russian border guards briefly crossed into Estonian territory on December 17. Estonian authorities reported that the Russian border guards used a hovercraft to access the Vasknarva stone breakwater on the Narva River, which is situated in both Russian and Estonian territory.[9] The border guards reportedly disembarked the hovercraft, walked a short distance along the breakwater into Estonian territory, and subsequently returned to Russian territory shortly thereafter.[10] Estonian Interior Minister Igor Taro stated on December 17 that the border guards crossed into Estonian territory in an area where Russian vessels must request access in order to pass into Estonian territory — a process to which Taro noted Russian authorities have long adhered.[11] Taro stated that Estonian authorities have not determined the motive behind the border crossing. Estonian border guards observed seven armed Russian servicemembers, who were wearing uniforms that suggested they were not Russian border guards, operating near the Russia-Estonia border on October 10, but the Russian personnel did not enter Estonian territory in that incident.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[13]The December 17 event is the first instance ISW has observed of uniformed Russian personnel crossing over into NATO territory since the start of Russia’s Phase Zero effort in September 2025.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continue to publicly demonstrate their commitment to achieving Russia’s original war aims while exaggerating Russian battlefield gains.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to signal his commitment to compromise in negotiations as high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to publicly and explicitly reject significant points of the peace plan currently under discussion.
Three Russian border guards briefly crossed into Estonian territory on December 17.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full DEC 18 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2025

Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly and explicitly outlined his continued commitment to his maximalist war aims in Ukraine — the same aims for which Putin launched his full-scale invasion in 2022. Putin spoke on December 17 to an expanded meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board, where he claimed that Russia will “undoubtedly” achieve its war goals in Ukraine.[1] Putin claimed that Russia would prefer to use diplomatic means to achieve its war goals and address the alleged “root causes” of the war (a term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand to mean its original war justifications and demands). Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik similarly noted on December 17 that Russia’s goal remains to eliminate the root causes of the war, which Kolesnik stated “means the demilitarization [and] denazification” of Ukraine — a reference to Russia’s original aims of severely limiting the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, the removal of the current Ukrainian government, and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in its place.[2]

Putin also reiterated Russia’s commitment to eventually achieving its wider territorial aims in Ukraine, claiming that Russia will “liberat[e] its historical lands” through military means if Ukraine and the West “refuse to engage in substantive discussions.”[3] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly referred to wide expanses of Ukrainian territory beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed as “historical” and “Russian” territory. Kremlin officials have often labelled Odesa City as a “Russian” city and discussed “Novorossiya” — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine that the Kremlin has claimed is “integral” to Russia, and that covers territory beyond the five regions that Russia has illegally annexed.[4] The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected US- and Ukrainian-proposed peace plans while trying to shift the blame for the lack of progress in negotiations onto Ukraine.[5] Putin’s claim about seizing Russia’s “historical” territories if Ukraine and the West refuse to engage in negotiations likely aims to put the responsibility on continued Russian efforts to achieve Putin’s original war aims on Ukraine — not Russia.

Putin’s statements continue to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement based on the US-proposed 28-point peace plan. The Kremlin has not publicly and explicitly stated that it would accept the 28-point plan or any subsequent versions, but rather has been rejecting many points of the plan in recent weeks.[6] The statements by Putin and other Kremlin officials make clear that Putin has no intention of giving up his maximalist objectives in Ukraine and will seek to pursue them after any suspension of hostilities on conditions short of those objectives. The repeated Kremlin statements contradicting elements of the 28-point plan call into question Putin’s willingness to accept even that outline agreement and demonstrate how essential a reliable security guarantee for Ukraine will be to the durability of any agreement.

The 28-point plan called for Russia to relinquish the territory it controls outside of occupied Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and for the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to freeze.[7] Putin and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov indicated during the Russian MoD board meeting that Russia will not be satisfied with those lines. Putin noted that Russian forces are creating and expanding “buffer zones” in Ukraine.[8] Belousov continued to claim that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk — despite evidence of Ukrainian forces liberating a significant portion of the town.[9] Belousov claimed that the alleged seizure of Kupyansk will expand Russia’s buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast, thereby reducing the threat of Ukrainian shelling against northern areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast. Putin similarly tasked Russian forces with creating a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in the past, and the Kremlin is likely also to demand cede some of this territory due to Russia’s alleged need for a buffer zone.[10] Belousov highlighted Russia’s commitment to achieving control of all of Zaporizhia Oblast, claiming that ongoing Russian efforts to seize Hulyaipole and Orikhiv will “pave the way” for the seizure of the entire oblast.

Robust security guarantees for Ukraine are essential to ensure that any future agreement produces a sustainable peace, but the Kremlin has been publicly rejecting the idea of such guarantees.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 17, for example, that Russia’s position on foreign military contingents operating on Ukrainian territory is well known, consistent, and clear, and Kolesnik stated that Russia will not tolerate European security guarantees with troop deployments to Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is likely seeking a peace agreement without security guarantees in order to set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine in the future, in order to achieve Putin’s maximalist war aim of gaining full effective control over Ukraine.

Belousov used Russia’s seizure of small- and medium-sized settlements to support false Russia claims that Russian forces can rapidly seize the significantly larger population centers comprising Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Belousov falsely claimed that the collapse of Ukrainian defenses is “inevitable,” continuing extensive Kremlin cognitive warfare efforts that aim to portray a Russian battlefield victory as inevitable in order to influence ongoing peace negotiations.[13] Belousov claimed that Russian forces are fighting within Kostyantynivka, which Belousov stated is “key” to seizing Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk — major cities that make up the heavily fortified Fortress Belt that serves as the backbone of Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk Oblast. Belousov highlighted Russia’s seizure of small- and medium-sized settlements, such as Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Mala Tokmachka. Belousov also claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk and Pokrovsk (which ISW has not observed evidence to confirm) and noted that Russian forces are currently trying to seize Hulyaipole and Lyman. Russian forces have often spent months trying to seize these small- and medium-sized settlements and have notably been fighting within Pokrovsk itself for almost 140 days.[14]

The cities in Ukraine’s Fortress Belt are significantly larger than the small- and medium-sized settlements that Belousov highlighted. Kurakhove is only about seven square kilometers in size and had a pre-war population of only 5,000. Siversk and Chasiv Yar are both about 10 square kilometers with pre-war populations of about 11,000 to 12,000.

Pokrovsk, which Russian forces have been trying to take for nearly two years, is about 23 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 60,000. Kostyantynivka has an area of 33 square kilometers and a pre-war population of 67,000. Druzhkivka is 23 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 54,000. Kramatorsk is 48 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 147,000. Slovyansk is 63 square kilometers with a pre-war population of 105,000. Belousov is attempting to present Russia’s seizure of much smaller settlements as evidence of Russia’s ability to rapidly seize the much larger cities in the Fortress Belt, but battlefield realities indicate otherwise.

Belousov claimed that Russian forces have seized 6,000 square kilometers along the entire frontline during 2025 — an area smaller than the US state of Delaware and just under one percent of Ukraine’s total land area.[15] ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized only 4,699.04 square kilometers in 2025 — an area slightly larger than the size of Rhode Island.[16] Even Belousov’s exaggerated claims about Russian advances demonstrate the slow pace of those advances. Belousov claimed that the Russian seizure of the Fortress Belt will enable Russian forces to “quickly” seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, but his statements about Russian advances in 2025 are actually in line with ISW’s assessment that it will take Russian forces two or more years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at great cost.[17]

Belousov’s comments demonstrate that Russian forces are optimizing themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine — not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains. Belousov laid out a series of technological and tactical adaptations that Russian forces have made on the battlefield in the last year, including the increased use of drones for reconnaissance and fire missions, the effectiveness of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, the reliance on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to quickly traverse the “kill zone” in the face of drones, and the increased use of trench-based electronic warfare (EW) systems.[18] Many of these Russian adaptations actually demonstrate how the Russian military has optimized itself for positional warfare in Ukraine rather than preparing to resume fast paced mechanized maneuver in Ukraine — as ISW recently assessed.[19] Belousov’s statements further show that the Russian MoD does not expect the character of the war to quickly change but is preparing rather to continue positional warfare and slow grinding advances. Russian forces have developed a minimally sufficient operational technique that can enable very slow operational successes, but this approach does not translate effectively to maneuver warfare on a wide scale and will not allow Russian forces to rapidly collapse Ukrainian defenses in the short- to medium-term.[20]

Belousov sought to conceal Russia’s military manpower problems. Belousov claimed that nearly 410,000 Russians have signed contracts with the Russian MoD since the beginning of 2025 — 8,200 per week or 32,800 per month.[21] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff on Russian losses indicate that Russian forces suffered an average of 34,600 casualties per month between January and November 2025 — suggesting that Belousov’s recruitment numbers are not quite replacing Russian losses. Belousov’s claimed figure is likely exaggerated, as Russian opposition media investigations examining Russian federal budget expenditures on payouts to new recruits have recently shown.[22] The Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to mobilize reservists for likely deployment to Ukraine in the future further indicate that Russia cannot meet its force generation requirements through the ongoing system that uses high financial incentives to recruit volunteers due to a lack of volunteers, a lack of resources to fund the payouts, or both.[23] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s efforts to deploy reservists to Ukraine are a domestically risky policy threatening to break the Kremlin’s ongoing social contract with the population, and the Kremlin would likely not pursue this force generation method unless necessary. Belousov is likely inflating the recruitment numbers to quell domestic worries about compulsory reserve mobilization.

Putin and Belousov highlighted Russian military and nuclear strength while threatening Europe. Putin claimed that it is “nonsense” that Russia poses a threat to Europe and that NATO, rather, is threatening Russia by preparing for a future confrontation.[24] Putin and Belousov simultaneously spotlighted Russia’s military expansion efforts, strategic nuclear forces, and new weapons systems, such as the Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle. Belousov claimed that Ukraine and the West are trying to prolong the war in order to weaken Russia and that NATO policies to prepare for a future war have created “preconditions” for Russia’s continued military action into 2026. Belousov stated that Russia must therefore continue to impose its will on its “enemy,” act preemptively, and refine its warfighting methods and techniques. Kolesnik also claimed on December 17 that Europe is playing “Russian roulette,” which Russians “have always won,” by supporting Ukraine.[25] Kolesnik claimed that Russia should show Germany the Soviet Victory Banner from the Second World War more often and that Germany should “think about Germany’s future.” Belousov’s false claims that Ukrainian defenses are on the brink of collapse are incongruous with Russia’s large-scale military expansion and weapons development efforts — if Ukraine is about to collapse, then the continued military mobilization of Russia should be unnecessary. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ongoing military reforms and expansion efforts reflect the reality that Russia is in no position to defeat Ukraine rapidly and are also part of preparation for a potential conflict with NATO in the future.[26]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly and explicitly outlined his continued commitment to his maximalist war aims in Ukraine – the same aims for which Putin launched his full-scale invasion in 2022.
Putin’s statements continue to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement based on the US-proposed 28-point peace plan.
Robust security guarantees for Ukraine are essential to ensure that any future agreement produces a sustainable peace, but the Kremlin has been publicly rejecting the idea of such guarantees.
Belousov used Russia’s seizure of small- and medium-sized settlements to support false Russia claims that Russian forces can rapidly seize the significantly larger population centers comprising Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.
Belousov’s comments demonstrate that Russian forces are optimizing themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine – not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains.
Belousov sought to conceal Russia’s military manpower problems.
Putin and Belousov highlighted Russian military and nuclear strength while threatening Europe.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

read the full DEC 17 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2025

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The Council of the European Union confirmed that European countries and the United States will provide “robust” security guarantees to Ukraine as part of the peace deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[1] The Council of the European Union issued a joint statement on December 15 affirming that the United States and European leaders are committed to working together to provide “robust security guarantees” and economic recovery measures for Ukraine in the context of the peace deal. The Council agreed to provide support for the Ukrainian military in peace time; a European-led multinational force composed of forces from the Coalition of the Willing; a US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; and a legally binding commitment to take military, diplomatic, and economic measures in the event of Russia’s reinvasion. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 16 that US and Ukrainian officials discussed legally-binding security guarantees during the talks.[2] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian and US officials will meet in Miami, Florida, to continue discussions about security guarantees, and a US official noted that US and Ukrainian working groups will likely meet over the weekend (December 20 and 21) “somewhere” in the United States, possibly Miami.[3]

The Kremlin explicitly rejected US and European offers to provide Ukraine with “NATO-like” security guarantees as part of a peace deal and continued to signal its unwillingness to compromise on Russia’s territorial claims to Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated in an English language TV interview with ABC News on December 15 that Russia “definitely will not at any moment subscribe to, agree to, or even be content with” any NATO troops in Ukraine, even if these forces are part of a security guarantee or are members of the Coalition of the Willing.[4] Ryabkov also reiterated that Russia would not compromise “in any form” on the five Ukrainian regions that Russia illegally annexed — which includes the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Ryabkov notably stated that Russia has “five [regions] altogether,” effectively reiterating the Kremlin’s demand that Ukraine give up unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia, and therefore signaling that Russia remains unlikely to agree to any ceasefire that would freeze the current frontline. Ryabkov reiterated Russia’s theory of victory — which claims that Russia will inevitably win by outlasting Ukrainian resilience and Western support — by stating that the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine depends on when Ukrainian supporters “recognize the inevitable outcome of [Russian] success.” Ryabkov also stated that Russia’s whole “purpose” of war in Ukraine is to have Ukrainians find out that they belong in Russia, effectively restating the Kremlin’s long-term goal of establishing control over Ukraine’s government and its people, not just its land.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly reiterated on December 16 that Russia wants to “end this war” but seeks to achieve its goals, which ISW assesses include decapitating and replacing the Ukrainian government, destroying the Ukrainian military, and undermining Western unity.[6] Peskov also rejected the Ukrainian-proposed and US-supported idea of a Christmas truce.[7] The Kremlin has been effectively rejecting key points of various peace deal proposals, including the original US-proposed 28-point peace deal, such as reliable security guarantees for Ukraine or territorial swaps.[8]

Russia launched an information campaign to frame the European Union and individual European countries as an enemy of the Russian people, comparable to Nazi Germany, in an effort to further militarize Russian society. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting on December 15 that Europe is waging a war “under a Nazi flag” with Russia through European support for Ukraine.[9] Lavrov claimed that European leadership in Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the Baltic states is reviving “the theory and practice of Nazism.” Lavrov also claimed that Germany is involved in a “resurgence of militarism” and connected modern Finland to Adolf Hitler and the Siege of Leningrad — likely referring to historically and culturally significant events that invoke historical grievances amongst Russians. Lavrov also compared modern European leadership to historical figures such as Adolf Hitler and Napoleon Bonaparte that represent an existential threat to Russia. Lavrov’s false claims that different European leaders are practicing a nebulously defined “Nazism” are distinct from Russia’s false claims that Ukraine has neo-Nazi leadership, which pertains to Russia’s false claims that Ukraine is engaged in a genocidal campaign against Russian-speaking populations living in the country. Lavrov is leveraging the term “Nazi” to identify modern European countries and their current leadership as enemies of the Russian people and to recall Soviet narratives of patriotism to prepare the Russian population to accept greater levels of sacrifices in the pursuit of the ideological defense of the Russian state for an indeterminate amount of time.

The Kremlin is trying to downplay ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in Kupyansk as Russian ultranationalist milbloggers continue to acknowledge the severity of the situation for the Russian forces. Ukrainian military sources reported on December 16 that around 200 Russian servicemen remain in Kupyansk and that Russian forces have limited logistics due to successful Ukrainian shaping and interdiction operations.[10] Russian state media has recently vastly platformed statements from Russian military officials and propagandists that downplay the situation in Kupyansk, likely in an effort to uphold a false Russian narrative that Russian forces are imminently collapsing Ukraine’s defense — a narrative aimed at influencing Ukraine and the West to make significant concessions to Russia. Russian state sources, including the Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) and an unnamed source from the Russian Joint GoF, claimed that Russian forces retained control over Kupyansk and accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of falsifying the December 11 video that he took in Kupyansk.[11] Some Russian milbloggers also amplified allegedly geolocated footage that shows two servicemen of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly walking in southern Kupyansk, using the video to claim that Russian forces still control the settlement.[12] Other Russian milbloggers, however, continued to criticize Russian state media for failing to adequately cover Ukrainian counterattacks in Kupyansk, with one milblogger even pointing out that Russian state media is relying on the Western and Joint GoFs to conceal the battlefield situation in Kupyansk.[13]

The Russian Black Sea Fleet denied the loss of a Russian submarine as the result of a Ukrainian unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) strike against the Novorossiysk Naval Base on the night of December 14 to 15 Russian Black Sea Fleet Spokesperson Captain 1st Rank Alexey Rulev claimed on December 15 that Ukrainian reports of the sinking of a Russian submarine in Novorossiysk are false and that no vessels suffered damages in the strike, and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-run TV network Zvezda published footage on December 16 allegedly showing the undamaged submarine.[14] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst assessed that the Ukrainian UUV detonated 20 meters from the Russian Project 636 Varshavyanka-class (NATO Kilo-class) submarine and noted that the Zvezda-published footage does not show the stern of the submarine, which was closest to the explosion site.[15] Another OSINT analyst noted that satellite imagery taken on December 16 shows that the submarine has not moved since the strike, potentially indicating damage to the submarine.[16] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that the Black Sea Fleet now only fields two submarines capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles following the strike.[17] Russian milbloggers noted that Ukraine’s ability to conduct a UUV strike inside the ostensibly secure Novorossiysk Naval Base is a serious security lapse, and reported that Ukrainian forces apparently hacked a surveillance camera at the Novorossiysk Naval Base headquarters to provide footage of the strike.[18] ISW cannot assess whether the Ukrainian UUV strike damaged the submarine from the available open-source information at this time.

