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ISIS claimed a VBIED attack in a market area in Zubair, south of Basra, as part of its longstanding Wilayat Janub, which previously claimed attacks primarily in areas south of Baghdad, including Jurf al-Sakhar.
Russian airstrikes continue to primarily target Syrian opposition groups in areas far from ISIS's core terrain. These strikes are concentrated in northwestern Syria, particularly in rebel-held areas of Idlib Province and the northern countryside of Hama Province. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed only three airstrikes targeting positions in known ISIS-held terrain between October 1 and October 3. However, local reporting only confirmed two of these strikes.
Russia conducted a second round of airstrikes in Syria on October 1, targeting rebel-held positions in the provinces of Homs, Idlib, and Aleppo. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has repeatedly claimed that the airstrikes are targeting ISIS positions in these rebel-held areas. These airstrikes are the first Russian strikes confirmed by the Russian MoD that have targeted positions in ISIS-held terrain.
Russia mobilized and transported forces and equipment to Syria under the guise of military exercises. The link between Russia’s arrival at the naval base at Tartus and its military exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean are clear, and the proximity in time of Russia’s deployment into Syria and its Center 2015 exercise indicates that these military exercises served as preludes or covers for deployments.
Russian involvement in Iraq has prompted U.S. concerns that Iraqi officials may be sharing classified information with Russia and Iran amid a significant increase in Russian activity in Syria.
These charts contrast international leaders’ positions on Assad before and after mainstream media coverage of Russia’s deployment of aircraft to Syria, marked here as September 4, 2015. Several leaders softened their stance on the Syrian leader following Russian intervention, undermining the United States’ stated goal of achieving a negotiated political solution in which Assad is not in power.
The positioning of Russian aircraft in Syria gives the Kremlin an ability to shape and control U.S. and Western operations in both Syria and Iraq out of all proportion to the size of the Russian force. It can compel the U.S. to accept a de facto combined coalition with Russia, Syria, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah, possibly in support of indiscriminate operations against any and all regime opponents, not just ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.
An anonymous senior U.S. official stated that “low-level Russian generals” had established a “coordination cell” in Baghdad with Syrian and Iranian military commanders to coordinate the activities of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias in Iraq.
Russia and the separatists continued their operational pause in eastern Ukraine as Russia turned its attention toward its creation of a forward operating base in Syria ahead of President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the UN General Assembly on September 28.
ISF operations to recapture Ramadi remain stalled, but remain the ISF’s main effort.