Key Takeaways

The Council of the European Union confirmed that European countries and the United States will provide “robust” security guarantees to Ukraine as part of the peace deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin explicitly rejected US and European offers to provide Ukraine with “NATO-like” security guarantees as part of a peace deal and continued to signal its unwillingness to compromise on Russia’s territorial claims to Ukraine’s sovereign territory.
Russia launched an information campaign to frame the European Union and individual European countries as an enemy of the Russian people comparable to Nazi Germany in an effort to further militarize Russian society.
The Kremlin is trying to downplay ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in Kupyansk as Russian ultranationalist milbloggers continue to acknowledge the severity of the situation for the Russian forces.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and marginally advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical areas.

read the full DEC 16 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 15, 2025

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US, Ukrainian, and European officials reportedly agreed on unspecified security guarantees for Ukraine during a peace negotiation meeting in Berlin, Germany, on December 15. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner met in Berlin, Germany, on December 15 to continue negotiations for a prospective peace deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[1] Two US officials told the New York Times (NYT) on December 15 that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe agreed on a “NATO-like” security guarantee for the future security of Ukraine.[2] The US officials stated that the majority of the December 14 to 15 negotiations pertained to security guarantees, although the officials did not elaborate on specifics. The Kremlin has consistently indicated that it will reject any peace deals that offer reliable security guarantees for Ukraine, and is highly unlikely to accept a settlement that contains any provisions safeguarding Ukrainian territorial integrity.[3] The Kremlin notably effectively rejected the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine as outlined in the US-proposed 28-point peace plan.[4]

Zelensky stated on December 15 that discussions concerning territorial issues are ongoing, and the two US officials cited by NYT reported that Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely need to discuss and decide upon the matter of territorial agreements themselves.[5] Putin has consistently declined to meet with Zelensky, including during the lead up to the full scale invasion and during several subsequent iterations of peace negotiations.[6] Russia has previously attempted to secure untenable territorial concessions from Ukraine that include Ukraine’s Fortress Belt, the fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that has served as the backbone of Ukraine’s defenses since 2014.[7] Ukraine’s concession of its most valuable defense line into the hands of the Kremlin would provide Russia with more advantageous positions to renew aggression against southwestern and central Ukraine in the future.[8] ISW continues to assess that Russia will use political and military means to achieve its stated goal of seizing all of Ukraine and that Russia is therefore unlikely to accept a peace deal or security guarantees that do not grant full Russian control of Ukraine in the intermediate to long term future.[9]

Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) strike against a Russian submarine for the first time in naval history on the night of December 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) published footage on December 15, which was later geolocated, showing Ukrainian “Sub Sea Baby” UUVs strike a Russian Project 636 Varshavyanka-class (NATO Kilo-class) submarine docked at the Novorossiysk Naval Base in Krasnodar Krai, causing explosions and critical damage to the submarine.[10] The SBU noted that the submarine was equipped with four Kalibr cruise missile launchers that Russia used to strike Ukraine and that the damage may have forced Russian forces to stop operating the submarine. Planet Labs satellite imagery captured on December 5 shows that two Kilo-class submarines were present at the Novorossiysk Naval Base as of December 5, and lower-resolution imagery captured on December 11 indicates that at least one Kilo-class submarine was present at the base as of December 11. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data published on December 15 indicates that there were fires near the Novorossiysk Naval Base.[11] Russian forces previously docked Kilo-class submarines in occupied Crimea and the Sevastopol port but began withdrawing them from the western Black Sea and transferring them to Novorossiysk in October 2023 due to a successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian Black Sea Fleet assets.[12] Russia uses Kilo-class submarines to conduct Kalibr cruise missile strikes against Ukraine, primarily Odesa Oblast, and the Ukrainian strike likely intended to degrade Russia’s ability to target Odesa Oblast with Kalibr missiles. Ukraine’s strike against the Kilo-class submarine in Novorossiysk shows that Ukrainian forces continue to modernize and optimize their unmanned capabilities such that Ukraine can strike Russian military targets at a range that Russian forces previously thought safe.

Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking in the Kupyansk direction as Russian ultranationalist milbloggers acknowledge the severity of the situation for Russian forces. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 15 that Ukrainian forces continue clearing operations within Kupyansk and are avoiding engaging in urban combat, and that Russian forces are using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to supply the grouping of around 100 to 200 Russian personnel left within Kupyansk.[13] Trehubov implied that the Russian forces’ logistical situation is complicated in Kupyansk because UAVs have a limited carrying capacity, cannot fly over certain areas, and occasionally drop supplies in a way that exposes Russian positions to Ukrainian forces. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated several settlements and nearby forest areas, and that elements of his brigade are operating within northern Kupyansk.[14] The NCO stated that Russian forces continue attempting infiltration missions to reinforce positions in Kupyansk through a gas pipeline, but that Ukrainian forces have blocked the pipeline and have all possible egress points under fire control. Geolocated footage published on December 14 and 15 indicates that Russian forces likely do not hold positions within Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), contrary to Russian claims of advances in the area.[15]

Russian forces are striking Ukrainian logistics lines in Odesa Oblast with various air launched munitions, including glide bombs, highlighting Ukraine’s urgent need for a well provisioned and diverse air defense umbrella. Geolocated footage published on December 15 shows Russian long range drones and glide bombs striking a bridge on the P-70 Odesa City- Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi highway over the Dneister River in Zatoka, Odesa Oblast, on December 14.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 14 that Russian forces struck a railway bridge near Zatoka with glide bombs and Geran (Shahed) drones, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on December 15 that the Russian strikes completely destroyed the bridge.[21] Additional geolocated footage published on December 15 shows Russian drones striking the Odeska railway bridge over the Sarata River in southern Sarata, Odesa Oblast.[22] Russian forces have recently intensified strikes against Odesa Oblast in parallel with intensified Kremlin rhetorical threats.[23] The Russian use of glide bombs as part of their strike packages against Odesa Oblast is notable, as they allow Russian forces to cause damage to Ukrainian logistical infrastructure with relatively cheaper munitions.[24] Russian forces must still use expensive manned aircraft to launch these glide bombs, which makes the aircraft vulnerable to the threat of Ukrainian air defenses, forcing Russia to weigh the balance of using cheaper munitions at the expense of its more exquisite aircraft systems. The increase in guided glide bomb attacks against Odesa Oblast highlights the fact that Ukraine urgently needs a holistic air defense umbrella that allows it to down manned aircraft, missiles, and drones alike.

Russian strikes appear to be advancing the Kremlin’s stated goal of degrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure by splitting Ukraine’s power grid in half. Ukraine requires Western-provided air defense systems and partner support for its drone interceptor development to safeguard itself against increasingly devastating strikes on its energy infrastructure. Several people familiar with the situation told the Washington Post on December 15 that Russian strikes threaten to completely disable transmission systems that move electricity from the western half of Ukraine, which stores most of Ukraine’s electricity, to eastern Ukraine.[25] The Washington Post‘s sources noted that Russian strikes could effectively split Ukraine’s energy grid into two parts along an east-west divide. ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to generate a west-east split in the Ukrainian power grid.[26] An anonymous senior European diplomat told the Washington Post that eastern Ukraine is “at the brink” of a complete blackout, and another person familiar with the energy crisis stated that Kyiv City may also suffer a full blackout. The European diplomat also stated that Russian forces are attempting to create energy islands in individual Ukrainian oblasts, effectively cutting off individual regions from any electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems. A spokesperson for Ukraine’s energy grid operator Ukrenergo told the Washington Post that Russian forces launched eight massive, combined missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure between October and December 2025, particularly targeting electricity and distribution infrastructure. Ukrainian energy expert Volodymyr Omelchenko stated that Russian forces launch regular combined strikes every seven to 10 days to maximize energy deficits and target infrastructure that is undergoing repairs after the previous strike.[27] Omelchenko noted that Russian forces are constantly targeting energy distribution infrastructure in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts.

Russian forces launched 9,298 drones and 270 missiles in October 2025, 5,444 drones and 216 missiles in November 2025, and 2,757 drones and 91 missiles in December 2025 as of December 15.[28] ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces are engaging in a large-scale strike campaign that targets one or two specific regions in quick succession to degrade Ukraine’s ability to repair energy infrastructure rapidly.[29] Russian forces also focus on targeting different elements of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including substations, to systematically destroy the entire Ukrainian energy ecosystem and complicate Ukraine’s ability to treat targeted areas, elongating periods without power.[30] ISW continues to assess that Russia‘s increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with subsidies for Ukrainian programs that focus on air defense innovations such as Ukraine’s drone interceptor programs.

Key Takeaways

US, Ukrainian, and European officials reportedly agreed on unspecified security guarantees for Ukraine during a peace negotiation meeting in Berlin, Germany, on December 15.
Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) strike against a Russian submarine for the first time in naval history on the night of December 14 to 15.
Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking in the Kupyansk direction as Russian ultranationalist milbloggers acknowledge the severity of the situation for Russian forces.
Russian forces are striking Ukrainian logistics lines in Odesa Oblast with various air launched munitions, including glide bombs, highlighting Ukraine’s urgent need for a well provisioned and diverse air defense umbrella.
Russian strikes appear to be advancing the Kremlin’s stated goal of degrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure by splitting Ukraine’s power grid in half. Ukraine requires Western-provided air defense systems and partner support for its drone interceptor development to safeguard itself against increasingly devastating strikes on its energy infrastructure.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full DEC 15 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2025

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The Kremlin is setting conditions to reject the Ukrainian and European peace plan drafts after it previously rejected key points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan that overwhelmingly benefitted Russia. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated in a TV interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on December 14 that Russia has stated its position “very clearly” and that Russia will have “strong objections” if Ukraine and Europe make amendments to the peace plan.[1] Ushakov also stated that Russia will not accept provisions related to various “territorial issues,” including any discussions of a demilitarized “buffer” zone in Donbas.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question from Zarubin about the possibility of Ukraine reneging on a peace agreement by demanding that Russia receives guarantees and a system for the implementation of any peace agreements.[3] Peskov also emphasized that the Kremlin is uninterested in reviewing the European position on the peace deal.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US negotiators in Berlin, Germany on December 14 to continue negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and German Chancellor Frederich Merz met in Berlin to discuss the 20-point peace plan.[6] Witkoff stated that negotiations will continue on December 15.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Communications Adviser Dmytro Lytvyn told Reuters that negotiations lasted for over five hours.[8]

Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain the Kremlin’s desired multi-pronged offensive operations in different operational directions due to the long-term materiel and manpower costs of such operations. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military officials have intensified exaggerated claims of advances across the frontline in recent weeks, namely focusing on the Vovchansk, Kupyansk, Siversk, Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, and Hulyaipole directions.[9] Putin notably implied on November 27 that Russian forces would quickly translate Russian advances near Hulyaipole to operational breakthroughs in the Zaporizhia direction.[10] Russia will need to generate and concentrate substantially more manpower and materiel on each of these directions to achieve tangible operational effects, or will alternatively have to selectively prioritize offensive efforts in one frontline area, which would come at the expense of the Kremlin’s information operations that aim to falsely portray Russian forces as imminently collapsing the entire frontline.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on December 13 that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF), which operates in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions, will need to regroup or receive troops and materiel reinforcements from other operational directions in order to continue offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.[11] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are increasingly struggling to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in the 5th Combined Arms Army’s ([CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) area of responsibility (AOR) east and northeast of Hulyaipole and in the 36th CAA’s (EMD) AOR in the Oleksandrivka direction. Mashovets stated that the Eastern GoF’s troops and materiel are stretched along a wide frontline, which may complicate Russian forces’ further offensive operations unless the Russian military command narrows down the offensive zone near Hulyaipole or transfers additional resources from other operational directions. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces may redeploy some elements of the 36th CAA and the 29th CAA (EMD), which are currently operating in the Oleksandrivka direction, to the 5th CAA’s AoR over the coming weeks. Mashovets argued that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division and 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) will be unable to imminently achieve tactical or operational successes. ISW assessed on December 3 that Russian forces achieved the tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025, likely in part by concentrating and committing a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction.[12] Russian forces notably redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division to the Hulyaipole direction from Sumy Oblast in September 2025; elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) from the Central GoF’s AoR to the area between Novopavlivka and Hulyaipole; and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (both of 35th CAA, EMD) to the 5th CAA’s AoR northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[13]

Russian efforts to start the battle for the Fortress Belt — Ukraine’s main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — will likely further stretch Russian resources. Mashovets assessed that offensives against the Fortress Belt’s Slovyansk and Kramatorsk strongholds would require the Russian military command to fully commit troops and materiel from the Western, Southern, and Central GoFs, and that Russian forces will not be able to get “distracted” on other directions, such as the Velykyi Burlyk or Orikhiv directions.[14] Mashovets added that Russia’s strategic challenges, such as problems with its domestic wartime economy and the defense industrial base (DIB), will also negatively impact Russia’s ability to generate sufficient forces and materiel for multi-pronged offensives. Russia will likely need to concentrate even more forces and deprioritize other frontline sectors to exploit tactical advances around Hulyaipole or to attempt to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin is therefore making territorial demands of unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts because it cannot militarily seize these regions at this time.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia’s oil refining and military capabilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, causing explosions and a large-scale fire.[15] Geolocated footage published on December 14 shows large-scale fire on the refinery’s territory.[16] Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported that the refinery has a processing capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces additionally struck the Uryupinsk Oil Depot in Volgograd Oblast, causing explosions and fires at the facility.[18] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that drone debris set fire to the Uryupinsk Oil Depot.[19] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces likely targeted the Slavneft-YANOS Oil Refinery, one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast.[20] Militarnyi reported that local Telegram channels reported witnessing explosions in the vicinity of the oil refinery.[21] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevraev issued a drone strike warning for unspecified areas of Yaroslavl Oblast on December 13.[22] Ukrainian forces also reportedly struck Dorogobuzhskaya Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Smolensk Oblast, causing power outages in the region.[23]

Ukrainian forces also struck Russian military and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian PMM ferry bridge vehicles, and Kasta-2E2 and the 96L6E radar stations in occupied Crimea.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 96L6E is an expensive component for Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on December 14, which was later geolocated, that showed Ukrainian drone strikes on a Russian fuel train near occupied Yantarne, Crimea and on an oil depot near occupied Bitumne, Crimea.[25] Ukrainian forces also reportedly struck two oil depots in occupied Simferopol and a substation in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there were fires at the oil depot in occupied Bitumne and at the Dzhankoi power substation.[26] Militarnyi reported that the strikes against the power substation likely caused power outages in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, and Russian occupation officials reported vast power outages in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[27] The Ukrainian SSO and the Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian drones struck two command posts of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division; a 9С19 Imbir radar station; a Volna-2 electronic warfare (EW) station; and a first-person view (FPV) drone operator training center in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian TOR-M2 anti-aircraft missile system and a Russian drone lab in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[29]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin is setting conditions to reject the Ukrainian and European peace plan drafts after it previously rejected key points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan that overwhelmingly benefitted Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US negotiators in Berlin, Germany on December 14 to continue negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain the Kremlin’s desired multi-pronged offensive operations in different operational directions due to the long-term materiel and manpower costs of such operations.
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia’s oil refining and military capabilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

read the full DEC 14 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 13, 2025

Toplines

Ukrainian forces continue to advance within and near Kupyansk, and more details have emerged about the counteroffensive effort. Geolocated footage published on December 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces made further advances in central Kupyansk while conducting clearing operations and also advanced southeast of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[1] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces completely seized Yuvileynyi Microraion in southwestern Kupyansk and assessed that this lost ground will likely prevent Russian forces from sustaining any remaining positions in southern Kupyansk.[2] Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces are still clearing Kupyansk, and geolocated footage published on December 12 and 13 indicates that Russian infiltration groups remain in northern and western Kupyansk.[3] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces are still attempting to penetrate into Kupyansk, primarily on foot.[4] Russian milbloggers acknowledged Ukrainian advances into Yuvileynyi Microraion and northwest of Kupyansk and stated that heavy fighting continues near Myrove and Radkivka (both northwest to north of Kupyansk).[5] One milblogger acknowledged Russia’s loss of Radkivka and two defensive positions south and east of Radkivka.[6] Many Russian milbloggers continued to cast doubt on or outright reject many of the Ukrainian reports of advances despite available evidence supporting the Ukrainian reporting.[7]

Ukrainian forces began counteroffensive operations in September 2025 after relatively rapid Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction and infiltrations into Kupyansk itself. Russian forces advanced relatively quickly in the Kupyansk direction in Summer 2025, threatening Kupyansk itself by early August 2025, and the Russian military command began portraying Russian infiltrations into Kupyansk as significant advances in late August.[8] Butusov’s reporting indicates that Russian forces were able to leverage these infiltration missions to advance into and consolidate positions within Kupyansk. Butusov reported that assault groups of the Russian 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA), and 1855th Battalion had established enduring positions within Kupyansk after Russian forces first infiltrated into the town in August 2025 and had also seized a key height north of Kupyansk — making the situation critical for Ukrainian forces by mid-September 2025.[9] Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated towns northwest of Kupyansk — Tyshchenkivka by September 24, Kindrashivka by October 9, and Radkivka by October 11 — allowing Ukrainian forces to break through Russian defenses in the area. Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces had reached the west (right) bank of the Oskil River and cut Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Kupyansk from the north by October 21. Butusov stated that drone operators of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces, Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, the Sudniy Den (Judgement Day) drone project (reportedly part of the Sudoplatov Battalion), and 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) had created a “kill zone” (an area of elevated drone strike risk) in the Kupyansk direction.[10] Butusov noted that Ukrainian forces created and leveraged battlefield advantages to allow Ukrainian counterattacks despite the “kill zone.”[11] The Ukrainian counterattack continues to demonstrate that Ukrainian forces are capable of making tactical gains on the frontline, particularly in areas where Russian forces are overstretched.[12] The Kremlin has been leveraging its claims of advances in and near Kupyansk for a cognitive warfare effort designed to portray the Ukrainian lines as on the verge of collapse, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia’s demands, and the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction continue to demonstrate that this narrative is false.[13]

Russian forces launched 495 total missiles and drones against Ukraine overnight on December 12 to 13, heavily targeting energy infrastructure across the country. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 465 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which roughly 270 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tula and Tambov oblasts; five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea; five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast; and 16 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black and Caspian seas. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 417 drones and 13 cruise missiles; eight missiles and 33 drones hit 18 locations; debris fell on three locations; and six missiles did not reach their targets (presumably due to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] operations). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Odesa Oblast.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian energy, residential, and port infrastructure in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts, injuring at least eight civilians.[15] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the Russian attacks struck energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts, causing power outages in Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[16] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russian strikes left over one million subscribers without power across the country.[17] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian strikes left Odesa City without electricity, water, and heat.[18] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes damaged 20 power substations in Odesa Oblast and caused outages for at least 100,000 subscribers throughout the oblast.[19] The Ukrainian Navy reported on December 13 that Russian drones struck the Turkish vessel Viva that had been transporting sunflower oil in the Black Sea at the time of the strike.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he will hold discussions regarding a peace settlement with US and European delegations in Berlin in the coming days.[21] Two White House officials told Axios on December 13 that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner will meet with Zelensky, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Frederich Merz in Berlin on December 15.[22] A White House official stated that the United States would support a potential Ukrainian territorial referendum and sees Zelensky’s proposal to hold this referendum as progress in the peace negotiations.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces continue to advance within and near Kupyansk, and more details have emerged about the counteroffensive effort.
Ukrainian forces began counteroffensive operations in September 2025 after relatively rapid Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction and infiltrations into Kupyansk itself.
Russian forces launched 495 total missiles and drones against Ukraine overnight on December 12 to 13, heavily targeting energy infrastructure across the country.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he will hold discussions regarding a peace settlement with US and European delegations in Berlin in the coming days.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

read the full DEC 13 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2025

Toplines

Ukrainian forces recently liberated territory including part of the city of Kupyansk in a tactical counterattack in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps reported on December 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack to stabilize the situation in the Kupyansk direction and liberated Kindrashivka and Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk) and the surrounding forests, liberated areas in northern Kupyansk, and broke through to the Oskil River, cutting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Kupyansk area.[1] The Ukrainian 2nd Corps stated that Ukrainian forces have encircled roughly 200 Russian personnel in Kupyansk as of December 12.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky published a photo of himself on the southwestern outskirts of Kupyansk along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway on December 12 — indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely pushed Russian forces much farther back from this area.[3] Geolocated footage published on December 12 also shows Ukrainian forces operating throughout Kupyansk.[4] Other Russian and Ukrainian sources corroborated the Ukrainian counterattack.[5] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Ukrainian forces encircled Russian forces within Kupyansk, cleared northwestern Kupyansk, and liberated Myrove, Kindrashivka, and Radkivka.[6] The source indicated that Russian forces still hold Holubivka (north of Kupyansk). A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces began infiltrating the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk from Myrove (just northwest of Kupyansk) and Radkivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces also liberated Myrove.[7] The milblogger noted that Russian forces do not control eastern Kupyansk and that the Oskil River (which flows through Kupyansk) complicates Russian efforts to reach central Kupyansk. Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a counterattack and made some advances but rejected the extent of observed Ukrainian advances.[8] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported on November 16 that it began efforts to push back Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction, and these recent advances are likely the result of a multi-week effort to retake Kupyansk.[9]

This Ukrainian counterattack demonstrates that Ukrainian forces remain capable of defending and counterattacking against significant Russian offensive efforts, contrary to the claims of Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Ukrainian lines are collapsing. The Ukrainian advances in and near Kupyansk show that Ukrainian forces are capable of conducting successful counterattacks and making tactically significant gains, particularly when Russian forces are overstretched. The seizure of Kupyansk has been a Russian priority since mid to late July 2025, but Russian forces have been unable to allocate sufficient force concentrations to overcome Ukrainian defenses in this area as they pursue intense offensive operations elsewhere in the theater.[10] Russian forces have also struggled to move troops into Kupyansk because Ukrainian forces have been successfully maintaining fire control over Russian logistics into northern Kupyansk since before the recent Ukrainian advances.[11] Russian advances have come at disproportionately high casualty rates and significant time costs, and Russian forces have had to commit 150,000 servicemembers to the Pokrovsk direction alone.[12] Putin and senior Russian military officials have recently intensified exaggerated claims of advances across the frontline in recent weeks, and Putin highlighted on November 21 that Russian forces will “inevitably” repeat their operations in the Kupyansk direction in other areas of the front.[13] These exaggerated claims of advance are false, however, and even a prominent Kremlin-coopted milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian counterattack “took advantage” of “some not entirely truthful statements” — recognizing that Putin’s November 27 claim of seizing Kupyansk was false.[14] Putin and senior Russian military officials have been attempting to portray the frontline in Ukraine as imminently on the verge of collapse, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia’s demands, but this Ukrainian counterattack in Kupyansk along with staunch Ukrainian resistance along the rest of the line shows that this narrative is false.

The contours of the Ukrainian counterproposal to the most recent US peace proposal are emerging, but details of this counterproposal remain unclear. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 11 that Ukraine gave the United States an updated peace proposal framework containing 20 key points and is waiting for a US response.[15] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak told French outlet Le Monde that the Ukrainian proposal to the United States contains three parts: the 20-point proposal to end the war itself, a proposal about the creation of a postwar European security architecture and security guarantees for Ukraine, and a proposal on Ukraine’s reconstruction and defensive capabilities.[16] Podolyak stated that Russia must pay reparations to help rebuild Ukraine. Podolyak stated that Ukraine agreed to create a demilitarized “buffer” zone in Donbas, but that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to pull back from the current front line to create this zone. Zelensky additionally proposed at a briefing that Ukraine should hold a referendum on the territorial provisions of the US peace proposal.[17] Zelensky reiterated his offer to hold elections but stated that Ukraine would need a ceasefire and additional security from the US and European states to ensure democratic elections.[18] The exact components of the Ukrainian counterproposal — including the provisions of such a referendum and the possible bounds and terms of a ceasefire or demilitarized zone — remain unclear as of December 12.

The Kremlin explicitly rejected Ukraine’s proposals for a ceasefire and referendum. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Zelensky’s territorial referendum proposal on December 12 by explicitly rejecting a ceasefire as a pause that “will not work” for Russia.[19] Peskov claimed that the ceasefire proposal is ”another deception, another delay” to prolong the war and re-arm Ukraine and suggested that a ceasefire is incompatible with a ”guaranteed, long-term” peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov also rejected any outcome that does not place Donbas under Russian control, by claiming that all of Donbas is Russian and reiterating the Kremlin’s long-held demand that Ukraine must withdraw from all of Donbas before Russia will agree to a ceasefire.[20] Several Russian officials, including Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and others who frequently parrot Kremlin narratives, also rejected Zelensky’s proposed ceasefire and referendum.[21] Russian officials have rejected a ceasefire not only within the context of a territorial referendum but also throughout several attempts to arrive at a peace agreement to end the war.[22] The length of a ceasefire necessary to conduct an election or referendum would not be long enough to allow Ukraine to restore its combat capabilities, which is the continual Russian justification for refusing all ceasefire proposals. Russia continues to insist on the right to continue full-scale offensive operations until Russia is able to conclude the war on its terms.

The Kremlin rejected the Ukrainian offer to establish a demilitarized zone. Ushakov responded to the proposal to establish a demilitarized zone in Donbas by stating that such a zone is possible but that Russia must deploy Rosgvardia — Russia’s national guard — as well as Russian law enforcement and “everything necessary to maintain order and organize life” to this zone.[23] Such a deployment would militarize this zone. Putin created Rosgvardia in 2016 with the official mission of ensuring public order and guarding against terrorist attacks, but Rosgvardia possesses extensive conventional military capabilities and has active combat experience consistent with a conventional military.[24] Rosgvardia demonstrated combined arms capabilities prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion in exercises using rotary-wing aircraft, artillery, air defense systems, drone support, and electronic warfare (EW) and conducted operations in Syria and occupied Crimea.[25] Rosgvardia units participated in the initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the efforts to seize Kyiv and Kharkiv cities, fought across the theater, including in the Russian offensive in Kursk Oblast, and are currently conducting rear area internal security operations and limited combat operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[26] Rosgvardia continues building out its conventional military capabilities, including by taking the heavy armored vehicles and other military equipment formerly belonging to the Wagner Group.[27] The deployment of Rosgvardia to a demilitarized zone is therefore incompatible with the purpose and meaning of such a zone, and Ushakov’s insistence on deploying Russian units with full military capabilities to a demilitarized zone is therefore a rejection of the demilitarized zone. Such a deployment would also set conditions for Russia to further threaten Ukraine and conduct renewed combat operations using rested forces from more favorable lines, as ISW has previously assessed.[28]

The European Union (EU) agreed on December 12 to indefinitely freeze 210 billion euros (roughly $247 billion) in Russian assets to provide Ukraine with a reparations loan of up to 165 billion euros (roughly $194 billion).[29] The EU agreed to implement Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which allows the EU to indefinitely extend the asset freeze.[30] The EU vote to invoke Article 122 to freeze Russian assets indefinitely required only a qualifying majority (at least 15 of the 27 member states).[31] The EU previously required a unanimous, bi-annual vote to renew the asset freeze, so the December 12 agreement supports EU efforts to leverage Russian assets to finance a reparations loan for Ukraine. The European Council plans to finalize the details of the reparations loan on December 18.[32] The European Commission initially proposed using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine in December 2023.[33] The EU would only require Ukraine to repay the loan if Russia pays reparations to Ukraine.[34]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces recently liberated territory including part of the city of Kupyansk in a tactical counterattack in the Kupyansk direction.
This Ukrainian counterattack demonstrates that Ukrainian forces remain capable of defending and counterattacking against significant Russian offensive efforts, contrary to the claims of Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Ukrainian lines are collapsing.
The contours of the Ukrainian counterproposal to the most recent US peace proposal are emerging, but details of this counterproposal remain unclear.
The Kremlin explicitly rejected Ukraine’s proposals for a ceasefire and referendum.
The Kremlin rejected the Ukrainian offer to establish a demilitarized zone.
The European Union (EU) agreed on December 12 to indefinitely freeze 210 billion euros (roughly $247 billion) in Russian assets to provide Ukraine with a reparations loan of up to 165 billion euros (roughly $194 billion).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 12 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2025

Toplines

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov effectively rejected the following provisions:

Freezing the current line of contact in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts;
Restarting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rather than Russia;
Requiring NATO only to cease further enlargement rather than insisting on rolling NATO back to its pre-1997 borders;
Permitting European fighter jets to be stationed in Poland;
Providing reliable security guarantees to Ukraine;
Confirming Ukraine’s sovereignty; and
Accepting EU regulations on the protection of religious minorities as the required basis for Ukrainian laws on the subject.

Lavrov stated that the Russian Constitution recognized illegally annexed Crimea and Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as “integral and equal subjects of the Russian Federation” and implied that Russia cannot give away territories enshrined in its constitution.[1] Lavrov also claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding at the Alaska Summit on August 15 based on the proposals that summarized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14, 2024, speech — in which Putin demanded complete Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as one of the prerequisites for peace negotiations.[2] Lavrov’s reiteration of the Russian demand for Ukrainian withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts contradicts the 21st point of the original peace plan, which states that Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will be frozen along the line of contact and that both Ukraine and Russia would de facto recognize the line of contact.[3] Russia’s commitment to establishing full control of Zaporizhia Oblast also contradicts the 19th point of the original peace plan, which states that the ZNPP would restart its operations under the IAEA and would equally distribute electricity between Russia and Ukraine.

Lavrov effectively rejected the third, fifth, and ninth points of the original peace plan, which respectively required only that NATO would not expand further, that European jets would be stationed in Poland, and that Ukraine would receive “reliable” security guarantees.[4] Lavrov stated that Russia “cannot agree” to any security guarantees for Ukraine that it would see as preparations for “another attack” against Russia and demanded that Russia receive security guarantees. Lavrov threatened that Russia would deem any “peacekeepers” in Ukraine “legitimate military targets,” effectively ruling out any meaningful Western security guarantees that could plausibly deter or defend against a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine as provided for under the fifth point. Point 8 of the 28-point plan reads: “NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine,” but there is no discussion of a NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. The 28-point plan did not preclude the deployment of forces from individual NATO member states as part of a security guarantee force. The Russians’ choosing to read that point as precluding the deployment of forces to guarantee the security of Ukraine would constitute a revision of the plan and would render any security guarantee toothless.

Lavrov proposed the December 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO as the basis for security guarantees for Russia. The 2021 ultimatums notably demanded “security guarantees” from the United States and NATO that amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance — such as halting the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member-states that joined NATO after 1997.[5] The Kremlin also demanded in January 2022 (as part of the extended negotiations on the 2021 suite of demands) that NATO roll back to the borders it had in 1997 borders when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed.[6] Lavrov thus effectively insisted on a rollback of NATO forces rather than the freeze on further NATO expansion included in the 28 points. An agreement based on the 2021 ultimatums would preclude the deployment of European fighter jets to Poland as well, since Poland joined NATO after 1997.
Lavrov also effectively rejected the 1st point of the original peace plan, which would confirm Ukraine’s sovereignty.[7] Lavrov reiterated Russia’s demand that Ukraine “must return to a non-aligned, neutral, and non-nuclear status” and that these principles are the “foundation of its statehood.” Lavrov claimed that Russia’s original recognition of Ukraine in 1990 was conditional on Ukraine’s neutral and non-aligned status. He made clear that Russian recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty would be permanently conditional on Ukraine’s foreign policy.

Lavrov rejected the 20th point of the original peace plan, which would accept Ukraine’s adoption of “EU rules” on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities as sufficient to address Russia’s claimed concerns on the matter.[8] Lavrov explicitly stated that it is “unacceptable” for the 20th point to limit Ukraine’s obligations to just “EU rules” and that the “EU rules” on religious tolerance and protection of minorities are insufficient. Lavrov falsely implied on December 10 that the original 28-point peace plan did not feature the clause on “EU rules.”[9]

Lavrov’s December 11 statements indicate that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept the original 28-point peace plan but that Russia will instead demand further modifications should Ukraine agree to it. Lavrov’s effective rejection of key elements of the 28-point peace plan is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s November 27 statement that the 28-point plan could be the basis for future negotiations, but not a final agreement in itself.[10]

Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin, have similarly rejected key points of the 28-point plan in recent weeks. The Kremlin signaled that it would not be satisfied with Ukraine holding elections in 100 days after the signing of the deal, as specified by the 25th point of the original peace plan. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and other lower-level Kremlin officials responded negatively on December 9 to Zelensky’s expressed willingness to hold elections as early as the next 60 to 90 days.[11] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 26 that “there can be no talk of any concessions or any surrender” of the “key aspects” of Russia’s objectives in Ukraine in response to the US peace plan.[12] Ryabkov stated Russia “is prepared to achieve its stated goals” in negotiations — referring to Russia’s long-held and oft-repeated demands, including demands that Russia gain control over all of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and force the Ukrainian government to capitulate — and noted that Russia will continue its war in Ukraine if there are “any setbacks” in negotiations.[13] Lavrov and lower-level Russian State Duma officials notably began setting informational conditions to reject reliable security guarantees for Ukraine on December 10, with Lavrov threatening Russian retaliation against the deployment of European military contingents to Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin’s position on peace negotiations and territorial swaps has not changed in 2025, with Putin stating in March 2025 that Russia does not intend to “give in to anyone” or “give” up illegally annexed territories.[15]

Russian State Duma deputies, whom the Kremlin uses to shape Russian public opinion, also made clear that Russia remains disinterested in signing any peace agreements, including the original 28-point peace plan. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on December 11 that he had not yet seen a single peace plan that “would be in line with [Russia’s] interests” and denounced any plans that involve freezing the frontline along the line of contact.[16] State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov stated on Russian state television on December 11 that any peace agreement that Russia signs will not guarantee “anything;” that physical force is more authoritative than law; and that Russia’s goal in Ukraine were not to confined to seizing Donbas but was rather to ensure “global security” — likely a nod to the Russian 2021 demands for “security guarantees” for Russia from the United States and NATO.[17]

The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk as part of the Kremlin’s intensified cognitive warfare effort that seeks to portray Ukraine’s frontline as on the verge of collapse, and Russian battlefield victory as inevitable. Neither is true, and the Russian seizure of Siversk is unconfirmed as of December 11. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a virtual meeting with various echelons of commanders of the Russian Joint Group of Forces on December 11, in which Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Medvedev claimed that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Siversk.^[18]3rd CAA Commander Lieutenant General Igor Kuzmenkov claimed that Russian forces flanked Siversk from the north and south to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and avoid urban warfare, and relied heavily on drones, artillery, and airstrikes to facilitate advances near and within Siversk. While geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Russian forces have likely seized eastern Siversk, the Russian seizure of western Siversk remains unconfirmed.^[19] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets rejected Russia’s claims of seizing Siversk on December 11 and stated that fighting continues throughout Siversk and that Russian forces are taking advantage of near-constant poor weather conditions to infiltrate into the town.[20] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction also reported that direction also reported that Russian forces are leveraging bad weather to infiltrate in small groups and ostentatiously raise flags to assert that Russian forces control terrain and achieve informational efforts — in line with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are relying on flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[21] Some Russian milbloggers also claimed on December 10 and 11 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Siversk but that Russian forces control at least 90 percent of Siversk.^[22]

The Kremlin is attempting to portray the claimed fall of Siversk as the start of the battle for Slovyansk — a battle the Kremlin has not set conditions on the ground to begin. Medvedev claimed to Putin that Russia’s alleged seizure of Siversk sets conditions for a Russian drive on Slovyansk, the northernmost tip of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast to portray Russia as able to imminently and quickly advance on the northern part of the Fortress Belt.[23] Russian forces are at least several months away from being able to begin an offensive, conducting ground assaults against Slovyansk, however. Russian forces would have to complete the seizure of Lyman and advance the 14 kilometers from Lyman to Slovyansk (including crossing the Siverskyi Donets River) or traverse the 30 kilometers from Siversk to Slovyansk before assaulting the city itself. The Russian efforts for Lyman and Siversk have been years-long endeavors. Russian forces have been attempting to advance on Siversk since the fall of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in early July 2022, and it took Russian forces 41 months to advance 19 kilometers from the western outskirts of Lysychansk to central Siversk.[24] Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman in early October 2022 during their successful September-October 2022 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have been attempting to recapture the town since then.[25] Only after one or both of these advances would Russian forces be able to begin an assault on Slovyansk directly, and it will likely take a year for Russian forces to make these advances at their current rate of advance in the area. Russian forces have historically taken several months to seize relatively large urban areas, including Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk — the seizure of which is not yet complete — and would likely take another several months to seize Slovyansk after reaching it.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to portray Russian forces as imminently threatening the northern part of the Fortress Belt as part of its broader effort to portray Russian forces as making significant simultaneous advances across the theater, such that the frontline is imminently collapsing.

Putin’s December 11 meeting is part of a pattern of senior Russian officials aggrandizing claimed battlefield victories in the past several weeks to create the false perception that the frontlines are collapsing to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse. Putin has held several meetings with Russian military commanders in recent weeks to falsely inflate the claims of Russian advances in various sectors of the frontline, including the Vovchansk direction in northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk direction in eastern Kharkiv Oblast, the Pokrovsk direction in Donetsk Oblast, and the Hulyaipole direction in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[27] These officials have made exaggerated claims of advances in every meeting, and Russian ultranationalist milbloggers have rejected many of these claims as inflated.[28] The Kremlin is attempting to use these claims to portray a Russian military victory in Ukraine as inevitable, such that the West should stop supporting Ukraine and push Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands. The battlefield situation is serious in several sectors of the frontline, but the frontlines are far from collapsing, however. Russian forces have not been able to sustain tactically-significant gains across more than a few areas of the battlefield simultaneously, and there are several areas where Russian advances remain stagnant, including in southern Ukraine and in northern Sumy Oblast.[29] Russian forces have been able to make tactically-significant gains in certain sectors of the frontline largely through monthslong efforts to achieve partial battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in these sectors and degrade Ukrainian defenses ahead of intensified ground operations.[30]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed to Putin on December 11 that Russian forces had advanced south and southeast of Yunakivka, northeast of Sumy City.[31] Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast have stalled since late June 2025 and have not made any tactically-significant gains in the area.[32] Russian forces have also redeployed elements of the relatively elite naval infantry and airborne (VDV) elements that were leading the offensive operations to other areas of the frontline, including to the Pokrovsk direction and southern Ukraine.[33] Russian milbloggers, including a milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, have stated that Russian assaults near Yunakivka have been failing for several weeks and complained that the Russian military command orders Russian forces go conduct attritional assaults using the same unsuccessful tactics.[34]

Russian forces are only making tactical gains across most of the theater. ISW assesses that there are roughly 16 distinct tactical areas and operational directions in the theater. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced 4,652.2 square kilometers thus far in 2025, of which almost 80 percent occurred in only six directions: the Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions. Russian forces seized 964.01 square kilometers thus far in 2025 in the remaining 10 directions, only roughly 21 percent of the total Russian advances. These directions include the Sumy, northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Velykyi Burluk directions, where Russian forces have failed to make significant gains despite much-publicized efforts to create “buffer zones” near the Ukraine-Russia border, and the Kherson direction, where Russian forces have remained stagnant since a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive forced them to withdraw from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[35] Russian forces have made the most dramatic advances in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions — places where Russian forces have concentrated over two combined arms armies’ worth of combat power, each, and dedicated extensive time and effort to advance.[36] The Russian military command is not able to simultaneously dedicate the manpower and resources necessary to make similar advances across the theater, and even the most extensive Russian advances are constrained to foot pace.[37] Russian forces have thus failed to make significant gains in any direction without a significant commitment of forces along relatively narrow tactical and operational areas, demonstrating that Russian advances remain concentrated along a few narrow areas of the frontline rather than the broad advance that the Kremlin promotes.[38] The Kremlin continues to engage in a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and flag raising infiltration missions in an attempt to portray them as a sweeping, broad-front advance to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[39]

Ukrainian forces struck an oil platform in the Caspian Sea for the first time and struck other Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 10 to 11. Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne and a person familiar with the matter told Bloomberg on December 11 that at least four Ukrainian long-range drones struck Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft’s Filanovsky Oil Field in the Caspian Sea overnight, halting oil and natural gas production at over 20 production wells.[40] Suspilne reported that the Filanovsky Oil Field is one of the largest explored oil fields in Russia and in the Russian part of the Caspian Sea, with reserves estimated at 129 million tons of oil and 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on December 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Dorogobuzh Combined Heating and Power Plant (CHPP) that provides power to the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant in Verkhnedneprovsky, Smolensk Oblast, overnight.[41] Kovalenko reported that the chemical plant produces chemicals critical to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), including ammonia, nitrates, and nitrogen fertilizers. Russian opposition outlet Astra geolocated footage of overnight explosions in Verkhnedneprovsky to nearby the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant.[42] Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows a fire and explosions at the Akron Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Veliky Novgorod, Novgorod Oblast.[43] An Astra source within the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at the Akron plant, halting operations at five workshops.[44] Astra reported that the plant produces ammonium nitrate for both military and civilian use.[45] Novgorod Oblast Governor Aleksander Dronov claimed on December 11 that falling drone debris damaged buildings in unspecified areas of Novgorod Oblast.[46] Astra geolocated footage of damaged buildings in Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast, published on December 10 to near a CHPP and the Voronezhsintezkauchuk Plant, a manufacturer of thermoplastic elastomers and synthetic rubber products.[47] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev claimed that falling drone debris damaged a power line in Voronezh City, leading to power outages, and an industrial building in an unspecified location in southern Voronezh Oblast late on December 10 and overnight.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 11 that Russian forces downed 287 Ukrainian drones overnight, including six over Smolensk Oblast, 19 over Novgorod Oblast, and four over Voronezh Oblast.[49]

Key Takeaways

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine.
Lavrov’s December 11 statements indicate that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept the original 28-point peace plan but that Russia will instead demand further modifications should Ukraine agree to it.
Lavrov’s effective rejection of key elements of the 28-point peace plan is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s November 27 statement that the 28-point plan could be the basis for future negotiations, but not a final agreement in itself.
Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin, have similarly rejected key points of the 28-point plan in recent weeks.
The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Siversk as part of the Kremlin’s intensified cognitive warfare effort that seeks to portray Ukraine’s frontline as on the verge of collapse, and Russian battlefield victory as inevitable. Neither is true, and the Russian seizure of Siversk is unconfirmed as of December 11.
The Kremlin is attempting to portray the claimed fall of Siversk as the start of the battle for Slovyansk – a battle the Kremlin has not set conditions on the ground to begin.
Putin’s December 11 meeting is part of a pattern of senior Russian officials aggrandizing claimed battlefield victories in the past several weeks to create the false perception that the frontlines are collapsing to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands. ISW continues to assess that the frontline in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse.
Russian forces are only making tactical gains across most of the theater.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil platform in the Caspian Sea for the first time and struck other Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 10 to 11.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk.

read the full DEC 11 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 10, 2025

Toplines

The Kremlin is setting information conditions to reject any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine by threatening Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on December 10 that, although Russia does not intend to go to war with Europe, the Kremlin will respond to “any hostile steps,” such as the deployment of European military contingents to Ukraine and the seizure of frozen Russian assets.[1] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on December 10 that Russia will deliberately target any European military contingents deployed to Ukraine.[2] Lavrov’s and Chepa’s statements come amid US, Ukrainian, and European discussions about providing security guarantees to Ukraine.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 9 that US, Ukrainian, and European negotiators will discuss security guarantees for Ukraine during an upcoming security council-level meeting on an unspecified date.[4] The Kremlin is likely setting information conditions to undermine Ukrainian and Western efforts to secure meaningful security guarantees, such as the deployment of military contingents or other military assistance, against possible renewed Russian aggression in the future.

The Kremlin preemptively rejected the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian government that it does not directly control in response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent statements that he is ready to hold elections before the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on December 9 that he is ready to hold elections in Ukraine as early as the next 60 to 90 days and asked the United States and European countries to provide election security.[5] Zelensky tasked Ukrainian parliamentarians with preparing legislative proposals to change the Ukrainian law that bans elections during martial law, likely referring to Ukraine’s Constitution.[6] Kremlin officials responded negatively to Zelensky’s statement, despite previous Kremlin demands that Ukraine hold elections as a prerequisite for any peace negotiations or agreement ending the war.[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on December 10 that the Kremlin has not discussed Zelensky’s willingness to hold elections and will continue to monitor the situation as it unfolds.[8] Peskov added that Russian President Vladimir Putin has long discussed the “need” for elections in Ukraine. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Zelensky of “cynicism” and claimed that his request for the United States and Europe to provide security for the elections indicates that Ukraine has lost its sovereignty.[9] Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Zelensky’s readiness to hold elections is an “arrogant bluff” and a “manipulation” of Ukraine’s election rules and implied that Russia will oppose any US or European efforts to ensure election security in Ukraine.[10] Miroshnik insinuated that Zelensky cannot be ready to hold elections, given that Ukraine canceled the regularly scheduled elections in May 2024 and reiterated the Kremlin’s false narrative about Zelensky’s illegitimacy. Russian state media also platformed on December 10 statements from Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin who Putin initially aimed to replace Zelensky following Russia’s full-scale invasion — calling for Zelensky’s forced removal from office and criticizing the ongoing peace talks.[11] The Kremlin’s responses to Zelensky are consistent with Putin’s November 27 statements that Russia is only interested in signing peace agreements with a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and that the Ukrainian government would need to take additional steps beyond the elections before the Kremlin would consider signing any peace agreements.[12] Kremlin officials’ reactions to the prospect of elections in Ukraine further demonstrate that Russia continues to make excuses to stall any peace negotiations that do not equate to anything short of Ukraine’s surrender.

The Kremlin once again rejected the Ukrainian-proposed ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and signaled Russia’s commitment to destroying the Ukrainian power grid in the winter months. Zelensky stated on December 9 that Ukraine is ready to agree to an “energy truce” with Russia and implied that Ukraine would halt its strikes against Russian energy infrastructure if Russia ceased its strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[13] Ukrainian forces have been systematically targeting Russian oil refineries across Russia in 2025, undermining Russian revenue streams that directly fund its war effort.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected Zelensky’s energy infrastructure ceasefire offer on December 10, stating that Russia is “working towards peace, not a ceasefire.”[15] Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev accused Zelensky, the United Kingdom, and the European Union of attempting to “trick” Russia into a temporary ceasefire, likely in an attempt to justify Russia’s refusal.[16] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa, similarly attempted to justify Russia’s refusal by falsely accusing Ukraine of violating a prior US-brokered energy infrastructure ceasefire in March 2025.[17] Russia and Ukraine never agreed to any formal terms for the ceasefire, which Russia unilaterally claimed began on March 18 and did not renew.[18] ISW assessed in Spring 2025 that the Kremlin exploited the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire’s vague and unfinalized terms in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the agreements.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger asserted that Russia must fully destroy Ukraine’s power grid and that failing to do so could undermine Russia’s offensive operations in Ukraine.[20] Russian forces recently intensified large combined missile and drone strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the Winter 2025-2026 heating season and appear to be launching these combined strikes every seven to 10 days in an effort to break Ukraine’s power grid.[21]

Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not yet seized Pokrovsk, but the situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will take more time and suffer more casualties to do so. Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating along the Donetska Railway in northwestern Pokrovsk and in northwestern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), having either maintained or recently recaptured these positions.[22] The situation for Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket remains serious, however. Russian forces continue to infiltrate into central and western Myrnohrad.[23] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are simultaneously assaulting Myrnohrad itself and its flanks and are interdicting Ukrainian logistics.[24] The Ukrainian spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces only have limited opportunities to conduct rotations due to Russian strikes and infiltration missions, requiring careful preparation for each rotation mission. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are continuing air strikes against Ukrainian fortified positions and trying to combine large strike series with ground operations. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are operating armored vehicles near Pokrovsk, and the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division took advantage of poor weather conditions to conduct a mechanized assault from southern to northern Pokrovsk.[25] Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Russian forces conducting a platoon-sized mechanized assault in western Pokrovsk.[26] These reports indicate that Russian forces have been able to transport at least some vehicles into Pokrovsk after Ukrainian interdiction efforts successfully prevented Russian mechanized and motorized vehicle operations in the Pokrovsk direction in mid-November 2025.[27] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi indicated on December 10 that Ukrainian forces still operate in northern Pokrovsk but acknowledged that there were no Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk on an unspecified prior date, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have recently retaken limited positions within the town.[28] Syrskyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the Sukhyi Yar, Lysivka, and Novopavlivka areas south to southeast of Pokrovsk on an unspecified prior date.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Black Sea region with unmanned surface vehicles (USV) on December 10. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 10 that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy struck the DASHAN oil tanker with Sea Baby USVs in the Black Sea, severely damaging the tanker and forcing it to cease operations.[29] The Ukrainian intelligence sources stated that the DASHAN oil tanker was en route toward Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai; flew the Comoro Islands flag; and carried about $60 million of petroleum products at the time of the strike. Footage published on December 10 shows at least two USVs striking the tanker.[30] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the DASHAN was in the Black Sea south of occupied Feodosia, Crimea at the time of the strike.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have struck four oil tankers in the past two weeks.[32] Ukrainian forces used Sea Baby USVs to strike the KAIRO and VIRAT oil tankers, both part of Russia’s shadow fleet, in late November 2025.[33]

Russia may be setting conditions to threaten Odesa Oblast from Russian-occupied Transnistria in an effort to fix Ukrainian forces in southwestern Ukraine. Sources in Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)’s Public Administration told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 10 that the Kremlin is attempting to strengthen its presence in Transnistria by calling up reservists, bringing weapons out of storage, and launching drone production and training centers in Transnistria.[34] The GUR sources warned that these measures will increase the risk of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups infiltrating into Odesa Oblast from Transnistria. Odesa Oblast borders Russian-occupied Transnistria to the west, and the capital of Tiraspol is about 80 kilometers from Odesa City – meaning that the deployment of Russian drone units to occupied Transnistria places Odesa City within range of Russian mid-range drone strikes. Russian forces have been successfully conducting strikes into Ukrainian rear areas at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 kilometers) across the theater using specialized drone units and likely could transfer some of these capabilities to units stationed in Transnistria.[35] The Kremlin likely seeks to divert Ukrainian resources away from the frontline and near-rear by forcing Ukrainian forces to defend against infiltration missions and drone strikes in Odesa Oblast. The GUR’s warning comes as the Kremlin has been reigniting narratives in recent weeks claiming that Odesa City is a Russian city and threatening future aggression against Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[36] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to justify future Russian efforts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia remains unlikely to be able to conduct such offensive operations in the near-term and will likely focus on bringing to bear asymmetric capabilities such as limited infiltration and operational-depth drone strikes.[37]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin is setting information conditions to reject any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine by threatening Europe.
The Kremlin preemptively rejected the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian government that it does not directly control in response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent statements that he is ready to hold elections before the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin once again rejected the Ukrainian-proposed ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and signaled Russia’s commitment to destroying the Ukrainian power grid in the winter months.
Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not yet seized Pokrovsk, but the situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will take more time and suffer more casualties to do so.
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Black Sea region with unmanned surface vehicles (USV) on December 10.
Russia may be setting conditions to threaten Odesa Oblast from Russian-occupied Transnistria in an effort to fix Ukrainian forces in southwestern Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Oleksandrivka.

read the full DEC 10 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 9, 2025

Toplines

The Kremlin is significantly intensifying its cognitive warfare effort to present the Russian military and economy as able to inevitably win a war of attrition against Ukraine. High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have been aggressively promoting exaggerated battlefield advances and the alleged strength and resilience of the Russian economy.[1] This multipronged cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia’s demands now during negotiations out of fear of intensified, protracted Russian military operations in the future. Though the situation in specific sectors of the frontline is serious, especially in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, most of Putin’s assertions of Russian victories do not correspond to the battlefield reality, nor do they indicate that the frontlines in Ukraine will collapse imminently.[2] Putin’s claims about the strength of the Russian economy also ignore how the Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is facing mounting costs in the face of Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the compounding costs of the war.[3]

The Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aims to achieve several of Putin’s original war aims through a negotiated settlement, as Russian forces are currently unable to achieve them on the battlefield. Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly and publicly reiterated their commitment to Russia’s original war aims, including granting Russia a veto over future NATO expansion, the removal of the Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government, and limits on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.[4] Putin reiterated on December 9 his call for Ukraine to cede all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts – including areas that Russian forces currently do not occupy. Putin claimed that Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are Russia’s “historical territory” and were “always part of Russia.”[5] Putin repeated his narrative that Ukraine is an artificial state that Soviet authorities whimsically created. The Russian Federation has notably recognized Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders several times in the past three decades, including with its recognition of Ukrainian independence in 1991, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty.

ISW continues to assess that the Russian campaign to militarily seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine’s heavily fortified Fortress Belt, would likely take at least two-to-three years, pose a significant challenge, and result in difficult and costly battles that the Russian Federation may not be able to sustain.[6] Russia’s cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West to cede this heavily defended territory to Russia without a fight, allowing Russia to avoid spending significant amounts of time and resources to try to seize it on the battlefield. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would also notably set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing, particularly as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to indicate that their longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine – not only its southern and eastern regions – remains unchanged.[7]

Russian forces have gained 0.77 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2025 while suffering disproportionately high personnel costs. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 4,669 square kilometers since January 1, 2025. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces have suffered a total of 391,270 casualties in that time – or about 83 casualties per square kilometer. The Russian rate of advance has not exceeded a footpace, even in areas where Russian forces have been making relatively quicker gains recently, such as in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions. Russian advances are unlikely to move faster than a footpace in the near- to medium- term. The drone-dominated battlefield denies Russian forces the ability to conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances that restore maneuver to the battlefield.[8] Ukraine’s drone-based defenses have some vulnerabilities (e.g. weather factors) that Russian forces have managed to exploit to make tactically significant advances, but Ukraine’s drone defenses overall have denied Russian forces the ability to use armored vehicles and conduct mechanized maneuver and have forced Russian forces into grinding attritional infantry missions.[9] This equilibrium is unlikely to change rapidly, barring any sudden changes in the fundamental technologies and operational concepts underpinning the current war in Ukraine.

Russia’s resources are not endless as Putin is trying to assert, and Putin currently appears to be facing difficult decision points regarding the strategic sustainment of Russian force generation. ISW assessed in February 2025 that Russia would likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in the next 12 to 18 months as the mounting costs of the war compounded over time.[10] Russia’s main force generation recruitment system that uses high financial incentives to attract personnel appears to be hitting diminishing returns and negatively affecting the Russian economy.[11] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s slowing recruitment efforts likely could not indefinitely replace Russia’s casualty rates without a compulsory reserve mobilization.[12]

Putin is very likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near-exhaustion of voluntary recruitment in 2026 by mobilizing elements of Russia’s strategic reserve to sustain combat operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unlikely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time, however, and is most likely to persistently recruit reservists on a rolling basis. Putin signed a decree on December 8 authorizing the compulsory call-up of an unspecified number of Russian inactive reservists who will undergo compulsory “military assemblies” in the Russian Armed Forces, National Guard (Rosgvardia), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Emergency Situations military rescue units, and other state security agencies.[13] Putin tasked the Russian government with calling up the inactive reservists and organizing the assemblies in 2026, but the publicly released version of the decree classified two of the four provisions.[14] Military assemblies in Russia refer to the gathering of staff at a training ground or a unit’s headquarters, usually within the context of preparing units for military exercises or service.[15] Russia’s resolution titled, “On Military Assembly and Certain Issues of Ensuring the Fulfillment of Military Duty,” states that the Russian president may order military assemblies for training purposes or to check combat and mobilization readiness; that the assemblies may last no longer than two months; and that the total duration of a mobilized person’s participation in a military assembly may not exceed 12 months.[16]

The December 8 decree will likely allow the Kremlin to covertly mobilize members of its strategic inactive reserve. Russia has two types of reserves. Russia retains a higher readiness “human mobilization reserve” – an active reserve of Russian citizens who sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up. Russia also maintains an inactive reserve (also known as the human mobilization resource or “zapas” in Russian), which includes Russian men as old as 65-70 years old in some circumstances who are not actively affiliated with the Russian Armed Forces.[17] ISW warned in October 2025 that the Kremlin was preparing to conduct rolling partial mobilization without a formal declaration of war or formal announcement that it was conducting partial compulsory call-up.[18] Putin first signed a law on November 4 that allowed the Kremlin to call up active reservists to “defend critical infrastructure facilities” in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and Russian officials and state media avidly rejected concerns that the Kremlin would commit active reservists to combat operations in Ukraine.[19] The December 8 decree notably does not impose any restrictions on the use of inactive reservists in combat operations, however, allowing the Kremlin to call up and determine the uses of inactive reservists during or after the military assemblies.[20]

The Kremlin notably has been setting up a system that could support some limited compulsory reservist call-ups without interrupting Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles. The December 8 decree follows the Kremlin’s recent intensified efforts to mitigate Russia’s administrative capacity bottlenecks that would complicate Russia’s ability to quickly mobilize reserves during the semi-annual conscription cycles. Putin signed another law on November 4, allowing Russian military conscription administrative processes to occur year-round, as opposed to only during the spring and fall cycles as had happened before.[21] The Kremlin has also been simplifying conscription regulations, likely to decrease the number of administrative and medical staff needed to support the semi-annual conscription cycles.[22] The Kremlin notably postponed the Fall 2022 conscription cycle after declaring partial mobilization in late September 2022 because it lacked the necessary administrative and medical staff to simultaneously facilitate two compulsory call-ups, and the September 2022 partial mobilization resulted in mass societal backlash against the regime.[23]

The December 8 decree marks a notable departure from the Kremlin’s social contract with the Russian people via its volunteer recruitment campaign, through which the Kremlin aimed to avoid deeply unpopular compulsory reserve call-ups. The ever-increasing cost of the system that used high financial incentives to recruit volunteers and the growing need for manpower to sustain Russia’s highly attritional assaults have likely forced the Kremlin to reconsider its social contract regarding compulsory military service in Ukraine. Compulsory call-ups of reservists may enable the Kremlin to generate forces more cheaply and demobilize servicemembers mobilized in 2022, but will likely pose greater political risks to the Kremlin.[24] The Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to downplay or misrepresent the true intent of these personnel system changes suggest that the Kremlin remains unlikely to conduct a general mobilization of inactive reservists or repeat its 2022 partial mobilization at this time due to the heavy political costs associated with such compulsory reserve call-ups.[25] ISW continues to assess that the West and Ukraine can leverage the manner in which Russia’s economic, demographic, and force generation challenges compound over time to force Putin to grapple with challenging decision points at home sooner than he would like. The US can use such an approach to build leverage against Russia to compel Putin to come to the negotiating table with and offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin notably has offered no concessions on the war in Ukraine so far and has not publicly signaled agreement with any of the United States’ recently proposed ceasefires or peace plans.

A Kremlin official suggested that Russia may try to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine due to the Ukrainian government’s alleged “illegitimacy” – as ISW has long warned. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed on December 9 that Ukraine must hold elections in order to “legitimize” the government.[27] Slutsky stated that Russia must be “absolutely certain” that no one can challenge the authority of the Ukrainian signatories on a future peace agreement. The Kremlin, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long used deliberate misinterpretations of Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian constitution to allege that Zelensky is illegitimate.[28] Slutsky’s statement is in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment that the Kremlin may use its false claims about Zelensky’s illegitimacy to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine at a time of Russia’s choosing.[29]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the latest 20-point US-proposed peace plan. Zelensky stated on December 8 that the latest US-proposed peace plan contains 20 points.[30] Zelensky stated that territorial issues remain unresolved and that Ukrainian forces are fighting in order to not give up Ukrainian territory. Zelensky noted that Russia is putting military, informational, and diplomatic pressure on Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk Oblast. Zelensky noted that there is currently a proposal to “exchange” the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and part of the territories that Russian forces occupy for the parts of Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces currently do not occupy. Zelensky continued to reiterate the importance of security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.

Ukraine continued discussions with its European allies on December 8 about the ongoing peace negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met on December 8 with French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and German Chancellor Friederich Merz in London to discuss diplomatic engagement with the United States and further defense support for Ukraine.[31] Starmer noted the importance of reaching a settlement that guarantees a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. The Ukrainian readout of the meeting noted that the leaders reiterated that a peace plan must provide for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, security guarantees from Ukraine’s partners, and a full ceasefire. Zelensky and Starmer also held a joint telephone conversation with representatives of Finland, Italy, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, NATO, and the European Commission on December 8, wherein the parties emphasized that the Coalition of the Willing must play a significant role in future security guarantees for Ukraine.[32] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is engaging in continuous communication with its partners to ensure that the ongoing negotiations consider Europe’s position.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin is significantly intensifying its cognitive warfare effort to present the Russian military and economy as able to inevitably win a war of attrition against Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aims to achieve several of Putin’s original war aims through a negotiated settlement, as Russian forces are currently unable to achieve them on the battlefield.
Russian forces have gained 0.77 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2025 while suffering disproportionately high personnel costs.
Russia’s resources are not endless as Putin is trying to assert, and Putin currently appears to be facing difficult decision points regarding the strategic sustainment of Russian force generation.
Putin is very likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near-exhaustion of voluntary recruitment in 2026 by mobilizing elements of Russia’s strategic reserve to sustain combat operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unlikely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time, however, and is most likely to persistently recruit reservists on a rolling basis.
A Kremlin official suggested that Russia may try to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine due to the Ukrainian government’s alleged “illegitimacy” – as ISW has long warned.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the latest 20-point US-proposed peace plan.
Ukraine continued discussions with its European allies on December 8 about the ongoing peace negotiations.
Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka.

read the full DEC 9 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8, 2025

Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to portray the Russian economy as able to support a protracted war in Ukraine — likely to buttress the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare effort falsely claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable. Putin stated on December 8 at the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects that Russia is working to overcome demographic issues and increase the birth rate, and highlighted numerous support measures the Kremlin is offering families with children.[1] Putin stated that the birth rate continues to decline, including due to unspecified “external challenges” – likely in part referring to the demographic impacts of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated that the Kremlin will include birth rate indicators in performance evaluations of regional governors. Putin claimed that sociological indicators about people’s readiness to have children have most significantly improved in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts — where Russian occupation authorities have been pushing pro-natalist policies as part of wider efforts to exploit occupied Ukraine as an economic and demographic resource.[2] Putin claimed that Russia’s GDP growth will be about one percent by the end of 2025 and that inflation will be near or below six percent, with the Central Bank forecasting four to five percent inflation in 2026. Putin claimed that Russia can now gradually increase “economic momentum” while maintaining low unemployment and moderate inflation. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed that Russian GDP growth in the past three years is roughly 10 percent despite “unprecedented” sanctions pressure and that the Russian economy can “move forward” despite “attempts to restrain [Russia’s] development.”

The Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin’s statements seek to suggest, however.[3] Putin intensified his efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead-up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting in Moscow, and Putin’s December 8 remarks are likely similarly aimed at influencing the ongoing peace negotiations.[4] Putin is likely attempting to convince the United States that increased sanctions pressure will not have its intended effect on the Russian economy and will not push Putin to make compromises to end his war against Ukraine. Putin is also notably not discussing the ongoing war in Ukraine in his speeches on the Russian economy, likely in order to obscure the connections between Russia’s battlefield losses and economic problems.[5] The Kremlin appears to be trying to dovetail its claims about the Russian economy with the false narrative that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Both narratives aim to push the West and Ukraine into capitulating to Russia’s demands now out of fear of intensified, protracted Russian military operations in the future. ISW continues to assess that the West and Ukraine can leverage several key Russian battlefield and economic weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions and that a Russian victory is not inevitable.[6]

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia’s unwillingness to compromise to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated on December 8 that Russia does not care who signs the “capitulation” to end the war but that the “main thing” is that the terms in the settlement “satisfy Russia.”[7] Zhuravlev claimed that the issues that led to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stemmed from deteriorating US-Russia relations such that Russia should sign a peace agreement only with the United States — not Ukraine. Zhuravlev’s statements reiterate how the Kremlin has consistently made demands not only of Ukraine, but of NATO as well, and that the Kremlin continues to refuse a settlement to the war that amounts to anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.[8] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 8 that negotiations to end the war must be “done in silence” — repeating recent Kremlin calls for parties to withhold details about the ongoing negotiations from the public, likely to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of proposed peace plans.[9]

Russia is reportedly planning to foment protests in Ukraine, likely to support the longstanding Kremlin narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on December 8 that Russian special services are planning to destabilize the domestic situation in Ukraine by staging allegedly “peaceful protests” in large cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine.[10] Lubinets stated that the Russian special services plan to recruit women, especially mothers of Ukrainian military personnel who are prisoners of war (POW)s or missing in action (MIA) for such protests. Lubinets stated that the Kremlin aims to use the protests to pressure Ukraine’s military-political leadership amidst ongoing peace negotiations. The Kremlin, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long used deliberate misinterpretations of Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian constitution to allege that Zelensky is illegitimate.[11] Ukrainian intelligence notably identified the Russian “Maidan-3” information campaign in 2024 that aimed to spread doubt about Zelensky’s legitimacy.[12] The reported Russian attempt to foment protests in Ukraine is likely similarly aimed at reinforcing the false narrative that the current Ukrainian government does not have the support of the Ukrainian people. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin may use its false claims about Zelensky’s illegitimacy to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine at a time of Russia’s choosing.[13]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to portray the Russian economy as able to support a protracted war in Ukraine — likely to buttress the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare effort falsely claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable.
Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia’s unwillingness to compromise to end Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Russia is reportedly planning to foment protests in Ukraine, likely to support the longstanding Kremlin narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate.
Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.

read the full DEC 8 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 7, 2025

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The Kremlin positively reacted to the recently released US National Security Strategy (NSS). Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 7 that the new US NSS is “largely consistent with [Russia’s] vision” and could be a “modest guarantee” that Russia and the United States will be able to continue working toward securing a peace settlement in Ukraine.[1] Peskov stated that the Kremlin considers the NSS’s call for cooperation with Russia and refraining from listing Russia as a “direct threat” to the United States as a “positive step.”[2] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated that the updated NSS is a signal that the United States is ready to discuss issues related to the “security architecture,” likely referring to European security architecture and the role NATO plays in it.[3] Medvedev stated that the NSS “unexpectedly” aligns with Russia’s ideas about the need to share security and respect the sovereignty of states. Medvedev stated that the “window of opportunity for dialogue” is now “ajar.”

Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in northern Kharkiv Oblast, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics to eventually facilitate battlefield gains. The Kharkiv Oblast Infrastructure Restoration and Development Service reported on December 7 that Russian forces struck a bridge near Staryi Saltiv (east of Kharkiv City and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline), forcing Ukrainian authorities to close the T-2111 Chuhuiv-Velykyi Burluk road near Pechenihy (southeast of Kharkiv City and roughly 40 kilometers from the front line) and the T-2104 Kharkiv City-Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway near Staryi Saltiv.[4] Pechenizkyi Hromada Head Oleksandr Husarov reported on December 7 that Russian forces also conducted a missile strike against the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam, forcing Ukrainian authorities to suspend traffic across the dam.[5] Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows damage to the dam after the Russian strike.[6] Russian strikes on the bridge and dam likely aim to degrade Ukrainian GLOCs supplying the Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions. Ukrainian forces were reportedly prepared for this scenario, such that the effectiveness of these Russian strikes on Ukrainian logistics may be limited. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on December 7 that Russian forces have long been systematically targeting the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam with missiles, Shahed-type drones, guided glide bombs, Molniya drones, and first-person view (FPV) drones but have only started to destroy the area in recent days.[7] The 16th Army Corps noted that Ukrainian forces have long been aware of the potential risks to the dam and developed contingency plans and backup routes in the event of significant damage to the dam. Russia’s BAI campaigns involve strikes against targets in the near rear and operational rear, such as roads, railways, and bridges that support Ukrainian GLOCs.[8] Russia’s BAI campaigns aim to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline defenses. Russian strikes targeting the operational rear of the Kharkiv, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions may aim to replicate these effects in these sectors of the front as part of preparation for intensified offensive operations. Russian forces have notably been unable to replicate the successes their months-long BAI campaign brought about in the Pokrovsk direction in other sectors of the front, however, possibly because Russia can only dedicate the necessary assets to generate these effects at scale in a single operational area at a time.[9]

Russian forces also intensified strikes against bridges near the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian drone strikes against a mined bridge across the Haichur River in central Andriivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka and north of Hulyaipole).[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to cross the Haichur River will likely be the determining factor in its ability to make operationally significant advances further westward.[11] Russian forces may have destroyed the bridge in Andriivka in order to disrupt supplies to and isolate Ukrainian forces on the river’s east bank and facilitate Russian advances in the area south of the river near Oleksandrivka. The bridge strike suggests that Russian forces are confident that they will be able to cross the river at another point or will be able to rebuild the Andriivka crossing in the future.

Balloons from Belarusian airspace continue incursions into NATO airspace in Lithuania. The Vilnius International Airport reported that it temporarily suspended operations on December 6 due to an unspecified number of balloons flying towards the airport from Belarusian airspace.[12] Lithuanian authorities have not named an actor behind the latest balloon incursion as of this writing, but aerial incursions from Belarus have forced the Vilnius International Airport to suspend operations several times in recent months.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that the ongoing airspace violations are likely part of “Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[14] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, such that Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[15]

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin positively reacted to the recently released US National Security Strategy (NSS).
Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in northern Kharkiv Oblast, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics to eventually facilitate battlefield gains.
Balloons from Belarusian airspace continue incursions into NATO airspace in Lithuania.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 7 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 6, 2025

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Russian forces launched 704 total missiles and drones against Ukraine overnight on December 5 to 6, heavily targeting railway and energy infrastructure across the country. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 653 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which over 300 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Ryazan and Tambov oblasts; 34 Kh-101/Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast and the Black Sea area; and 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Rostov oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 585 drones, 29 cruise missiles, and one ballistic missile; that an unspecified number of missiles and 60 drones hit 29 locations; and that debris fell on three locations.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian rail, energy, residential, and port infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Lviv, Volyn, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[2] Ukraine’s Energy Ministry reported that Russian forces struck electricity generation, distribution, and transmission facilities throughout Ukraine.[3] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the Russian strikes caused power outages in Odesa, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts on the morning of December 6, leading to energy restrictions and rolling blackouts across the country. Ukrainian State Inspectorate for Energy Supervision Deputy Head Anatoliy Zamulko reported that Russian forces struck facilities that redistribute electricity between Ukrainian regions, forcing Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to reduce their electricity generation capacity.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian drone strikes destroyed the Fastiv Rail Station in Kyiv Oblast.[5] Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that the Russian strikes against the station disrupted suburban routes, forcing Ukrainian authorities to limit railway operations.[6] Ukrzaliznytsia Chairperson Oleksandr Pertsovsky noted that the Russian strikes did not hit cargo trains but rather Fastiv Station and electric commuter trains that connect Kyiv City with its suburbs.[7] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russian forces also struck food and medicine warehouses in Kyiv, Volyn, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[8]

The US and Ukrainian negotiating delegations agreed that any progress toward peace talks to end the war in Ukraine is dependent on Russia’s readiness to demonstrate a good faith commitment to long term peace.[9] The US Department of State and Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov issued a joint statement about the December 4-5 US-Ukrainian talks.[10] The statement noted that the delegations worked to find a “credible path” toward a durable and just peace in Ukraine. Umerov reaffirmed Ukraine’s priority to secure a peace settlement that protects Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty, ensures the safety of Ukrainians, and provides a stable foundation for Ukraine’s prosperous democratic future. The delegations agreed on the framework of security arrangements; discussed the deterrence capabilities necessary for a lasting peace; and reviewed the agenda to support Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, joint US-Ukrainian economic initiatives, and long term recovery projects. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in an interview with Sky News published on December 6 that there can only be a just peace if there is a ceasefire along the current front lines, after which Russia and Ukraine can conduct negotiations.[11]

Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad while Russian forces are complicating Ukrainian logistics in the area. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows three Ukrainian servicemembers raising a flag on Yakuba Kolasa Alley in northern Pokrovsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions within the town.[12] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi also stated in an interview with Sky News published on December 6 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Pokrovsk.[13] Additional geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian drone launcher in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions within Myrnohrad.[15] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion told The Telegraph in an article published on December 6 that Ukrainian and Russian forces in Pokrovsk are operating in “pockets” close to each other as Ukrainian and Russian positions are interspersed among neighboring buildings.[16] The chief of staff noted that there is no discernible front line in the area, in line with indicators that Russian forces have infiltrated between Ukrainian positions into Myrnohrad and northern Pokrovsk. Russian forces continue to hinder Ukrainian logistics in this direction, however. A Ukrainian drone unit servicemember stated to The Telegraph that unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are an insufficient replacement for logistics via manned vehicles, as the UGVs carry less cargo than traditional vehicles and often only survive a few missions before Russian forces destroy them. Ukrainian sources have recently noted that Ukrainian forces maintain limited logistics in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, but Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with artillery and drones.[17] ISW continues to assess that available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not completed the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket but are attempting to completely deny Ukrainian tactical and operational level logistics in the area, even as Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions within both towns.[18]

A February 2025 Russian drone strike on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) rendered the protective structure of the NPP unable to fulfill its primary safety functions. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on December 5 that an IAEA inspection team confirmed during the week of November 28 to December 5 that the February 14, 2025 Russian drone strike on the Chornobyl NPP severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure enclosing the remains of the plant’s reactor No.4 such that the NSC can no longer fulfill its primary safety functions, including its confinement capabilities.[19] Grossi added that the plant requires comprehensive repairs to “ensure long term nuclear safety.” The Kremlin has periodically conducted information operations aimed at portraying Ukraine as endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP), but continued Russian strikes and shelling against Ukrainian NPPs, as well as Russia’s consistent mismanagement of the ZNPP, highlight that Russia remains the actual danger to Ukrainian NPPs.[20]

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly leaning on India to alleviate domestic labor shortages and is setting conditions for India to support drone production for Russia’s war effort. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov announced on December 5 that Russia may accept an “unlimited number” of migrant workers from India under the new bilateral labor mobility agreement signed on December 5 in New Delhi.[21] Manturov stated that Russian manufacturing industries have a labor shortage of 800,000 workers, and that Russian trade, construction, and service industries have a labor shortage of 1.5 million workers. Manturov stated that it will likely take Russia well over a year to set the conditions necessary to accept, employ, and process many Indian migrants. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on December 6 that regional occupation authorities discussed possible business cooperation with Indian partners at a recent international investment forum.[22] Saldo stated that occupation authorities are ready to attract Indian migrant workers to strengthen the region’s agricultural industry and to work with Indian partners to integrate occupied Kherson Oblast into international trade corridors.

Head of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, stated on December 5 that Russia is in discussions with India to localize production of Russian drones, such as Lancet loitering munitions, in India.[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview on December 4 to English-language news magazine India Today, wherein he highlighted that Russia is not just selling military equipment to India but also sharing technology for shipbuilding and missile and aircraft manufacturing.[24] Putin stated that India uses Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft and produces Russian T-90 tanks and Russian-Indian BrahMos cruise missiles in India. Putin and Chemezov’s statements suggest that the Kremlin is considering expanding joint weapon production in India to drones that Russia would very likely use on the battlefield in Ukraine, possibly in exchange for Russian technological innovations and lessons learned in Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger notably reported on December 5 that a delegation of the Smolensk Oblast First Person View (FPV) Drone Piloting Center arrived in India to complete objectives within the framework of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership.[25] The milblogger added that the center has already started training the first international FPV drone piloting group in Russia in cooperation with Smolensk Oblast Medical University and arrived in Goa, India to discuss training for Indian drone operations with the Indian Sport Ministry.[26]

India’s increased partnerships with Russia come against the backdrop of Russia’s growing reliance on North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to support the war in Ukraine. Russia is reportedly localizing Garpiya drone production in the PRC, and PRC-origin drone components have been critical in Russia’s efforts to adapt its drones to gain battlefield advantages.[27] North Korea has reportedly started mass production of short range FPV drones and medium range strike drones in North Korea, possibly to provide to Russia in the future, and has provided Russia with soldiers, artillery shells, and missiles.[28] Russia is also reportedly relying on North Korea for migrant workers, including to work at Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan to produce Shahed-type drones.[29] North Korea, in turn, is also receiving direct combat experience operating drones in exchange for its materiel, manpower, and labor support.[30]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces launched 704 total missiles and drones against Ukraine overnight on December 5 to 6, heavily targeting railway and energy infrastructure across the country.
The US and Ukrainian negotiating delegations agreed that any progress toward peace talks to end the war in Ukraine is dependent on Russia’s readiness to demonstrate a good faith commitment to long term peace.
Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad while Russian forces are complicating Ukrainian logistics in the area.
A February 2025 Russian drone strike on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) rendered the protective structure of the NPP unable to fulfill its primary safety functions.
The Kremlin appears to be increasingly leaning on India to alleviate domestic labor shortages and is setting conditions for India to support drone production for Russia’s war effort.
India’s increased partnerships with Russia come against the backdrop of Russia’s growing reliance on North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to support the war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full DEC 6 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 5, 2025

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US and Ukrainian officials continued peace talks to end the war in Ukraine in Miami, Florida on December 4 and 5. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov and Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner in Miami, Florida on December 4 and 5 to continue discussing a possible peace settlement.[1] A source with knowledge of the negotiations told Axios that Witkoff and Kushner briefed the Ukrainian delegation on the December 2 Witkoff-Russian President Vladimir Putin meeting.[2] Umerov previously led the Ukrainian delegation in talks with US negotiators in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.[3] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 5 that Russia is waiting on a response to the December 2 talks.[4] ISW will continue to monitor for more information about the ongoing peace negotiations process.

Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of December 5 as Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north and southeast of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk.[5] Additional geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces also infiltrated into positions in northwestern Pokrovsk.[6] These geolocations are not yet dispositive that Russian forces have achieved a complete land encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, however. Commander of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces, Commander Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk, reported on December 5 that Russian forces have not encircled the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and that Ukrainian forces hold northern Pokrovsk and maintain positions in central Pokrovsk.[7] Lasiychuk noted that Russian forces are avoiding urban warfare and are instead attempting to bypass Pokrovsk from its flanks. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[8] Although ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian reports to assess that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, the situation is likely extremely difficult, and Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with artillery and drones.

Russian forces are attempting to completely deny Ukrainian tactical- and operational-level logistics to the Pokrovsk direction using drones to achieve effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI). A Ukrainian artillery battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 5 that Russian forces are using drones in an attempt to interdict Ukrainian GLOCS within a 50-kilometer range of Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces are attempting to mitigate.[9] Lasiychuk noted that Ukrainian forces are able to supply and conduct rotations into the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and are working to widen the GLOC north of the pocket.[10] Russia’s evolving campaign design relies on achieving partial effects battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian logistics at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 kilometers) over several months to degrade Ukrainian defensive abilities such that Russian forces can advance more easily against a degraded Ukrainian forces.[11] Russian forces have dedicated elite drone units, such as the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to striking Ukrainian logistics and drone operators at operational depths.[12] A successful Russian BAI campaign within a 50-kilometer range of Pokrovsk would also impact Ukrainian logistics into the Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions and would likely enable more rapid Russian advances, especially if Russian forces managed to replicate campaign successes in other areas of the frontline.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian oil and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 5 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified facility and caused a fire at the Temyruk seaport in Krasnodar Krai, which houses liquified natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, ships, and other cargo.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the battle damage assessment (BDA) is ongoing. A Krasnodar Krai government source reported on December 5 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged port infrastructure in Temyruk and caused a fire covering an area of 1,350 square kilometers.[14] The Ukraine General Staff also reported that Ukrainian strikes damaged an installation and caused a fire at the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, which has an annual processing capacity of seven to 8.9 million tons of oil.[15] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Balashovskaya electrical substation in Volgograd Oblast.[16]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on December 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the Nevinnomyssk Azot Chemical Plant in Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai on the night of December 3 to 4.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Nevinnomyssk Azot Chemical Plant is a critical part of the Russian DIB with a production capacity of over one million tons of ammonia and up to 1.4 million tons of ammonium nitrate per year — making the plant a key supplier of basic components for explosives and ammunition products for the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 5 that a recent Ukrainian strike against Saratov Oil Refinery, Saratov Oblast, likely referring to a strike overnight on November 27 to 28, damaged the refinery’s ELOU-AVT-6 primary oil purification unit.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian strikes forced the Saratov Oil Refinery to suspend crude oil processing as of December 2025 and that the refinery is operating at under 50 percent of its capacity.

Five unidentified drones flew over a major French nuclear submarine base on the evening of December 4 amid increasing reports of drones flying over European military infrastructure. French Defense Minister Catherine Vautrin confirmed on December 5 that the French military used unspecified means to intercept the drones over the Île Longue base in Finistère, which houses France’s four nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).[19] French military sources told Agence France-Presse that French marines opened fire on the drones, but other French media sources suggested that French authorities attempted to jam the drones.[20] French officials have not officially attributed the drones to a specific actor as of this writing. Several sources noted that an unspecified number of drones also flew over the Crozon peninsula — where the Île Longue base is located — on the evening of November 17 to 18 but the drones did not enter restricted military airspace.[21] The December 4 drone sightings are part of a newly observed pattern of aerial incursions into NATO airspace, possibly with the purpose of reconnoitering known European military bases and defense infrastructure.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian and suspected Russian airspace violations are likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that aims to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[23]

Russian forces committed a war crime in the Siversk direction. Geolocated footage published on December 2 shows a soldier of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) executing a Ukrainian prisoner-of-war (POW) with his hands raised in surrender in Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[24] A Russian Telegram channel claiming to be the official channel of the Russian 3rd CAA notably published the footage of the execution and characterized Russian forces’ murder of a Ukrainian POW as “humane treatment.”[25] ISW has observed an increase in Russian war crimes in directions where Russian forces are beginning to intensify offensive operations and infiltrating into towns, and Russian forces recently began infiltration operations in Siversk.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[27]

Key Takeaways

US and Ukrainian officials continued peace talks to end the war in Ukraine in Miami, Florida on December 4 and 5.
Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of December 5 as Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.
Russian forces are attempting to completely deny Ukrainian tactical- and operational-level logistics to the Pokrovsk direction using drones to achieve effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian oil and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure.
Five unidentified drones flew over a major French nuclear submarine base on the evening of December 4 amid increasing reports of drones flying over European military infrastructure.
Russian forces committed a war crime in the Siversk direction.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.

read the full DEC 5 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2025

Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process. Putin gave an interview to India Today English-language news magazine ahead of his December 4 state visit to India.[1] Putin stated that Russia will end its war in Ukraine when it achieves the goals that Putin set forth at the start of the full-scale invasion. Putin stated that Ukraine must understand that the “best way” to solve the war is for Ukraine to agree to a peace settlement like the one Russia tried to impose on Ukraine in 2022 – referencing the 2022 Istanbul agreement that amounted to Ukraine’s full capitulation.[2] Putin responded to a question about what constitutes a victory for Russia, stating that Russia wants to “protect” ethnic Russians, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine – justifications the Kremlin has often used for its demand for the removal of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with a pro-Russian government.[3] Putin also demanded that NATO not expand further, essentially calling for a revocation of NATO’s Open Door Policy and return to NATO’s 1997 borders. ISW continues to assess that Putin, in part, launched his full-scale invasion in order to destroy NATO and seize control of all of Ukraine, and Putin’s original war demands notably include not only demands of Ukraine but of NATO and the West as well.[4]

Putin is attempting to falsely frame his war aims as solely geographically limited to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Putin falsely claimed that Russia “had no choice” but to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), that he offered Ukraine to withdraw its forces from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to avoid hostilities in 2022, and that Ukraine subsequently refused. Putin claimed that Russia will now either seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts through military means or Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the areas of the two oblasts that Ukraine still controls. Putin’s focus during the December 4 interview on Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts ignores the way that his full-scale invasion initially sought to capture far more territory than just those two regions, including Kyiv City, and to fully control Ukraine through a Kremlin-installed government. Russia had to rescope its strategy after its failure to take Kyiv City to focus instead on more limited operations in eastern Ukraine.

Putin attempted to obfuscate his rejection of the latest US peace proposal in the December 4 interview. Putin discussed the December 2 meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, claiming that the peace proposals from the US delegation were “in one way or another” based on the agreements from Putin’s previous meeting with US President Donald Trump in Alaska. Putin stated that there were points in the US-proposal to which Russia could not agree, but that he would not offer more specifics so as to not “disrupt” Trump’s peace process. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is purposely refraining from publicly discussing the December 2 meeting in order to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal that did not concede to all of Russia’s absolutist war demands.[5]

Other Kremlin officials continued to publicly display their commitment to Putin’s original war aims. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated that Russia will not change its “basic” demands, including the prohibition of NATO membership for Ukraine and Ukraine’s demilitarization (Ukraine’s disarmament such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future) and denazification (a term the Kremlin uses to call for the removal of the current Ukrainian government).[6] Slutsky claimed that Russia can “entirely” achieve this “baseline” on the battlefield. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Ukraine could lose its statehood, not just territory, such that it is “better” for Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement before “things will get worse.”[7] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been engaged in widespread cognitive warfare efforts in the lead up to and during the ongoing negotiations process that aims to paint a Russian victory on the battlefield as imminent and inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia’s demands now.[8] Russian military victory is not imminent or inevitable, however, and the West maintains significant agency in how Russia’s war against Ukraine ends.[9]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian “concession” in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on December 3 that Russian commanders have not been publicly reporting on activity in the Kherson direction recently because Russian forces are “deliberately” not intensifying offensive operations there.[10] Zhuravlev claimed that Russian forces “definitely could” intensify in the area and then could launch an offensive on Odesa and Mykolaiv cities such that Ukraine would have “no other major cities left on the Black Sea coast.” Zhuravlev threatened that Russian forces could use occupied Crimea as a launch point for such offensive operations “both on land and at sea.” Zhuravlev further claimed that Ukrainian authorities are discriminating against Russian-speakers in Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv cities and that residents in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts would vote to “join” Russia should there be referenda in those regions – calling back to the sham referenda that Russia held in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022 to justify its illegal annexation of the four regions.[11] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Putin himself, have recently reignited the longstanding Russian narratives about Russia’s claim to Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[12] These Kremlin statements in the past days are likely part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing the ongoing peace negotiations. Russian forces are notably not in a position to make such large-scale advances to take Odesa or Mykolaiv cities either by land or sea. Russian forces would need to deprioritize other sectors to deploy a significant force grouping to successfully cross the Dnipro River and make significant advances westward and northward over land – an exceedingly difficult undertaking.[13] Ukrainian forces have also significantly damaged and denied further usage of the Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) landing ships that Russian forces would need for an amphibious invasion, while also pushing the BSF out of the northwestern Black Sea.[14] The Kremlin may be setting conditions to “relinquish” its demands for these territories in the future in order to create the impression that the Kremlin is making “concessions” during negotiations.

The Kremlin may also be incorporating threats of kinetic action into this cognitive warfare effort surrounding Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Putin responded to an alleged Ukrainian attack against a Russian-flagged tanker off the coast of Turkey on December 2, threatening to strike Ukrainian ports, ships traveling to Ukrainian ports, and vessels of states helping Ukraine.[15] Putin also threatened to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea – possibly threatening to seize territory in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk assessed, however, that Russia may have staged the attack.[16] The Kremlin may also try to present a Russian agreement to refrain from striking Ukrainian ports and vessels on the Black Sea as an alleged “compromise” in negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains committed to his goal of taking control of all of Ukraine, however. Any putative Kremlin “concession” agreeing to abandon efforts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities would be a short-term negotiating tactic, not a shift in the Kremlin’s long-standing strategic goals.

ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported on December 3 that Ukrainian servicemembers stated that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of November 29, and one of the sources stated that Ukrainian forces in the area have not rotated since November 12.[17] A source told Hromadske that Ukrainian attempts to relieve the encirclement have been partially successful. The source also indicated that Ukrainian forces could hold Myrnohrad if Ukrainian forces retook Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) and Rodynske (just northwest of Chervonyi Lyman). Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi refuted claims that Russian forces had surrounded Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, reporting that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct rotations and limited logistics within the town.[18] ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian reports to assess that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, though the situation is likely extremely difficult, and Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and GLOCs with artillery and drones.

Ukrainian forces are still operating within Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the area. Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported on December 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within Pokrovsk and even hold unspecified areas of the town.[19] Geolocated footage published on December 1 and 3 shows two Russian servicemembers unconfidently operating north of Pokrovsk and two operating in central Rivne (between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad).[20] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces are infiltrating in fireteams of two to three personnel into northern Pokrovsk during poor weather conditions.[21] The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command has concentrated roughly 150,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, about 11,000 to 12,000 of which are conducting assaults. The spokesperson stated that Russian drones are complicating Ukrainian logistics but that Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct several rotations and bring in supplies in the past few days.

Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City against the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko warned on December 4 that Russian sources are spreading narratives about Russian forces purportedly preparing for offensive operations against Chernihiv City.[22] Kovalenko observed that these narratives emerged against the backdrop of the US-led peace effort and noted that the claims aim to put additional pressure on Ukrainian society and imitate a Russian ability to simultaneously advance on multiple fronts. Kovalenko stated that Russia does not have the manpower or materiel required for an assault on Chernihiv City and that Ukrainian forces have been repelling Russian provocations in Chernihiv Oblast. Kovalenko recalled that Russia launched similar cognitive warfare campaigns against Kharkiv and Sumy cities in the past but that Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces from advancing to these cities. ISW observed on December 3 and 4 a limited number of milbloggers vaguely implying that Russian forces are preparing for offensive operations against Chernihiv City.[23] The Kremlin may start widely amplifying this narrative as part of its consolidated cognitive warfare campaign aimed at convincing Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia’s demands that it cannot secure militarily.[24]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process.
Other Kremlin officials continued to publicly display their commitment to Putin’s original war aims.
The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian “concession” in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities.
ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City against the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

read the full DEC 4 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3, 2025

Toplines

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory and negotiating tactics assume that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition. Rubio stated on December 2 in an interview with Fox News that Putin appears to be the “most difficult” party in the peace negotiations process.[1] Rubio amplified Putin’s recent statement that Russia will “achieve its objectives” no matter the cost or timeline and noted that this is Putin’s “actual mentality” about his war in Ukraine. Putin’s long held theory of victory for the war in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that the Russian military and economy can outlast and overcome both Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine’s own ability to continue defending itself against Russian aggression.[2] Rubio stated that it is not realistic for Russia to continue its war for another “four or five years” and emphasized that Russia holds less Ukrainian territory currently than it did in the first few months of the full scale invasion in early 2022. Ukrainian forces have notably retaken over 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have seized since 2022, and Russia’s economy is facing several issues that will likely continue to affect its ability to continue a war of attrition in the medium to long term.[3]

Russian officials continue to falsely frame recent Russian advances on the battlefield as an indication that a Russian victory is imminent and inevitable. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 3 that Russian forces’ successes had a “positive impact” on the December 2 meeting between Putin and a US delegation in Moscow and that Russian advances have given the West a “more accurate assessment” of the “paths to achieving” peace in Ukraine.[4] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed on December 3 that Western officials are changing their negotiating positions given Russia’s successes on the front.[5] The Kremlin’s claims about, and overinflation of, Russian battlefield gains and their impact on the negotiating process support Putin’s theory of victory for a protracted war. Putin and other high ranking Kremlin officials have recently intensified their cognitive warfare efforts that aggrandize battlefield claims to convince the United States that Russia is winning in Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should acquiesce to Russian demands now during negotiations.

Kremlin officials continued to refuse to publicly discuss the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russia meeting, as ISW previously forecasted. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa stated on December 3 that Russia is holding the talks with the United States “confidentially” to prevent outside forces from “exerting pressure” on the negotiations.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly stated that Russia will conduct the negotiations “in silence” and claimed that the negotiations will be more successful if they are private.[7] Peskov also claimed that Russia hopes the United States will adhere to Russia’s preference not to divulge information about the negotiations. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin was preparing to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russia meeting, to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.[8]

The Kremlin is reigniting narratives that Odesa City is a Russian city. Russian State Duma Deputy Dmitry Pevtsov claimed on December 3 that Russia will likely resolve the war with the “pseudo-state” Ukraine through military means so that Russians can go to their “ancestral lands” in Odesa City.[9] Former Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin claimed on November 26 that he would like Odesa and Mykolaiv cities to be a part of Russia through “voluntary” means, not military means.[10] Russian claims regarding Odesa and Mykolaiv cities come against the backdrop of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 2 threat that Russia could cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea – possibly to set conditions to seize territory on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[11] These recent Russian territorial claims and threats against the Black Sea region are not new or isolated but follow repeated statements in the past, including from Putin himself.[12] Putin claimed in December 2023 that Russia historically controlled the Black Sea region and that Odesa City is a “Russian” city.”[13] Russian officials last ignited their narrative that Odesa City is a Russian city during the height of the April 2025 peace negotiations, likely in an attempt to paint Russia as prepared to protract the war and seize even more territory from Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia’s seemingly more limited demands now.[14] Russian officials’ renewal of these narratives in December 2025 likely aims to support the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort to portray Russia as capable of protracting the war to achieve its goals and a Russian victory as ultimately inevitable. The Kremlin may also aim to use repeated narratives over the years about Odesa City to set conditions to justify renewed aggression against Ukraine following a future peace settlement in the name of protecting ethnic Russians and “ancestral” Russian lands. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not in a position to cross the Dnipro River, make significant advances westward, and seize Odesa City, however.[15]

Russian forces achieved the tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025, likely in part by concentrating and committing a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) currently operating in the Hulyaipole and Dnipropetrovsk direction is comparable in combat effectiveness and numerical strength to the Central GoF operating in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya sectors and that the Eastern GoF may even have a greater concentration of manpower in its area of responsibility (AoR).[16] Ukrainian officials reported in November 2025 that the Russian military command committed between 170,000 to 220,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction.[17] The Russian Eastern GoF near Hulyaipole consists of three brigades of the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) operating south of Hulyaipole; one division and two brigades of the 5th CAA (EMD) operating directly east and north of Hulyaipole; two brigades of the 36th CAA (EMD) operating near Velykomykhailivka and southwest of Novopavlivka; and one brigade and one regiment of the 29th CAA (EMD) conducting active defense jointly with the 36th CAA.[18] The Russian military command notably strengthened the Eastern GoF in Summer-Fall 2025 by redeploying a number of elements to the area. The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to the Hulyaipole direction from Sumy Oblast in September 2025; elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) from the Central GoF’s AoR to the area between Novopavlivka and Hulyaipole; and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (both of 35th CAA, EMD) to the 5th CAA’s AoR northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[19]

Mashovets assessed that the redeployment of elements of the two brigades to the 5th CAA’s AoR significantly improved its combat capability, enabling the 5th CAA to develop a tactical breakthrough 17 kilometers in depth, conduct a wide river crossing over the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and reach the outskirts of Hulyaipole from the north and northeast.[20] Mashovets speculated that the Russian military command may have committed some elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), including detachments of the 34th and 205th motorized rifle brigades or possibly elements of the 7th Military Base, to the area because the Russian military command frequently uses these elements to reinforce various GoFs – including the Dnepr GoF (operating in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts) and the Western GoF (operating in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions).[21] Mashovets stated that the 5th CAA presumably has two brigades in reserve and warned that Russian forces may try to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division or the 90th Tank Division to reinforce the 5th CAA’s tactical breakthrough.[22] The commitment and redeployment of elements of several units from other frontline sectors further suggests that the recent Russian tactical breakthrough in the Hulyaipole direction is, in part, due to significant manpower concentration in the area over several months, rather than a sudden breakthrough or collapse of Ukrainian defenses as Kremlin officials have recently tried to claim.[23] This significant force concentration suggests that Russia will likely need to concentrate even more forces and deprioritize other frontline sectors to exploit tactical advances around Hulyaipole and attempt to develop them into operational successes.

The 5th CAA’s tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole could enable Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions. Russia’s ability to exploit such a breakthrough, however, largely depends on Ukrainian resistance and denial of Russian river crossings. Elements of the 5th CAA achieved a tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole after seizing a tactical bridgehead over the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (on the west bank of the Yanchur River) in November 2025.[24] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces were able to advance in the area using infiltration tactics and by exploiting foggy weather, which undermined Ukrainian drone operations in the area.[25] Rural terrain west of Uspenivka likely facilitated a rapid Russian advance towards the Haichur River, which flows through Hulyaipole. Ukrainian forces likely struggled to defend positions in the open fields that cover the area west of Uspenivka, allowing Russian forces to relatively rapidly advance 17 kilometers deep. Russian forces now face the challenge of crossing the Haichur River.

Russia’s ability to cross the Haichur River will likely be the determining factor in its ability to make operationally significant advances further westward. Russian forces may aim to isolate and threaten an encirclement of Hulyaipole from the north and northwest. Mashovets warned that Russian advances near Danylivka (north of Hulyaipole at the junction of the Yanchur and Haichur rivers) could threaten to isolate the Ukrainian grouping in Hulyaipole from Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovske-Oleksandrivka area (north of Danylivka along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway).[26] Russian forces may aim to cross the Haichur River in the Danylivka-Dobropillya area to threaten an encirclement of Hulyaipole from the northwest. Russian forces may also aim to advance across the river to the O-081238 Rizdvyanka-Zaliznychne highway that runs west of Hulyaipole and supplies Ukrainian forces defending the town. Russian forces may further aim to advance westward from the Haichur River to threaten Ukrainian defenses in the Orikhiv direction by advancing to the T-0408 Orikhiv-Novomykolaivka highway, a major GLOC into Orikhiv. Russia’s ability to cross the Haichur River is therefore critical to its ability to isolate Ukrainian groupings in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv areas.

Ukrainian forces have been successfully restraining the 36th CAA’s advances further northeast near Velykomykhailivka, however. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian counterattacks in recent weeks have pushed elements of the 36th CAA back near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka and just south of the Vorona River) and allowed Ukrainian forces to maintain a bridgehead between Orestopil and Novoselivka (northwest and northeast of Sosnivka) between the Vorona and Vovcha rivers.[27] Mashovets noted that Ukrainian defenses near Oleksandrivka (west of Velykomykhailivka on the southern bank of the Vovcha River) are also holding back Russian advances to the Vovcha River and allowing Ukrainian forces to strike the C-041424 road between Voskresenka and Novoselivka (both east of Velykomykhailivka in the Russian near rear) that Russian forces use to bring supplies to the Vovcha River. Ukrainian forces have thus far prevented Russian forces from advancing to and seizing Oleksandrivka, a key settlement near the junction of the Haichur and Vovcha rivers, and Ukraine’s continued successful defense of this area may complicate Russian attempts to cross the Haichur River.

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to set conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Moldova and the Baltics. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on December 3 that authorities in the Baltic states and Moldova are passing “racist” laws and are “discriminating” against the Russian population.[28] Lavrov’s statement notably mirrors the narratives that the Kremlin used to try to justify its invasions of Ukraine. Russian officials have long applied the Kremlin’s informational playbook used against Ukraine to threaten Moldova as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.[29] ISW continues to assess that Russia has entered a “Phase Zero” effort that aims to set informational and psychological conditions to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia conflict in the future.[30]

The Kremlin is attempting to mobilize Russian and Belarusian civil societies, including Belarusian organizations and the Russian Orthodox Church, to garner support for the war in Ukraine and influence campaigns globally. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with volunteers involved in humanitarian aid deliveries in Russia and occupied Ukraine as part of the state-affiliated #MyVmeste (#WeAreTogether) international forum for civic participation on December 3.[31] Putin spoke with a veteran from occupied Donetsk Oblast who is currently involved in providing supplies to Russian servicemembers in Ukraine, and the veteran asked Putin to expand the forum’s operations in Russia’s “border regions,” likely referring to regions bordering Ukraine as well as areas of occupied Ukraine. Putin also offered state support to a volunteer who sought to create a civil society initiative that aims to unite family members of Russian servicemembers. Putin also stated that he will talk with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilev about a proposal from a physician at the only Russian Orthodox Church’s hospital, which has been treating Russian servicemembers fighting in the Pokrovsk direction and training volunteers on tactical medical treatment. The physician stated that the hospital trained over 8,000 volunteers and would like to restart a 19th and 20th century-era movement that provided battlefield treatment in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea. The physician asked for government funding and Kremlin support to open the movement’s branches in all Russian regions and occupied Ukraine.

Putin also spoke to a Belarusian Paralympian and the founder of a charitable foundation based in Belarus that supports occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Paralympian claimed that the foundation remained operational despite US sanctions, that many Russian volunteers travel to Belarus to support the foundation, and that the foundation is opening a rehabilitation center in Borisov, Belarus, for children who sustained injuries from mine explosions. The Paralympian asked for Putin’s support for the foundation’s effort to launch a separate Missiya Dobra (Mission of Good) program to advance the Russian and Belarusian Union State’s humanitarian objectives in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, which had already reportedly received 500,000 rubles (about $6,500) from the Crimea occupation government. Putin also spoke to the founder of the BRICS Youth Council, who discussed how Russia sent volunteers to India and announced that the Russia-BRICS project office approved the creation of the BRICS Youth Council. Putin’s meetings with various civil societies and organizations come against the backdrop of various Russian reports that civil support and crowdfunding efforts had significantly decreased over time, especially after the Kremlin began efforts to centralize control and to restrict the operations of non-government organizations (NGOs).[32] The December 3 meeting also follows Putin’s November 25 decree on Russia’s “State National Policy,” which in part aims to strengthen all Russians’ civic identity, civil unity, and patriotism to ensure Russia’s national interests and to safeguard Russia’s national security.[33] ISW also assessed that Russia would leverage its control over Belarus to augment Russia’s war effort and the Union State framework as a model to expand Russian influence in the former Soviet Union.[34]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine. Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide announced on December 3 that Norway, Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands will provide two packages totaling $500 million to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[35] Eide noted that Germany and Poland will provide one package, and Germany and the Netherlands will provide the second. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated that Germany will provide $200 million toward the packages, which will provide Ukraine with essential supplies, including air defense equipment and ammunition.[36]

Key Takeaways

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory and negotiating tactics assume that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition.
Kremlin officials continued to refuse to publicly discuss the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russia meeting, as ISW previously forecasted.
The Kremlin is reigniting narratives that Odesa City is a Russian city.
Russian forces achieved the tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025, likely in part by concentrating and committing a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction.
The 5th CAA’s tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole could enable Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions. Russia’s ability to exploit such a breakthrough, however, largely depends on Ukrainian resistance and denial of Russian river crossings.
High ranking Kremlin officials continue to set conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Moldova and the Baltics.
The Kremlin is attempting to mobilize Russian and Belarusian civil societies, including Belarusian organizations and the Russian Orthodox Church, to garner support for the war in Ukraine and influence campaigns globally.
Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

read the full DEC 3 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2025

Toplines

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the US-Ukrainian peace proposal during his meeting with a US delegation in Moscow on December 2 and remains highly unlikely to accept any compromises short of his original war goals. Putin, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev met on December 2 with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner.[1] Ushakov stated after the meeting that the US and Russian delegations discussed “several options” for a peace settlement but that they did not agree on a “compromise plan.”[2] Ushakov stated that some of the US proposals were acceptable to Russia but that Putin “made no secret” of Russia’s critical or negative attitude about others. Ushakov stated that the parties did not discuss “specific wording or specific proposals” but discussed the “essence” of the documents that the United States “submitted to Moscow some time ago.” Ushakov stated that the delegations discussed territorial issues and the “enormous prospects” for US-Russian economic cooperation. Ushakov stated that the US and Russian delegations agreed not to disclose the substance of the talks – in line with ISW’s December 1 forecast that the Kremlin was planning to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the meeting to obfuscate Russia’s rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.[3] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Putin, have been consistently rejecting the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plans did not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist war demands.[4]

NBC reported on December 2, before the US-Russian meeting, that a Russian official stated that Russia will not compromise on territory in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, limits on Ukraine’s military, and US and European recognition of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory.[5] The source reportedly stated that Russia is prepared to be flexible on “secondary issues,” such as frozen Russian assets in Europe. Kremlin insider sources may have leaked information into the US information space about Russia’s stance to frame Russia as willing to compromise on some “secondary issues” in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions on other issues. Russia’s original war aims include the annexation of all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, while issues related to frozen Russian assets are notably not part of Russia’s original war aims. Kremlin insider reports likely also aim to obfuscate Putin’s actual, more extreme objective of taking control of not only all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but of all of Ukraine.

The Kremlin intensified its cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent in the lead up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting, likely to coerce the West into accepting Russia’s absolutist demands. Putin held a meeting with Russian military commanders on the evening of November 30 and answered journalists’ questions on December 2, during which Putin flaunted Russia’s alleged successes across the battlefield.[6] The Kremlin notably did not publish the readout of Putin’s meeting with the commanders until late in the evening on December 1, suggesting that the Kremlin was trying to create informational efforts ahead of Putin’s December 2 meeting with the US delegation. Putin and Russian military commanders claimed that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk, southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), Vovchansk, and Kupyansk. Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers continued to refute these Kremlin claims, however. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on December 2 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Russian forces from Kupyansk and blocking Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups’ infiltration routes into the town.[7] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported that Ukrainian forces control most of Kupyansk and that Russian groups only maintain a presence in the northern part.[8] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Vovchansk and Pokrovsk, and a Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces remain in northern Pokrovsk.[9]

Putin and the Russian military commanders amplified Russian successes in the Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Hulyaipole, and Orikhiv directions, and Putin noted that Russian forces “entirely” maintain the initiative across the front.[10] Putin stated that the Russian military command must provide Russian troops with “everything they need” for winter operations – implying that Russia is prepared to continue hostilities to achieve its goals militarily. Putin’s long held theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces will be able to indefinitely continue gradual advances, prevent Ukraine from regaining any territory, outlast Western support for Ukraine and Ukrainian ability to resist Russian aggression, and ultimately win a war of attrition.[11] Putin’s aggrandized battlefield claims are part of his wider efforts to convince the West that Russia can outlast Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should acquiesce to Russian demands now during negotiations.

Putin exaggerated Russia’s claimed seizure of Pokrovsk as strategically important for large scale breakthroughs. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the complete Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, but Russia’s seizure of the town in the near future is unlikely to produce rapid Russian advances. Putin claimed on December 2 that Pokrovsk is a “good base” for achieving all the objectives that Putin set at the beginning of the war.[12] Putin claimed that Pokrovsk offers Russian forces the ability to advance in “any direction” that the Russian General Staff “deems most promising.” Putin’s statements overestimate the ease with which Russian forces will be able to conduct large-scale breakthroughs from Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely face several challenges when advancing from Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces have a series of effective field fortifications to the west, north, and northeast of Pokrovsk that will complicate Russian advances from Pokrovsk.[13] Russian forces have also recently exploited periods of foggy and rainy weather that hinder the operability of Ukrainian drones to advance in various areas of the front line, but these weather conditions will not persist indefinitely.[14] Russian forces will additionally face terrain and water features that complicate Russia’s ability to rapidly maneuver. Russian forces notably previously failed to make operationally significant advances in the Dobropillya direction as they struggled to widen the deep but narrow penetration and maintain supplies to Russian forces in the area.[15] Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, former 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) also notably struggled to close the northern shoulder of the Russian encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction, and Russia will likely face similar problems advancing from Pokrovsk.[16] Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction are also likely severely degraded, having suffered significant losses in recent months.[17] ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub, but that Russia had already achieved this objective by July 2025.[18] The further operational significance of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk will depend on the nature of Ukrainian withdrawal, Ukrainian defenses beyond Pokrovsk, and the availability of necessary combat power to exploit the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. A Russian seizure of Pokrovsk will not significantly alter Russia’s ability to achieve Putin’s objective of imminently seizing all of Donetsk Oblast, as Russian forces have yet to seize the Fortress Belt, Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of large population centers the size of which Russia has not seized since 2022.

Putin also intensified efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead up to the December 2 meeting. Putin spoke at the VTB “Russia Calling!” investment forum on December 2, before he met with the US delegation, and attempted to portray the Russian economy as unaffected by Western sanctions.[19] Putin acknowledged that external pressure has impacted Russia but claimed that the Russian economy is “successfully coping” with these challenges. Putin claimed that Russia’s unemployment rate is 2.2 percent and that Russia has made significant progress in reducing inflation to seven percent year on year. Putin acknowledged that Russian economic growth slowed in the first nine months of 2025 but claimed that the Russian government expected this when the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates. Putin attempted to posture medium-term stability by claiming that the Kremlin designed the federal budget for 2026-2028 to mitigate external risks and increase the share of non-oil and gas revenues. Putin noted that Russia has significantly increased trade with countries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India.

The Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin’s portrayal, however. Russian inflation is estimated at around 20 percent, and the Russian Ministry of Finance stated on September 29 that it expects Russia’s oil and gas revenues to be down 50 percent in 2026 as compared to 2025.[20] The Russian Central Bank began selling its physical gold reserves in late November 2025 for the first time as part of the Russian Ministry of Finance’s operations to fund the state budget.[21] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves funding its war in Ukraine and has had to resort to selling its gold reserves due to unsustainable spending.[22] Putin also signed a law on November 27 increasing the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent, likely to buttress federal budget deficits.[23] Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate indicates that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to inflation. Russia has also likely had to resort to importing labor from North Korea to compensate for labor shortages, and Putin’s recent executive order temporarily waiving visa requirements for Chinese nationals suggests that Russia could be preparing to import labor from the PRC as well.[24] Russia recently began compulsory recruitment of active reservists, likely to prepare to deploy them to combat in Ukraine, as Russian regional authorities continue to reduce one-time recruitment payments in the face of mounting economic strain.[25] These policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as Putin is claiming. Putin is likely attempting to convince the United States that increased sanctions pressure will not have its intended effect on the Russian economy and will not push Putin to make compromises to end his war against Ukraine.

Putin attempted to preemptively deflect blame onto Europe for Russia’s rejection of any peace plan iterations ahead of the December 2 US-Russian meeting. Putin answered journalists’ questions on December 2 ahead of the meeting and claimed that Europe is hindering US President Donald Trump’s peace efforts.[26] Putin stated that Europe created peace proposals with points that are “completely unacceptable” to Russia and that Russia will only “allow” Europe to return to the negotiation process if Europe accepts the “realities on the ground,” a phrase the Kremlin often uses to refer to Russian advances on the battlefield. Ushakov similarly stated on December 2, following the US-Russia meeting, that European leaders are engaged in “destructive actions” in the peace process.[27] High ranking Kremlin officials repeatedly indicated in recent weeks that the Kremlin was not going to accept any peace agreement that did not meet Russia’s maximalist demands, including the US-proposed original 28-point peace plan.[28] The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to blame Europe’s insertion of non-starters into any peace plan as the reason for Russia’s rejection, essentially using Europe as a scapegoat for Russia’s own obstruction of the peace process.

Putin threatened Europe to prevent Europe from engaging in the peace process. Putin claimed that Russia has no intention of going to war with Europe but would be “ready right now” should Europe suddenly want to fight Russia.[29] Putin issued a thinly veiled nuclear threat, stating that a situation would “quickly arise” should Europe start a war with Russia, in which Russia will “have no one to negotiate with.” Putin also threatened that a future Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war would not be like Russia’s war in Ukraine, which Putin claimed Russia is conducting “surgically” and “carefully.” Putin claimed that the war in Ukraine is not a war “in the literal, modern sense of the word,” threateningly implying that Russia could fully mobilize its military, economy, and society in a war against NATO. Russian State Duma deputies echoed Putin’s threats on December 2. Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that there is a “dangerous trend” in Europe toward militarization and threatened that “the more you play with fire, the higher the risk of a conflagration in Europe and around the world.”[30] State Duma Defense Committee member Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed that Europe is trying to protract the war in Ukraine until a war between Russia and Europe erupts.[31] Kremlin threats against Europe likely aim to deter Europe’s involvement in the peace process as well as undermine the strengthening of Europe’s defenses out of fear of allegedly provoking Russian aggression.

Russia may be trying to set information conditions to justify Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports to impose a de facto blockade of Ukraine. The Turkish Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure stated on December 2 that the MIDVOLGA-2 tanker reported that unspecified actors attacked it 80 miles off the coast of Turkey while it was transporting sunflower oil from Russia to Georgia.[32] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated that Ukraine was not involved in the incident and that Russia may have staged it, questioning why the ship was sailing from Russia to Georgia via Turkey’s exclusive economic zone.[33] Russian milbloggers widely blamed Ukrainian forces for conducting a strike against the Russian-flagged vessel with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).[34] Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) notably told Ukrainian media on November 29 that Ukraine was responsible for unmanned surface vehicle (USV) strikes against two oil tankers in Russia’s shadow fleet on November 28.[35] The reported use of UAVs against a ship that is not part of Russia’s shadow fleet as well as the Ukrainian MFA’s public denial about the December 2 strike, are markedly different from the SBU sources’ acknowledgement and the use of USVs in the November 28 strikes. The MIDVOLGA-2 notably changed its destination from Rostov-on-Don, Russia, to Mersin, Turkey, on November 28 and turned off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) near occupied Kerch, Crimea, on November 29.[36]

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded on December 2 to a journalist’s question about the incident, stating that Russia will take retaliatory measures.[37] Putin threatened that Russia would expand its strikes against Ukrainian ports and ships travelling to Ukrainian ports or would strike vessels belonging to states that are allegedly helping Ukraine conduct strikes against Russian vessels. Russia notably aimed to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports by withdrawing from the 2022-2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed cargo ships to sail between ports in Odesa Oblast and the Bosphorus Strait without fear of Russian strikes.[38] Russia aimed to use the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) to deter Ukrainian and international maritime activity in the Black Sea without having to enforce an actual blockade. Ukraine’s missile and drone strike campaign starting in June 2023, however, largely inhibited Russia’s ability to use the BSF. Russia may be attempting to use threats of retaliatory strikes to prevent Ukraine’s Black Sea activity, as the BSF is no longer an effective deterrent. Russia may also aim to use the threat of strikes to discourage international vessels from transporting Ukrainian grain due to high insurance costs and ultimately to accuse Ukraine of causing global food insecurity.[39]

Putin may also be setting information conditions to justify Russian attempts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia’s seizure of these regions remains unlikely at this time. Putin stated that Russia’s “most radical” response to the December 2 strike on the tanker would be to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea – possibly threatening to try to seize territory on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[40] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea.[41] A Russian milblogger responded to Putin’s threat, noting that it is “currently impossible” for Russian forces to seize Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[42] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not in a position to cross the Dnipro River, make significant advances westward, and seize Odesa City.[43]

Russian forces are modifying their Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian air defenders. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on December 2 that Russian forces have begun striking Ukrainian mobile fire teams operating in moving vehicles with Shahed-type drones.[44] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on December 2 that recent Russian technological adaptations – such as cameras – allow Russian drone operators to directly control Shahed drones (as opposed to Shahed drones with preplanned routes and targets that Russian forces have historically used in strikes against Ukraine’s rear areas), making it easier for Russian forces to hunt Ukrainian air defense systems, especially in rear areas.[45] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Innovation Lieutenant Colonel Yurii Myronenko recently stated that Russian forces started using operator-controlled Shahed drones to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, which Ukrainian forces have been using to shoot down Russian drones.[46] Beskrestnov also reported on December 1 that Russian forces have equipped Shahed drones with R-60 air-to-air missiles to try to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and aircraft that hunt Shaheds.[47] Recent Russian adaptations to the Shahed drone will likely degrade Ukraine’s air defenses and ability to down Shaheds in the rear, and Russia has been exploiting drone adaptations to strike moving targets like trains to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects.[48]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the US-Ukrainian peace proposal during his meeting with a US delegation in Moscow on December 2 and remains highly unlikely to accept any compromises short of his original war goals.
The Kremlin intensified its cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent in the lead up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting, likely to coerce the West into accepting Russia’s absolutist demands.
Putin exaggerated Russia’s claimed seizure of Pokrovsk as strategically important for large scale breakthroughs. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the complete Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, but Russia’s seizure of the town in the near future is unlikely to produce rapid Russian advances.
Putin also intensified efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead up to the December 2 meeting.
The Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin’s portrayal, however.
Putin attempted to preemptively deflect blame onto Europe for Russia’s rejection of any peace plan iterations ahead of the December 2 US-Russian meeting.
Putin threatened Europe to prevent Europe from engaging in the peace process.
Russia may be trying to set information conditions to justify Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports to impose a de facto blockade of Ukraine.
Putin may also be setting information conditions to justify Russian attempts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia’s seizure of these regions remains unlikely at this time.
Russian forces are modifying their Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian air defenders.
Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

read the full DEC 2 report

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1, 2025

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US-Ukrainian talks reportedly continued in Florida on December 1 ahead of US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 2 to present the US-Ukrainian peace proposal. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov reportedly held more meetings in Florida on December 1.[1] US President Donald Trump stated on November 30 that he does not have a deadline for a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine.[2] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on November 30 that the US goal is to end the war while “help[ing] Ukraine be safe forever” and preventing another invasion.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Witkoff will meet with Putin in Moscow on the afternoon of December 2.[4]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russian meeting, possibly in order to obfuscate Russia’s likely rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal. Peskov responded to a question about points in the latest US-Ukrainian peace proposal, stating that Russia does not intend to conduct negotiations through a “megaphone” or “through the media.”[5] Peskov stated that the Kremlin will release footage from the start of the Putin-Witkoff meeting on December 2, but that it is too early to talk about any public statements afterwards.[6] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa stated on December 1 that he would like the US delegation to “reaffirm the fundamental nature” of the positions that the United States and Russia allegedly reached during the US-Russia Alaska summit in August 2025.[7] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on December 1 that the “right” negotiations are between Russia and the United States, who will present a “fait accompli” to Europe and Ukraine such that they will have “no choice but to…sign whatever [the United States and Russia] say.”[8] High-ranking Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been consistently rejecting the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plans did not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist war demands.[9] The Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of clarity about the Alaska summit to conceal the way the Kremlin — not Ukraine — is impeding the negotiations process by sticking to its original war demands.[10] The Kremlin will likely try to replicate this approach with the upcoming US-Russia meeting on December 2 and is setting conditions to conceal the details of the talks from the public, likely because Russia will reject the terms of the plan.[11] The Kremlin likely seeks to avoid framing Russia as an impediment to ending the war in Ukraine if Moscow rejects the peace deal that the United States will present to Russia, and that Ukraine agreed to. Russia previously rejected several US-proposed ceasefires that Ukraine agreed to.[12]

Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to undermine the Kremlin’s effort to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) December 1 claim that Russian forces seized Klynove (north of Kostyantynivka, about 10 kilometers from the current Russian frontline) by criticizing the MoD’s repeated exaggerations about battlefield successes.[13] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD is making premature claims that Russian forces seized settlements without offering any supporting evidence and is even claiming Russian success in settlements several kilometers away from confirmed Russian positions. The milblogger noted that the Russian MoD has made clearly false claims over five settlements in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in 2025 alone — Orikhovo-Vasylivka in February 2025, Novomarkove in March 2025, Markove and Mayske in September 2025, and Fedorivka in October 2025. The milblogger added that recent developments on the battlefield are strengthening the current Russian negotiating position and insinuated that the Russian MoD is actually hurting its negotiating position by making false claims that could easily “backfire” with the emergence of evidence to the contrary. The Kremlin has repeatedly made exaggerated claims about the battlefield as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia’s demands now.[14] ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the front line is serious, particularly in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, the Kremlin’s efforts to present Russia’s victory in Ukraine as inevitable do not correspond to battlefield realities.[15] It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground continues to be so far from reality that prominent pro-war milbloggers continue to feel compelled to issue their own corrective statements.

Russian forces are not yet confirmed to have seized all of Pokrovsk despite operating within the town for over 120 days. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on December 1 that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk, though it remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces may occupy limited scattered positions in northern Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on December 1 that Russian forces have become bogged down in urban warfare within Pokrovsk, contrary to previous claims from Russian military and political leadership that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk.[16] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces killed 1,221 Russian servicemembers and wounded 545 in the Pokrovsk agglomeration in November 2025, including 519 killed and 131 wounded within Pokrovsk alone. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have incurred significant casualties in their monthslong campaign to seize Pokrovsk.[17] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces retain main and alternate rotation routes in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and recently rotated troops in the town. The corps’ statements indicate that Ukrainian forces likely retain the ability to resupply forces within Myrnohrad, despite Russian interdiction of Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[18] ISW has not yet observed evidence to confirm that Russian forces have completed the seizure of Pokrovsk as of this writing. The Kremlin may have announced the seizure of Pokrovsk prematurely on December 1 — as it has for numerous other settlements in Ukraine — as part of a cognitive warfare effort in order to shape the US-Russian negotiations in Moscow on December 2.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine’s growing defense industrial base (DIB). Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on December 1 that the Netherlands will contribute 250 million euros (roughly $290 million) to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[19] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmyhal and Brekelmans also signed an agreement to jointly produce Ukrainian drones in both the Netherlands and Ukraine, which the Netherlands will purchase and then transfer to the Ukrainian military.[20]

The Russian military continues implementing longstanding plans to form new Russian divisions as part of the Russian military’s transition back towards a force structure based on maneuver divisions, likely in preparation for a possible future war with NATO. The Russian Pacific Fleet announced on December 1 the reorganization of its 155th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Naval Infantry Division.[21] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that the Russian military command intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including by expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[22] The new 55th Naval Infantry Division is very likely not staffed at its full doctrinal end strength, given that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade participated in combat operations, including in the Pokrovsk direction and previously in Kursk Oblast, which likely have significantly degraded the brigade.[23] ISW has observed evidence to support the formation and combat deployment of at least eight new Russian divisions since December 2022.[24] The Russian military command has formed the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 27th, 68th, 69th, and 71st motorized rifle divisions from previously existing brigades, and the new 67th, 70th, and 72nd motorized rifle divisions since December 2022.[25] These divisions also likely have not yet reached their doctrinal end strength, as they have all been committed to active combat operations. The Russian military will likely be able to bring them up to their full end strength rapidly after the end of fighting in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that the expansion of Russian conventional forces and the Russian military’s larger force structure reform back to maneuver divisions is in line with Russia’s preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future, as the Russian military command likely assesses that the Russian military will require more mass and higher echelon formations to wage effective combat operations.[27]

Balloon incursions in NATO airspace continue to shut down Lithuanian airports. Lithuanian authorities temporarily suspended operations at the Vilnius International Airport on the evening of November 30 into the early morning on December 1 due to balloons flying towards the airport.[28] Lithuanian air navigation company Oro Navigacija Director Saulius Batavicius stated that authorities detected roughly 60 balloons in Lithuanian airspace and that an unidentified actor launched the balloons continuously at varying altitudes and in small groups.[29] Lithuanian authorities have not attributed the balloon flights to any specific actor as of this writing, though Lithuanian officials previously attributed similar balloon incursions to Belarus.[30] The overnight balloon sightings come against the backdrop of repeated similar incursions from Belarusian airspace – the most recent of which occurred on the night of November 28 to 29 — that have closed the Vilnius Airport.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations are likely part of Russia’s ”Phase Zero” effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that aims to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[32] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, such that suspected and confirmed incursions into NATO airspace from Belarusian airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[33]

Key Takeaways

US-Ukrainian talks reportedly continued in Florida on December 1 ahead of US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 2 to present the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.
The Kremlin is setting conditions to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russian meeting, possibly in order to obfuscate Russia’s likely rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.
Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to undermine the Kremlin’s effort to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable.
Russian forces are not yet confirmed to have seized all of Pokrovsk despite operating within the town for over 120 days.
Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine’s growing defense industrial base (DIB).
The Russian military continues implementing longstanding plans to form new Russian divisions as part of the Russian military’s transition back towards a force structure based on maneuver divisions, likely in preparation for a possible future war with NATO.
Balloon incursions in NATO airspace continue to shut down Lithuanian airports.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

read the full DEC 1 report

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Updates December 2025 – February 2026

December 1, 2024

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2026

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